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PART 9

October 1921

to December 1921.

CONFIDENTIAL

(11970)

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART IX.

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1921.

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PART IX.

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS.

[E 14200/116/58]

No. 1.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)(No. 1162.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 21, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1110 of the 6th December, I have the honour to state that very little further information has reached me regarding the situation in the Caucasus, and that there has been a distinct falling off in the crop of rumours even. Such little information as can be gleaned tends to show that I was right in receiving the rumours summarised in my previous despatch with great reserve.

2. I have heard nothing further regarding the alleged decree abolishing the independence of the Caucasian Republics. I enclose a translation of a resolution by Kav Bureau, which was published in the Batoum press, and which may easily be the sole foundation for the report in question. It is an interesting document, but it is no more than a public affirmation of what has been the policy of Moscow for some time past.

3. It is now clear that the reports as to what had happened in Batoum itself were much exaggerated.

4. It seems pretty well established that the Bolsheviks brought off a *coup* about the middle of November by arresting Lordkipanidze, the President, and several members of the "Adjarian Medjliss," a body in sympathy with the Turkish Nationalists, and so asserted their own supremacy over the so-called autonomous Republic of Adjaria. Apart from this, however, things appear to be fairly normal at Batoum, at any rate on the surface. It is not clear who now actually exercises authority, but whoever may be the rulers they are presumably a reflex of the Bolsheviks. There was apparently no ground for the report that Enver Pasha had taken charge. His whereabouts are doubtful, and rumour locates him in all sorts of places from Trebizond to Berlin. The most reliable information points to the fact of his being on his way to, if he has not arrived in Berlin. There is talk of a congress of representatives of oppressed Eastern nations in that capital, also of a congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. His Majesty's representative at Berlin will doubtless report any developments of this nature.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 1.

Resolution of the Kav Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

THE isolated position of the Transcaucasian Republics as independent States tends to weaken them in the eyes of the capitalist and *bourgeois* Powers.

A close political union will serve as a permanent guarantee against all attacks on them by counter-revolutionary forces, and will also strengthen the Soviet Government on the threshold of the East.

A political union will enable the republics to form a close economic union among themselves, an end for which they have been constantly striving.

Their individual independence, on the other hand, has had a detrimental effect on the economical situation, has increased poverty and the misfortunes of the popular masses and has given rise to an endless number of misunderstandings between the republics.

Transcaucasia must be considered as one entire economic unit, and the economic development of the country is only possible providing there is a general economic union of the Caucasus.

Finally, the existence of multitudinous people's commissariats absorbs much means and energy and gives rise to an unnecessary duplication of work in many departments, while the combination of forces by mutual efforts in the more important branches of Government administration strengthen and enrich the work of the Soviet Government.

Consequent on the above, the Kav Bureau considers it immediately essential to conclude a federative union of the Transcaucasian Republics, more particularly as regards all matters of a military, economic and financial nature, as also in all questions affecting foreign politics.

[E 14211/116/58]

No. 2.

Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 239.)

My Lord,

Moscow, December 20, 1921.

BY your Lordship's telegram No. 110 of the 7th December, I was instructed to report upon a rumour emanating from Constantinople to the effect that the Russian Soviet Government had issued a decree abolishing the independence of the three Transcaucasian republics.

As I stated in my reply (telegram No. 109 of the 11th December), no such decree has been issued, but there has been a resolution of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in Tiflis in favour of the federation of the three republics. Resolutions in the same sense are reported from Baku, Poti and other centres.

The project, if realised, would lead to the establishment of a single administrative centre for the three republics, and the fusion of the separate Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and Ways and Communications. A joint Commissariat for Foreign Trade already exists.

The party is, naturally enough, enthusiastically in favour of an arrangement which would take away what semblance of independence has been accorded to the Transcaucasian States, and would bring them into direct subservience to the Central Communist Party in Moscow. The press points out that Caucasian federation is essential to the well-being of the peoples affected, since it will put an end to the internecine feuds which have torn them from time immemorial, and would make of the Caucasus a sure Communist bulwark against the aggressive designs of Imperialism, ever seeking to profit by the weakness of its adversaries and covetous of the oilfields of Baku.

England and France are, as might be expected, accused of nourishing designs for the economic subjection of the Caucasus, but there are reasons for thinking that the real enemy in view is not so much these countries as Turkey, which the Russians are convinced is not likely to remain for long on friendly terms with them, and which, sooner or later, will endeavour to recover a territory to whose loss it has never been resigned.

An indication of Russian apprehensiveness in this matter is afforded by the negotiations which preceded the recently-signed Treaty of Kars. On this occasion the Angora representatives demanded insistently that the treaty should be signed, not by the three republics combined, but with each State separately. The Russians, who attributed the Turkish attitude to a desire to create dissension among the contracting States, contested this procedure and ultimately won the day, with the result that the joint treaty, approved by the representatives of Moscow, was signed.

Chicherin's views on the question of the Transcaucasian republics appear to be in favour of decentralisation. He is prepared to allow them liberty of action in the belief that community of interests will bring them together and lead to an understanding which, being natural, will be durable and so preferable to the artificial union for which the Communists are clamouring.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON.

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

[E 10939/143/44]

No. 3.

Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 442.)

My Lord,

Athens, September 23, 1921.

IN the telegrams which I have the honour to address to your Lordship I can but report the various and contradictory versions which reach me regarding the Greek retirement in Asia Minor, and I have unfortunately no really reliable source of information to enable me to judge of the relative values of these versions. The Turks apparently say that they have won a great victory and that the Greeks fled across the Sakharra in disorder with very heavy losses in men and material, and Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No. 620 of the 18th instant suggested that the Turks were preparing a great encircling movement which might lead to a complete Greek disaster. On the other hand, members of the Greek General Staff at Athens assure the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, in apparently frank conversations, that the decision to retire was taken when it was seen that a further advance and the capture of Angora, though feasible, would entail losses greater than the object was worth; that the retirement across the river was carried out with practically no interference from the Turks and with hardly any loss of men or material; that, though the Turkish army was admittedly not crushed, the *moral* of the Turks had sunk very low and they are not capable of taking a serious offensive, and that the retirement has continued in perfect order, according to plan, every rail of the line being systematically removed or destroyed. The official communiqué to-day states that the Greek army have now taken up their position on the line decided on some 50 kilom. to the east of Eskishehr. The General Staff also assured Colonel Nairne that the *moral* of the troops is still excellent, and that it is only here in Athens that the *moral* has fallen and depression and pessimism exist. I imagine that both sides are lying; that the Greek retirement was not quite so easy and successful as the Greeks make out, but that the Turks are certainly not justified in claiming a great victory.

It is undoubtedly the case that Athens is thoroughly depressed and inclined to be very pessimistic, and this is not to be wondered at, even if the official version of events can be relied on, considering the ridiculous way the Government have allowed and encouraged the press to feed the public with the idea that the war was to all intents over and the Turks completely defeated; in fact "Kathemerine" still keeps this up. It is known that the losses during the Sakharra battle were very heavy—M. Baltazzi assured me that they were below 14,000, but I believe it is really admitted that they were 18 to 20,000—and the wounded who are streaming in tell terrible tales of their sufferings owing to bad hospitals and bad transport arrangements, &c. Stories are told of mutinies at or near the front, or at least of violent dissatisfaction against the military authorities and the Government. The last time I saw M. Gounaris, two days ago, he spoke as calmly and cheerily as ever, but he looked to me worn out with anxiety and depression.

I have already reported in a previous despatch my surprise at hearing my Italian colleague agree most strongly with my own conviction that a Greek victory is eminently desirable from the Allied point of view, and he has since constantly repeated this expression of his personal opinion. But I was much more surprised to hear that M. Taigny, the French delegate on the International Financial Commission, who has hitherto always been most violently anti-Greek and who has just returned from leave, volunteered the remark to Mr. Bentinck last night that it would be a very serious matter for the *Entente* if Greece were to be defeated. I am convinced that this is true even for France and Italy, but it appears to me much more important for Great Britain. Our position, prestige and popularity here in Greece have been far superior to those of any other Power, and I venture to urge once more upon your Lordship how eminently desirable it is for British interests that a friendly country like Greece should win rather than an undoubtedly hostile Turkey. So strongly do I feel this that I would go so far as to urge His Majesty's Government, if there should be any apparent probability of the Kemalist forces being able seriously to threaten the new Greek line, to render moral and material assistance to the Greeks rather than to allow them to be crushed (see my telegram No. 298 of the 3rd June).

I have advisedly said above that our position "has been" pre-eminent; I think and hope that it still is so, but we have already lost a good deal by our surrender to Italy on the Albanian question, and one reads in the papers a good many bitter suggestions that we have forgotten our principles of protection of small nations, &c., and are prepared to look on them simply as pawns to be sacrificed when desirable for the sake of more important pieces on the board.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

[E 10961/1/44]

No. 4.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 892.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 27, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of an intelligence report which was left with me a few days ago by the Greek High Commissioner. This report purports to explain the real purpose of the recent visit to Constantinople of M. Hermitte, M. Briand's private secretary.

2. Whilst it is necessary to make allowances for natural inclination on the part of the Greek High Commissioner to present the French in an unfavourable light, since the Greeks are well aware that the French are endeavouring to help the Nationalists in every possible way, I have thought the report of sufficient interest to forward to your Lordship, as it confirms, in a perhaps exaggerated form, impressions which I had already formed of the French attitude towards ourselves at Constantinople.

3. I knew M. Hermitte at Berlin before the war. He was M. Jules Cambon's private secretary. When I recently met him here he volunteered the information that he had come to Constantinople for his honeymoon, and that he was only spending ten days in this town. He nevertheless remained some three weeks, and there is no doubt that, besides having an audience of the Sultan, he saw the Turkish Ministers several times.

4. Your Lordship will remember that General Pellé, the French High Commissioner, succeeded M. DeFrance as French High Commissioner in the early spring of this year. General Pellé had no diplomatic training. He is an able and business-like man with a considerable capacity for work. He brought out with him, no doubt as a sort of diplomatic adviser, Count Chambrun, a regular member of the French diplomatic service holding the rank of Counsellor of Embassy. In a recent conversation which I had with M. de Chambrun, at the time when the question of General Harington's status *vis-à-vis* the Allied High Commissioners was under discussion between my Allied colleagues and myself, he said that he hoped that we did not intend to turn Constantinople into a second Egypt, because, if so, we should be getting into deep water. I replied that we had no such intention and that we fully recognised the considerable French economic interests in Turkey. We did not desire anything for ourselves in this part of the world. Our main interest was the re-establishment of peace so as to allow of a return to a normal state of things.

5. M. de Chambrun's remark was significant because it expresses what many of the French out here undoubtedly feel. The French see a British general in command of the Allied troops of occupation. They also see practically the entire Mediterranean fleet spending a considerable part of the summer in these waters. They conclude that we wish to impress the Turks with our strength and to play a predominant rôle.

6. The French are honestly anxious to come to a settlement with the Nationalists about the Cilician question and to effect the release of the French prisoners of war. Inspired also possibly with the hope of counteracting our influence at Constantinople, besides being actuated by a real dislike of the Greeks, they are undoubtedly helping the Nationalists as far as they can. There is no doubt that they have allowed the Turkish authorities to gather that they look with sympathy on the Nationalist cause, and they have done their best to convince the Turks at Constantinople and the Nationalists that they are their friends. But this is not all, for a reliable report says that they will endeavour to obtain the exclusive organisation of the future gendarmerie in Anatolia, besides a concession for the constructions of all future railways in that region.

7. I am on very good terms with my French colleague, who constantly emphasises the necessity for our respective countries to co-operate closely in the settlement of European problems. But there are signs that, just as in the past there was a struggle for influence at Constantinople between England and Russia, and then between Russia and Germany, so there will, in the future, be something in the nature of a struggle between England and France for a similar object. If this struggle comes, it will not be so much owing to any action taken by England, but rather the direct result of French jealousy. In fact, the struggle will be forced on us. Whilst the Turks appreciate the fact that France is helping them at the present moment and may be counted on to help them when the moment for intervention arrives, I am convinced that, at the back of their minds, the Turks realise quite well that England is the Power which really counts and that her support would be the most valuable they could have. In other words, they will use the French for what they can get out of them, but they will tend to rely in the last resort on England. This will become apparent to the French in the future and will not diminish their jealousy of us.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Intelligence Report communicated by the Greek High Commissioner.

LA véritable mission de M. Hermitte, secrétaire particulier de M. Briand, n'a jamais été connue en cette ville. Selon les milieux officiels français, le chef du cabinet particulier de M. Briand est venu à Constantinople en voyage de noce. Tel n'est pas, toutefois, le cas. Le Général Pellé, dans les rapports qu'il envoyait au Quai d'Orsay, signalait avec regret la recrudescence de l'influence anglaise à Constantinople. Il se plaignait que les intérêts des autres Alliés étaient gravement lésés par la prédominance de l'Angleterre, là où tous les Alliés devaient jouir des droits égaux. L'aide voilée de l'Angleterre aux Grecs, l'occupation de Constantinople par les Britanniques, l'accession au trône de Mésopotamie de l'Émir Feïçal et, enfin, la mainmise de l'Angleterre sur des propriétés turques et l'hostilité manifestée par ce pays envers les Turcs formaient une source de graves soucis au Gouvernement français, qui, avant de prendre nettement position contre l'Angleterre, a voulu se rendre à l'évidence des susdits faits et agir en conséquence. M. Briand a, dès lors, chargé son chef du cabinet M. Hermitte de se rendre à Constantinople et de mener sur place une enquête approfondie, se mettre au contact avec les dirigeants turcs, donner des assurances à ces derniers que la France, contrairement à l'Angleterre, nourrit envers la Turquie des sentiments d'amitié et souhaite son prompt rétablissement et la restitution de ses territoires occupés par les Hellènes et, enfin, que la Turquie est menacée du même ennemi en Mésopotamie que la France en Syrie. Conclusion : les intérêts franco-turcs sont menacés par une seule et unique Puissance. Une autre considération de ce que la France cherche l'amitié de la Turquie est due au fait que la Syrie s'agite et veut secouer le régime de Gouraud. Or, la majorité de l'opinion publique syrienne—exception faite des Libanais—est ouvertement turcophile et désire le rétablissement de l'autorité turque. La France, en s'entendant avec la Turquie, usera ce pays pour consolider sa position en Syrie. De plus, la France suit avec une angoisse visible le développement des choses en Transjordanie. Les menées de l'Émir Abdallah l'inquiète d'une façon pressante. La France, selon l'expression même de M. Hermitte, veut liquider la question de la Cilicie un moment plus vite, même si elle devait consentir à des sacrifices douloureux. M. Hermitte a constaté le bien-fondé des plaintes du Général Pellé. Il s'est rendu compte que les autorités anglaises, en apparence très cordiales envers les Français, sont nettement hostiles envers ces derniers. Par contre, il a constaté que les Nationalistes, ainsi que la majorité des Ministres turcs, étaient prêts de s'entendre avec les Français. Grâce au Lieutenant-Colonel Sarraut, dont la sympathie pour la Turquie est connue de longue date, M. Hermitte a eu de nombreuses entrevues secrètes avec Ahmed Izzet Pacha et le Grand-Vizir. Il leur a promis l'aide financière de la France pour le relèvement de leur pays et les a priés d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement d'Angora pour engager les Nationalistes à la modération. C'est en grande partie aux instances d'Ahmed Izzet Pacha que la signature de l'Accord franco-turc pourra s'effectuer sans obstacles. Trois réunions nocturnes ont eu lieu avant le départ de M. Hermitte pour Paris au conak du Grand-Vizir à Ayaz Pacha. Trois personnalités

assistaient à ces réunions extrêmement importantes : le Lieutenant-Colonel Sarraut, Ahmed Izzet Pacha et Chefki Bey, qui faisait fonctions de secrétaire. De graves décisions ont été prises et M. Hermitte partait pour Paris la minute de l'accord dans la poche. Il a laissé, toutefois, son représentant à Constantinople pour mener les négociations sur base de l'accord conclu à Ayaz Pacha.

Le 20 septembre 1921.

[E 10965/143/44]

No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 897.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 28, 1921.

ACCORDING to reports which have reached Constantinople from Anatolia, the Grand National Assembly conferred the rank of mushir (field-marshal) and the title of Ghazi (the "Victorious") on Mustapha Kemal Pasha, on his return to Angora from the front some ten days ago. In a speech which, according to the "Anatolian Agency," he made to the Assembly on the 19th instant, Mustapha Kemal Pasha is reported to have declared *inter alia* that the claim that the Greeks formed a majority of the population in the territories occupied by them was not correct. When it was proposed at the Conference of London to hold an enquiry in the war zones on this subject, the Turkish delegates accepted, but the Greeks, realising that the result would be unfavourable to their pretensions, opposed the holding of such an enquiry. He expressed the hope that Mr. Lloyd George would not go back on his speech of the 15th August in the House of Commons, when he declared himself in favour of supporting the country that gained a military success, now that that country was Turkey. Mustapha Kemal Pasha stated in conclusion that the army would not lay down its arms while a single Greek soldier remained within the national frontiers.

2. In this connection I would mention that since the Greek intention to occupy Angora was given up the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has on two occasions stated in conversation that the success obtained by the Kemalists would render them more docile and disposed to treat for peace. However that may be, neither Izzet Pasha nor, indeed, any member of Tewfik Pasha's Cabinet with whom I have had conversations has put forward any reasonable or practical suggestion as to the terms on which the present conflict might be ended. They have one and all expressed the opinion that Smyrna with the neighbouring district and Thrace should be restored to Turkey, and have spoken of economic independence and the abolition of the Capitulations as being essential. The Opposition groups also hold the view that the region of Smyrna and Thrace should be restored to Turkey. Reshid Bey, a former Minister of the Interior, who is at present in opposition, went farther than any Turk with whom I am in touch when he stated that Thrace might be made an autonomous province under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but he maintained that the Smyrna region must be restored completely to Turkey.

3. Foreign opinion here inclines to the view that the terms of peace will have to be imposed on both belligerents by the Great Powers, either by direct intervention or by mediation after a conference of the representatives of both parties has reached a deadlock. In the interests of humanity it is greatly to be desired that hostilities may cease before winter sets in.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 10739/22/44]

No. 6.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Signor de Martino.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, October 3, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the various questions involved, and, after consultation with the French Government, are now in a position to reply to the proposals contained in your Excellency's memorandum No. 1734 of the 11th July last in regard to the allocation

of the subsidiary posts under the Allied Military and Financial Commissions at Constantinople, provided for in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

2 His Majesty's Government desire, in the first place, to record their appreciation of the favourable attitude adopted by the Italian Government since November last towards the proposal then put forward by His Majesty's Government for the appointment of General Sir C. Harington as Allied Commander-in-chief at Constantinople.

3. As regards the military sub-commissions, His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to share the view of the Italian Government that there exists any necessity for rotation in these posts, seeing that the presidency of the Military Commission, which will control the activities of the three sub-commissions, is itself subject to the principle of rotation.

4. As regards the subsidiary posts under the Financial Commission, His Majesty's Government agree in principle to the creation and allocation to an Italian national of a post of liaison officer between the Turkish Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Public Works and the Financial Commission, for the special purpose of mutual agreement on concessions. But they regret that they cannot agree to the assignment to an Italian of a "mandate of control over all concession contracts," as proposed in the penultimate paragraph of your memorandum under reply. The creation of such a post would impair the contemplated powers of the Financial Commission under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and make it less easy to carry out the terms of the peace settlement as a whole in the matter of concessions. For the same reasons His Majesty's Government consider it unnecessary to provide for such a post by a special provision to be inserted in any subsequent revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11096/143/44]

No. 7.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respecting Intervention between Greece and Turkey.

TWO of my colleagues have written notes urging an immediate or early intervention in the struggle, which appears to have reached a position of stalemate between the Greeks and the Turks. They may be sure that the idea of such intervention at the first moment consistent with a reasonable chance of success has never been absent from my mind since the rejection by the Greeks of the last offer made by the Allies after my visit to Paris in June. But the problem is not to be solved by the mere expression of an *à priori* desire; and I will here endeavour to state, for the assistance of the Cabinet in arriving at a decision, the main conditions of the problem, as it now presents itself. The story will necessarily be rather a long one.

The first point to be determined is the military situation. Since the Greeks early in September failed to break through to Angora and retired west of the Sakharra, the Greek objective has apparently been to occupy a line about 20 miles east of Eskishehr, extending in front of Afion Karahissar, and some 16 miles south-eastwards along the Anatolian Railway, and to hold on to this territory as territory conquered in war, organising its administration on the lines of the zone round Smyrna. It is difficult, however, from the information reaching us, and while the situation changes from day to day, to form a clear opinion of the state of either belligerent's army.

As regards the Greeks, Sir H. Rumbold telegraphed on the 18th September that, although the Greeks had fought remarkably well, the *moral* of their staff appeared to be shaken and the Turks seemed to be working round both flanks. It remained to be seen whether retirement could be carried out in good order. General Harington also telegraphed on the 22nd September that he had received General Papoulas's appreciation of the situation, "which was that of a beaten man seeing the enemy threatening him everywhere." He added that the Greeks might succeed in stopping on the Eskishehr line if the weather broke there as it had at Constantinople. Again Lord Granville telegraphed on the 26th September that his Italian colleague had good information that the Turks had completely cut the communications between Afion Karahissar and Ushak; that they were encircling the right wing of the Greek army, whose *moral* was low but discipline not lost. On the 23rd September Lord Granville telegraphed that the Greek Minister of

Finance had informed his French colleague that the Greeks would defend Eskishehr, but if the Turks succeeded in driving them thence, the Greeks might consider themselves defeated and the campaign might be abandoned.

On the other hand, Major Johnston, General Harington's liaison officer with the Greeks, reported on the 20th September that the Greeks were "destroying the railway west of the Sakharra by blowing up each rail," and were laying waste the country. The Greeks, although their losses were said to have been 23,000 against Turkish 17,000, "were not in danger, and the retreat will be carried out safely." General Harington also telegraphed on the 23rd September that "the Greek army appears to be holding its own and retiring in good order on positions previously decided upon, despite the fact that the Turks are showing great energy and ability in carrying out cavalry raids."

As regards the Turks our information is more meagre. Secret messages indicated, however, that, just before the Greek retreat, the Turks were very short of ammunition and guns and equally short of motor lorries and petrol. We know, however, that they are receiving ammunition in coasting boats from Batum, and General Harington admits a leakage from Constantinople, apparently from stores under French control, which the Greek warships can only partially stop in the Black Sea. General Papoulas even admitted to General Harington that the Turkish troops opposed to him were stronger and better equipped than his own troops. It is also clear from secret sources that the French are negotiating for the direct supply of ammunition to the Kemalists, although actual delivery seems to depend on the outcome of the Franklin-Bouillon negotiations at Angora. Meanwhile both parties are officially celebrating the tremendous victory that they have won. *Te Deums* have been sung at Athens, and public rejoicings have taken place at Angora. We are reminded of the Battle of Jutland, which we simultaneously celebrated as a triumph in London and Berlin.

On the whole, however, it seems unlikely that the Kemalists can for some time sufficiently remount themselves or become sufficiently mobile, with winter and the rainy weather setting in, to drive the Greeks from the two junctions of Eskishehr and Afion Karahissar. Though their lines of communication are long the Greeks have all the railways, other than the short stretch of the Anatolian and Baghdad beyond Tchah to Cilicia, and, if they can enforce it against the French and Italians, the command of the sea communications, other than those between Trebizond and Batum. A stalemate with both sides exhausted has been General Harington's forecast up to now, and this seems probable but not certain. On the other hand time seems to be on the side of the Turks since if the Greek troops cannot be demobilised, their *moral* is likely to suffer during the winter months in the trenches, subject to continuous raids and in the middle of a hostile country. If the situation changes at all it seems likely to be against the Greeks. From the military point of view the moment for intervention by the Allies would appear therefore to be propitious.

I now turn to the political attitude of the Greeks.

After the meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris in August and before the Greek retreat, Lord Granville sounded the Greek Prime Minister regarding his peace aims. They appeared to be a "strategic" frontier for the Smyrna zone, apparently pushed north to the Sea of Marmara to include Brusa, and some form of autonomous international State for the Straits and Constantinople, in the administration of which Greece would participate with the principal Allies. About the same time there were indications that the Greek Government believed that His Majesty's Government would support a Greek entry into Constantinople. The idea seems to have been reluctantly dropped after strong representations by Lord Granville and a Reuter statement, and in an interview at Brusa just before the Greek retirement King Constantine was reported to have admitted that he realised that the Allies would not allow the Greeks to go to Constantinople, at any rate "for the present." Since the Greek retirement there has been no clear indication from Athens whether mediation would be acceptable or what terms Greece would now accept. On the one hand Lord Granville reported on the 19th September that all the papers seemed to agree that the time had come when the Government must at last make a great diplomatic effort in order to secure the acquiescence of Powers in suitable terms of peace, and that the general tone of the press indicated that mediation would be welcome. On the other hand he telegraphed on the 21st September that M. Gounaris, "who was not at all cheerful," had said "no" to an enquiry whether the Greeks meant to take the first

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step towards negotiation with Kemal. They would hold the line decided upon and see what happened. "Gounaris made no allusion to mediation." In a more recent statement to the press (26th September), M. Gounaris announced that "the Greeks must organise the occupied territory so as to defend it with the least possible sacrifices and expense, and we shall proceed to that organisation making it as complete as possible."

In August, before Parliament rose, M. Gounaris suggested a visit to London to see the Prime Minister and myself. The moment was, for many reasons, inopportune, and the reply was sent that the middle of October would be a better season. M. Gounaris has now revived the proposal, but has not yet been given a definite date. Until he comes he is not very likely to indicate with any precision how the Greeks view the situation or what terms they will accept. Meanwhile his own position seems to be somewhat insecure. Rival politicians are believed to have obtained the ear of the King, and, although M. Gounaris may survive the expected crisis, his Ministry does not seem likely to be long-lived.

Such information as we have regarding the internal situation in Greece (necessity of floating an internal loan, drachma at 78, calling up of the 1922 class, an admitted shortage of reserves) points to the Greeks (even if they believe that they can hold the Eskişehir line, which is uncertain) being ready to accept Allied mediation if the Allies are at all insistent and if sufficiently "face-saving" terms can be offered. Indeed, we hear of a spirit of depression prevailing at Athens when the real nature of the retirement came to be understood. This feeling will grow as winter draws on.

The attitude of the Constantinople Government is a less important factor, but it is perhaps significant that on the 23rd September Sir H. Rumbold reported that Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had at a recent Cabinet reviewed the situation in Asia Minor as a stalemate, and stated that he had advocated in recent conversations with diplomatists at Constantinople the retention of Thrace by Greece, together with certain concessions in Smyrna, conditional on the immediate evacuation of Anatolia. He added that the time had come to approach the Allies officially. The more Nationalist members of the Cabinet had protested on the ground that Angora must make the first move. Tewfik's move was believed to be inspired by the Sultan, and possibly to herald changes in the Cabinet in a direction unfavourable to the Kemalists. This, however, has not followed. Meanwhile we know the Constantinople Government to be in close touch with Angora through the Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs, Izzet Pasha.

As regards the situation at Angora, our reports do not encourage any very sanguine hopes as to Angora's readiness for peace. One thing seems clear, however, namely, that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the nationalist movement, with Mustapha Kemal either as dictator or figurehead, has a real hold in Asia Minor. It also seems probable that there is really not much difference of opinion in principle between the various parties at Angora, beyond personal jealousies, and that the pre-war C.U.P. elements have created a fairly strong centralised and comparatively efficient Government, of a military kind. These points were emphasised at the Foreign Office the other day by Dr. White, an American missionary of long experience, who has seen much of Kemalist Turkey and only recently left it.

On the other hand, the material resources of the Kemalists cannot be strong. The shortage of ammunition, motors and petrol has already been noted. The recent forcible requisition of 40 per cent. of all stocks in Asia Minor was also significant. If intelligence reports may be trusted, a recent decision first to ask the Bolsheviks for labour and later for cavalry, and the removal of all troops from the Caucasus and Cilicia fronts show exhausted man-power. The same reports, confirmed by Dr. White, go to show that although the Russians have undoubtedly helped with arms and ammunition and offered but not delivered warships, the Kemalists regard Bolshevik agents and Bolshevik designs with no small suspicion, while the Bolsheviks hardly conceal their intention of recovering Kars and Sarykamish at the earliest opportunity. The "marriage de convenance" with the Bolsheviks, in short, seems unlikely to weigh strongly with the Kemalists at the moment if they thought that they could obtain acceptable terms from the Allies. Unfortunately it is very hard even to guess what their terms would be to-day.

Before the Greek offensive of last July there was very little indication that the Kemalists would modify appreciably in negotiations the terms of the National Pact of February 1921, which, as it is so often referred to, I am printing at the

close of this Memorandum. These terms, though admittedly susceptible of modification in detail in the course of negotiation, differ very materially from the Treaty of Sèvres even as afterwards proposed to be modified in London and Paris.

On the other hand, the indication of Kemalist terms communicated to us at the end of July by Mr. Toynbee, the correspondent of the "Manchester Guardian," who has transferred his sympathies from the Greeks to the Turks, showed a certain willingness to interpret the Pact more reasonably, especially in the matter of the Capitulations and finance, and possibly in the case of the Straits. That was, however, before the Greek retreat, and there was no sign of any abandonment of the Pact's territorial provisions—retention of Smyrna and Thrace.

Since the Greek retreat, however, there has been some indication that Angora might be willing to accept intervention, though probably on her own terms. First, a telegram from Angora to Constantinople of the 12th September showed an inclination to turn negotiations about prisoners into negotiations for peace, and the Japanese High Commissioner, who had offered to intervene, was informed that the object of the National Assembly was to secure a peace guaranteeing the liberty and independence of the Turkish nation within its frontiers, and if the British Government would admit and concede these legitimate aims, they would be ready to start negotiations at once.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt what the legitimate frontiers of Turkey, as interpreted by the Kemalists, are. On the 21st September Sir H. Rumbold reported that the Kemalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, Youssouf Kemal, in a long and not unreasonable reply to the High Commissioner's protest as to Greek and Armenian deportations in Asia Minor, had concluded that the Near East could only be pacified if Smyrna were restored to Turkey. No palliatives would be of any avail. A complete end must be put to the invasion of Asia Minor by the Greeks, and, he added, in Sir H. Rumbold's words—"almost as an afterthought," a similar course must be adopted in respect of the Greek occupation of Thrace.

Thirdly, in a very recent speech reported by the "Morning Post" Constantinople correspondent on the 26th September, Mustapha Kemal said "... we want peace and we are ready to make peace. My own opinion is that there is not any obstacle to such aim." All he demanded was recognition of their existence and national independence. "Mr. Lloyd George on the 16th August in the British House of Commons indicated intervention in favour of the winner of the war, and I am hopeful that Mr. Lloyd George will not go back on his word."

These are of course only vague indications of a readiness to treat, but they are perhaps significant coming after the Greek retirement. They seem to justify the general appreciation of the situation given in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch of the 20th September. "I find that my colleagues share my impression that the Nationalists would be glad to make peace as they realise their exhausted state. I personally do not believe, however, that they would be satisfied with less than the solution contemplated at Paris in June last with regard to Smyrna" (i.e., an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty, a mixed gendarmerie under a proportion of Allied officers and gradual retirement of Greek troops). "Looking at the situation from here it would seem that we must await further development of military situation and see whether the Greeks will be able to carry out their programme of destroying the railway between Eskişehir and Angora, and creating a desert without hindrance from the Nationalists. A few weeks should be sufficient to judge of the effect on the internal situation in Greece of the serious check they have received. We therefore think that towards the end of October the Allies may find the moment favourable for action."

In short, the Kemalists would probably not refuse Allied intervention in the shape of an invitation to a conference by the Supreme Council. Whether terms could be agreed upon and offered on a basis acceptable to them is a very different matter, which I will discuss presently.

One condition, however, it will not be disputed, is an essential preliminary to any such conference, supposing the two combatants to be willing to attend it.

The Allies must agree in advance, preferably with Greece, but certainly among themselves, on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres which will be reasonably likely to satisfy the Kemalists.

The terms of such a settlement can, for the purposes of convenient consideration, be divided into two main categories:—

- I. Those which mainly concern Greece and Turkey.
- II. Those which mainly concern the Principal Allies and Turkey.

I. The crux is undoubtedly, as it has been all along, the Smyrna zone. At the June Conference in Paris there was agreement among the Principal Allies in proposing an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty administered by a Christian Governor (incidentally Greece would be more likely to accept and Turkey might well offer a Turkish subject of Greek race as Governor) with the assistance of a mixed gendarmerie under European officers; Greek troops to be withdrawn as soon as the gendarmerie could ensure security in the province.

It may I think be taken as axiomatic that the Kemalists will never make a peace with Greece on less favourable terms than these, unless the Allies are prepared to unite in support of Greece and in hostility to Turkey (by which I mean the formal supply of arms and financial assistance to Greece and the blockade of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Kemal ports at the least). But it seems equally axiomatic that France, with King Constantine on the throne of Greece, anxious to recuperate herself economically in Turkey, and probably committing herself to some support of Turkish aspirations in her negotiations in Angora, will not agree so to support Greece. It is hardly more likely that the Italians will support Greece with regard to Smyrna. It is true that the Italian Government has recently sat rather carefully on the fence as between Greeks and Turks and as between ourselves and the French, but we know from secret sources that they are now sending Signor Tuozzi to Angora and that they are really as anxious as ever to secure economic concessions from Turkey in southern Asia Minor.

In these circumstances it would probably be impossible for Great Britain alone to enable Greece to defeat the Kemalists and to hold Smyrna in the face of a benevolent French attitude towards the Kemalists, quite apart from the outweighing disadvantages of risking a split in the *Entente*.

If these considerations are sound, it follows that if a profitable mediation is to be offered Great Britain must press upon the Greeks something like the Paris proposals of June with regard to Smyrna. These proposals might conceivably be made more palatable to Greece by abolishing any customs barrier between the Smyrna province and Greece, and possibly by admitting Greece, so far as the Smyrna province is concerned, to the Tripartite Agreement or to the "understanding between gentlemen" which, it was proposed at Paris in June, should take the place of the Tripartite Agreement.

In addition His Majesty's Government might offer recognition of King Constantine and possibly facilities for raising a loan here, though I doubt very much whether the French Government would join in any such proceeding. It is also a matter for consideration whether the islands in the Sea of Marmara left to Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres but ethnologically Greek might not be given to Greece. They could not be garrisoned, as they are in the demilitarised area.

Lastly, we shall have to insist on the Italians returning the Dodecanese even if it is too much to hope that they will throw in the concession of Rhodes.

If, however, the Greeks are to be brought to accept such a solution as the above of the Smyrna area, it seems politically impracticable to change the settlement of Thrace provided for in the Treaty of Sèvres in the direction apparently desired by both the French and the Italians at the Paris Conference in June (the creation of an international zone under an international gendarmerie). Both on ethnological grounds and more especially in order to secure that the Dardanelles shall remain open, it seems essential that the Dardanelles peninsula and the northern shore of the Marmara, at any rate as far as Rodosto, should remain in Greek hands. This would rule out the return of Northern Thrace to Turkey or acceptance of the Enos-Midia line (which is no natural frontier) as the Greco-Turkish boundary. The Kemalists, and the French supporting them, ask for the return of Thrace or for its internationalisation in order the better to defend Constantinople. There are other ways of meeting this: (a) The Treaty of Sèvres frontier can be brought across from its present point south of Midia to a point on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara nearer Rodosto. (b) Greek troops in Eastern Thrace (as opposed to gendarmerie) might be stationed only in certain places and in fixed numbers. Correspondingly the number of Turkish troops in European Turkey would have to be fixed. (c) There would remain, to safeguard both Turkey and Greece, the existence of an international commission of the Straits and of an Allied force, however small, at the Dardanelles end of the Straits. Greek troops might participate in this garrison on the European shore and Turkish troops in the Allied garrison on the Asiatic shore.

In addition, it must be remembered that we have promised our support for

the strengthening of article 15 of the Greek Minority Treaty in such a way as to give the Moslem majority of Adrianople the predominant share in the executive functions and in the ministerial council, and some stronger provision regarding non-interference by the Greek Government with the management of Moslem sacred shrines or places of Moslem worship, the immunities of the latter to be guaranteed.

II. I pass to the considerations that more directly affect the Allies in relation to Turkey. While we have no clear indication of what precise modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, apart from Thrace and Smyrna, would satisfy the Kemalists, it seems certain that in order to obtain a settlement now, the Allies may have to go further than the concessions offered in London in March last (see Annex I to this memorandum) in the direction of saving the face of the Turks so far as the financial provisions of the treaty are concerned.

At Paris in June M. Briand told me that with regard to finance, in which French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities. He probably meant abolishing the Financial Commission and falling back on the pre-war Debt Council. Our objection to this has always been that although the machinery of the Public Debt is very efficient, and although we and the Italians are represented equally with the French on the Council, the French Government, owing to the preponderant number of French bondholders in the pre-war Debt, would inevitably cause French claims on Turkey to be given precedence over other Allied claims. Under the Treaty of Sèvres the policy was to pool Turkish resources (revenues assigned to the Debt and other sources of revenue) for the payment not only of the pre-war Debt, but also of the cost of Allied occupation and the payment of Allied war claims for damages, &c. For us therefore it would be preferable to maintain the financial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and in some form or other the substitution of the Financial Commission for the pre-war Debt Council. Having regard, however, to the facts (a) that French financial interests in Turkey are greater than British, while British economic interests in Turkey (share of imports and exports) are greater than French, and (b) that the Kemalists object to a body like the Financial Commission under the Treaty of Sèvres, which is responsible to the Allies and has practically executive powers, as an infringement of their independence, a "way out" might be found by going back more or less to the pre-war system of Allied advisers to Turkish Ministries. The French might appoint an adviser to the Ministry of Finance who would be a servant of the Turkish Government; we might appoint an adviser to the Ministry of Customs; and the Italians an adviser to the Ministries concerned with concessions. The financial and economic obligations of Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres would remain, and these three advisers might form a council for advising the Turkish Government as to how best to meet their obligations. This plan would, of course, mean that we should recognise and make permanent the French preponderant control of Turkish finance. It would also mean that we should rely on the personality and influence of the Allied representatives to ensure Turkey meeting all her obligations. To safeguard ourselves against French pre-war and war claims against Turkey being met before our own, owing to the preponderant French influence at the Ministry of Finance, we might have to make a separate agreement with the French Government regarding priority of payments, &c. These are very tentative suggestions, and the Treasury might have objections to offer, but in the case of Turkey, finance and politics are so mixed up that it is inevitable that in finding treaty terms acceptable to Turkey and France political considerations must carry great weight.

I shall be prepared, if the situation arises, to make suggestions with regard to other possible concessions, military, economic and judicial, which might render our proposals more palatable to the Kemalist Turks. But it would perhaps be premature to dilate upon them now.

My general conclusion, however, is that if something like the terms I have sketched could be agreed upon by the three Principal Allies and offered jointly and firmly to the Greeks and Kemalists in the near future, a settlement should not be found impossible.

As regards procedure, apart from M. Gounaris' proposal to come to London in the middle of this month, a preliminary informal discussion with the Greeks seems essential, if only because we do not know their present attitude, and more especially because it seems absolutely necessary that His Majesty's Government

should do their utmost to persuade them to take the line advocated above regarding Smyrna. The present position of the Greeks in Asia Minor is, after all, largely due to the mandate originally given them by the Supreme Council; and His Majesty's Government's obligations towards Greece, however slight they may be legally and on paper, render it desirable that we should treat their susceptibilities as far as possible with consideration, at any rate until we see whether friendly but strong persuasion fails to succeed. If the objection be raised that such a discussion would make it appear that we intended to back the Greeks strongly in the approaching conference, we could meet it by explaining to the French in advance what line we intend to take with the Greeks, and possibly by even suggesting that they should take steps to sound Angora in the same way as we are sounding the Greeks as to their attitude towards the conference and terms of peace. The French may be in a better position to do this than we.

The next step after discussion with the Greeks would appear to be to call an Allied Conference and to try to obtain an Allied agreement as to the main terms to be offered to both Greece and Turkey. The partial agreement reached at Paris in June would form the natural basis for such a resumption of Allied discussion, but the Allies should then be in a better position to know the Greek, and possibly the Kemalist, attitude, and it seems essential to remove the deadlock regarding Thrace which existed in June at Paris.

After the Supreme Council have reached agreement on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres to be proposed to both sides the Greeks and Turks might then be invited to attend, the invitation to Angora again being made through the Turkish Government at Constantinople. The latter point might perhaps be waived if necessary to ensure Kemalist acceptance of the invitation.

Mr. Churchill in his recent memorandum to the Cabinet has proposed that the Allied terms when agreed upon should, if necessary, be enforced by the Allied Powers by blockade or by assistance to one side or the other, in order to assure that the unreasonable party be brought to heel. It seems impossible to come to a decision on this point until there has been another Allied discussion and friendly mediation has again been tried. Even then it can hardly be contemplated, unless the Greeks are intolerably unreasonable, that we should assist Kemalist Turkey against Greece. It is difficult to overlook the fact that the Kemalists are the actual, if not the legal, successors of the Turkish Government which waged a five years' war against us, that the Greeks were our Allies until recently, and that they fought for, and the Kemalists against, the Treaty which was signed by all the Allies a year ago, and, lastly, that the Kemalists have shown continual and bitter hostility to us ever since the London Conference. The Kemalists may generally wish, or at any rate circumstances may now make them ready, to change this attitude if more favourable terms are offered them, but time alone can show their good faith. Only a hopelessly intractable attitude on the part of the Greeks would, therefore, seem to justify our forcing our terms on the latter by help to the Kemalists. There are stronger grounds, already indicated, for enforcing our terms on the Kemalists, if they are unreasonable, but such a policy would require a change of French and Italian opinion, for which it is difficult to hope. In the circumstances it would seem better not to consider at this stage any form of forcible mediation.

It will be seen, therefore, that I endorse the plea for an early handling of the case, and this plea is undoubtedly strengthened by the fears so naturally expressed by Mr. Churchill that a failure to come to terms with the Turks may gravely prejudice the situation in Mesopotamia, the burden of which he has undertaken with so much courage, but where the balance may easily be deflected to his detriment.

On the other hand, Mr. Montagu's complaint that by the attitude of the Foreign Office we are prevented from exercising any influence at Angora, that we can conceive of nothing but official representation there, and that the consequences of our apathy are disastrous, seems to me quite unfounded.

We have lost no opportunity presented to us of getting into touch with Mustapha Kemal and of ascertaining his views. We received Bekir Sami Bey when he came as the official representative of the Kemalist Government to London last year, and we made proposals and concluded agreements with him which were ignominiously and, in the case of our prisoners, most dishonourably thrown over by Mustapha Kemal when his delegation returned to Angora. As regards our prisoners, Mustapha Kemal not merely broke this engagement, but has treated our prisoners, including officers of high distinction, with great indignity, ultimately

forcing us, in order to extricate them before the forthcoming winter, to conclude a bargain against which the Commander-in-chief at Malta has just protested as deplorable and humiliating.

Nevertheless, when Mustapha Kemal showed an inclination to be brought personally into touch with us last July through General Harington, we at once gave authority to the latter to proceed. Nothing came of it because Mustapha Kemal sought to attach the acceptance of his extreme political claims as a condition to discussion.

Mustapha Kemal can let us know his views any day that he pleases through his personal friend and former colleague, Izzet Pasha, now Foreign Minister at Constantinople, or through his liaison officer there, Hamid Bey, with both of whom our High Commissioner is in constant contact. He has other emissaries in Europe: Dr. Nihad Rehad, Jami Bey and Bekir Sami, who can approach us whenever they please.

No private person has been stopped or dissuaded from going to Angora except General Townshend, whose qualifications were not considered suitable. As regards the unofficial representatives of our Allies, I cannot think that their reception and experience there have been particularly encouraging. Count Sforza gained nothing whatever by his prolonged flirtation with Mustapha Kemal except the final refusal of the latter to receive the Italian representative, Signor Tuozi, at all. The French first tried to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal through M. du Caix, their representative in Syria, who negotiated the armistice preparatory to a treaty. They next made a separate agreement with Bekir Sami about Cilicia and their prisoners, which was at once thrown over by Mustapha Kemal and the National Assembly. Since then they have spent the best part of a year in trying to negotiate a substitute, first, in Paris, with Bekir Sami Bey (who was once again thrown over by Mustapha Kemal), and secondly, at Angora, through the instrumentality of M. Franklin-Bouillon, who has paid two, if not three, visits to Angora, and is believed, though officially disavowed by the French Government, to have made or to be making some arrangement confined to French prisoners and the Cilician frontier.

These examples are not particularly encouraging. Nor can I see the slightest reason to suppose that had any Englishman, official or unofficial, been at Angora during the last six months the results would have been very different. More probably he would have experienced the fate of Colonel Rawlinson. The time may come—I hope it may not be long delayed—when we can again attempt to enter into relations with Angora, while not I hope forgetting that there is still such a thing as a Government at Constantinople, to which our High Commissioner is accredited, and without whose concurrence we cannot negotiate any settlement at all. But isolated action will not help us to solve the larger problem any more than it has already helped the Italians and the French. The problem remains an international problem, and the steps now to be taken for its settlement are in my judgment these:—

- (a.) A very early effort to ascertain what are the bases on which mediation can now take place with a reasonable prospect of success—such effort involving an urgent conference with the Greeks, upon whom we alone can exercise a friendly pressure, to be accompanied or followed by a similar attempt to resume discussion with the Turks.
- (b.) As soon as the bases have been provisionally determined, a meeting of the Supreme Council to draw up the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.
- (c.) A summons to Greeks and Turks to attend and receive the revised conditions.

C. OF K.

Foreign Office, October 7, 1921.

Annex I.

*London Proposals (March 1921).**Admission of Turkey to League of Nations.*

To be facilitated on proof that Turkey is willing to carry out treaty.

Constantinople.

Art. 26, para. 2. Threat to independence to be withdrawn. Possibility of rapid evacuation of city and Ismid peninsula.

Straits.

Art. 40 and ff. Art. 178 and ff. Permanent chairman to be a Turk, with two votes. Demilitarised zone to be reduced to—

- (i.) 25 kilom. either side of Bosphorus.
- (ii.) At Dardanelles, from Gallipoli peninsula to Rodosto, and from Tenedos to Karabigha.
- (iii.) Islands in Aegean and Marmora which command Dardanelles.
- (iv.) Possibility of Allied garrisons being limited to Chanak and Gallipoli.
- (v.) Possibility of Turkish troops being allowed in Constantinople.
- (vi.) Possibility of allowing Turkey free passage across demilitarised Bosphorus zone.

Kurdistan.

Art. 62. Modification in accord with present circumstances, provided Turkey gives facilities for autonomy and for protection of Kurds and Assyrians.

Smyrna.

- Art. 65.
- (i.) Turkish sovereignty.
 - (ii.) Greek force in Smyrna town.
 - (iii.) Outside town, gendarmerie officered by Allies and recruited according to population as reported by an Allied Commission.
 - (iv.) Administrative personnel to be recruited similarly.
 - (v.) Christian Governor appointed by League of Nations.
 - (vi.) Elective Assembly and elective Council.
 - (vii.) Annual payment to Turkey corresponding with prosperity of district.
 - (viii.) Revision by League of Nations after five years on demand of either party.

Armenia.

Art. 88. Adaptation, provided Turkey recognises right of Turkish Armenians to national home on eastern Turkish frontier and agrees to accept decision of commission appointed by League of Nations as to territory to be transferred to Armenia.

Judicial Commission.

Art. 136. Turkey to be represented.

Military Clauses.

- Art. 152 and ff.
- (i.) Gendarmerie to be increased to 45,000. Special elements to be increased to 30,000.
 - (ii.) Distribution of Turkish forces to be in agreement with Allies.
 - (iii.) Fewer foreign officers and more Turkish officers and n.c.o.'s.
 - (iv.) Possible increase of military schools.
 - (v.) Extension of periods for demobilisation, reduction of armaments, &c.

Naval Clauses.

Art. 181 and ff. Possible increase of fleet.

Turkish Military, Naval or Air Mission Abroad.

Art. 207. To be allowed.

Financial Commission.

- (i.) Honorary president to be Turkish. Art. 231.
- (ii.) Turkish delegate to have vote on all internal questions and consultative voice in questions specially affecting Allies.
- (iii.) Parliament to have right to modify budget; but if such modifications disturb financial equilibrium, budget must be submitted to commission again.

Concessions.

Turkish Government to be free to grant concessions, but Minister of Finance first to decide with Financial Commission as to desirability of such concessions. Art. 232.

Foreign Post Offices.

Possibility of suppression. Art. 262.

"Nationals."

Definition of term might be modified. Art. 317.

Annex II.

*Proposals made by me at Paris in June 1921.**Smyrna.*

Lord Curzon proposed and M. Briand agreed to: Art. 65 and ff.

1. An autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty.
2. A Christian Governor.
3. A mixed gendarmerie under Allied officers.
4. Withdrawal of Greek troops as soon as the gendarmerie was in working order.

Thrace.

Lord Curzon proposed: Art. 84.

1. Enforcement of minority provisions about Adrianople and the Moslem population.
2. Demilitarisation of an area north-west of the Chatalja lines.

In reply, M. Briand proposed an international Thrace under international gendarmerie. Lord Curzon was unable to accept this. M. Briand then proposed to revert to the commission of enquiry, but the question of Thrace was reserved.

M. Briand was not prepared, in any circumstances, to recognise King Constantine.

Financial Commission.

It was agreed that a means of control might be found which, while effective, would not offend the Turks. Art. 231.

Tripartite Agreement.

Lord Curzon suggested the possibility of modifying or abolishing the agreement. M. Briand concurred that French and Italian rights might be secured by a formula less offensive to Turkey, and it was agreed that a self-denying arrangement between Great Britain and France might satisfy Italy. M. Briand hinted at British concessions in Mesopotamia.

Lord Curzon insisted that the protection of minorities must not be allowed to lapse.

The Italian Ambassador made reservations on all points, and especially as to the Tripartite Agreement.

Greece refused the Allied offer of mediation. No proposals on the above lines were therefore ever made to her or to Turkey.

Text of "National Pact" as printed in the Proceedings of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies of February 17, 1920.

The members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies recognise and affirm that the independence of the State and the future of the nation can be assured by complete respect for the following principles, which represent the maximum of sacrifice which can be undertaken in order to achieve a just and lasting peace, and that the continued existence of a stable Ottoman Sultanate and society is impossible outside of the said principles:—

First Article.—Inasmuch as it is necessary that the destinies of the portions of the Turkish Empire which are populated exclusively by an Arab majority, and which on the conclusion of the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, were in the occupation of enemy forces, should be determined in accordance with the votes which shall be freely given by the inhabitants, the whole of those parts, whether within or outside the said Armistice line, which are inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority, united in religion, in race and in aim, imbued with sentiments of mutual respect for each other and of sacrifice, and wholly respectful of each other's racial and social rights and surrounding conditions, form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason in truth or in ordinance.

Second Article.—We accept that, in the case of the three sanjaks, which united themselves by a general vote to the mother-country when they first were free, recourse should again be had, if necessary, to a free popular vote.

Third Article.—The determination of the juridical status of Western Thrace also, which has been made dependent on the Turkish peace, must be effected in accordance with the votes which shall be given by the inhabitants in complete freedom.

Fourth Article.—The security of the city of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate and the headquarters of the Ottoman Government, and of the Sea of Marmora must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle is maintained, whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, regarding the opening of the Bosphorus to the commerce and traffic of the world, is valid.

Fifth Article.—The rights of minorities as defined in the treaties concluded between the *Entente* Powers and their enemies and certain of their associates shall be confirmed and assured by us, in reliance on the belief that the Moslem minorities in neighbouring countries also will have the benefit of the same rights.

Sixth Article.—It is a fundamental condition of our life and continued existence that we, like every country, should enjoy complete independence and liberty in the matter of assuring the means of our development in order that our national and economic development should be rendered possible, and that it should be possible to conduct affairs in the form of a more up-to-date regular administration.

For this reason we are opposed to restrictions inimical to our development in political, judicial, financial and other matters.

The conditions of settlement of our proved debts shall likewise not be contrary to these principles.

January 28, 1920.

[E 11189/143/44]

No. 8.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 918. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 3, 1921.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 898 of the 28th September, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a further telegram which the Greek High Commissioner brought to me yesterday, and which he had obtained through the same channels. This telegram, which is addressed by the Turkish Minister of War to the Minister of National Defence at Angora, purports to give a description of the

conversations which Reshid Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior in Damad Ferid Pasha's Cabinet, has had with General Pellé regarding the conditions on which the French Government would be prepared to intervene in the Græco-Turkish conflict.

2. After the murder of Mahmoud Shefkhet Pasha in 1912, Rechid Bey went to France. He was in Switzerland during the war. He occasionally comes to see the first dragoman at this Embassy, but, as reported in my despatch No. 830 of the 7th ultimo, I have not encouraged his schemes. He is no doubt mainly concerned to advance his own interests. At the same time, the fact that he went to France before the war and remained at Geneva during the war in a thoroughly French atmosphere would perhaps tend to make him Francophil, and possibly incline him to use the French for the promotion of his own interests. Bearing the above facts in mind, it would be wise to discount much of what he says about the French, not to speak of the constitutional inability of the Turks, as a general rule, to report conversations accurately and without exaggeration.

3. It would appear from the telegram that, according to Reshid Bey, France would, in return for certain privileges not specified, but which may be presumed to be of an economic and financial character, be prepared to intervene immediately in the Græco-Turkish conflict on the basis of the unconditional evacuation by the Greeks of Smyrna and Thrace, as the French Government consider that the present moment is favourable for intervention. In this connection I would observe that I have gathered from General Pellé that he does not consider the time ripe for intervention on the part of the Allied Powers.

4. The telegram further confirms what we already knew, that there are two parties in the Turkish Cabinet, headed respectively by the Grand Vizier and Izzet Pasha, the latter representing ultra-Nationalist opinion. The Grand Vizier is reported as having been favourable to Reshid Bey's proposals, the details of which could be examined subsequently. The Grand Vizier's party thought that the opportunity furnished by the victory on the Sakaria River should not be lost. Izzet Pasha's party, which includes Sefa Bey, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Zia Pasha, the Minister of War, consider that the Greeks should be forced immediately to evacuate not only Smyrna and Thrace, but all the occupied territories; that Greece should pay a war indemnity; and that the peace pourparlers should take place direct with the Greek representatives. In addition to the above, the stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres as regards the Ottoman Empire and Greece must be modified in the manner desired by the representatives of those two States. French intervention could therefore only be accepted on the above basis.

5. The views of Izzet Pasha's party in the Cabinet as described by the Minister of War do not quite tally with those expressed to me by Izzet Pasha as recorded in my telegram No. 638 of the 29th ultimo. As I reported on that occasion, Izzet Pasha, whilst stating that the Nationalist Government would be adamant on the subject of Smyrna, thought that they would accept a special régime for that town and adjoining territory and would be prepared for an arrangement as regards Thrace. But it is quite possible, and even likely, that Izzet Pasha uses language to me which he would not use towards the Nationalist Government. Our difficulty here is to ascertain what is in the minds of the Nationalist Government. Even if we could do this we should not be on certain ground, because their attitude must necessarily vary with the military situation.

6. I discussed the situation at length with my Italian colleague yesterday. Marquis Barroni, who is a very shrewd observer with a considerable knowledge of the Turks, thought that, as far as the Turks were concerned, they might act in one of two ways. Izzet Pasha, after coming to an arrangement with the Nationalist Government, might approach the High Commissioners and indicate the basis on which the Nationalists, including the Constantinople Turks, would be prepared to ask for Allied intervention. The High Commissioners would listen to him and would refer to their respective Governments. This course would have the advantage of not compromising anybody, still less the Allied Governments. Or, as an alternative, the Sultan might, in his capacity as Khalif, issue a proclamation to the inhabitants of Anatolia to the effect that the struggle had lasted long enough, and inviting them to rally to his support in putting a stop to it. Your Lordship will notice that this idea is precisely similar to that recently put forward by Reshid Bey in conversation with Mr. Matthews (see my despatch No. 830 of the 7th ultimo). My Italian colleague said that Izzet Pasha had expressed the opinion that 75 per cent. of Mustapha Kemal's army would respond to such a proclamation, but, on his own statement, the remaining 25 per cent. would still continue the struggle. Neither my Italian colleague nor I believe that such a

proclamation would have the result anticipated by Izzet Pasha. For the moment we think that the Nationalists are under the influence of the reaction and relief produced by the Greek retreat and the removal of the threat to Angora, for it is certain that at one time the Angora Government thought that the Greeks would succeed in taking Angora.

7. My Italian colleague also informed me that he had not ceased to impress on Izzet Pasha for some time past that if the Turkish Government contemplated asking for intervention they should address themselves to myself, as the representative of the strongest Power in Europe and in the Near East.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Turkish Minister of War to Minister of National Defence, Angora.

(Télégraphique.)

Le 25 septembre 1337 (12/25 septembre 1921).

SUR l'ordre de la seconde section du quartier général, le 25 septembre 1337 (1921).
Réponse à la dépêche du 22 septembre 1337 (1921):

"L'ex-Ministre de l'Intérieur Réchid prolonge les pourparlers avec Pellé. A la suite de la dernière dépêche de Briand, Réchid est venu au Ministère. Il a dit que Rome partagera le désir de la France en vue de l'intervention; que dans le cas où les privilèges demandés venaient à être immédiatement accordés contre obligations financières, des démarches seront faites d'abord auprès des Gouvernements d'Angora et d'Athènes et ensuite auprès du Gouvernement de Constantinople; comme première base, il sera proposé l'évacuation sans conditions de Smyrne et de Thrace. Le Gouvernement français est d'avis que le moment actuel sera propice à une intervention, c'est-à-dire avant la fin des hostilités. Conformément à votre dernière réponse, Izzet Pacha, Faik Bey, Sefa Bey et moi avons soulevé une opposition. Nous avons répondu que la Grèce doit être obligée à évacuer immédiatement, outre Smyrne et la Thrace, les territoires occupés; qu'elle doit nous indemniser pour les dommages de guerre subis; que les pourparlers de paix doivent être débattus directement avec les représentants grecs; en outre, les dispositions du Traité de Sèvres relatives à l'Empire ottoman et à la Grèce doivent être modifiées, sous la forme que les représentants de ces États désirent, et que l'intervention de la France aurait pu être acceptée sur les bases et restrictions ci-dessus énoncées.

"Tewfik Pacha, Riza Pacha et Husséin Kiazim Bey ont déclaré que les propositions de Réchid étaient favorables, que les détails pourraient être examinés ultérieurement et qu'on ne doit pas perdre l'occasion qui se présente à la suite de la victoire de Sangarios. Nous n'avons pas accepté.

"Tewfik Pacha a déclaré qu'il s'entretiendrait avec le Sultan, et que Réchid se rendra au Palais dans le courant de cette semaine. On ne peut pas savoir encore quelle sera la réponse du Sultan. Garroni, qui avait voulu envoyer son premier secrétaire au Palais, a été empêché de le faire par l'entremise de Réchid. On en déduit que Réchid travaille pour faire prévaloir l'opinion de la France. Vous accorderai de nouvelles informations. Attends votre réponse."

[E 11473/143/44]

No. 9.

Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe.

M. VENISELOS called upon me to-day. He said he came to say good-bye before going on a trip of several months to America. In the course of a friendly conversation he naturally alluded to the situation in Asia Minor. He reminded me that he had always regretted the Greek military operations which had been undertaken, and which he thought had really been unnecessary, but no doubt they were due to the belief of King Constantine that without an anti-Turkish campaign he would not be secure on his throne. He said on looking at the whole situation, as it now presented itself, he saw that the greatest danger to Greece consisted in the ability of the Turks to enlist the sympathy of one or other of the Allies, and even to play off one against the other; in fact, so long as there was no definite agreement between England and France as

regards their policy towards Greece, his country had not a chance of arriving at any satisfactory settlement. He therefore looked upon the establishment of an Anglo-French understanding respecting Greece as the first desideratum.

He had recently been to Paris and had a very frank conversation with M. Briand, who had assured him that, whatever might be his own personal affection for Greece, it was impossible for the French Government to conduct their policy on lines not approved by public sentiment in France. French opinion was absolutely opposed to King Constantine; M. Briand went so far as to say that Constantine was hated more than the Emperor William; as long as Constantine was on the throne, friendship with Greece was out of the question. On the other hand, he definitely assured M. Veniselos that, once Constantine was got rid of, French policy would undergo a radical and rapid change, which would be entirely to M. Veniselos's satisfaction.

This being so, M. Veniselos has come to the conclusion that in order that England might give effect to her well-known friendly feelings towards Greece, she must come to an understanding with France on the subject of King Constantine; that is to say, she must consent to make the sacrifice to French *amour-propre* of siding with her in declaring definitely against Constantine. He thought that an opportunity might shortly present itself for taking this step; M. Gounaris was coming to England in the near future, and M. Veniselos knew that he was also going to Paris; it would suffice for the British Government to make it clear to M. Gounaris that he must fully take into account French requirements, and advise him to come to a definite understanding with France. Possibly the British Government might previously concert with M. Briand that the latter should quite explicitly demand the abdication of Constantine as a *conditio sine qua non* of French support and goodwill; it was to be expected that, if England then made it clear that she could not separate herself from her French ally, the hint would be taken, and M. Veniselos seemed to think that, with the disappearance of Constantine, the Greeks would be able, with the then friendly assistance of the Allies, to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Turks.

I asked him whether he still contemplated that Greece would be able to maintain intact all her demands upon Smyrna in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres. To this he replied that no compromise was possible on the point. He even suggested that he would be able to convince the French that any weakening of the Greek position in Smyrna would react disastrously on the French position in Syria.

I warned him, in a friendly way, that the solution of the difficulty in which Greece found herself did not lie entirely in the hands of England and France, even if they wished her well. There was the Turk. Was it quite certain that the influence which the Allies could still exercise would induce Angora to recognise Greek claims on Smyrna? He must realise that not only in France, but even in England, there was a movement of considerable strength in favour of seeking some accommodation with Angora, in order to put an end to Turkish and Moslem hostility to the Western Powers, and so far we had not received any indication that Mustapha Kemal considered himself compelled to give up his designs on the recovery of Smyrna.

M. Veniselos said he was well aware both of the actual dangers of the situation and of the sentiments entertained here, and in Paris, favourable to a compromise, rather than to a definite enforcement of the stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres. He still hoped, however, that reflection would bring greater wisdom. He was convinced that the enmity of the Turk towards the Western Powers would be in no way abated by any concessions that they made as regards Greece, whereas, on the contrary, to yield and make any concessions to Mustapha Kemal would only tend to increase Turkish contempt of the Christian Powers.

M. Veniselos finally told me that he was going to see the Prime Minister to-morrow afternoon, and intended to express his views to him with the frankness which he had always shown in former conversations with him.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, October 13, 1921.

[E 11401/143/44]

No. 10.

Earl Granville to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 456.)

My Lord,

Athens, October 3, 1921.

THE "Eleutheros Typos" published yesterday morning a long letter from M. Veniselos, dated the 16th July last, blaming the Government very severely for

refusing the Allies' offer of mediation. It is absurd, he says, for the Government to say that they are continuing his policy, as his policy was reversed by the elections of the 14th November, which led to the rupture of the alliance with the Powers; he would never have dreamed of continuing the war without that alliance, and the only thing the Government ought to have done was to try to obtain an understanding which would put an end to the war and save what could still be saved; England tried to arrange this in March, but the Government were afraid of public opinion, refused to accept, and recommended military operations; now, a second chance was given when the Allies were prepared to state their conditions, which were known to be, so far as England, at least, was concerned, the retention by Greece of Thrace up to Chataldja and the autonomy of Smyrna under a Governor-General appointed by the League of Nations; this solution would certainly have been less favourable than that proposed in the Treaty of Sèvres, but unfortunately that would have been the price which Greece would have had to pay for her neglect of the Allied note after the elections; it was a crime for the Government to refuse this offer—not that the Turks would have accepted it, but their refusal would have enabled England to support Greece in imposing the Treaty of Sèvres, whereas as the first refusal came from Greece, public opinion in England will now never allow the Government to help Greece. M. Veniselos goes on to say that a complete Greek victory is impossible owing to Greece's diplomatic isolation, and that the continuance of hostilities can only lead to Greece's economic and military exhaustion, which will oblige her to beg for mediation. M. Veniselos then points out the danger of an invasion of Thrace by Bulgaria, and hints at a Serbian occupation in that case of Salonica, and he foresees that, in view of the hostility of France and Italy, the decision of the Supreme Council with regard to Northern Epirus will be against Greece. Unfortunately, he says, they have not yet realised at Athens the dangers involved in the open hostility of France. Finally, he expresses the fear that some of his friends may accuse him of treachery for having gone so far in pleading in London for the application of the Treaty of Sèvres, as to urge the recognition of King Constantine when it was pointed out to him that that would be sure to follow the application of the treaty. "The fact is that the rulers of to-day are continuing the war in order to wear out the Greek people and to lead them by disaster after disaster to regard as benefactors those who will eventually give them peace—a repetition, that is to say, of 1915-16."

To-day's papers publish a long communication from M. Gounaris replying to M. Veniselos's letter. He denies that the alliance with the Powers has lapsed; as a matter of fact, how did the alliance manifest itself towards M. Veniselos's Government? No Allied army co-operated with the Greek army, no arms or munitions were supplied; not only was no money given, but through the International Financial Control M. Veniselos was forbidden to issue paper money; he never had any liberty of action in Asia Minor, and neither M. Veniselos nor "He who exercised Royal Power" was ever allowed to set foot in Asia Minor; now, these barriers have fallen, Greece has obtained full liberty of action, the King has visited all the occupied territory, and the Greek army has freely carried the national banner to the points where it floats to-day. The money required has been obtained at home, and the Powers have, as they did in Veniselos's time, left their private commerce free to supply our wants. How dares M. Veniselos speak of the dissolution of the alliance as the result of the elections? Should he not mention that the Treaty of Sèvres was signed with the obligation for Greece to undertake alone its execution? And why has that treaty never been ratified by any of its signatories? As to Epirus, Northern Epirus was in the possession of Greece in consequence of the struggle of the Epirotes, which Veniselos did all he could to hamper (the "Patris" states with reference to this sentence that Veniselos, while pretending to try to restrain the movement in order to save appearances, did, in fact, all he could to help it); the Allies occupied the country by agreement with Veniselos; how did it come under Albanian occupation? Who handed it over to Albania instead of to Greece? Who was then governing Greece? As to the agreement with Italy, was it not during Veniselos's Government that it was denounced?

With regard to the refusal of the Government to accept the terms offered by the London Conference, M. Gounaris argues that, before Greece had time to answer, Turkey had declared by the mouths of all those who represented Angora that she would not accept those terms, and she was preparing her troops to attack the Greeks, and the Powers themselves recognised this and declared that Greece was free to take steps to forestall the Turkish preparations.

Finally, M. Gounaris declares that the present Government have done everything possible for the national interests, and far more than M. Veniselos could have done, as he had not the confidence of the people as the present Government have; M. Veniselos again talks of the people being tired of war, as he did when he claimed that that was the cause of his fall; but it was not the weariness of the people that turned him out, neither will it bring him back.

The newspapers are, of course, full of comment on M. Veniselos's letter. "Patris" says that the man who gave the letter to be published without M. Veniselos's authorisation is a very bad friend; "Embros" considers the letter very important, but its publication now very badly inspired—it should have been published at the time of its receipt, when it might conceivably have been useful, or not at all; "Nea Hemera" calls it an act of treason, as it apparently tries to show that Greece is crushed; "Kathemerine" cannot understand why the Government have condescended to answer a letter written by a man who no longer exists so far as Greece is concerned. All the Government papers suggest that the date of the letter is forged and that it has really only been written now.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE.

E 11600/143/44]

No. 11.

Law Officers of the Crown to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 21.)

My Lord,

Royal Courts of Justice, October 18, 1921.

WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands signified to us in Mr. Lancelot Oliphant's letter of the 21st ultimo, requesting us to favour your Lordship with our opinion on certain questions raised by the apparent intention of the Russian Soviet Government to deliver warships to the Kemalist Turkish Government of Angora.

We have taken the matter into our consideration, and, in obedience to your Lordship's commands, have the honour to

Report—

1. In our opinion, in view of the declared attitude of neutrality towards the Græco-Kemalist hostilities, His Majesty's Government are not entitled to regard acts of the Kemalist Government as "hostile action" within the meaning of article 1 (a) of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. To put forward a case of breach of the agreement on that basis would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with a policy of neutrality towards the Kemalists.

2. In this view this question does not arise.

We have, &c.
GORDON HEWART.
ERNEST M. POLLOCK.

E 11675/476/44]

No. 12.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 24.)

(No. 946.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 13, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 871 of the 21st September, I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 669 of the 12th October, of which copy is enclosed.

2. The conclusion of an agreement with the Sublime Porte for the creation of a mixed court composed of British, French, Italian and Turkish judges seems to me of sufficient importance to justify us in yielding the presidency, of which the Sublime Porte makes a condition *sine qua non*.

3. The objection to this concession, pointed out in my previous despatch, has been removed in great part by the stipulation that the Allied members of the court are to take their turn with the Turkish president in drawing up the judgments. Under the French procedure used in the Turkish courts this stipulation will prevent the domination of the Turkish president. The Sublime Porte made its acceptance conditional also on the establishment of some procedure for the settlement of

disputes between Ottoman subjects and Allied subjects of nationalities other than British, French and Italian.

4. Such disputes have been since the armistice dealt with by the Allied police in a rough-and-ready fashion and only at the instance of the Allied subjects; Ottoman subjects having no means of redress when they were plaintiffs. This inequality will now be remedied, and it is hoped that eventually the other Allied nationalities, Greek, Serbian, &c., will ask to have their cases tried by this court. The Turks are anxious that the court should have jurisdiction over all mixed cases.

5. If this were achieved we should have created a valuable precedent for the establishment of a permanent mixed judicial system which would replace the clumsy pre-war institution of the "Tidjaret" without the great inconvenience of introducing judges of all the smaller nationalities.

6. In order to bring about this result it is important that the new court should inspire confidence from the start, and for this purpose the Allied members of the court must be selected with great care.

7. So long as the armistice lasts it is impossible to allow Allied officials to be paid by the Turkish Government, and my colleagues and I trust that our Governments will consent, in view of the important future issue involved, to provide the staff required. Each of the three Allied Governments will be required to furnish—

One judge.
One assistant judge.
One clerk.

I have already indicated Sir Lindsey Smith as particularly qualified for the post of judge, but he tells me that he must return to England on the 1st November for family reasons.

8. If it is found impossible to obtain his services, I suggest that Judge Cator, now in the Egyptian Mixed Court of Appeal, should be appointed. The appointment should in any case be held concurrently with that of judge of the British Supreme Court, and it is essential that the judge should have a good knowledge of French and some experience of Moslem jurisprudence.

9. As assistant judge I propose to name Mr. Matthews, consul and legal dragoman, part of whose duties in peace-time would be to attend the "Tidjaret" Court. The duties of sub-chief of one of the clerical departments of the mixed court could be discharged by Mr. Dawson, registrar of the Supreme Court.

10. If these appointments are made, the only extra expenditure entailed on His Majesty's Government would be a small allowance to the three officials to cover their daily journey expenses to and from the court-house in Stamboul, and an increase of pay to the judge, as neither Sir Lindsey Smith nor Mr. Cator can be expected to accept the post on the salary of 800*l.* which is at present attached to the judgeship of the Supreme Court.

11. I have the honour to forward herewith copies of the text of the draft agreement with the Sublime Porte, which has been accepted by the three High Commissioners and the Porte, subject to the approval of the three Allied Governments; and also copy of the memorandum annexed to the agreement and relating to the treatment of other Allied nationals.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.

(No. 669.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY despatch No. 871 of 21st September.

Constantinople, October 12, 1921.

Sublime Porte accepts mixed court on two conditions, which my colleagues and I think we should yield in order to obtain agreement, which is otherwise impossible. First condition is Turkish president. Objection raised in my despatch above quoted has been partly removed by depriving president of predominant influence. Judgments will be given in the name of the Sultan. Second condition is establishment of procedure for settlement of disputes between Ottomans and Allied subjects of nationalities other than British, French or Italian.

Sublime Porte desires such cases also to be tried by our mixed court, but this does not seem possible without consent of such other Allied Governments. Hitherto since armistice such disputes have been dealt with by the Allied police, but only at the instance of an Allied plaintiff.

As soon as this agreement comes into force the three Allied High Commissioners will propose to the other Allied representatives that disputes between their nationals and Ottomans, whether plaintiffs or defendants, shall be settled by Allied police subject to approval of mixed court.

If any Allied representative rejects this proposal Allied police will refuse protection of his nationals.

It is probable that smaller Allied Powers, and perhaps neutrals, will ask extension of jurisdiction of mixed court to their nationals.

This would constitute valuable precedent for permanent mixed judicial system with British, French, Italian and Turkish judges only. During armistice each Allied Government must pay its own share of this mixed court, but extra expenditure involved will be small. Judge of Supreme Court should sit as British member and staff required by him can be supplied by High Commission.

My colleagues are very anxious for speedy and favourable decision. They are telegraphing in same sense.

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Contre-proposition des Alliés remise à la Réunion du 5 octobre 1921.

Accord concernant la Formation d'une "Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la Période d'Armistice."

PENDANT la période actuelle d'armistice et jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, sans préjuger en quoi que ce soit le régime judiciaire qui sera établi en Turquie après la paix, une "Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la période d'Armistice" connaîtra de toutes les affaires en matière civile, commerciale et maritime, entre Anglais, Français et Italiens d'une part, et Ottomans d'autre part. Cette commission connaîtra également, à l'exclusion des affaires concernant le droit de propriété immobilière, de toutes les affaires en matière de location entre Anglais, Français et Italiens d'une part, et Ottomans d'autre part, dès qu'un accord sera intervenu entre les Hauts-Commissaires alliés et le Gouvernement ottoman sur les modifications à apporter à la loi promulguée dernièrement par ledit Gouvernement concernant la prorogation d'office des baux et l'augmentation des loyers des habitations et des locaux destinés au commerce.

Les autorités militaires interalliées et notamment la police interalliée cesseront alors d'intervenir dans ces sortes d'affaires, qui seront déferées à la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire. Elles cesseront également, dès maintenant, de s'occuper des autres affaires civiles, maritimes et commerciales déferées à ladite commission.

La Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire aura pouvoir d'assigner les parties et de les juger par défaut, faute de comparution. Les jugements seront rendus au nom de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan et seront exécutoires sans recours, sauf requête civile ou opposition en cas de défaut.

La commission sera composée de trois membres alliés et de trois membres ottomans. En cas d'absence, les membres seront remplacés par des membres suppléants de la même nationalité. Chaque affaire sera jugée par un membre allié de la même nationalité que l'intéressé allié, un membre ottoman et un troisième d'une autre nationalité alliée. Le membre ottoman assumera la présidence.

Les jugements devront être rendus à la majorité des voix.

Les requêtes seront remises directement à la commission.

La Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire appliquera la loi ottomane et les usages locaux. Elle réglera elle-même sa procédure en prenant pour base la procédure employée devant les tribunaux du Tidjaret en la simplifiant et en diminuant les délais le plus possible.

Les revenus et les dépenses devront être précisés. Après prélèvement des dépenses occasionnées par la constitution et le fonctionnement de la commission, tout excédent de recette sera versé au Trésor ottoman.

Les requêtes seront rédigées en français et en turc; il en sera de même des citations. Les plaidoiries pourront avoir lieu en français et en turc. Les jugements seront rédigés en français et en turc. En cas de contestation, le texte français fera foi.

La commission retiendra pour être jugées par elle les affaires qui lui paraîtront présenter un caractère suffisant d'urgence, et aura la faculté de faire porter les autres affaires au rôle d'attente.

Les services administratifs seront dirigés par un des membres ottomans comme président administratif; ils comprendront notamment un greffier, un drogman et un bureau exécutif; chacun de ces services aura un chef ottoman et un sous-chef étranger. Le bureau exécutif procédera à l'exécution des jugements d'après les instructions du président administratif et en requérant au besoin l'assistance de la police ottomane quand il s'agira d'exécuter vis-à-vis d'un Ottoman, et de la police interalliée quand il s'agira d'exécuter vis-à-vis d'un Allié. Dans ce dernier cas, les instructions du président devront être contresignées par un des juges alliés ayant pris part au jugement.

La commission déterminera par un règlement intérieur les conditions de son fonctionnement et notamment l'attribution des affaires selon qu'elles devront être portées au rôle d'audience ou inscrites au rôle d'attente, le roulement à établir entre les divers membres de la commission pour la rédaction des jugements, les conditions d'exécution des jugements, les questions concernant le personnel judiciaire ainsi que l'étude du budget et des modifications à apporter aux taxes judiciaires.

Le siège de la commission sera au Ministère de la Justice.

La Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire ainsi constituée continuera, après l'entrée en vigueur du futur Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, à juger les affaires dont elle aura été saisie antérieurement, à moins qu'il n'en soit décidé autrement par le Traité de Paix.

Enclosure 3 in No. 12.

Memorandum.

Dès la conclusion d'un accord avec la Porte concernant la formation d'une Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire pour la période d'armistice, les Hauts-Commissaires proposeront aux autres représentants alliés d'accepter le règlement par la police interalliée, mais avec exequatur de la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire, des affaires civiles, commerciales et maritimes mixtes entre leurs ressortissants et les Ottomans, demandeurs ou défendeurs, dans la mesure même établie par l'accord pour les ressortissants anglais, français et italiens, c'est-à-dire le règlement immédiat, en cas d'acceptation comme urgentes par ladite police interalliée, de toutes les affaires urgentes civiles, commerciales et maritimes, sauf les affaires en matière de location, et de ces mêmes affaires locatives, après la promulgation d'une loi ottomane qui serait acceptée par les Hauts-Commissaires en matière de location. Les décisions de la police interalliée, quand elles auraient été revêtues de l'exequatur de la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire, seraient exécutées par les soins du bureau exécutif de la commission. Les mesures d'exécution seraient déterminées par le règlement intérieur de la commission avec cette condition que l'exécution serait toujours faite contre un Ottoman par la police ottomane avec le contreseing d'un juge ottoman et contre un Allié par la police interalliée avec le contreseing d'un juge allié.

Dans le cas où certaines autorités alliées intéressées n'accepteraient pas ces conditions, la police interalliée recevrait pour instruction de refuser dorénavant son concours à toute demande d'intervention qui lui serait adressée par ces autorités en matière civile, commerciale et maritime.

Il est entendu qu'en cas d'acceptation de ces propositions par les autorités alliées intéressées, les affaires de location entre leurs ressortissants et Ottomans continueront à être réglées par la police interalliée dans les conditions actuelles jusqu'à la promulgation d'une loi en cette matière qui serait acceptée par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés.

Dans le cas où certaines Puissances le demanderaient, les affaires civiles, commerciales et maritimes entre leurs ressortissants et Ottomans pourraient être portées devant la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire.

Le 5 octobre 1921.

[E 11922/143/44]

No. 13.

Minutes of a Meeting between Lord Curzon and MM. Gounaris, Baltazis and Rangabé, held in Lord Curzon's Room, October 27, 1921, at 12 o'clock.

M. Gounaris began by an account of the recent offensive and its results, by which he said, 100,000 square kilom. and 3,000,000 inhabitants had come under Greek control in Asia Minor. He said that he had told M. Briand that so long as they were in occupation of the territory they must organise it, but that this entailed heavy burdens. Allied interests must be respected, and he had asked M. Briand that no obstacles should be placed in their way, and that no munitions or provisions should be sent to the Turks, as he believed the French and the Italians were doing. M. Gounaris had also asked for the right of search. This M. Briand had refused, but he had said that he would do his best to stop contraband. M. Briand had spoken on France's desire for peace, and M. Gounaris had replied that Greece was equally anxious for it, but that he did not believe the Turks were disposed to recognise the facts of the situation. M. Gounaris said that he had also tried to sound M. Briand as to what he meant by peace, but M. Briand had proved very vague and had practically referred M. Gounaris to His Majesty's Government.

Lord Curzon asked if M. Gounaris had any definite proposals to make.

M. Gounaris replied that the Greek Government had never refused to negotiate on concrete proposals, but that it was not easy for the Greek Government to take the initiative in making them now. Generally speaking, the Greek Government would be ready to accept concrete proposals, on condition that these were based on a recognition of the sacrifices made by Greece and of the safeguarding of her position.

M. Baltazis said that according to M. Briand the Turks were now more inclined to compromise and reason, and M. Briand had quoted the Franklin-Bouillon negotiations as a proof of this. M. Baltazis had said that, in his opinion, these negotiations would be the principal thing that might incline the Turks to be less than more reasonable. M. Baltazis added that he had questioned M. Briand as to whether France had taken any engagements towards the Turks in regard to Thrace and Smyrna; to which M. Briand had replied: "No! that would be disloyal."

M. Rangabé said that until the visit of MM. Gounaris and Baltazis, M. Briand had not realised the present military situation. The Greek representatives had explained to him on the map and M. Briand now realised that it was all to Greece's advantage.

Lord Curzon said that he would speak with great frankness.

His Majesty's Government had throughout been friendly and sympathetic to Greece—to the present Greek Government as to M. Venizelos. If ever a point had been strained the tendency had been to strain it in favour of Greece. This attitude had not always had the results expected, as, for example, the proposals made and accepted in Paris in August respecting the sale of arms and munitions by private firms to the belligerents. He was not sure that the Greek Government had been wise to press for such facilities, as in the long run the Turks had perhaps benefited more than the Greeks. M. Gounaris had alluded to two or three minor subjects before coming to the main point. Among the former were administration in the conquered territory. The Greek Government would be ill-advised at this juncture to take steps having the appearance of permanent occupation.

M. Gounaris said that he had told M. Briand that annexation was not contemplated. The steps taken had been with a view to relieve the financial burden.

Lord Curzon said that M. Gounaris had then passed to the right of search. On this M. Briand had been uncompromising. Then came the main point—peace. The question was important to everybody. To Greece on account of the necessity of settling down and relieving the strain on her financial resources. It was important to Great Britain because the acceptance of the Treaty of Sèvres or its substitute was the last remaining necessary step towards European peace. It was also important to this country on account of the difficulties created for us all over the East, and especially in India, by our present relations with the Turks. There was a large section of opinion in this country—and an even stronger one in India—that held that we should have peace with Turkey, and that we were sacrificing our

imperial interests for Greece. British policy must be decided by the largest considerations.

Lord Curzon then gave a short résumé of the history of the negotiations from the early stages of the Treaty of Sèvres to the Conference in London last March. He, personally, thought that the Greeks had made a mistake in refusing the commissions of enquiry proposed, and another mistake in resuming the offensive, which had ended with failure after the initial success. Something of the same nature had happened in the second offensive, and the Greek retirement had had an undoubted effect upon public opinion in the East. There had been a meeting in Paris in June to make another effort towards peace. A telegram had been sent to the Greek Government asking whether they would place themselves in the hands of the Powers. The suggestion had been declined and, from the point of view of peace, this also seemed to him a mistake. The position after the second offensive now was that neither side was really strong enough to resume it. The two parties were equal in numbers; if anything, the Turks were slightly superior, and their armament and *moral* had both improved. If the Greek army were to remain indefinitely in its present position the strain on Greek finances and *moral* would be heavy. Were we to wait through the winter or to try fresh steps now towards peace? For this purpose, however, three conditions were necessary. Firstly and secondly, that the Greeks and Turks respectively should be willing to negotiate, and, thirdly, that the Great Powers should be unanimous. In regard to the first two conditions, Smyrna appeared to be the crux; Thrace was secondary. What was the Greek attitude? Did they think that on account of their recent advance they could acquire an area larger than the Smyrna enclave? If so, he did not believe that the Turks would make peace on these terms. His information from Angora was to the effect that the Turks would not make peace on any basis that left the Greeks at Smyrna. This he considered unreasonable. The Powers should insist on arrangements for the Smyrna area similar to those which had been contemplated in June. This was the utmost compatible with peace. In regard to Thrace, His Majesty's Government would do their best to stand by the Treaty of Sèvres, though it might be necessary to draw the line somewhat further than Chatalja in order to relieve the Turks from the position of having their capital so close to the Greek line as to be at Greece's mercy.

In regard to the possibility of resuming negotiations, the Powers could not afford to meet with a third refusal, and they would make no proposals if that was again to be the attitude of the Greek Government. It was also necessary for the Allies to be in agreement and for the two parties concerned to place themselves in Allied hands, and if the Allies were in agreement the refusal of either party would necessarily place the recalcitrant in a false position. What were the bases of Greek assent? If M. Gounaris considered that they could still obtain the whole or even more than the Treaty of Sèvres, there was probably nothing to be done. The Greeks would be wise to accept the terms already suggested for Smyrna (and here Lord Curzon read out the proposals contemplated in Paris in June) and to trust His Majesty's Government in regard to Thrace, for, as they were aware, Great Britain was their best friend.

Lord Curzon made it clear that he was, of course, unable to say whether the Turks would accept this, or, in point of fact, whether the Allied Governments would either. He was merely giving them an indication of what His Majesty's Government would be prepared to try to obtain for them. In any case, the first step towards negotiations must be Greek willingness to consider this point of view.

Minutes of a Second Meeting between Lord Curzon and MM. Gounaris, Baltazis and Rangabé, held in Lord Curzon's Room, October 27, 1921, at 4 P.M.

Lord Curzon enquired whether the Greek representatives wished to put any questions as the result of the morning meeting.

M. Baltazis said that M. Briand had declared that the Treaty of Sèvres neither had been nor could be presented to the French Parliament, and he believed the same remark to apply to Italy. Any such treaty must have another name.

Lord Curzon said that the Treaty of Sèvres had been signed but not ratified: since then, numerous modifications had been suggested. The French and the

Italians had explicitly declined to ratify. That was not the British attitude. We had been willing to do so, but saw that it was now impossible. Therefore, the Prime Minister had said in August that the Treaty of Sèvres had been practically torn up. A new treaty was necessary, and the preliminary stage must be that both parties should put themselves in the hands of the Powers who could then draw up a new treaty; but this was far from meaning that the whole treaty should be scrapped; a new one would be built up on the foundations of the old.

M. Baltazis interposed that this was also the view of M. Briand. M. Baltazis said that the Greek representatives had asked M. Briand if the new treaty could be made in the same manner as the old one, *i.e.*, by agreement among the Powers and subsequent presentation of the treaty to Greece and Turkey. M. Briand had merely replied "perhaps." Or would a draft of the treaty be presented to Greece for her consideration in advance?

Lord Curzon said that in his view it would not be done precisely in that manner, which would entail delay; it was most desirable to avoid that. A more expeditious and practical method would be the agreement of Greece to put her case in the hands of the Powers.

M. Gounaris said that his Government would prefer to place it in the hands of Great Britain.

Lord Curzon said that that was the same thing. His Majesty's Government were pledged only to act with their Allies, and that is why it had been desired here that the Greek representatives should go first to Paris and Rome. He had already told them the views of His Majesty's Government; it was possible that they might not be shared by the other two Powers. The Greek representatives had been told what His Majesty's Government would be prepared to try to obtain for them, and the Turks should also be asked if they would place their case in the Allies' hands. A new draft treaty could then be prepared, and the Greek and Turkish representatives could be invited to receive it. This procedure would obviously make acceptance easier for both the Greek and Turkish Governments, since the new treaty, by the very nature of things, could not be wholly palatable to either party.

M. Baltazis said that the principal question was that of initiative. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Greek Government to take it.

Lord Curzon replied that he did not suggest that. The Greek Government should merely do what they had refused to do in June. It would be sufficient for the Powers to know that the Greeks were prepared to accept mediation.

M. Baltazis said that public opinion in Greece would accept the placing of their case in the hands of Great Britain. It would be more difficult to agree to place it in the hands of the other two Powers, especially in view of the agreements that they had respectively either made or attempted to make with Turkey.

Lord Curzon advised the Greek representatives not to disquiet themselves unduly on this score. The French and Italian Governments had to reduce or withdraw their troops from Asia Minor on financial grounds. The ensuing agreements were, therefore, somewhat beside the point, if we had been at all rightly informed of the intentions of our Allies. This country could not fairly be asked to shoulder the whole responsibility for the result, whatever it might be, but must be trusted to do her best with France and Italy, who also would not take the initiative again without prospect of success. If the Greek Government accepted and the Powers approached the Turks and met with a refusal, then the Greek position would be correspondingly improved. The Turks were at this moment elated and swollen-headed. Refusal on their part was quite impossible. In view of all this the best advice that he could give to the Greek representatives was to get the French and Italian Governments as favourably disposed towards Greece as was already Great Britain.

At this point the Greek representatives asked that an account of the two meetings might be sent to them in writing so that they might study and reflect upon it during the following day.

The next meeting was accordingly fixed for 11.30 on the 29th October.

Minutes of a Third Meeting between Lord Curzon and MM. Gounaris, Baltazzis and Rangabé, held in Lord Curzon's Room, October 29, 1921, at 11.30 A.M.

M. Gounaris said that the Greek representatives had been studying and pondering upon the minutes of the last meeting. In their consideration of the issues involved they had been largely guided by the attitude of Great Britain and her constant friendship, of which they were aware, and for which they were profoundly grateful. This would be the determining factor in the eventual Greek decision. The results of the previous two meetings had been telegraphically communicated to their colleagues at Athens, whom they felt bound to consult in view of the gravity of the issues involved; but they were able to say that this communication had been accompanied with the expression of MM. Gounaris and Baltazzis of the view that Greece should accept the advice tendered by Lord Curzon.

M. Gounaris added that they would ask for another meeting so soon as an answer had been received from Athens.

Lord Curzon enquired when a reply might be expected.

M. Gounaris replied that it might be expected at the beginning of next week, and it was provisionally arranged that the next meeting should be held on Wednesday morning.

Meanwhile, M. Gounaris trusted that the conversations might be regarded as strictly confidential and not divulged to the press. M. Briand himself had made this suggestion in Paris.

Lord Curzon said that he quite agreed; but that while he would be responsible for saying nothing to the press, he proposed, in accordance with what he had said at the previous meeting, as to the imperative necessity of common action between the Great Powers, to communicate to Paris and to Rome a brief account of what was passing, in the same way as M. Briand had given him a summary of the two conversations with the Greek Ministers in Paris. The question would only be solved if, in the last resort, there was a single Allied policy, instead, as had hitherto been the case, of two or three.

M. Gounaris expressed complete agreement.

[E 11937/1/44]

No. 14.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 986.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following account of an interview which the acting first dragoman had on the 23rd instant with Hamid Bey, vice-president of the Ottoman Red Crescent Society and local Kemalist agent. Mr. Matthews had called on Hamid Bey to obtain from him a document relating to the exchange of the British prisoners in Anatolia, and, while waiting for the document to be prepared, had asked if it was a fact that an agreement had been signed with M. Franklin-Bouillon by the Government of Angora. Hamid Bey replied in the affirmative, and stated with evident pleasure that the new frontier line between Turkey and Syria would start from a point a little to the south of Payas on the Gulf of Alexandretta and about 9 kilom. to the north of Alexandretta. It would then pass north of Aleppo and cross the Euphrates at Kalat Jaber about half-way between Meskenah and Rakka and some 100 kilom. south of the Bagdad Railway line. It would continue east to Nisibin and thence to the frontier of Mesopotamia. To prevent Aleppo losing its importance as a commercial centre, it had been decided to remove all customs barriers on the frontier between Syria and Turkish territory. The main Bagdad Railway line would be everywhere within Turkish territory, but was to be worked by the French. Mersina was to remain Turkish and Alexandretta was to be made a free port. The French would evacuate Cilicia a few weeks after the agreement had been approved by the French Government. No mention had been made of the Capitulations, as other Powers besides France and Turkey were interested in that question. M. Franklin-Bouillon had accomplished the journey from Angora to Constantinople by car and destroyer in thirty hours. He arrived here on the 22nd October and left the same day for Paris, where he would see M. Briand before the latter left France for Washington. Hamid Bey had had a conversation of an hour with M. Franklin-Bouillon.

2. Referring to the conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey, Hamid Bey said that he did not anticipate this before the spring of 1922. He foresaw that the Grand National Assembly would sign peace with Greece after a conference at the invitation of the Great Powers. The Grand National Assembly would dissolve itself after arranging for elections for a Constituent Assembly, the members of which would be chosen from all parts of the country, including Constantinople. This body would ratify the treaty of peace and take the necessary measures for carrying its provisions into effect. He was most emphatic that no action would be taken against the present Sultan, with whom the Nationalists had no quarrel. He was equally emphatic that Mustapha Kemal Pasha would not endeavour to promote himself from Dictator of Anatolia to be Dictator of the whole of Turkey. As proof of this, he said that it had taken Mustapha Kemal two days to induce the Grand National Assembly to approve of the agreement with France, which had been signed at 4 o'clock in the morning (of the 20th October presumably).

3. Hamid Bey concluded by saying that no privileges had been granted to France, to which other States, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, could take exception.

4. The "Wakt" and the "Tevhid-i-Efkia" of the 24th instant publish a sketch-map on which Payas, Jerablus, Killis, Birejik, Ras-ul-Ain, Mardin and Nisibin are placed on the Turkish side of the new frontier, and comment favourably on the agreement in leading articles. The "Wakt" says that it is necessary to await the publication of the official text of the agreement to learn how certain points in dispute have been arranged. Nevertheless it is clear, it continues, that a complete accord has been reached by the two parties with regard to the evacuation of Cilicia, the rectification of the Syrian frontier, the fixing of the Eastern frontier, and with regard to minorities in the territory under French occupation being placed under an international guarantee.

5. With such information as is available locally, it is difficult to decide whether the agreement runs counter to the letter of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement. The modification of the frontier in favour of Turkey in "the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates" would certainly appear to do so (articles 62-64 of the Treaty of Sèvres). Article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement was no doubt designed to give France a monopoly of railway interests in her zone.

6. I would add that rumours are current as to special privileges having been granted with regard to the position of French schools in Anatolia and as to the existence of secret clauses in the agreement for the supply of material of war, both naval and military, to the Kemalists.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 11970/1/44]

No. 15.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 2986.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from the French Government, dated the 29th October, enclosing a copy of an agreement between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government respecting Cilicia.

Paris, October 30, 1921.

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

M. de Peretti de la Rocca to Sir M. Cheetham.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 29 octobre 1921.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

J'AI l'honneur de vous donner ci-joint communication de l'accord, signé le 20 octobre, entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et le Gouvernement de l'Assemblée nationale d'Angora.

Vous trouverez également sous ce pli le texte d'une lettre adressée le même jour à M. Franklin-Bouillon par le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de ce Gouvernement.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
(Pour le Président du Conseil,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères),
E. D. PERETTI DE LA ROCCA,
Ministre plénipotentiaire, Directeur des
Affaires politiques et commerciales.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

Accord signé à Angora, le 20 Octobre 1921, entre M. Franklin-Bouillon, ancien Ministre, et Youssouf Kemal Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

LES hautes parties contractantes déclarent que, dès la signature du présent accord, l'état de guerre cessera entre elles; les armées, les autorités civiles et les populations en seront immédiatement avisées.

ARTICLE 2.

Dès la signature du présent accord, les prisonniers de guerre respectifs ainsi que toutes les personnes françaises ou turques détenues ou emprisonnées seront remises en liberté et reconduites aux frais de la partie qui les détient dans la ville la plus proche qui sera désignée à cet effet. Le bénéfice de cet article s'étend à tous les détenus et prisonniers des deux parties, quels que soient la date et lieu de détention d'emprisonnement ou de capture.

ARTICLE 3.

Dans un délai maximum de deux mois à partir de la signature du présent accord, les troupes turques se retireront au nord et les troupes françaises au sud de la ligne désignée à l'article 8.

ARTICLE 4.

L'évacuation et la prise de possession, qui auront lieu dans le délai prévu à l'article 3 seront effectuées selon des modalités à fixer d'un commun accord par une commission mixte nommée par les commandants militaires des deux parties.

ARTICLE 5.

Une amnistie plénière sera accordée par les deux parties contractantes dans les régions évacuées dès leur prise en possession.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie déclare que les droits des minorités solennellement reconnus dans le Pacte national seront confirmés par lui sur la même base que celle établie par les conversations conclues à ce sujet entre les Puissances de l'Entente, leurs adversaires et certains de leurs Alliés.

ARTICLE 7.

Un régime administratif spécial sera institué pour la région d'Alexandrette. Les habitants de race turque de cette région jouiront de toutes les facilités pour le développement de leur culture. La langue turque y aura le caractère officiel.

ARTICLE 8.

La ligne mentionnée à l'article 3 est fixée et précisée comme suit :

La ligne frontière partira d'un point à choisir sur le golfe d'Alexandrette immédiatement au sud de la localité de Payas et se dirigera sensiblement vers Meidan-Ekbes (la station du chemin de fer et la localité restant à la Syrie); de là elle s'infléchira vers le sud-est de manière à laisser à la Syrie la localité de Marsova et à la Turquie celle de Karnaba, ainsi que la ville de Killis; de là elle rejoindra la voie ferrée

à la station de Tchoban-bey. Puis elle suivra la voie ferrée de Bagdad, dont la plate-forme restera sur le territoire turc jusqu'à Nousseibine; de là elle suivra la vieille route entre Nousseibine et Djéziré-ibn-Omer, où elle rejoindra le Tigre. Les localités de Nousseibine et de Djéziré-ibn-Omer ainsi que la route resteront à la Turquie; mais les deux pays auront les mêmes droits pour l'utilisation de cette route.

Les stations et gares de la section entre Tchoban-bey et Nousseibine appartiendront à la Turquie comme faisant parties de la plate-forme du chemin de fer.

Une commission composée de délégués des deux parties sera constituée, dans un délai d'un mois à partir de la signature du présent accord, pour fixer la ligne sus-mentionnée. Cette commission procédera aux travaux dans le même délai.

ARTICLE 9.

Le tombeau de Suleiman Chah, le grand-père du Sultan Osman, fondateur de la dynastie ottomane (tombeau connu sous le nom de Ture Mézari), situé à Djaber-Kalissi restera, avec ses dépendances, la propriété de la Turquie, qui pourra y maintenir des gardiens et y hisser le drapeau turc.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie accepte le transfert de la concession de la section du Chemin de fer de Bagdad entre Bozanti et Nousseibine ainsi que des divers embranchements construits dans le vilayet d'Adana à un groupe français désigné par le Gouvernement français, avec tous les droits, privilèges et avantages attachés aux concessions, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'exploitation et le trafic.

La Turquie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Meidan-Ekbes à Tchoban-bey dans la région syrienne, et la Syrie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Tchoban-bey jusqu'à Nousseibine dans le territoire turc.

Sur cette section et ces embranchements aucun tarif différentiel ne pourra être établi en principe. Cependant, les deux Gouvernements se réservent le droit d'étudier, le cas échéant, d'un commun accord toute dérogation à cette règle qui deviendrait nécessaire.

En cas d'impossibilité d'accord, chaque partie reprendra sa liberté d'action.

ARTICLE 11.

Une commission mixte sera instituée après la ratification du présent accord en vue de conclure une convention douanière entre la Turquie et la Syrie. Les conditions ainsi que la durée de cette convention seront déterminées par cette commission. Jusqu'à la conclusion de la convention précitée les deux pays conserveront leur liberté d'action.

ARTICLE 12.

Les eaux de Kouveik seront réparties entre la ville d'Alep et la région au nord restée turque de manière à donner équitablement satisfaction aux deux parties.

La ville d'Alep pourra également faire à ses frais une prise d'eau sur l'Euphrate en territoire turc pour faire face aux besoins de la région.

ARTICLE 13.

Les habitants sédentaires ou semi-nomades ayant la jouissance de pâturages ou ayant des propriétés de l'un ou de l'autre côté de la ligne fixée à l'article 8 continueront comme par le passé à exercer leurs droits. Ils pourront pour les nécessités de leur exploitation, librement et sans payer aucun droit de douane ou de pâturage ni aucune autre taxe, transporter d'un côté à l'autre de cette ligne leur bétail avec le croît, leurs instruments, leurs outillages, leurs semences et leurs produits agricoles, étant bien entendu qu'ils sont tenus de payer les droits et taxes y relatifs dans le pays où ils sont domiciliés.

Youssef Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

JE me plais à espérer que l'accord conclu entre le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et le Gouvernement de la République française en vue de réaliser une paix définitive et durable aura pour conséquence de rétablir et de consolider les relations étroites qui ont existé dans le passé entre les deux nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'efforçant de résoudre dans un esprit de cordiale entente toutes les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée, désireux d'autre part de favoriser le développement des intérêts matériels entre les deux pays, me charge de vous déclarer qu'il est disposé à accorder la concession des mines de fer, de chrome et d'argent se trouvant dans la vallée du Harchite pour une durée de quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans à un groupe français, qui devra procéder dans un délai de cinq ans à partir de la signature du présent accord à l'exploitation de cette concession par une société constituée conformément aux lois turques avec participation des capitaux turs jusqu'à concurrence de 50 pour cent.

En outre, le Gouvernement turc est prêt à examiner avec la plus grande bienveillance les autres demandes qui pourraient être formulées par des groupes français relativement à la concession de mines, voies ferrées, ports et fleuves, à condition que lesdites demandes soient conformes aux intérêts réciproques de la Turquie et de la France.

D'autre part, la Turquie désire profiter de la collaboration des professeurs spécialistes français dans ses écoles professionnelles. A cet effet, elle fera connaître plus tard l'étendue de ses besoins au Gouvernement français.

Enfin, la Turquie espère que dès la conclusion de l'accord le Gouvernement français voudra bien autoriser les capitalistes français à entrer en relations économiques et financières avec le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

[E 12246/143/44]

No. 16.

Minutes of a Fourth Meeting between Lord Curzon and MM. Gounaris, Baltazis and Rangabé, held in Lord Curzon's Room at the Foreign Office, at 12.30 P.M., November 2, 1921.

M. Gounaris said that a telegram had now been received from Athens in which the Greek Government expressed its adherence to the suggestions made at the previous meeting by Lord Curzon on behalf of His Majesty's Government. He felt, however, that it was his duty to submit, at an early date, a memorandum embodying the information of the Greek Government on the situation in the Near East (on which, by their close contact, they were peculiarly qualified to speak) and the views suggested by it. He trusted that this might facilitate the mediation which the Greek Government agreed to accept.

Lord Curzon said that he was very glad to hear that the suggestions of His Majesty's Government, with a view to mediation, had been accepted by the Greek Government. With regard to the memorandum mentioned, he enquired whether it dealt with the military or political situation.

M. Baltazis replied that it applied to both, and would be communicated for the information of His Majesty's Government.

Lord Curzon enquired whether it dealt with Thrace and Asia Minor.

M. Baltazis replied "only Asia Minor."

Lord Curzon enquired when the memorandum might be expected.

M. Baltazis replied that it would be prepared and delivered as soon as possible—possibly on Saturday.

Lord Curzon enquired whether the Greek representative had any information regarding a report he had seen in the press to the effect that the Turks of Angora would send a mission to mediate.

M. Rangabé replied that they had no official information.

[E 12164/1/44]

No. 17.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2863.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1921.

I ASKED the French Ambassador to call upon me this afternoon, in order to make certain enquiries about the draft of the agreement concluded by M. Franklin-Bouillon, apparently on behalf of the French Government, with the Turkish Government at Angora, a copy of which, with an accompanying letter by Youssef Kemal Bey, the Foreign Minister of that Government, had been forwarded to us by the French Foreign Office.

I reminded the French Ambassador that in the earlier part of the present year I had more than once asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin-Bouillon had any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private person—rather a busybody, in fact—who was going to Angora for purposes of his own. Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government, M. Briand had in an official note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally, when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had again enquired as to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Government the larger questions of peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Government, with regard to French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops.

Relying upon these categorical assurances I had taken no further steps in the matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only during the last week I had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and in spite of their pressure I had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful effort in the interests of the Alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that I had read the provisions of M. Franklin-Bouillon's Agreement, as to which I could not avoid asking a number of serious questions, and which I could hardly believe that the French Government would be prepared to accept in its present form.

I said that I would hand to the Ambassador a memorandum which he could transmit to his Government containing the enquiries which I felt bound to make; but the principal of them I would indicate in my present remarks.

Whilst, I said, it was a matter of common knowledge that the Allies had agreed among themselves in the earlier stages of the war not to conclude peace with any enemy Power except by common agreement, it appeared from the wording of article 1 of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement that a peace had now been concluded between France and Angora, and, further, inasmuch as the agreement was one with the Grand National Assembly of Angora, that it amounted to a recognition by the French of that Government as the Government of Turkey. No mention was made of the Government at Constantinople, and undoubtedly, if the agreement were ratified in its present form, Mustapha Kemal's Government could claim that they had received recognition from one of the most powerful of the European Allies.

Article 3 of the agreement, which provided for the withdrawal of French troops, appeared to run directly counter to article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, in which the French had pledged themselves to maintain their troops in the zone of special French interests until the Allies were satisfied that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey was being executed, and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities had been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed.

Article 6, in which the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declared that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established by the conversations on this subject between the Entente Powers and other Allies—such as Poland—or

other European enemies—such as Hungary—called for a serious explanation. In the first place it did not appear to apply to Cilicia only, but to be of general application to all Turkey. It was in direct opposition to the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres for the protection of minorities, by which the French Government had assumed the responsibility for the protection of minorities in their zone of special interest under the Tripartite Agreement. If this article were accepted, it would appear that France had not only not recognised her responsibility under that Agreement, but had pledged herself to new minority provisions on the lines of the treaties made in Europe. The provisions of these treaties were quite inapplicable to Turkey, and it would appear that this point had been conceded by the French Government independently and to the detriment of any general negotiations for peace that might remain to be concluded between Turkey and the whole of the Allies.

Article 8 provided for a wholesale revision of the northern frontier of Syria, under which a large tract of territory was apparently to be handed over by France to the Angora Government without any reference to, or consent on the part of, the rest of the Allies. I reminded the Ambassador that the whole of this territory had been conquered from Turkey in the war, not by French troops, or even by Allied troops, but by British troops alone. In our loyalty to our engagements with the French we had handed over the whole of Syria to them, and when the Treaty of Sèvres was drawn up we had without protest, on the assumption that they would receive the mandate for Syria—which, in passing, I remarked they had not yet done—been willing to settle a frontier entirely in accordance with their views. And yet a large slice of territory within the mandated area, which did not belong to them, which they had no right to distribute, and which was still, in the absence of peace, vested in the hands of the Allies, had now been handed over to Angora as a part of the price of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement. When we were discussing the Mesopotamia frontiers with the French last year a good deal had been said about Nisibin and Jeziret-bin-Omar, which we had eventually agreed to include in the mandated area of Syria, and yet these places, which were of great strategic importance to Mesopotamia, were now about to be handed back by France on her own account to Turkey. Nor was this all. It appeared from the provisions of the same agreement that Turkey was to receive the track of the Bagdad Railway between Choben-bey and Nisibin, and, still worse, that the Turks were to have the right to use that part of the Bagdad line which might lie in the French sphere for the military transport of their troops. In other words, France was about to authorise the transport of Turkish troops from Konia to Nisibin with a view—it might very well be—to an attack by Mustapha Kemal upon the British mandated territory in Mesopotamia.

Supposing that we had made an arrangement of this sort, involving a serious possible risk to the French area in Syria, would not the French Ambassador have come down in a great hurry to Downing Street, and would he not be addressing me in language of even greater surprise than that which I was now employing to him?

There were further provisions in the agreement which seemed equally to call for explanation, but a detailed enumeration of these would appear in the memorandum which I promised to send to the Ambassador. I must, however—I went on to say—ask him some serious questions about the letter from Yussouf Kemal Bey addressed to M. Franklin-Bouillon which accompanied the agreement. Was this a letter which, though detached, was to be regarded as forming a part of the agreement? What did its very ominous phraseology mean? What was the nature of the reply which the French Government had sent or contemplated sending to it? I noted that in the first paragraph the Angora Foreign Minister expressed a hope that the French Government would undertake to settle in a spirit of cordial friendship all the questions relating to the independence and the sovereignty of Turkey. What did this mean? What relation had this to the evacuation of soldiers or prisoners from Cilicia? The language seemed to indicate that the Angora Government at least expected in return for their favours some large measure of support from the French Government in matters of a very much wider than local concern.

In the second paragraph of the letter the Grand National Assembly declared its willingness to grant concessions to the French for the iron, chrome and silver mines in the Harchite Valley, and announced its readiness to consider with the utmost good-will any other requests for concessions for mines, railways, ports or river which might be put before them by French groups. I could not help asking what all this meant. Even if the localities concerned were inside the French zone of special interest, the suggested concessions appeared to me to travel far beyond the spirit of the Tripartite Agreement. If they were outside, surely the concessions were in direct conflict with it.

The letter went on to invite the collaboration of French professors and teachers in the schools not of Cilicia alone, but apparently of every part of Turkey, and ended by inviting French capitalists to enter into economic and financial relations with the Angora Government—again without any geographical limitation. I did not know, of course, what view would be taken of these proposals by the French Government, or how far M. Franklin-Bouillon had committed them on the matter; but that a local arrangement of a relatively minor character for the evacuation of French troops, or the release of French prisoners, should have been expanded in this elastic fashion to include this vast motley of interests and concessions seemed to me one of the most unusual diplomatic achievements of which I had ever heard.

Before concluding, I alluded to a further report which, although it was not supported by anything that appeared in the agreement or in the letter, had yet reached me from more than one quarter, that the French had tried to procure, or had procured, the monopoly of the provision of French officers and instructors in the gendarmerie—again not in Cilicia alone, but in Anatolia, without limitation. I could hardly believe that such was the case, since any such provision would be entirely contrary to the arrangement already concluded between the Powers, by which the future gendarmerie was to be international in character.

I said that the Ambassador must pardon me if I sought insistently for further information upon all these points. I could not, I said, conceal from him that the sum total of them had left upon the minds of myself and my colleagues a very painful impression, and I hoped very earnestly that the majority of the apprehensions, to which I had given expression, would turn out to be unfounded, and would be dispelled by the explanation which it would be in his power to give.

The Ambassador interrupted me at various points of my narrative to inform me that whatever might be the answers returned by his Government on the points which I had raised, he was certain that they regarded the agreement as one of a purely local character: so much so, that they did not even propose to submit it for ratification to the French Chamber. It was merely a restricted arrangement between Angora and themselves with regard to Cilicia, and he felt convinced that the provisions, as to which I had expressed alarm, could only be applicable to the zone in which, under the Tripartite Agreement, it had been agreed that French interests should be recognised as predominant. He took great credit for the fact that there had been no attempt to discuss such wider issues as Smyrna and Thrace, and the conclusion of a general peace with Turkey, and he seemed to anticipate that, in reply to my charge that the French Government had been dealing with Angora as though it were the Government of Turkey, they would say that the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, if accepted by the French, would be submitted to the Constantinople authorities. He did not contest that the questions which I had put were of a very important and serious nature, and that on the face of it the language both of the agreement and of the letter appeared to suggest a wider field of action and consequence than he had himself predicated. It might be that M. Franklin-Bouillon, who was a person of very ebullient nature and not used to official negotiations, had done rather more than was expected of him, and had placed matters in a light which was open to criticism. All this would be elucidated in the enquiry which I had asked him to make.

I represented to the Ambassador in taking leave of him that the question was one to which we attached great importance, and that if we were shortly to reopen Allied negotiations for the settlement of the entire Eastern question it was indispensable that there should be removed from our minds the suspicion that one of our Allies had taken independent action, or sought to secure special advantages behind the backs—and, as it would appear in some cases, to the distinct detriment—of the others.

The Ambassador did not express any surprise at the manner in which I had spoken to him, and his defence of the procedure of his Government—such as it was—would not, I think, have secured him a favourable verdict, even from a tribunal of his own countrymen.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the Count de Saint-Aulaire.

Your Excellency.

Foreign Office, November 5, 1921.

ON the occasion of our interview on the 3rd November, I undertook to send you a memorandum containing the principal points arising out of the draft agreement concluded between M. Franklin-Bouillon and the Angora Government, and also the accompanying letter to M. Franklin-Bouillon from Yussouf Kemel Bey—to some of which I had called your attention, although it was not possible in the course of a single conversation to refer to all.

I commenced by reminding you that in the earlier part of the present year I had asked M. Briand personally whether M. Franklin-Bouillon had any official mission, and had been definitely assured by him that he was a private person—and rather a busybody, in fact—who was going to Angora in connection with the press or for purposes of his own. Further, in July of the present year, when M. Briand was conducting negotiations with Bekir Sami Bey on behalf of the Angora Government, M. Briand had in an official note assured us that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France on the general question of peace between the Allies and Turkey without a close agreement with the Allies, and especially with the British Government. Finally, when M. Franklin-Bouillon went a second time to Angora in September, and we had again enquired as to the capacity in which he was acting, the French Government had admitted that he had some sort of official mission, but M. Briand had added that he had been forbidden to discuss with the Angora Government the larger questions of peace, and had been only empowered to negotiate, on behalf of the French Government, with regard to French prisoners, the protection of minorities in Cilicia, and other points involved in the evacuation of Cilicia by French troops.

Relying upon these categorical assurances, I had taken no further steps in the matter, but, on the contrary, had pursued here the policy of close and unwavering co-operation with the French in every aspect of our Middle Eastern policy. Only during the last week I had been conducting negotiations with the Greek Ministers, and in spite of their pressure, I had insisted upon the duty incumbent upon me of acting only with our Allies, and had only yesterday successfully persuaded the Greeks to place themselves unreservedly in the hands of the latter. Fresh from this successful effort in the interests of the alliance, which I thought boded so well for the future, it was with feelings of astonishment and almost of dismay that I had read the provisions of M. Franklin-Bouillon's agreement, as to which I could not avoid asking a number of serious questions, and which I could hardly believe that the French Government would be prepared to accept in its present form.

The points of the agreement as communicated to His Majesty's Government which seemed to me to call for special explanation were the following:—

Article 1 provides that with the signature of the agreement "the state of war will cease between the high contracting parties." Clearly, this phrase implies something more than a local armistice, because a state of armistice is still technically a state of war. Nothing is said as to whether the agreement is provisional pending a general peace between the Allies and Turkey or whether it is intended to have purely local scope. The latter could hardly be the case, as some of the articles appear to be of general application to Turkey. It is presumed, therefore, that the agreement establishes a state of peace between France and the Grand National Assembly.

It would also appear that the agreement involves formal recognition by France of the Grand National Assembly of Angora as the sovereign authority in Turkey, in which case a peace concluded with Angora would be contrary to the Franco-British Treaty of the 4th September, 1914, and to the London Pact of November 1915.

Article 3. This provision for the withdrawal of French troops from the territory handed over to Turkey ignores French obligations under article 8 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, to maintain troops in the zone of special French interests until the French, British and Italian Governments are agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace with Turkey is being executed, and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities have been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed. While the evacuation of Cilicia, which, as M. Briand stated, was the object of the negotiations,

necessarily involved the withdrawal of French troops, it was clearly incumbent on the French Government to take all possible guarantees for the protection of minorities in accordance with their obligations.

But while the full amnesty provided in article 5 may offer some protection for the minorities in Cilicia, the agreement appears to contain no safeguards for its effective operation by the Kemalists.

Further, while article 6 provides that "the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey declares that the rights of minorities solemnly recognised in the National Pact will be confirmed by them on the same basis as that established by the conversations concluded on this subject between the Powers of the *Entente*, their enemies and certain of their Allies," it is noted that the clause is not drafted to apply to Cilicia and is therefore presumably of general application to Turkey.

It is thus open to the objection that it runs counter to the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres for the protection of minorities, and ignores the responsibilities assumed by the French Government for the protection of minorities in the zone of their special interests under the Tripartite Agreement. Article 1 of that agreement states that the "assistance" to be afforded to the Turkish Government by France "shall be specially directed towards enhancing the protection afforded to racial, religious or linguistic minorities." It appears, therefore, that by this article France has not only renounced her responsibilities with regard to the protection of minorities under the Tripartite Agreement, but has pledged herself to substitute for the minority provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres other provisions on the lines of the treaties made between the principal Allies and such European countries as Poland. It need hardly be pointed out that these treaties are inadequate and their provisions generally quite inapplicable to Turkey. In fact, the contention of the Angora Government on one important point of general application to Turkey has been accepted by one Ally in advance of general negotiations for a treaty of peace between all the Allies and Turkey.

Article 7. It is assumed that this article, which provides for special rights of Turks in the Alexandretta area and for the use of Turkish as the official language, will necessitate some modification of, or addition to, the draft mandate for Syria now before the League of Nations.

Article 8. The revision, provided for in this article, of the northern frontier of Syria as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres cannot be regarded as the concern of France alone. It hands back to Turkey a large and fertile extent of territory which had been conquered from her by British forces and which constituted a common gage of Allied victory, although by an arrangement between the Allies the mandate had been awarded to France. The mandate is now under consideration by the League of Nations and this important and far-reaching modification of the territory to which it applies altogether ignores the League of Nations, while the return to Turkey of territory handed over to the Allies in common without previous notification to Great Britain and Italy is inconsistent with both the spirit and the letter of the treaty which all three have signed.

Further, the revision provides for handing back to Turkey the localities of Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar, both of which are of great strategic importance in relation to Mosul and Mesopotamia; the same consideration applies to the handing back to Turkey of the track of the Bagdad Railway between Tchoban-Bey and Nisibin. In neither case have His Majesty's Government been consulted.

It is noted that the frontier is to be "fixed" by the two parties within one month of the signature of the agreement in advance of all the other frontiers of Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.

Article 11. Inasmuch as this concession may be followed by demands from Turkey for similar privileges in regard to other sites, the Allies were entitled to expect that they should have been consulted before any such arrangement was made.

Article 10. The transfer of the Bozanti-Nisibin section of the Bagdad line to a French group seems to be tantamount to the execution by France of paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, in advance of, and independently of the duties and responsibilities undertaken by France towards her Allies under the Tripartite Agreement and under the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, which are interdependent. It is presumed that the transfer of this part of the Bagdad line by Turkey to the French group is not intended to override article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres, whereby Turkey was herself to liquidate the whole Bagdad Railway on the demand of the principal Allies. Nor is it supposed that the article can be intended to give France a large portion of the railway without regard to the

claims of her other Allies upon a concern which both under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres is the Allies' common asset, and in respect of which special arrangements are contemplated under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. Paragraph 3 of article 10 provides that each party shall have the right to use for military transport that part of the Bagdad line which lies in the other's territory. This in effect appears to mean that France must permit Turkish troops to be carried from Konia to Nisibin and possibly thus threaten the Mesopotamian frontier. Great Britain can hardly believe that the French Government would propose to conclude an arrangement which may well have such serious strategic consequences to her position in Mesopotamia without any prior reference to His Majesty's Government. Moreover, it is not understood how the acceptance of this servitude on territory placed under a mandate of the League of Nations can be accepted without prior consultation with the other members of the League concerned.

The appended letter from Yussouf Kemal expresses the hope that the French Government will endeavour to solve all questions relative to Turkish independence and sovereignty; it goes on to add that the Government of the Grand Assembly (it also speaks of the "Turkish Government") is ready to grant a number of concessions and other advantages in favour of France and French nationals, apparently both within and without the French zone. The form of the letter inevitably lends itself to the interpretation that there is some connection of a conditional nature between the Turkish hope and promise, and the expression "questions relative to Turkish independence and sovereignty" would appear to be quite outside the scope of an arrangement regarding Cilicia and Syria.

His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn whether the letter in question, which has been officially communicated to them, is regarded by the French Government as an integral part of the agreement. The implication is suggested that it was written in connection with some written or verbal understanding with M. Franklin-Bouillon. His Majesty's Government would be pleased to receive information on these points and to know whether the French Government have replied, or propose to reply, to the letter of Yussouf Kemal Bey.

The agreement and the letter have also formed the subject of various statements in the press regarding secret clauses or annexes. It has been alleged that, under arrangements concluded but not published, France is to have a monopoly of the gendarmerie organisation in Turkey (which would be entirely contrary to the arrangements for international control contemplated by the Treaty and already to some extent carried out in anticipation); that a large portion of the war loan is to be handed over to Turkey; that a French loan has been arranged; that France has promised to supply the Nationalists with a formidable armament; that she has undertaken to support Turkish claims to Smyrna and Thrace; even that she has obtained a promise of anti-British agitation by the Nationalists in Mesopotamia. His Majesty's Government cannot believe that there is any foundation for any of these statements, but, in view of their wide dissemination in the press, His Majesty's Government would like to be in a position to issue a formal denial of these and similar assertions and to announce that the published agreement was accompanied by no other written or verbal understandings.

In conclusion, with regard to the agreement as a whole, His Majesty's Government find the utmost difficulty in recognising in its present no doubt provisional form any resemblance to the *tractation locale* described by M. Briand. On the contrary, it has the appearance of being a separate agreement concluded by one of the Allies with an enemy Government without consultation with the remainder, and this impression, unless it is dissipated, cannot fail to react unfavourably upon the policy of full and complete Allied co-operation in which His Majesty's Government have always believed and which they have consistently practised in their desire to bring about a general peace in the Near East.

His Majesty's Government look forward to receiving a full and friendly explanation on the whole of these points from the French Government, and they express the confident expectation that the agreement in the form in which it is finally approved by the French Government will be freed from many of the ambiguous or questionable features which, in their desire to avoid all possible cause of dissension or misunderstanding, they have been compelled to point out.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 12338/1/44]

No. 19.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 951.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 8, 1921.

I ASKED the Italian Ambassador to come and see me to-day in order to have a talk with him about the situation which had arisen in consequence of the conclusion of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement with the Angora Government.

I gave Signor de Martino a succinct account of all that had so far passed in the matter, including my representations to the French Government, with which the Count de Saint-Aulaire had returned to Paris. I pointed out how completely at variance the French proceedings had been, both with the treaty obligations of the Allies and also with the policy of mutual co-operation for the settlement of the Near and Middle Eastern question, to which I thought that, after the unsuccessful attempts of both the French and the Italians to break away last year, we had since all pledged our faith to adhere. The Italian Government was, I thought, as much concerned as ourselves in the action of the French, because the privileges obtained by the latter appeared in many cases to apply not to the French zone of economic preference only, but to the whole of Asia Minor, including the Italian sphere. I hoped that on all these grounds I might rely upon Italian support in the stand which I had been compelled to make.

The Ambassador replied that the Marquis della Torretta had not yet received the text of the agreement, and had not, therefore, communicated with him about it; but he had already informed him of the impression that had been produced in this country on its publication.

He then went into a long disquisition about the importance to Italy of the Tripartite Agreement, not so much because of its technical provisions as from the effect that it had upon Italian public opinion. Italy could not relinquish her rights under this agreement, and she would have to resist any encroachment upon them.

All this the Ambassador explained at great length, and he dwelt so exclusively on that subject that I was compelled to recall his attention to the much more serious aspect of the French action, namely, the effect that it could hardly fail to have upon the larger question of a common Allied policy *vis-à-vis* the Greeks and the Turks. If France were left at liberty to act in such a manner without remonstrance, the Italian representative at Angora might think that he enjoyed a similar liberty. I earnestly hoped that nothing of the kind would take place, and that the Ambassador would renew to me his assurances of the very circumscribed area of Signor Tuoizzi's conversations.

This he did, explaining, as he had done before, that they related to matters arising out of the Adalia question alone. On the larger issue he adhered to all that we had both said on recent occasions as to the necessity of absolute confidence between the Allies and the extreme unwisdom of any one of them acting apart from the others; but, as soon as he got the Marquis della Torretta's views, he would be able to speak to me more confidently on the matter.

The Ambassador hinted once again, as he had often done before, at a resumption, when the Turkish question was out of the way, of the close relations between Great Britain and Italy in the Eastern Mediterranean, which he has repeatedly declared to have existed before the war. Though there were conversations about the matter in the time of Lord Grey of Fallodon, I have never been able to discover that they resulted in an agreement; nor have I been able to find out exactly what the Italian Government desires, except British support in all her Mediterranean undertakings. I have hitherto, therefore, rather evaded the question, feeling that it was for Italy, by a sustained policy of good faith—in which, up to the present time, she has been decidedly lacking—to justify the creation of closer relations than those which already exist.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 12440/1/44]

No. 20.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 3128.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 11, 1921.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 669 of yesterday, I have drawn up a communiqué to the press of which I enclose a copy herewith, refuting the allegations made repeatedly during the past week in the French press, relating to the agreement made by M. Franklin-Bouillon and the alleged failure of His Majesty's Government to protest against it. This communiqué will be handed to the press to-night, but I have no guarantee that the French press will be sufficiently liberal-minded to publish it, since I noticed that only one French newspaper published this morning a telegram from Reuter dealing with this question and pointing out some of the errors of the French press.

As an act of courtesy, I gave to M. Peretti this evening a copy of the communiqué which I told him I had received your instructions to make in view of the absolute necessity of bringing home to the French press the falseness of some of the statements which they continue to propagate, and which, in my opinion, were only fomenting a hostile spirit in the press, which I warned him would, if allowed to continue, seriously affect Anglo-French relations.

After perusal he referred to various points. As regards No. 1, he stated that the cessation of the state of war in no sense implies a recognition of the Angora Government by the French Government either *de facto* or *de jure*, and that they regard their arrangement with the Kemalist Government as one between themselves and irregular bandits who were fighting their troops. The question was one of *force majeure* and that they should come to terms with them. He likened the negotiations which had taken place to those which on a former occasion had taken place between Raisuli, the Moroccan bandit, and the local British officials in order to obtain the release of a British captive.

In reply to point No. 2, M. Peretti stated that the minority provisions now to be enforced in Cilicia are far more serious and effective than those provided for in the Sèvres Treaty, since M. Franklin-Bouillon is to return at once to Angora and, with the approval of the Nationalist Government, is to have three delegates who will aid him in watching over the security of the minorities in what was former French occupied territory. I asked whether these persons were to be consuls or commissioners. He replied that they were simply delegates of the French Government, since the French Government could not appoint consuls or commissioners to a Government which they do not recognise.

The rights given to the Turks to use the Bagdad Railway for purposes of military transport mentioned in point No. 4 was, he stated, inevitable, since the new frontier would pass south of the railway, but he added that, in view of the fact that the more western portion near Alexandretta was under French control, the French Government would be able to prevent the Turks sending troops or provisions to the Mesopotamian frontier, if sent with hostile intentions against their ally.

As regards point No. 5, M. Peretti maintained that there is no reply to Yussuf Kemal's letter to M. Franklin-Bouillon except a simple acknowledgment, and he added that Yussuf Kemal's letter was of the vaguest possible character and contained no specific offer.

He had nothing to say in reply to the contention of the last paragraph of the communiqué.

I did not argue these various points with M. Peretti because I considered his replies so childish that they do not bear serious discussion, and that to do so would simply be a waste of time and energy, but in view of the fact that the note is being drawn up at the Quai d'Orsay at the present moment, I think they provide an indication of the sort of disingenuous reply that the French Government intend to make to your Lordship's note.

I took the opportunity of asking M. Peretti how soon there would be a reply to your note. He answered that the note was in course of preparation and nearly completed, that it would be transmitted by telegram to M. Briand for his approval, and that he hoped to be able to communicate it to your Lordship in a few days' time. I told M. Peretti that although you would like to publish the French reply simultaneously

with your note to Count Saint-Aulaire, you would, if there was any untoward delay in the receipt of the French note, be compelled to publish your own note alone. M. Peretti deprecated this.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Communiqué to the Press.

IT has been freely stated in the French press during the last week (a) that the agreement concluded by M. Franklin-Bouillon at Angora differs little, if at all, from that come to by M. Briand with Bekir Sami Bey in London in March last; and (b) that His Majesty's Government never raised any objections to that agreement, with the possible exception of purely verbal ones of which no record exists.

In the face of these repeated assertions, His Majesty's Embassy feels itself obliged to state the facts as they are.

The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement contains the following new points:—

1. The cessation of the "state of war" referred to in article 1, which apparently implies the conclusion of peace between the French and Angora Governments, and the recognition by the former of the latter as the sovereign power of Turkey.
2. The admission by France, in article 6, of the Nationalist demand for general minority provisions differing widely from those of the Treaty of Sèvres.
3. The modification, in article 8, of the frontier between Nisibin and Tigris.
4. The right given to the Turks to use the Bagdad Railway in Syrian territory for purposes of military transport.
5. The letter addressed to M. Franklin-Bouillon by Yussuf Kemal, in which French support in questions of Turkish independence and sovereignty is coupled with promises of various concessions, goes far beyond anything in the French agreement with Bekir Sami.

In regard to (b), it is quite untrue to state that His Majesty's Government raised no objections to the Bekir Sami Agreement. On the 1st April His Majesty's Ambassador left at the Quai d'Orsay an *aide-mémoire* protesting against the conclusion by the French Government of an agreement with one of the common enemies of the Allies. The text of the agreement was thereupon communicated to Lord Hardinge by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and forwarded by him to Lord Curzon, who, in conversation with the French Ambassador on the 19th April, raised strong objections to the agreement on both general and particular grounds—objections which were doubtless transmitted to the Quai d'Orsay by the Comte de Saint-Aulaire. The reason why His Majesty's Government did not press further their objections to the Bekir Sami Agreement was that the agreement was never ratified.

Paris, November 11, 1921.

[E 12528/1/44]

No. 21.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 1022.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 8, 1921

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 712 and 713 of to-day and previous correspondence relative to the Franco-Kemalist Agreement, I have the honour to state that I received this morning from the French High Commissioner a letter enclosing copies of the agreement and of the note regarding concessions addressed by Yussuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon simultaneously with the signature of the agreement. The text of the agreement had already been made public here, and Yussuf Kemal Bey's letter was published in the local press this morning. Although General Pellé informs me that the two documents have been communicated to the British, Italian and United States Governments, I enclose copies for convenience of reference.

[7866]

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I also enclose the full text of the interview given by my French colleague to the Constantinople press as published in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 3rd November. General Pellé's statement, though circulated in advance of the publication of the agreement, is still of considerable interest.

2. I venture to offer the following comments on the enclosed documents, though in doing so I may to some extent appear to labour considerations which cannot fail to have already occurred to your Lordship.

3. In the first article of the agreement the parties are described as the "high contracting parties," an expression the use of which appears to recognise the claim of the Angora Government to be a sovereign Power legitimately constituted. The declaration in this article that the agreement ends the state of war between the parties is unqualified. General Pellé's emphatic declaration that the agreement merely ends the local war in Syria, and that the effect of it is to restore matters, as regards Turkey generally, to the basis created by the Armistice of 1918 will hardly commend itself to the Angora leaders, in view of their pretension to be regarded as the sole Government of Turkey.

4. Article 6 of the agreement constitutes a signal success for the Angora Government. Not only do they secure a formal reference to the "National Pact" in an instrument concluded with one of the Allied Powers, but they have induced the French to admit that, in Cilicia at any rate, clauses similar to the minorities clauses of treaties concluded between the Allies and European Powers must suffice for the protection of the non-Moslem minorities. It is a far cry from this to the Treaty of Sèvres, and it is obvious that the French acceptance of such a clause cannot fail to prejudice the position of the Allies generally in regard to the future of the Christian minorities in Turkey. General Pellé's observations on this part of the agreement gloss over the greatness of the success achieved by the Angora Government, and will afford cold comfort to the minorities and their sympathisers.

5. Article 7 of the agreement represents a further success for the Turks, though its permanent importance must depend on the nature of the special régime to be created in the Alexandretta area, and the extent to which it may provide for the exercise of direct Turkish influence in the administration of that area. Incidentally, this clause will affect the scope of the French mandate for Syria.

6. I do not propose in the present despatch to offer any observations on the new frontier provided for in article 8, as the exact *tracé* is a subject of military rather than political interest, except in as far as the Bagdad Railway is affected for economic purposes. This brings me to article 10 of the agreement, and to the contents of Yussuf Kemal Bey's letter to M. Franklin-Bouillon. General Pellé has nothing to say in his interview of the great economic advantages which the French have secured for themselves as a reward for their accommodating attitude in other directions. He, no doubt, realised how difficult it would be to invest these arrangements with an appearance of decency. The French cannot escape the imputation of having looked to their own economic and financial interests without regard to the effect on the position of the Allies generally in reference to concessions in the future Turkey. Not only have they by article 10 of the agreement entered into arrangements gravely affecting the Bagdad Railway, which is a matter of the greatest general interest, but they have obtained a letter from Yussuf Kemal Bey promising extensive mining and other concessions and expressing readiness to examine favourably other applications by French groups for further concessions. It is noteworthy, and here again it must be borne in mind that Angora claims to be the sole Government in Turkey, that there is nothing to limit such applications to any particular area.

7. I do not offer these observations in any spirit of hostility to the French. It is still my desire to collaborate loyally with our Allies in all questions affecting the Near East. So far as the French representative in Constantinople is concerned, I have reason to believe that he has been to a large extent short-circuited, and I imagine he views with some misgiving the proceedings of M. Franklin-Bouillon and their possible consequences. The fact remains that the highest authorities in France have committed themselves to an agreement with a revolutionary Government in Turkey, which goes far beyond the limits of a local settlement intended to extricate them from their difficulties in Cilicia and Syria. It is difficult to regard these arrangements as paving the way to a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. They tend much more to destroy any prospect of a general settlement on any basis at all resembling the guiding principles embodied in that treaty. There is no doubt that the Nationalists are greatly elated by the agreement which they have just concluded with the French, and consider that they have now a real friend at court in France.

8. The local press states that the Italian Mission to Angora has been cordially received, and the Nationalists are no doubt counting on the conclusion of an agreement with Italy which will still further strengthen their position.

9. Whilst the French and Italian Governments may advance the argument that the conclusion of agreements with the Nationalist Government will enable them to exercise a moderating influence on Nationalist claims, I venture to think that it will have the opposite effect. Various Turkish papers openly say that the Nationalists will not abate one jot from the provisions of the National Pact, and I cannot but think it unfortunate that France should have negotiated an agreement and Italy be in the process of negotiating one with the Nationalists before the termination of the Græco-Turk conflict. These proceedings are eminently calculated to weaken the general position of the Allies towards the Turks, and to hamper them in effecting a settlement between Nationalist Turkey and Greece. I would except agreements relating strictly to the exchange of prisoners.

10. I believe that in spite of the Franco-Nationalist agreement and of the negotiations now proceeding between the Italian Mission and the Angora Government, we are in a strong position, inasmuch as we want nothing from Mustafa Kemal's Government. The Nationalists are closely watching the Irish situation, and if a settlement is reached in Ireland they know that this will release a large number of British troops. They would appreciate the fact that if His Majesty's Government wished to increase the army of occupation here troops would be available for that purpose.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No 21.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of November 3, 1921.

L'ACCORD FRANCO-TURC: TEXTE DU TRAITÉ.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

LES hautes parties contractantes déclarent que, dès la signature du présent accord, l'état de guerre cessera entre elles; les armées, les autorités civiles et les populations en seront immédiatement avisées.

ARTICLE 2.

Dès la signature du présent accord, les prisonniers de guerre respectifs ainsi que toutes les personnes françaises ou turques détenues ou emprisonnées seront remises en liberté et reconduites aux frais de la partie qui les détient dans la ville la plus proche qui sera désignée à cet effet. Le bénéfice de cet article s'étend à tous les détenus et prisonniers des deux parties, quels que soient la date et le lieu de détention, d'emprisonnement ou de capture.

Evacuation et Protection des Minorités.

ARTICLE 3.

Dans un délai maximum de deux mois à partir de la signature du présent accord, les troupes turques se retireront au nord et les troupes françaises au sud de la ligne désignée à l'article 8.

ARTICLE 4.

L'évacuation et la prise de possession qui auront lieu dans le délai prévu à l'article 3 seront effectuées selon des modalités à fixer d'un commun accord par une Commission mixte nommée par les commandants militaires des deux parties.

ARTICLE 5.

Une amnistie plénière sera accordée par les deux parties contractantes dans les régions évacuées dès leur prise en possession.

ARTICLE 6.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie déclare que les droits des minorités solennellement reconnus dans le Pacte national seront confirmés par lui sur la même base que celle établie par les conventions conclues à ce sujet entre les Puissances de l'Entente, leurs adversaires et certains de leurs alliés.

ARTICLE 7.

Un régime administratif spécial sera institué pour la région d'Alexandrette. Les habitants de race turque de cette région jouiront de toutes les facilités pour le développement de leur culture. La langue turque y aura le caractère officiel.

La nouvelle Frontière.

ARTICLE 8.

La ligne mentionnée à l'article 3 est fixée et précisée comme suit :

La ligne frontière partira d'un point à choisir sur le golfe d'Alexandrette immédiatement au sud de la localité de Pavas et se dirigera sensiblement vers Meidan-Ekbes (la station du chemin de fer et la localité restant à la Syrie).

De là, elle s'infléchira vers le sud-est de manière à laisser à la Syrie la localité de Marsova et à la Turquie celle de Karnaba, ainsi que la ville de Killis; de là, elle rejoindra la voie ferrée à la station de Tchoban Bey. Puis elle suivra la voie ferrée de Bagdad dont la plate-forme restera sur le territoire turc jusqu'à Nousseibine; de là, elle suivra la vieille route entre Nousseibine et Djéziré-ibn-Omer, où elle rejoindra le Tigre. Les localités de Nousseibine et de Djéziré-ibn-Omer ainsi que la route resteront à la Turquie; mais les deux pays auront les mêmes droits pour l'utilisation de cette route.

Les stations et gares de la section entre Tchoban Bey et Nousseibine appartiendront à la Turquie comme faisant partie de la plateforme du chemin de fer.

Une commission composée des délégués des deux parties sera constituée dans un délai de deux mois à partir de la signature du présent accord, pour fixer la ligne susmentionnée. Cette commission procédera aux travaux dans le même délai.

ARTICLE 9.

Le tombeau de Suleïman Chah, le grand-père du Sultan Osman, fondateur de la dynastie ottomane (tombeau connu sous le nom de Turc Mézari), situé à Djaber-Kalissi, restera, avec ses dépendances, la propriété de la Turquie, qui pourra y maintenir des gardiens et y hisser le drapeau turc.

Les Voies ferrées.

ARTICLE 10.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie accepte le transfert de la concession de la section du Chemin de fer de Bagdad entre Bozanti et Nousseibine, ainsi que des divers embranchements construits dans le vilayet d'Adana, à un groupe français désigné par le Gouvernement français avec tous les droits, privilèges et avantages attachés aux concessions, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'exploitation et le trafic.

La Turquie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Meidan-Ekbes à Tchoban Bey, dans la région syrienne, et la Syrie aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par chemin de fer de Tchoban Bey jusqu'à Nousseibine dans le territoire turc.

Sur cette section et ces embranchements, aucun tarif différentiel ne pourra être établi en principe. Cependant, les deux Gouvernements se réservent le droit d'étudier, le cas échéant, d'un commun accord, toute dérogation à cette règle qui deviendrait nécessaire.

En cas d'impossibilité d'accord, chaque partie reprendra sa liberté d'action.

ARTICLE 11.

Une commission mixte sera instituée après la ratification du présent accord en vue de conclure une convention douanière entre la Turquie et la Syrie. Les conditions, ainsi que la durée de cette convention, seront déterminées par cette commission. Jusqu'à la conclusion de la convention précitée, les deux pays conserveront leur liberté d'action.

Les Eaux et l'Agriculture.

ARTICLE 12.

Les eaux de Kouveik seront réparties entre la ville d'Alep et la région au nord restée turque, de manière à donner équitablement satisfaction aux deux parties.

La ville d'Alep pourra également faire, à ses frais, une prise d'eau sur l'Euphrate en territoire turc pour faire face aux besoins de la région.

ARTICLE 13.

Les habitants sédentaires ou semi-nomades ayant la jouissance de pâturages ou ayant des propriétés de l'un ou de l'autre côté de la ligne fixée à l'article 8 continueront comme par le passé à exercer leurs droits. Ils pourront, pour les nécessités de leur exploitation, librement et sans payer aucun droit de douane ou de pâturage, ni aucune taxe, transporter d'un côté à l'autre de cette ligne leur bétail avec le croit, leurs instruments, leurs outillages, leurs semences et leurs produits agricoles, étant bien entendu qu'ils sont tenus de payer les droits et taxes y relatifs dans le pays où ils sont domiciliés.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

Yussuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

JE me plais à espérer que l'accord conclu entre le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et le Gouvernement de la République française en vue de réaliser une paix définitive et durable aura pour conséquence de rétablir et de consolider les relations étroites qui ont existé dans le passé entre les deux nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'efforçant de résoudre dans un esprit de cordiale entente toutes les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée, désireux d'autre part de favoriser le développement des intérêts matériels entre les deux pays, me charge de vous déclarer qu'il est disposé à accorder la concession des mines de fer, de chrome et d'argent se trouvant dans la vallée de Harchite pour une durée de 99 ans à un groupe français qui devra procéder dans un délai de 5 ans, à partir de la signature du présent accord, à l'exploitation de cette concession par une société constituée conformément aux lois turques avec participation des capitaux turcs jusqu'à concurrence de 50 pour cent.

En outre, le Gouvernement turc est prêt à examiner avec la plus grande bienveillance les autres demandes qui pourraient être formulées par des groupes français relativement à la concession de mines, voies ferrées, ports et fleuves, à condition que lesdites demandes soient conformes aux intérêts réciproques de la Turquie et de la France.

D'autre part, la Turquie désire profiter de la collaboration des professeurs spécialistes français dans ses écoles professionnelles. A cet effet, elle fera connaître plus tard l'étendue de ses besoins au Gouvernement français.

Enfin, la Turquie espère que, dès la conclusion de l'accord, le Gouvernement français voudra bien autoriser les capitalistes français à entrer en relations économiques et financières avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 21.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of November 3, 1921.

LES agences nous ont annoncé la signature, puis la ratification de l'Accord franco-turc qui vient d'être conclu par M. Franklin-Bouillon à Angora. Toutefois, ces renseignements—forcément laconiques et incomplets, puisque transmis par dépêche—laissent subsister bien des points d'ombre. Quelle est l'exacte portée de l'accord? Quelles en sont les clauses fondamentales? Autant de questions que tout le monde se posait avec une bien légitime curiosité. Une seule personne était à même de nous renseigner sur ces divers points de façon exacte et surtout autorisée: son Excellence le Général Pellé, Haut-Commissaire de France à Constantinople. C'est donc au général que nous nous sommes adressé. Notre démarche ne laissait pas d'être hardie. La bonne grâce avec laquelle son Excellence voulut bien se laisser

interviewer fut plus grande d'ailleurs que l'audace professionnelle qui nous animait. . . .

Son Excellence le Général Pellé nous a reçu dans son cabinet de travail, à l'Ambassade de France. En face du fauteuil où nous avions pris place sur l'aimable invitation de notre éminent interlocuteur, un grand portrait d'un ancien sultan enturbané—Abdul-Medjid, le Réformateur, sauf erreur—révait dans son cadre de bois doré, et un firman de jadis enroulait ses savantes arabesques—témoins silencieux qui confirmaient de façon concrète, matérielle en quelque sorte, cette ancienneté multi-séculaire des relations franco-turques dont son Excellence le Général Pellé nous parlait avec l'éloquence persuasive que donne une conviction sincère et profonde.

“ Je tiens à insister sur ce point,” nous dit son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire : “ le traité, ou mieux l'accord qui vient d'être conclu ne fait que renouer les liens de cette amitié traditionnelle qui a toujours uni, par le passé, la France et la Turquie. Ces liens extrêmement anciens dérivent à la fois des liens économiques entre nos deux pays—il fut un temps où les bateaux étrangers qui traversaient les Dardanelles venaient ici, sous l'égide de la bannière franque—et des relations intellectuelles créées par l'usage de la langue française, par les nombreuses écoles françaises établies dans le pays, par les relations étroites entre la pensée française et la pensée turque. L'expérience des dernières années a démontré d'ailleurs que les liens entre les deux pays étaient plus forts que les circonstances politiques plus ou moins éphémères. . . .

“ Pour ma part,” continue le général, “ je fus frappé, il y a quelques années, à l'époque où l'Allemagne semblait ici plus puissante que jamais; où l'Ambassade d'Allemagne, érigée sur les hauteurs de Péra, et la gare de Haïdar-Pacha, terminus du Bagdad-bahn, se faisaient face, de part et d'autre du Bosphore; à l'époque où Liman von Sanders venait de s'établir au Séraskérat et où l'influence allemande paraissait triomphante, je fus frappé, dis-je, de ce que me mandait un ami, alors à Constantinople. Il m'affirmait, en effet, que l'influence française subsistait quand même; que l'amitié pour la France animait beaucoup de nobles âmes appartenant à toutes les classes de la population.

“ En ce moment encore, après une guerre au cours de laquelle la Turquie a très malencontreusement rompu ses liens antiques, l'accord qui sanctionne la reprise de nos relations amicales a trouvé tout de suite l'adhésion unanime de l'opinion publique française et turque. . . .”

Son Excellence s'excuse de ne pouvoir pas encore communiquer à la presse le texte intégral de l'Accord d'Angora, qui d'ailleurs doit être publié prochainement. Le signataire français de l'accord en question, M. Franklin-Bouillon, est passé ici en coup de vent, lors de son “ voyage-record ” qui lui a permis de couvrir, en sept jours, la distance qui sépare Angora de Paris. Durant son passage en notre ville, il n'a pas eu le temps matériel de communiquer au moins une copie du document à M. le Haut-Commissaire. Toutefois, le général veut bien nous indiquer *grosso modo* la substance de l'accord. Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent :

1. En thèse générale, à rétablir et à consolider à l'avenir les relations traditionnelles d'amitié franco-turques.
2. A procéder à l'échange et à la restitution des prisonniers respectifs (cette clause a déjà reçu son effet).
3. A procéder dans un délai de deux mois à l'évacuation des territoires occupés au delà de la nouvelle frontière.

[La ligne en question part du golfe d'Alexandrette, au sud de la localité de Payas, rejoint vers l'est la voie ferrée près de Tchoban-Bey; elle longe ensuite la ligne de chemin de fer jusqu'à Nissibin et la “ vieille route ” jusqu'à Djéziret-ibn-Omar, les deux localités susdites demeurant à la Turquie.]

A ce propos, son Excellence relève une particularité aussi curieuse que suggestive.

“ Cette frontière,” nous dit le général, “ comporte une réelle innovation. C'est en effet la première fois que l'on choisit une voie ferrée comme ligne de démarcation entre les territoires de deux Etats. Ce fait prouve bien que les parties contractantes sont fermement décidées à vivre désormais en bonne intelligence et qu'elles entendent exploiter la voie en commun. . . .”

Le détail est en effet fort caractéristique. Si l'on avait nourri, de part et d'autre, des intentions belliqueuses ou même de simples soupçons quant à la bonne

foi de l'autre partie contractante l'on n'aurait pas offert ainsi, à portée de main de l'adversaire éventuel, un gage militaire aussi précieux et aussi vulnérable qu'une voie ferrée. . . . Mais la partie la plus intéressante de l'interview de son Excellence le Général Pellé est celle qui a trait à la portée politique du nouvel accord.

“ On ne saurait trop faire ressortir,” souligne son Excellence, “ le caractère limité de l'accord. L'état de guerre avait cessé d'exister, entre la Turquie et la France, depuis la conclusion de la convention d'armistice de Moudros. Par la suite, il y eut une reprise des hostilités entre une partie de la Turquie et la France, en Syrie. Le nouvel accord met fin à cette guerre partielle et nous replace, pour l'ensemble de la Turquie, sous le régime établi par la Convention d'Armistice. Nous ne pouvions, ou mieux nous ne voulions pas toucher à l'ensemble des conditions de la paix générale qui ne peuvent être réglées qu'avec le concours de nos Alliés, et au sujet desquelles nous entendons ne prendre d'engagement qu'en parfait accord avec eux.

“ La nouvelle frontière,” continue le général, “ répond aussi pratiquement que possible à la frontière des nationalités. Consultez une carte d'avant-guerre—c'est-à-dire tracée à un moment où aucun souci de défendre une cause politique n'inspirait le géographe: vous verrez que la ligne de démarcation entre les populations arabes de Syrie et les populations—sinon turques, du moins kurdes—de Cilicie, coïncide presque exactement avec la frontière tracée par l'Accord d'Angora. Comme partout, d'ailleurs, des mélanges se sont produits, il y a eu pénétration réciproque en certains points, notamment dans la région d'Alexandrette. C'est précisément dans le but de sauvegarder les droits des îlots de population turque ainsi constitués en territoire syrien, que l'on a introduit dans le traité des clauses spéciales réglant les droits des minorités ethniques. Dans les districts peuplés par une majorité turque, on reconnaîtra la langue turque comme langue officielle.

“ Il n'a pas tenu à nous que le traité signé déjà à Londres ne soit mis à exécution. Du moins, ne nous sommes-nous pas laissés influencer par les phases de la guerre gréco-turque et avons-nous strictement maintenu les intentions que nous avions manifestées dès le début, concernant l'évacuation volontaire de la Cilicie—que nous avions pourtant conquise par les armes, de concert avec nos Alliés, au cours de la grande guerre.

“ Jadis, une sorte de principe universellement admis par les nations européennes établissait que tout pays conquis aux musulmans ne devait être jamais évacué ni rendu. Nous avons cru bon de nous inspirer d'un principe plus moderne et plus équitable, du seul principe qui en soit vraiment un—du principe des nationalités. En agissant ainsi nous avons donné une preuve de notre confiance à l'égard de la Turquie. . . .”

Après un court moment de réflexion, notre éminent interlocuteur reprend, dans les termes suivants—et dans le silence de la vaste pièce, ses paroles revêtent un cachet presque solennel :

“ Il est bien certain que l'Europe et le monde jugeront la nouvelle Turquie d'après la façon dont sera appliqué ce traité, dans les pays que nous aurons rendus volontairement et de bonne amitié à la Turquie. Si les droits des minorités ne sont pas respectés, si l'on se laisse aller à des violences ou à des représailles à l'égard des populations chrétiennes, ou des populations qui ont vécu en bonne entente avec nous, sur ces territoires, il y aurait, dans l'opinion du monde entier, un ‘ tollé ’ considérable contre la Turquie. C'est à l'œuvre que l'on connaîtra la maturité politique de ceux avec qui la France vient de conclure un accord de paix et d'amitié. . . .”

[E 12728/143/44]

No. 22.

Memorandum communicated by the Greek Delegation.—(Received November 14.)

ON the 2nd instant the Greek Government formally expressed its adherence to the suggestions put forward, on behalf of the British Government, by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston with a view to the restoration of peace in the Near East. Consequent on this, the following points are submitted for the consideration of His Britannic Majesty's Government:—

1. In the course of a conversation with M. Gounaris and M. Baltazzi on the 27th ultimo the Marquess Curzon expressed the opinion that peace in the Near East could not be attained unless certain modifications were accepted in the régime

provided for the Smyrna territory by the Treaty of Sèvres. The Greek Government is confident that the British Government will recognise that these modifications must not be such as to compromise the basic principle on which this régime is founded, the necessity, that is, of securing the non-Turkish elements of the population against the dangers accruing from Turkish domination. What these dangers are is indicated—not to give instances from the interminable list of Turkish outrages against these elements—by the precedent of Ismid, where, on the evacuation of the peninsula by the Greek army, no less than 30,000 inhabitants abandoned their homes to subsist on a refugee's pittance in Greece rather than come again under Turkish rule. The majority of these refugees were Greeks and some were Armenians, but they also included several thousands of Moslem Circassians. No one can reasonably doubt that unless an effective guarantee is devised the horrors of Ismid will be repeated throughout Western Asia Minor and that the withdrawal of the Greek army would be accompanied by a general exodus of all these elements—Greek, Armenian and Circassian—which are convinced, not without good reason, that the return of the Turk will involve their own extermination.

It will be remembered that as a result of the persecutions which began immediately after the Balkan wars over 300,000 refugees arrived in Greece from Thrace and Asia Minor. The great majority of these have been enabled to return to their homes thanks to the Greek occupation. Thus in the Smyrna area alone 126,000 of these refugees have been repatriated. The return of these populations, under the auspices of the Greek Administration, has had results which justify the prediction made by an Inter-Allied Commission that it would prove "by far the soundest means of restoring prosperity in the country." Detailed evidence to this effect may be found in Annex (A) to the present memorandum. Whether these populations shall continue to enrich the country with their industry or shall become refugees once more clearly also depends on the effectiveness of the guarantee to be furnished them against persecution.

The Greek Government feel confident that the British Government will accordingly concur in the view that it would be desirable to extend this guarantee to as considerable a proportion of the non-Turkish elements in Western Asia Minor as may be possible. The Greek Government trust that in determining the limits of the area within which the contemplated régime is to be set up the fact will not be ignored that throughout a considerable stretch of territory to the north and north-east of the Sèvres zone non-Turkish elements are preponderant and that the fate of these elements will not be decided without their wishes being taken into account. Should these populations be excluded, they will undoubtedly abandon their homes and take refuge in Greek territory. Greece will thus become flooded with masses of refugees, involving a heavy drain on the Greek Treasury, while at the same time fertile regions in Asia Minor will suffer depopulation.

2. A further point is that means must be contrived effectively to safeguard the régime to be set up in the Smyrna area against outside attacks. The disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres—and there can be no doubt that these should be maintained—have proved inadequate for this purpose. The Kemalist army doubtless obtained the greater part of its armament by taking forcible possession of the stores in which Turkish war material surrendered at the armistice had been concentrated by the Allies. It cannot, however, be doubted that the Kemalists have also succeeded in importing considerable quantities of arms and munitions from abroad. If such importation has been possible in spite of the difficulties inherent in the fact that the state of war has not yet come to an end in Turkey it is clear that it will be far easier under the normal conditions of peace. Even if in the future the Turkish Government were itself to respect its pledges it is not likely that it would sincerely wish or effectually be able to put down organisations, similar to that of Mustapha Kemal, directed against the *status quo* in Smyrna. The danger to the latter is thus a reality. A reaffirmation of the principle that territory which has once been detached from Turkish rule cannot be put back under the Turk would have a moral effect calculated to lessen this danger. Unfortunately, certain breaches have been made in this principle in the very recent past, and this has roused hopes among the Turks that the principle has lost its force. The Marquess Curzon, in the course of his conversation with M. Gounaris and M. Baltazzi on the 27th ultimo, stated that he considered that the Turkish refusal to "make peace on any basis that left the Greeks at Smyrna" was unreasonable. The Greek view is that the presence of Greek troops in the Smyrna territory should be regulated on the basis of the recognition of the fact that it constitutes the only adequate guarantee that the régime to

be set up there will be respected by the Turks. Greece has consented to heavy sacrifices for the liberation of the Greeks of Asia Minor. The force of circumstances has not allowed the integral liberation of the Christian populations of Turkey—proclaimed as a war aim by the Allies—to be fully realised. In consequence of this, a process rendered inevitable by historical forces is still incomplete, and it remains to the future to bring it to consummation. The Greek Government, interpreting the feeling of the Greek nation as directly affected by this fact, is under an imperative obligation to declare that it is essential that the position of Greece in Smyrna should be so regulated as effectually to secure through the Greek army the protection of the new *status quo* against attack.

Reasons have already been pointed out, connected with the necessity of safeguarding as large a proportion as possible of the non-Turkish elements, which militate in favour of a northward extension of the Smyrna zone. It may here be further pointed out that such an extension as far as the Marmora littoral would materially assist in securing the *status quo* in Smyrna by facilitating communications between European Greece and Asia Minor and thereby making possible the rapid transfer of troops, which would further be available for coping with any hostile action against the freedom of the Straits.

3. A third point which the Greek Government cannot ignore is that, however wide the extension to be given to the area referred to above, it will in any case be impossible to incorporate in it the whole of the territories which contain compact non-Turkish populations. The Greek Government feels it to be its duty to draw the attention of the British Government to the necessity of taking measures to safeguard the elementary rights of these populations. The worthlessness of Turkish promises to respect the rights of subject populations is an historical truism. The development of events in the recent past has made the situation yet more acute. In the first place Kemalist Turkey is animated by a spirit of aggressive and intransigent nationalism which the Kemalists have imbibed from the Young Turks while intensifying it. Again, the war-time attitude of the subject populations, which, counting on Allied pledges, looked to an Allied victory to secure their liberation, widened yet further the breach between them and their Turkish neighbours. Indeed, men of these subject races fought during the war in the Allied armies against Turkey, and tens of thousands of Asiatic Greeks, Armenians and Circassians have fought with the Greek army against the Kemalists. Soldiers from every district within the Greek occupation are at present serving in the Greek army, and volunteers have come from beyond the Greek lines. Finally, the Turkish Government, which has always failed to secure these non-Turkish elements from outrage, will be less than ever able to protect them in the future. At the present moment the *de facto* Government of Mustapha Kemal has usurped throughout Anatolia the authority lawfully belonging to Constantinople. Sooner or later, of course, Turkish territories will be again united under a single Government, but a result of the existence for over two years of a *de facto* Government at Angora has been to create among the Turks of Anatolia a feeling of indifference and contempt for Constantinople, and this will in the future make them less amenable than ever to control from Constantinople, especially as the *pronunciamento* of Anatolia will in all probability be regarded by them as having saved Turkey.

It was in order to safeguard the future of these subject populations that the Greek Government undertook the war in Asia Minor. In this the Greek people were in hearty concurrence with their Government and readily consented to the sacrifices involved. Now that Greece, in the interests of peace has adhered to the suggestion of the British Government that she should entrust the settlement of the problem to Allied diplomacy, she feels it to be her duty to draw the attention of the British Government, and thereby of the Allied Governments generally, to the position of the non-Turkish populations that will remain outside the territory which will enjoy the guarantees of the Smyrna régime. The Greek Government feels the existence of an imperative moral duty that special measures for the protection of these minorities should be devised and imposed on Turkey. Greece is ready to take on herself the burdens, military and other, necessary to make these measures effective, as she cannot assume in the eyes of the civilised world the responsibility for the sequel of misery and extermination to a return of these populations under the Turkish sway.

4. It is hoped that the British Government will recognise that the Greek Government is sincerely actuated by a spirit of moderation. The Greek Government ventures to affirm that this spirit has animated its policy throughout. The Marquess Curzon, on the 27th ultimo, expressed the opinion that Greece had made a mistake

in rejecting the proposals of the Conference held at London in March. The Marquess Curzon also described as mistakes on the part of Greece the offensive then begun in Asia Minor and the subsequent refusal of the offer of Allied mediation in July. It may be pointed out in this connection that the Greek Government did not in any way refuse to discuss the March proposals. On the contrary, it confidentially communicated to the British Government its readiness to accept these proposals, with certain modifications, in proof of its conciliatory spirit. A copy is appended of the confidential declaration to this effect then addressed by MM. Calogeropoulo and Gounaris to the British Government.* Again, the March offensive was solely inspired by urgent considerations of military necessity which are set forth in Annex (C) to the present memorandum. In the same way military considerations, which will be found stated in Annex (D), made impossible a postponement of the July offensive. In this connection it will be remembered that in her answer to the collective notes of the Allies on this occasion Greece formally declared her willingness to consider any concrete proposals of peace which might be formulated by these Powers.

With this attitude on the part of Greece the British Government may contrast the absolutely intransigent attitude of the Turks. The British Government may further be reminded that Greece has preserved this attitude, while the Greek claims contested were claims whose legitimacy is not only founded on strong ethnical and historical grounds, but has been recognised in the most formal manner by the Allied Powers and Turkey herself in the Treaty of Sèvres in return for the sacrifices of Greece in a war waged side by side with the Allied Powers, who themselves proclaimed the substance of these claims as one of their explicit war aims.

London, November 12, 1921.

Annex (A).

The list at the end of this annex gives the names of 150 towns and villages in the area between the Gulf of Adramytti and the Meander Valley, the whole or a considerable proportion of whose Greek inhabitants were deported or expelled from their homes between 1914 and 1919. The table below gives the total number of such refugees repatriated by the Greek Administration up to January 1921, classified according to districts of provenance and repatriation:—

District.	Total.
1. Vourla	5,500
2. Smyrna-Vourla	2,800
3. Tchesme	30,000
4. Menemen	3,500
5. Aivali	22,000
6. Karabouroun	9,000
7. Fodja	11,000
8. Dikeli-Pergamos	12,500
9. Smyrna	4,500
10. Ak-Hissar	8,200
11. Adramytti	10,000
12. Cassaba, Magnesia, Tireh, Odemish, Baindir	7,000
	<hr/> 126,000

The Greek Administration has not only repatriated these populations but has furnished them with the necessary assistance during the period immediately subsequent to their repatriation. It has built or repaired 25,800 houses to meet the acute housing crisis. It has distributed ploughs and seed and has guaranteed loans by the National Bank of Greece to agriculturists—and the refugee populations are mostly agricultural—totalling 25,000,000 drachmai. The effect has been immediate. The consequences which the displacement of these populations had had for the economic life of the country may be gauged from the fact that the area under cultivation, which stood at 126,000 hectares in 1913, had fallen to 45,000 in 1919. In

* Annex (B).

particular fully 70 per cent. of the vine-plantations had fallen out of cultivation at the time of the Greek occupation. As a result of the repatriation of the Greek refugees and of the measures taken by the Greek Administration the present year's harvest is above the pre-war average—in fact there are districts which had not had such a crop for sixty years—while the area under cultivation has risen from 45,000 hectares to above the pre-war level and now stands at 135,000 hectares.

TCHESME DISTRICT.

1. Tchesme.
2. Ovadjik.
3. Reis-dere.
4. Kermehalesi.
5. Aghia Paraskevi.
6. Kato Panaghia.
7. Lythri.
8. Lidjia.
9. Agrilia.
10. Alatsata.
11. Pyrgi.
12. Ouzoun-Koyou.
13. Nochout-Alani.
14. Tshekouria.

VOURLA DISTRICT.

15. Vourla.
16. Vourla Skala.
17. Gul-baktche.
18. Segouti.
19. Tsekouria.
20. Yaghtchilar.
21. Ortandja.
22. Kolicja.
23. Mentesi.
24. Kilisman.
25. Ano Demerdjik.
26. Kato Demerdjik.
27. Englezonisi.
28. Aghia Paraskevi.
29. Aghios Demetrios.
30. Aghios Panteleimon.
31. Yatronisi.
32. Pournali.
33. Bitcher-alani.

KARABOUROUN DISTRICT.

34. Meli.
35. Eghri-liman.
36. Deniz-gheren.
37. Salmani.
38. Voinaki.
39. Sandjaki.
40. Kutchuk-baktche.
41. Sarpandjik.
42. Yeni-liman.
43. Haseki.
44. Tepe-poz.
45. Saip Skala.
46. Achirli.
47. Saip.
48. Ambar-Seki.

49. Monastiri.
50. Mikro Moldovani.
51. Adjeounar.
52. Tekhe.
53. Moldovani Skala.

SMYRNA-VOURLA LITTORAL.

54. Lidjia.
55. Glikeui.
56. Narli-dere.
57. Aghios Georgios.

FODJA DISTRICT.

58. Eski Fodja.
59. Sovoudjouk.
60. Karagateh.
61. Gherenkeui.
62. Yeni Fodja.
63. Tchakmakli.
64. Kiz-Begli.

AIDIN DISTRICT.

65. Aidin.
66. Dermendjik.
67. Kara-bounar.
68. Baladjik.
69. Nazli.

MENEMEN DISTRICT.

70. Menemen.
71. Oloudjak.
72. Serekeui.
73. Younerli.
74. Ortakeui.
75. Panitsa.
76. Ali-agma.
77. Arab-tchiflik.

PERGAMOS DISTRICT.

78. Pergamos.
79. Dikeli.
80. Tchandarli.
81. Kabakum.
82. Ismailar.
83. Azanos.
84. Kallergha.
85. Santzides.
86. Klissekuei.
87. Tchagran.
88. Klissekeui Skala.
89. Kinik.

90. Boryadjik.
91. Kasixi.
92. Roumkeui.
93. Bourdjekeui.
94. Ayazkeui.
95. Zachnos.
96. Sarandjilar.

AIVALI DISTRICT.

97. Aivali.
98. Yenitsarochori.
99. Aghios Nikolaos.
100. Keremkeui.
101. Kouvouk-omer.
102. Tchakmak.
103. Moschonisia.
104. Ayasmat.
105. Salachlar.
106. Besik-tepe.
107. Outs-karagatch.
108. Kansiz.

ADRAMYTTI DISTRICT.

109. Adramytti.
110. Freneli.
111. Zeitunli.
112. Balia.
113. Kemer.
114. Derekeui.
115. Frenkeui.
116. Karagatch.
117. Yaghikeui.

118. Gumetch.
119. Papazli.
120. Narli.
121. Ada-tepe.
122. Ak-tehai.
123. Lidjia.
124. Papazli Skala.
125. Narli Skala.
126. Ada-tepe-Skala.
127. Tchipni Skala.
128. Megalo Tchipni.
129. Mikro Tchipni.
130. Kutchuk-kuyou.
131. Avdjilar.
132. Avdjilar Skala.
133. Ghiouras.
134. Tachtakeuz.
135. Tchourouk.
136. Pilkekeui.
137. Kemer Skala.
138. Daghlidkinas.
139. Kiosentere.
140. Muradli.
141. Alaklisse.
142. Karaidin.
143. Bachram Skala.
144. Ivrandi.
145. Arakli.
146. Madzerkia.
147. Piskaya.
148. Mezar Altı.
149. Eski Oda.
150. Makaronia.

Annex (B).

The Greek delegation after careful study of the memorandum communicated to it by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, desires, in the first place, to state its inability to admit the principle of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Greek delegation cannot but continue to regard the latter instrument as constituting the lawful basis on which the relations of the signatory States with Turkey must rest.

However, in its desire to facilitate the work of mediation undertaken by the British Government in a spirit which it fully appreciates, and with a view to an immediate and durable re-establishment of peace in the Near East, the Greek delegation has the honour to inform the British Government, in strict confidence, that, in the event in which it should prove possible for the British Government to secure the acceptance by Turkey of the conditions laid down in Lord Curzon's memorandum as modified in the appended note, it may count on acceptance by the Greek Government of an additional protocol to the Treaty of Sèvres defining the internal organisation of the Smyrna territory as outlined in the said memorandum and note.

It is, however, understood that the signature of such a protocol would be conditional on the maintenance of all other clauses of the treaty, and on immediate and full applications of these clauses on the part of Turkey.

London, March 10, 1921.

The following is the text of the proposals referred to:—

1. The Greeks to be allowed to keep a garrison in Smyrna town.
2. Order to be maintained in the rest of the sanjak by a gendarmerie with Allied officers to be recruited in proportion to the numbers and distribution of the population (as reported by a commission (inter-Allied) not the one we have proposed).

3. The same proportional arrangement—equally according to the report of the commission—to be made for the administration. If there is a Greek majority this will ensure their real control of the country, more especially if there is—

4. A Christian Governor to be appointed by the League of Nations and assisted by an Elective Assembly and an Elective Council.

5. As an off-set to this, country so administered would be called the vilayet of Smyrna, and

6. As proposed by the Prime Minister, this morning, it would remain nominally under Turkish sovereignty even if, under the "proportional" arrangement of the Administration, the real control was Greek.

7. The Christian Governor would be responsible for the payment to the Turkish Government of a fixed annual sum which might be augmented with the prosperity of the province. It had better not be called tribute, as that term might, for opposite reasons, give both Greeks and Turks something to cavil at.

8. Our great object is to get a provisional arrangement now, and peace, *i.e.*, to tide over the period when this particular point is over-heated. The heat will diminish. We should therefore add that this arrangement could be reviewed in, say, five years, on the demand of either party by the League of Nations.

Note.

1. Accepted on the understanding that the strength of the garrison is to be fixed by the Greek Government and will be calculated to secure the vilayet against any incursion.

2. The cadres of the gendarmerie to be recruited from local elements and its organisation to be entrusted to Greek cadres, the latter to command the gendarmerie pending the recruiting and instruction of local cadres. The commission to determine the proportional participation of the various local elements in the gendarmerie would appear to be unnecessary. A better and simpler way would be to hold a ballot vote, the results of the latter to serve as a basis for the proportional participation in the gendarmerie.

3. Accepted with a reservation as to the commission which is regarded as unnecessary for reasons stated above. A minimum representation (*e.g.*, one-third) should be stipulated for minorities except in cases where there is only one occupant to be nominated, the occupant in such cases to be chosen from the majority.

4. The Governor to be nominated by the Greek Government subject to the approval of the League of Nations, or to be nominated by the League of Nations on the proposal of the Greek Government.

5. and 6. Accepted.

7. Accepted with the proviso that Turkey and Greece shall each receive a quota only after deduction of the expenses of the Administration and of general charges on the territory (including those of the upkeep of the garrison). It is desirable that a minimum and a maximum sum be fixed for the Turkish quota.

London, March 10, 1921.

Annex (C).

The operations begun by the Greek army in March 1921 were a necessity in view of the fact that the signature of the Franco-Kemalist agreement in London had had a moral effect favourable to Kemal whose forces were beginning to develop into a regular army, while available information was to the effect that Kemalist forces in Cilicia and elsewhere were being transferred to the Greek front. In point of fact a division from Cilicia and another from the Caucasus were so transferred. Had the Greek army not assumed the offensive at this juncture Kemal would have forestalled them in which case the Greek army would have found itself in a very disadvantageous position. The March operations resulted in the occupation of Afion-Karahissar, the advance of the Greek army as far as Tchai and the destruction of a considerable section of the railway to Koniah. Afion-Karahissar was subsequently evacuated after the attainment of the objective in this direction, but the Greek army retained certain positions on the roads leading to Kutahia which were to be utilised in the July offensive. The Greek army did not succeed in occupying

Eski-Shehir, because it found itself before strong Kemalist fortifications with heavy artillery which made possible a resistance much more serious than had been anticipated. The operation was, however, so far successful in that it succeeded in taking the initiative from the enemy who was not even able to follow up our forces on their withdrawal. Early in April Kemal attempted to take the initiative and concentrated his forces for an attack on the Greek positions at Toulou-Bounar. The attack was, however, repulsed with heavy loss for the Kemalist army which retired with the Greek army in pursuit. Subsequent to this Kemal was never again able to take the initiative which remained to the Greek command. The latter was thus enabled to devote the interval between April and the end of June to the reorganisation of its forces which were raised to more than double their original strength and at the same time was at liberty to choose its own time and place for a fresh offensive. These advantages were secured as a result of the March offensive.

Annex (D).

Military Considerations which made it Impossible for Greece to Accept Mediation in June.

The result of the March operations, though it did not constitute a defeat for the Greek army left the latter at a moral disadvantage owing to the failure to take Eski-Shehir, while it left Kemal the solid advantage of retaining possession of the Angora-Eski-Shehir and Karakeui-Eski-Shehir-Afion-Karahissar railway lines. Thanks to this Kemal was in a position promptly to transfer his forces from one sector to another as required while the Greek army, occupying as it did Brusa and Ismid, was obliged to disperse its forces at such wide intervals that it was virtually impossible for any one fraction of the army to come to the assistance of another if attacked. From the point of view of distribution of forces the Greek position was thus very unfavourable, while that of Kemal was extremely advantageous.

Further Greece by a great effort which strained her energies to the utmost, had since March succeeded in preparing a large, well-equipped and well-organised army, stronger than any which had ever taken the field previously in Anatolia. Greece thus felt that she was beyond doubt the stronger and that her superior strength made it certain that her army would retain the initiative throughout and would succeed in depriving Kemal of the positive advantages consequent on his holding Eski-Shehir, Kutahia and Afion-Karahissar, as well as of the negative advantages involved in the necessarily disadvantageous distribution of the Greek forces. The Greeks were convinced that they would succeed in gaining possession of the three important localities in question with the railway connecting them and thereby reuniting into a single army the whole of their scattered forces. They realised, however, that this result could only be attained on condition that they struck quickly, as delay over a month or two meant that the operations would have to be conducted in the autumn season. This again meant that the Greek army would lose all the advantages of easy communications owing to the rains and the consequent deterioration of the roads. The sequel proved that there was not a week to spare, for time actually failed for a continuation of the advance on Angora. Thus when, in June, the Allies offered to Greece their good offices, Greece had against her the failure of her army to take Eski-Shehir in March, while, on the other hand, she disposed of a strong army with an excellent *moral* and an absolute initiative in the coming operations. She was accordingly convinced of success on condition, however, that she struck quickly. It follows from this that for Greece at this juncture to have postponed her offensive by accepting the proposed good offices with a view to mediation, without any assurance that this mediation would also be accepted by the Kemalists or would secure a satisfactory peace-settlement, would have meant military suicide which Greece had no reason to commit.

The operations then begun proved successful and their development corresponded with mathematical precision to Greek anticipation. By the 21st July the Greek army was in possession of the whole of the section of the Bagdad railway between Karakeui and Afion-Karahissar. Moreover, the Greek forces were now concentrated on a single front while the defeated enemy was retiring beyond the Sakaria on Angora.

The objective of the first phase of the operations was thus completely attained. To secure the gain of this phase, however, it was necessary that the enemy should

be followed up partly with a view to inflicting yet heavier losses on him, partly in order to put an end for the future to any possibility of a Kemalist attack along the most important (Eski-Shehir) section of the Greek front by neutralising the Kemalist base at Angora.

This objective was also attained through the advance on Angora. The approach of winter and the beginning of the rains, it is true, made the continuation of the advance as far as Angora itself impracticable. However, a vacuum has been created round Angora by the destruction of over 100 kilom. of the railway-line and by stripping the country of the resources necessary for the maintenance in it of an army of any size. Proof of this is furnished by the fact that Kemal has been compelled to move his centre in the direction of Koniah. The Greek army is thus guaranteed for a considerable time to come against the possibility of a serious attack against Eski-Shehir and can devote its undivided attention and the bulk of its forces to the southern front in the Afion-Karahissar district.

[E 12571/1/44]

No. 23.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 3152)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the alleged monopoly of the organisation of the Turkish gendarmerie.

Paris, November 14, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 23.

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Lord Hardinge.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 14 novembre 1921.

PAR une lettre du 10 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que, d'après une information parvenue de Constantinople au Gouvernement britannique, le Commandant Sarron prétendrait avoir reçu de Paris une commission le nommant Inspecteur général de la Gendarmerie ottomane.

Lord Curzon craint de voir dans cette information la confirmation de la rumeur déjà signalée dans sa lettre du 5 novembre à M. de Saint-Aulaire et d'après laquelle M. Franklin-Bouillon aurait obtenu du Gouvernement d'Angora l'engagement secret que la France recevrait le monopole de l'organisation de la gendarmerie dans toute la Turquie.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que M. Franklin-Bouillon n'a sous aucune forme, demandé ni obtenu aucun monopole ni promesse de monopole en vue de l'organisation de la gendarmerie en Turquie. J'ajoute que l'Accord d'Angora n'a apporté aucun changement à la situation actuelle du Commandant Sarron et que cet officier n'a été l'objet d'aucune nomination en dehors de sa récente promotion au grade de lieutenant-colonel dans l'armée française.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu, à cette occasion, rappeler les différents accords et notamment celui du 19 juin dernier intervenus entre nos deux Gouvernements au sujet de la prise de commandement du Général Harrington et de la constitution des sous-commissions militaires. Elle rappelait également que le Général Fillonneau a été nommé à la présidence de la sous-commission de gendarmerie.

Je serais très obligé à votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire savoir d'urgence au Marquess Curzon of Kedleston que le Gouvernement français considère que les accords précités demeurent intégralement en vigueur, et que la nomination du Général Fillonneau et le caractère de sa mission ne sont en rien modifiés.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

L. BONNEVAY.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 18.)

M. le Marquis,

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 17 novembre 1921.

À LA suite de l'entretien que votre Seigneurie a eu avec M. de Saint-Aulaire touchant l'accord intervenu entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et le Gouvernement d'Angora, elle a bien voulu adresser, le 5 novembre, à l'Ambassadeur de la République, une lettre faisant ressortir sur quels points cet arrangement paraît au Gouvernement britannique dépasser le caractère d'une "tractation locale," suivant la définition donnée par M. Briand, et réserver à la France des avantages particuliers.

Je me suis empressé de faire part de cette communication à mon Gouvernement, qui, après l'avoir examinée avec le plus grand soin, et dans l'esprit le plus amical, m'a prié de faire connaître à votre Seigneurie les observations que l'étude de ce document lui suggère. Le Gouvernement français ne doute pas que la netteté et la précision de ses explications ne dissipent l'impression qui se dégage de la lettre de votre Seigneurie et ne peut résulter que d'un malentendu.

Le Gouvernement français a été heureux tout d'abord de constater que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a bien compris la nature des deux missions confiées à M. Franklin-Bouillon, missions dont votre Seigneurie avait été informée dès qu'elles furent décidées.

Le premier voyage de M. Franklin-Bouillon a été entrepris spontanément et à titre strictement privé et personnel; le Gouvernement français a saisi, avec satisfaction, cette occasion de se renseigner sur les tendances du Gouvernement d'Angora et les possibilités de mettre fin aux hostilités dont la France supportait, en Cilicie, tout le poids, alors que la nation et le Parlement avaient exprimé, avec force, leur volonté de faire cesser de cruelles effusions de sang et des dépenses particulièrement onéreuses.

Le Président du Conseil a estimé que M. Franklin-Bouillon était pleinement qualifié pour entreprendre une telle enquête par son passé d'ancien membre du Gouvernement, sa connaissance approfondie des affaires d'Orient et les garanties qu'offraient son expérience et son activité.

Votre Seigneurie constatera que rien, dans le programme d'information indiqué ci-dessus, n'allait à l'encontre des assurances données par M. Briand, aux termes de quoi la France n'avait contracté et ne contracterait aucun engagement touchant aux questions générales de la paix entre les Alliés et la Turquie, sans être en accord étroit avec eux, et particulièrement avec le Gouvernement britannique.

Quant à la seconde mission de M. Franklin-Bouillon, mission dont votre Seigneurie a connu le caractère officiel, elle n'est pas davantage sortie du cadre tracé par M. Briand: laissant entièrement de côté les problèmes de la paix générale, elle s'est limitée strictement à la négociation des affaires mêmes énumérées par votre Seigneurie dans sa lettre du 5 novembre: libération des prisonniers français, protection des minorités en Cilicie, et questions qui se posaient nécessairement comme corollaires de l'évacuation de la Cilicie par nos troupes.

Le Gouvernement français m'a prescrit de renouveler l'assurance qu'il a toujours réservé la question de la paix avec la Turquie et n'a jamais envisagé qu'un engagement puisse être pris à cet égard en dehors d'un accord étroit avec ses Alliés et, notamment, avec le Gouvernement britannique. Des assurances catégoriques à cet égard ont déjà été données au Gouvernement britannique le 14 juillet 1921, et je suis chargé de les réitérer expressément.

Le Gouvernement français les répète d'autant plus volontiers qu'il a trouvé chez le Gouvernement anglais le même esprit de complète collaboration lors des conversations qui ont eu lieu récemment, à Londres, entre votre Seigneurie et les Ministres grecs, pour la recherche d'une paix satisfaisante en Orient. Le Gouvernement de la République ne peut que se réjouir de constater la parfaite identité de principes qui existe ainsi entre les deux Gouvernements.

Ce plein accord, sur les maximes qui régissent la conduite des deux Gouvernements, met le Gouvernement français d'autant plus à l'aise pour dissiper tout malentendu, tant sur la portée de l'arrangement d'Angora, que sur les motifs qui ont amené la France à l'approuver.

Sans doute, le Gouvernement anglais a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement français sur les inconvénients d'un accord direct entre la France et le Gouvernement d'Angora. Le 4 avril, au cours d'une visite de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, il fut rappelé à Lord Hardinge qu'en mars 1921,

M. Briand avait déclaré, à plusieurs reprises, à Mr. Lloyd George, sans que le Premier Ministre britannique élevât la moindre observation, qu'il ne quitterait pas l'Angleterre sans avoir conclu un accord avec la délégation d'Angora. M. Briand avait fait ressortir que ni le Parlement ni l'opinion française n'accepteraient la prolongation d'hostilités entraînant des pertes cruelles et inutiles, puisque le Traité de Sévres consacrait l'évacuation de la Cilicie et que les légères concessions faites, à la frontière septentrionale du mandat syrien, conformément au principe des nationalités qui a dominé toute l'œuvre de la paix, ne sont au détriment d'aucun Allié, tout en étant propres à faciliter l'entente générale. Il fut, en même temps, précisé à Lord Hardinge que M. Briand avait alors marqué à Mr. Lloyd George qu'il ne signerait cet accord qu'à la dernière heure et après avoir constaté l'impossibilité d'aboutir à Londres à un arrangement général sur l'Orient. C'est au cours de cette conversation que, dès le 4 avril, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reçut le texte de l'arrangement dont il s'agit.

Ces déclarations ont été renouvelées à votre Seigneurie par M. de Saint-Aulaire le 19 avril dernier, quand elle a bien voulu entretenir le représentant de la République de cette affaire. Le Gouvernement français a été fondé à croire que les explications fournies par l'Ambassadeur de France avaient donné au Gouvernement britannique ses apaisements, puisque votre Seigneurie n'a pas donné suite au projet de note dont elle avait annoncé l'envoi à M. de Saint-Aulaire.

Depuis lors, le Gouvernement français n'a cessé d'ailleurs, et notamment dans sa lettre du 14 juillet dernier, adressée à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, d'affirmer sa volonté de mettre fin aux hostilités qui se poursuivaient sur les confins du mandat syrien, dès qu'il pourrait obtenir l'acceptation de clauses précises assurant la protection des minorités et notamment des Arméniens.

C'est, dans ces conditions, et alors que depuis longtemps déjà les Alliés avaient retiré leurs troupes des divers points de l'Empire ottoman occupé au moment de l'armistice, que le Gouvernement français a estimé, après avoir informé ses Alliés de ses intentions, et en réservant soigneusement la solution de toutes les questions générales à régler en commun par les Alliés, qu'il avait le droit de s'engager dans la voie où ses partenaires l'avaient précédé, en usant des moyens que les événements imposaient. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté reconnaît, en effet, que si le retrait des troupes royales des frontières de la Mésopotamie et la suppression du contrôle militaire allié sur les voies ferrées d'Anatolie ont pu s'accomplir sans accord avec le Gouvernement d'Angora, dépourvu à cette époque de toute puissance offensive, il ne pouvait en être de même sur les frontières de Syrie, car, d'un côté, les forces nationalistes se sont depuis lors considérablement développées et, par ailleurs, la Syrie ne se trouve pas, comme la Mésopotamie, protégée par la distance.

Nul ne peut contester que la France n'ait eu le choix qu'entre les deux alternatives suivantes: ou bien maintenir ses effectifs et continuer la guerre en Cilicie, ou bien négocier avec le pouvoir de fait qui commandait aux troupes turques de cette région. La volonté de la nation française s'étant clairement, fortement et constamment manifestée en faveur de l'évacuation, le Gouvernement français était dans l'obligation de poursuivre la conclusion d'un arrangement local, qui est, au reste, conforme, dans ses dispositions fondamentales, à celui dont le texte avait été communiqué au Gouvernement anglais le 4 avril 1921.

Les tendances générales qui ont inspiré la conduite du Gouvernement français étant ainsi précisées, j'ai l'honneur de donner, ci-après, à votre Seigneurie quelques éclaircissements touchant des points particuliers visés dans sa lettre du 5 novembre.

Les mots "cessation de l'état de guerre," qui figurent à l'article 1^{er}, ont paru au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté être des termes impropres pour définir un armistice local. Votre Seigneurie estime, en outre, que mention aurait dû être faite du caractère provisoire de l'arrangement intervenu. La rédaction adoptée donnerait, au contraire, à l'accord l'apparence d'un véritable Traité de Paix.

Ainsi que l'a déjà marqué verbalement à Lord Hardinge le Directeur des Affaires politiques, l'Accord d'Angora ne constitue pas un Traité de Paix. Ce n'est qu'un arrangement de portée locale conclu avec un pouvoir qui n'est reconnu ni *de jure* ni *de facto*, mais qui a manifesté une autorité, un patriotisme et une loyauté, propres à le faire considérer comme capable de tenir et de faire exécuter les engagements qu'il a contractés. D'une manière générale, si l'Arrangement d'Angora eût constitué un Traité de Paix, il aurait dû, suivant la constitution, être soumis à la ratification du Parlement. Or, il a été simplement approuvé par le Gouvernement français et aucune ratification parlementaire n'a été sollicitée.

Le Gouvernement français considère, d'autre part, que l'usage des expressions

"d'armistice et d'arrangement provisoire" eût risqué d'inquiéter les populations en leur faisant craindre une reprise des hostilités.

Quant au terme "hautes parties contractantes," il n'a qu'une valeur d'usage et de courtoisie traditionnelle; il figure d'ailleurs déjà dans l'Accord de Londres, et le Gouvernement britannique n'avait, jusqu'ici, formulé aucune objection contre son emploi. Il est à peine besoin d'ajouter que l'emploi de ces expressions n'implique nullement, en droit international, la reconnaissance *de jure* d'un État ou d'un Gouvernement nouveau.

Le Gouvernement britannique estime que l'article 3 de l'Arrangement d'Angora ne tient pas compte des obligations contractées par la France, en vertu de l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite. Selon l'interprétation donnée par votre Seigneurie audit article 8, la France aurait pris l'engagement de ne retirer ses troupes de la zone d'intérêts spéciaux, qu'après s'être assurée de l'exécution des garanties pour les minorités.

Le Gouvernement français considère que l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite du 18 août, 1920 a été rédigé non pas dans le but de nous obliger à rester en Cilicie, mais bien au contraire dans l'intention de limiter notre occupation. Il tombe sous le sens que le Gouvernement français n'aurait jamais consenti à prendre l'engagement et à supporter les charges d'une occupation indéfinie.

Le Gouvernement français a d'ailleurs, à plusieurs reprises, comme je l'ai marqué plus haut, indiqué au Gouvernement anglais la nécessité où il se trouvait de mettre fin à la situation anormale que prolongeait les hostilités sur la frontière syrienne, tandis qu'elles avaient cessé entre les autres Alliés et la Turquie, sans que pour cela l'état de paix pût être considéré comme juridiquement rétabli.

En outre, le Gouvernement français tient à faire une remarque générale quant à la validité de l'Accord tripartite sur quoi est fondée principalement l'argumentation juridique de la lettre du 5 novembre. En aucun cas, le Gouvernement français ne se reconnaît autorisé à transiger sur les droits reconnus par cet accord au profit de ses Alliés, soit d'Angleterre, soit d'Italie. Mais il estime d'autant plus avoir le droit de renoncer aux avantages stipulés en sa faveur que cet accord n'a pas été ratifié et, comme le Traité de Sèvres, doit, aux termes mêmes des déclarations faites par Lord Curzon, tout récemment, à Londres, aux Ministres grecs, subir certaines modifications; il ne saurait donc avoir la valeur d'un traité en vigueur.

Enfin, dans les parties du territoire ottoman comprises ou non comprises dans les zones d'où les troupes alliées se sont retirées, aucune garantie n'avait pu jusqu'à ce jour être obtenue en faveur des minorités. La France, au contraire, a expressément subordonné tout retrait éventuel de ses troupes de Cilicie à l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement d'Angora qu'il assurerait la protection des minorités et la prise effective de dispositions dans ce sens.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté regrette que, par l'article 6, la France ait admis, pour la protection des minorités, des garanties différentes de celles que le Traité de Sèvres avait prévues et qu'en ne limitant pas expressément à la Cilicie lesdites dispositions le Gouvernement français ait paru donner satisfaction à une des prétentions du Gouvernement d'Angora en une matière de grande importance et de portée générale, alors qu'un tel sujet devait essentiellement faire l'objet d'un accord entre les Alliés et être réservé pour les négociations de la paix générale.

Il ne saurait, sans injustice, être fait reproche à la France de n'avoir pu faire accepter, pour la protection des minorités en Cilicie, des garanties que la pression de la force totale des Alliés n'a pu obtenir de la Turquie. Le retrait des troupes françaises étant une nécessité, le Gouvernement de la République a estimé que sa volonté de ne point s'écarter des dispositions—signées, mais non ratifiées—du Traité de Sèvres, ne pourrait aller jusqu'à laisser les minorités sans protection aucune, et qu'un devoir d'humanité l'obligeait à leur assurer, tout au moins, les garanties inscrites dans les traités imposés par l'Entente à la Hongrie et à la Bulgarie.

Quant au regret exprimé par votre Seigneurie que ces dernières garanties puissent être considérées comme s'appliquant non seulement à la Cilicie, mais aux autres parties de la Turquie, le Gouvernement français considère que tout l'accord d'Angora est dominé par l'idée qu'il s'agit d'un arrangement d'une portée locale.

D'ailleurs, il ne saurait être fait grief au Gouvernement français d'avoir étendu ses obligations non point dans son propre intérêt, mais dans celui des populations de l'Anatolie, qui se trouvent encore actuellement privées de toute protection.

Indépendamment des garanties formellement énoncées dans l'Accord, je puis ajouter que M. Franklin-Bouillon est tombé d'accord avec le Gouvernement d'Angora pour contrôler lui-même les conditions dans lesquelles s'effectueraient l'évacuation et l'installation des nouvelles autorités; il sera aidé dans cette tâche par trois délégués spéciaux du Gouvernement français, qui résideront à Adana, à Mersina et à Aintab.

Le régime administratif, visé à l'article 7, pour la région d'Alexandrette, n'est pas en opposition avec le régime prévu pour le mandat qui doit tenir compte de l'extrême diversité des races en Syrie; il est conforme à l'organisation générale des pays de mandat français, organisation qui accorde déjà une large autonomie administrative aux différents groupes ethniques. L'article 7 de l'Accord d'Angora n'attribue, d'ailleurs, aucun droit politique ou économique à la Turquie et ne prévoit l'usage de la langue turque, concurremment avec l'arabe et le français, qu'en raison de l'emploi de cette langue par la grande majorité de la population.

La rectification de frontière prévue par l'article 8 apparaît à votre Seigneurie comme intéressant non seulement le Gouvernement français seul, mais les Gouvernements alliés, les territoires pris à la Turquie constituant le gage de la victoire commune. Votre Seigneurie estime qu'une modification territoriale du mandat syrien ne tient pas compte des obligations de la France vis-à-vis de la Ligue des Nations, tandis que la rétrocession des régions abandonnées par la Turquie aux Alliés sans notification préalable à la Grande-Bretagne et à l'Italie est inconciliable à la fois avec l'esprit et avec la lettre du traité, qui porte la signature des trois Puissances. Cette situation apparaît à votre Seigneurie comme d'autant plus regrettable que, la frontière devant être fixée dans un délai d'un mois à dater de la signature de l'arrangement, la frontière turco-syrienne se trouvera déterminée avant toutes les autres frontières turques qui doivent être délimitées par le Traité de Sèvres.

Le Gouvernement français doit d'abord faire observer que les Alliés ont, au lendemain de l'armistice, procédé à d'autres occupations et à des mesures de contrôle militaire en Turquie qui constituaient également des gages d'une importance égale, et cependant ni ces occupations, ni ces mesures de contrôle n'ont pu être intégralement maintenues.

Les régions du mandat syrien, dont il est question à l'article 8, ne sont point d'ailleurs des territoires proprement arabes, mais bien des pays de transhumance sans limites nettes, sans populations sédentaires, et où domine non l'élément arabe, mais l'élément kurd.

Il y aurait, enfin, quelque exagération à reprocher à la France de renoncer à une fraction, relativement insignifiante, des territoires ottomans occupés, alors que plus de trois ans après l'armistice elle supporte encore, sur les frontières de Syrie, les pertes et l'entretien d'une armée de près de 100,000 hommes, tandis que dans les autres régions ottomanes où stationnaient des troupes alliées les effectifs ont été progressivement réduits à quelques bataillons. Le maintien de contingents aussi nombreux a été, d'ailleurs, jusqu'ici la conséquence non des difficultés que présenterait la préservation de l'ordre public en Syrie, mais bien de la nécessité de pouvoir faire face en Cilicie à une menace éventuelle de la Turquie. La fin de ce danger permettra sans doute au Gouvernement français d'opérer dans le plus bref délai une réduction considérable des forces françaises en Orient.

Il convient d'ajouter que l'obligation où se trouvait la France, pour assurer l'évacuation de la Cilicie, d'abandonner certaines parcelles du mandat syrien, était depuis longtemps connue de nos Alliés.

En ce qui concerne les territoires situés entre l'Euphrate et le Tigre qui, pratiquement, n'ont du reste jamais été occupés par les forces alliées, la communication faite, le 4 avril, à Lord Hardinge, de l'accord conclu à Londres par M. Briand avec Bekir Sami, constituait tout au moins une notification précise de l'intention du Gouvernement français de renoncer à l'occupation desdits territoires.

Quant au reproche d'avoir effectué cette renonciation à la suite d'un accord, il convient de répéter que la situation actuelle est fort différente de celle dont les Puissances avaient pu bénéficier précédemment. Les forces turques se sont considérablement développées. Le Gouvernement d'Angora dispose d'armées d'une valeur offensive qu'il n'avait point précédemment. Il n'était pas possible d'échapper à la nécessité d'un arrangement dès l'instant que l'évacuation de la Cilicie était décidée et il eût été inconcevable qu'un tel accord pût s'établir sans certaines concessions réciproques. Le Gouvernement français est convaincu qu'à cet égard il n'a donné à la Société des Nations aucun motif de reproche.

En outre, l'argument des mandats ne peut être retenu pour des raisons multiples. Les mandats n'ont pas encore été ratifiés par la Société des Nations et leurs termes sont encore en discussion. Le Traité de Sèvres n'est pas entré en vigueur. De l'avis même du Gouvernement anglais, il doit être modifié. Les frontières qu'il a fixées ne sont donc pas intangibles. La France, mandataire en Syrie, a seule qualité pour traiter les intérêts des populations syriennes dans leurs rapports inévitables avec les populations turques au delà de la frontière.

Le regret exprimé par votre Seigneurie au sujet de l'article 9, qui est relatif au tombeau du Sultan Soliman, paraît fondé sur une interprétation que le Gouvernement français tient à rectifier. Il ne s'agit point d'une question de souveraineté, mais d'un droit de propriété, reconnu pour des raisons de sentiment.

L'article 10 se borne à constater que le Gouvernement d'Angora accepte le transfert à un groupe français de la concession de la section Bozanti-Nisibin du Chemin de fer de Bagdad et ne précise pas, comme le fait l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres, que le Gouvernement "transférera" ladite concession. Ainsi la procédure envisagée par l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres se trouve réservée, et l'Accord d'Angora ne fait aucun obstacle à ce qu'elle soit appliquée.

Quant au fond même de l'arrangement intervenu entre les Alliés, en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer, tel qu'il résulte de l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite, et, notamment, du paragraphe 2 de cet article, le Gouvernement britannique veut bien reconnaître que le Gouvernement français tient à confirmer qu'il n'est en rien modifié, pas plus d'ailleurs que la répartition entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Italie de l'ensemble de la ligne de Bagdad.

Le Traité de Sèvres n'a réglé le sort du Chemin de fer de Bagdad que jusqu'au fleuve Djaïhoun. Si ce traité était entré en vigueur, le chemin de fer à l'est du Djaïhoun se fût trouvé en pleine Syrie et, à ce titre, il aurait dû être liquidé aux termes du Traité de Sèvres par la Puissance mandataire agissant seule : le transfert de cette section à une compagnie française, prévu par l'Accord d'Angora, nous maintient dans la même situation, tout en laissant le chemin de fer en territoire turc. Il est vrai que cette argumentation ne peut s'appliquer à la section du chemin de fer comprise entre les portes de la Cilicie et le Djaïhoun. La protestation contre le transfert immédiat à une compagnie française de cette section, qui, d'après l'Accord tripartite, tombait dans une exploitation en commun franco-anglo-italienne, aurait donc une certaine apparence de fondement. Mais, en réalité, l'alinéa 2 du paragraphe 4 de l'Accord tripartite a expressément prévu le transfert à notre profit de cette section, en représentation des intérêts français existant dans le Bagdad avant 1914. Ainsi l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora, loin d'être une violation des stipulations de l'Arrangement tripartite, n'en constitue, en réalité, qu'une application anticipée.

Quant à l'utilisation militaire de la ligne, elle a principalement pour but le maintien de l'ordre dans les parties éloignées de toute communication, mais il serait inconcevable que la voie ferrée puisse être utilisée contre l'Angleterre. En effet, le chemin de fer passe en mandat syrien depuis Maidam-Ekbes jusqu'à Chobanbeg et le Gouvernement français serait par conséquent en mesure d'arrêter les transports s'ils paraissaient impliquer la possibilité d'une menace militaire contre la frontière de Mésopotamie.

Sur ce point, le Gouvernement français tient à donner au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'assurance la plus formelle qu'en aucun cas il ne pourrait envisager l'hypothèse d'une facilité quelconque donnée par lui à des desseins hostiles dirigés contre un territoire de mandat britannique. Les liens étroits qui unissent la France à l'Empire britannique et l'idée que le Gouvernement français se fait de ses devoirs en tant que membre de la Société des Nations et Puissance mandataire, suffisent à faire écarter semblable préoccupation.

En cas de conflit armé, les lois de la neutralité feraient même au Gouvernement français l'obligation d'interdire aux transports turcs l'utilisation du territoire syrien et la voie ferrée au delà de Chobanbeg, coupée du reste de la Turquie, perdrait toute valeur pratique.

La lettre adressée par Youssouf Kemal et qui accompagne le texte de l'accord a également fait l'objet d'observations du Gouvernement britannique. Votre Seigneurie a marqué le regret que ladite lettre paraisse établir un rapport entre des promesses de concession et le vœu exprimé, dans ce document, qu'en raison des relations anciennes des deux "nations" les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie seraient examinées par la France dans un esprit de cordialité.

Le Gouvernement de la République tient à donner l'assurance qu'il ne recherche en Turquie aucun avantage exclusif, ni dans l'ordre politique, ni dans l'ordre économique. Il ne s'est en rien départi des principes généraux du Traité de Sèvres et de l'Accord tripartite. Il a réservé avec le plus grand soin toutes les questions ayant trait à la paix avec la Turquie, qui est et doit rester une œuvre interalliée. Les promesses de concessions visées dans la lettre de Youssouf Kemal ne sont la contrepartie d'aucun engagement secret, écrit ou verbal, que M. Franklin-Bouillon aurait pris touchant les questions qui doivent être réglées d'accord entre les Alliés et notamment les revendications turques sur Smyrna et la Thrace. M. Franklin-Bouillon

n'a eu et n'aurait d'ailleurs accepté aucune conversation sur des questions territoriales autres que celles impliquées par l'évacuation de la Cilicie.

Le négociateur turc d'Angora a si bien lui-même compris cette situation qu'un procès-verbal spécial mentionne que les questions d'ordre général sont réservées pour être traitées lors de la paix. Ainsi il a réservé expressément pour la conclusion du Traité de Paix le règlement des questions relatives à la participation de la Syrie à la dette ottomane, à la liquidation des biens de l'État, de la Couronne et de l'Enkap, au régime des Capitulations et à toutes autres conséquences du changement de souveraineté sur les pays à mandat. S'il exprime quelque désir au négociateur français, il a bien soin de ne s'adresser qu'à lui en le priant de recommander sa demande au Gouvernement français pour le moment où sera négocié le Traité de Paix.

Votre Seigneurie a exprimé le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement français avait répondu ou se proposait de répondre à Youssouf Kemal. M. Franklin-Bouillon s'est borné à adresser à Youssouf Kemal un accusé de réception de sa communication dans les termes du paragraphe premier en ajoutant ses remerciements des sentiments et des vœux exprimés par le Ministre d'Angora.

Quant aux rumeurs relatives soit à la promesse faite à la France d'un monopole pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie, soit à l'éventualité d'un emprunt, soit encore à la fourniture de matériel de guerre, elles sont dénuées de tout fondement. Les échanges de vues, oraux ou écrits, qui ont pu avoir lieu entre des personnalités politiques et M. Franklin-Bouillon, n'ajoutent rien à la substance de l'accord, qui ne comporte aucun arrangement secret. Ce n'est point sans une douloureuse surprise que le Gouvernement français a vu mentionner dans un document officiel, même en ajoutant qu'il n'y était accordé aucune créance, les bruits d'un encouragement donné par la France à une agitation antibritannique en Mésopotamie. Les relations entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne sont trop intimes et trop amicales pour qu'il soit nécessaire de démentir de semblables imputations.

Si, abandonnant la discussion proprement juridique, les deux Gouvernements élèvent le débat, votre Seigneurie reconnaîtra, d'une part, que le Gouvernement français ne pouvait prolonger indéfiniment les sacrifices de tout ordre qu'impliquait l'occupation de la Cilicie, alors que les forces alliées s'étaient retirées de nombre de régions saisies comme gages lors de l'armistice, et que, d'autre part, cette intention avait été clairement et constamment manifestée par la France, tant par l'organe de son Premier Ministre que par celui de ses représentants diplomatiques. Sans prétendre aucunement s'être assuré l'assentiment de l'Angleterre à ses desseins, la France peut légitimement soutenir qu'elle a averti son Allié des nécessités dont elle devait tenir compte.

Dans ces conditions, je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne maintienne pas les objections qu'il a élevées à première vue contre l'Accord d'Angora et veuille bien reconnaître que la France a tout fait pour concilier le maintien de ses obligations contractuelles et le souci des intérêts de ses Alliés et de ses devoirs d'humanité avec la nécessité où s'est trouvé le Gouvernement de la République de se libérer d'une charge que l'opinion publique considérait comme intolérable.

Le Gouvernement français ne se refuse, d'ailleurs, pas à admettre que, lors de la conclusion de la paix, les différents accords négociés jusqu'à ce jour (Traité de Sèvres, Accord tripartite, Arrangements pour la Libération des Prisonniers, Accord d'Angora) soient ajustés pour prendre place dans le règlement général.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

B. DE MONTILLE.

[E 12708/576/93]

No. 25.

Mr. Harvey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 19.)

United States Embassy,

London, November 17, 1921.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to advert to my memorandum of the 24th August last, in which, in connection with the question of "A" mandates, I stated that my Government was unable to conclude that any concession was ever granted by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company, and would shortly take up the considerations which have been advanced by His Majesty's Government upon this subject.

In the memorandum referred to, the position of my Government with regard to its interest in the disposition of mandate territories was again stated, and it was assumed that by reason of the relation of the United States to the victory over the Central Powers, and in view of the fundamental principles which have been recognised by His Majesty's Government, there would be no purpose in relation to any of these territories to discriminate against the United States or to refuse to safeguard equality of commercial opportunity.

The Government of the United States does not desire for its citizens any special privileges in the mandate territories, and expects, of course, that private rights actually acquired before the war will in general be respected.

It is believed, however, that in the consideration of claims to rights, His Majesty's Government would not entertain any desire to exclude American interests from participation in the development of any important resource, and will appreciate the justice of my Government's contention that the claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company in particular, which relates to the entire petroleum resources of Mesopotamia, should not be recognised except in accordance with the principles which have been accepted by the British Government as applicable to the mandate territories, and on the basis of a satisfactory determination of the character and extent of the rights of the company.

Since it has seemed from your Lordship's most recent communication on the subject that the views of His Majesty's Government with regard to this claim were widely at variance with those of my Government, I was instructed to suggest in my memorandum of the 24th August, 1921, that if the claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company continues to be asserted, appropriate provision should be made for its determination by a suitable arbitration.

In a note dated the 28th February, 1921, your Lordship was good enough to set forth the various considerations upon which the British Government based its opinion that the Turkish Petroleum Company possesses rights in Mesopotamia. It was stated that the concessions for the oilfields in the two vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad were bestowed by the Sultan on his Civil List in 1888 and 1898 respectively, and that by firmans issued in 1908 and 1909 the concessions had been transferred from the civil list to the Ministry of Finance. In the negotiations before the war between the British and the German Governments and between each of these Governments and the Turkish Government, the disposition of the oilfields of Mesopotamia was under discussion, and a British company, called the Turkish Petroleum Company, was organised, representing an amalgamation of German and British interests.

I shall not undertake to review what is said upon this subject in your Lordship's note, as I do not find in your Lordship's recital any suggestion that any negotiations which had thus taken place had ripened into any agreement or concession prior to the summer of 1914. The question then comes to the effect of what was done in that year.

It appears that Said Halim Pasha, to whom your Lordship refers as the Turkish Grand Vizier, addressed on the 28th June, 1914, a communication to the British Ambassador at Constantinople, a part of which has been stated by your Lordship, and which is understood to have been identical with a communication of the same date to the German Ambassador at Constantinople. This communication, according to the information in the possession of my Government, reads in translation as follows:—

"Mr. Ambassador,

"In response to the note No. 985 which your Excellency had the kindness to address to me under date of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

"The Ministry of Finance being substituted for the civil list with respect to petroleum resources discovered, and to be discovered, in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, consents to lease these to the Turkish Petroleum Company, and reserves to itself the right to determine hereafter its participation as well as the general conditions of the contract.

"It goes without saying that the society must undertake to indemnify, in case of necessity, third persons who may be interested in the petroleum resources located in these two vilayets.

"Be pleased to accept, &c.
"SAID HALIM."

In your Lordship's note of the 28th February, 1921, it is further set forth that during the war the German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company came into the hands of His Majesty's Government by liquidation, and have been allotted to the French Government in the San Remo Petroleum Agreement, which is explained as the adaptation of pre-war arrangements to existing conditions.

Your Lordship comes to the conclusion that the Turkish Petroleum Company possesses a right to the lease of the oilfields of the two vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, resting on an official undertaking given by the Turkish Government to the British and German Governments after prolonged negotiations, and that neither the rights claimed by the company nor the provisions of the San Remo agreement would preclude the Mesopotamian State from enjoying the full benefit of ownership or from prescribing the conditions on which the oilfields shall be developed.

Without entering into a detailed discussion of legal principles which may be applicable, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that the communication of the 28th June, 1914 from Said Halim Pasha, even in connection with the communications to which it is understood to have been a reply, cannot well be considered a definite and binding agreement to lease. Since both the extent of the participation of the Ministry of Finance in the operations of the company and the general conditions of the lease were, according to this communication, to be fixed at a later date by one of the parties to the alleged agreement, there would seem to be room for doubt whether, even if war had not intervened, a lease would actually have been executed. As your Lordship observes with respect to the letter of the 28th June, 1914, the Ministry reserved "the right to fix later on its share in the enterprise as well as the terms of the contract." There appears to be no reference in your Lordship's note to the provisions of Turkish law applicable to the execution of a lease or to the transfer of a concession; and there is no indication, if these provisions were intended to be disregarded, that any progress had been made toward obtaining the approval of the Turkish Parliament.

The relations between the Turkish officials concerned and the Turkish Petroleum Company would appear, therefore, to have been those of negotiators of an agreement in contemplation rather than those of parties to a contract. Your Lordship makes no mention of any communications subsequent to those of the 28th June, 1914; but from other information in the possession of my Government it would appear that in later notes addressed to the Turkish Grand Vizier, the British and German Ambassadors raised certain questions with regard to one of the conditions indicated in that communication.

It is hardly necessary to observe that in dealing with the resources of mandate territories placed under conditions of trusteeship there should be no consideration of alleged monopolistic claims based on rights asserted to have been vested before the war, unless such rights are established by convincing proof, and it is assumed that this position would be taken by the British Government as a mandatory Power, irrespective of the question whether such claims were advanced by British nationals. Hence the immediate question is one of the proof of the alleged prior contract, and an examination of the evidence thus far produced has not disclosed that any prior contract was made with the Turkish Petroleum Company.

The Government of the United States does not believe that any presumption should rest in favour of establishing in the mandate territories arrangements which were merely under diplomatic discussion before the war, but, on the contrary, is strongly of the view that such contemplated arrangements of a monopolistic character and inconsistent with the principles applicable to the mandate territories should receive no sanction.

I am instructed to express again the desire of my Government that the claim of the Turkish Petroleum Company, if it continues to be asserted, should be determined by a suitable arbitration, which, it is believed, should take place prior to any action which might involve further commitments or in any way imply recognition of the claim.

I may observe that the claim which is asserted by the Turkish Petroleum Company in Mesopotamia is regarded by my Government as in an entirely different category from the rights which are understood to be possessed by an American company in Palestine. The latter are apparently far from monopolistic and seem to have been regularly granted according to the prescribed formalities of Turkish law by the proper authorities of the Turkish Government. Adverting further to the suggestion in the note of the 28th February, 1921, that the attitude of my Government with respect to the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company in Mesopotamia is scarcely consistent with its position in regard to American rights in Mexico, it may be observed that those of the latter which have been made the subject of representations by my Government

were not merely contemplated or in course of negotiation, but were acquired in apparently full conformity with the local law.

In previous communications my Government has made clear its attitude toward certain British interests in Costa Rica and has stated its policy with reference to an Act of the Philippine Legislature relating to petroleum development, which is regarded by your Lordship as in contradiction of the general principles enunciated by the Government of the United States.

Shortly after the enactment in question the Government of the United States recommended that it should be so amended as to conform to the reciprocity provision of the United States general leasing law of the 25th February, 1920. At the last session of the Philippine Legislature an amending Bill was passed, the object of which was to relax substantially the restrictions embodied in the original Act. Nevertheless, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the proposed amendment did not sufficiently meet the situation; and your Lordship was informed in my memorandum of the 24th August, 1921, that it was the intention of my Government to take all appropriate steps with a view to bringing about at the next session of the Philippine Legislature a further amendment so that the Act may conform to the reciprocity provision above referred to. My Government has already taken certain of the steps which it deems appropriate, and believes that its position with regard to the natural resources of the Philippines is entirely consistent with the principles which it desires to see applied in other territories.

I have, &c.

GEORGE HARVEY.

[E 12734/143/44]

No. 26.

Minutes of a Fifth Meeting between Lord Curzon and MM. Gounaris, Baltazis and Rangabe, held in Lord Curzon's Room at 11.30 A.M., November 19, 1921.

M. GOUNARIS began by enquiring what would be the future procedure in regard to the negotiations which had taken place.

Lord Curzon replied that at the previous meetings he had suggested that Greece should place her interests in the hands of the Powers. To this the Greek representatives—in his opinion, wisely—had agreed. Since then they had presented a memorandum. He was not quite sure whether this did not imply an attempt to recede somewhat from their previous position. He would tell them in what respects this seemed to be the case:—

1. He had told them at the previous meetings that, in the event of a conference with the Powers, he would be prepared to urge the solution proposed in Paris in June respecting the future of the Smyrna zone; the exact extent of that zone had not been defined. The Greek representatives now appeared to claim that the future régime of the Smyrna zone should be widely extended north and north-east, indeed up to the Sea of Marmora. He wished to make it quite clear that the June proposals did not commit him to that.
2. The new régime, whatever might be the extent of the zone, would apparently, as contemplated by the memorandum, be guaranteed by the presence of the Greek army.

He could not accept such an undertaking. The Powers themselves must decide what instruments should be employed for the carrying out of their proposals. The Greek Government were, of course, entitled to express their views, but he could not commit himself to accept the principle that the Greek army should be used for this purpose.

3. The memorandum suggested that the Greek army should be charged with the looking after of the interests of the Christian elements.

This also must be left to the discretion of the Powers, and he could say nothing in advance on this point.

M. Gounaris reverted to the question of the immediate procedure.

Lord Curzon replied that there had been a full discussion and the Greek representatives had agreed to place their interests in the hands of the Allies. The next

step would be—in his view—to ascertain whether there was a corresponding willingness at Angora. The matter had not been rendered easier by the conclusion of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. On that subject His Majesty's Government were in communication with the French Government, and he hoped that it might soon be possible for the Allies to make a serious effort to induce the Turks to agree to accept the same course as had already been agreed to by the Greeks. He could not say whether the Turks would so accept; there were signs that Angora was inclined to be intractable. He was, however, still hopeful. Something depended on the prospect of a winter offensive. If the Turks really contemplated one they might delay acceptance in order to see the result. If there was no offensive a conference might be hoped for during the winter.

M. Gounaris replied that the Greek Government did not contemplate modifying their previous declaration, but they had thought it their duty to let His Majesty's Government and the Allies know the important questions that would arise in connection with a settlement of Asia Minor. The Greek representatives had had to bear in mind the question of tangible guarantees to the Christian population which might be in real danger. The local Christian population had been encouraged to fight against the Turks and unless it was properly protected its position might become untenable, and it would be impossible for it to remain in any territory evacuated by the Greek army. He pointed to the analogy of Cilicia, where no Christians now dared to stay. The same thing might happen in Asia Minor. He had been bound to point this out, for there was a possibility of extermination.

Lord Curzon enquired what the Greek view was as to the likelihood of an offensive.

M. Gounaris replied that accounts varied. According to one version the Turks were awaiting the arms and munitions promised by the French from Cilicia.

Lord Curzon interposed that the French Government denied that they were handing over any munitions.

M. Gounaris said that a telegram from Angora to Constantinople, intercepted by the Greek Headquarters, referred definitely to such an expectation, and

M. Baltazis added that this was confirmed from other sources.

The Greek representatives said that the Greek Headquarters rather expected an offensive and were quite prepared for it.

Lord Curzon took note with satisfaction of the Greek adherence to their previous declaration.

M. Baltazis said that the memorandum had been communicated for information only.

As to the procedure, M. Baltazis said that the Greek representatives would, on their return, be compelled to tell the Greek Parliament what had taken place in London. They could say that they had placed their case in the hands of the Powers without reserve, but it would be necessary for them to go beyond that.

Lord Curzon replied that he did not think they would be obliged to say more. They had expressed their views very fully, and the matter now rested in the hands of the Powers. Neither he nor they could say yet exactly what could be done. But the next move was clearly with the Powers, to whom he would communicate what had taken place in London, and with whom he hoped that joint action would then be possible.

M. Baltazis enquired whether he could say what steps would now be taken to summon a conference.

Lord Curzon replied that it was not possible to say so yet, nor was it necessary for them to attempt to tell the Greek Parliament the intentions of the Powers.

M. Gounaris then referred to financial questions, in which, he said, difficulties were being made by the Treasury, as he believed, on political rather than on financial grounds.

Lord Curzon said that under the financial agreement come to with Greece on the 10th February, 1918, it was provided that until the obligations held by the British, American and French Governments in respect of cash advances under that

agreement had been redeemed by the Hellenic Government, no fresh security can be given by that Government to cover a foreign loan without the prior assent of the Governments of the United States, France and Great Britain.

M. Gounaris said that he was not referring to this particular matter.

Lord Curzon replied that it was not quite clear precisely what point M. Gounaris desired to make, and he invited him to send an explanatory note.

He also suggested that the Greek representatives should prepare for consideration a formula for use in explaining matters to the Greek Parliament.

[E 12735/1/44]

No. 27.

Minutes of an Interview between Lord Curzon and MM. Noradunghian, Aharonian, General Bagratouni and Mr. Malcolm, held in Lord Curzon's Room at 12-30 P.M., November 19, 1921.

M. AHARONIAN expressed gratitude for the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to Cilicia, which he regarded as an indispensable lever for obtaining from Turkey a solution that took proper account of the Armenian position and claim. Kars and Ardahan had already been handed over to Turkey. If Cilicia were now similarly abandoned it would be a fresh catastrophe, which would involve the throwing away of all means of getting any terms for Armenia. The situation of Russia was such that she soon might be forced out of the Caucasus and the Turks would then walk in and massacre. The Eastern question must be settled before such a possibility materialised. For this purpose Cilicia should be used to make the Turks fulfil their obligations, and not returned to them before the Eastern question—and especially the Armenian question—was settled.

Lord Curzon replied that the Armenian delegation should say that at Paris rather than in London.

M. Aharonian said that he had seen MM. Briand and Franklin-Bouillon. The latter recognised the relation between Cilicia and the Armenian question as a whole. In reality Cilicia concerned all the Allies. All that M. Franklin-Bouillon could or would say was that Mustapha Kemal was an honest man who would do no harm. No real guarantee of any kind was offered to the Armenians for their safety; could not something be done by the other Allies to postpone evacuation by the French?

M. Noradunghian pointed out that the minority provisions in the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement were wholly inadequate. The French could only say that there would be French consuls at various points in these regions. This was obviously no safeguard. The Franklin-Bouillon Agreement was disastrous in that, apart from the special Armenian interests, it raised the prestige of Mustapha Kemal and lowered that of the Allies. Surely, if the Treaty of Sèvres were modified it must be done by all the Powers, and not by one. At present he feared that the last remnants of the Armenians were doomed. Could not Great Britain propose a special mission which should enquire on the spot as to the real wishes of the population, which was a mixed one? Any such enquiry would reveal a vast anti-Kemalist majority. If France maintained that the protection of the region was a question of money, could not the Allies see their way to assist? It was to be anticipated that America would be willing to contribute. He asked whether Lord Curzon would advise the Armenian representatives to send a telegram to the local population urging them not to flee, at least for the time being.

Lord Curzon replied that the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement had been made without British knowledge. We had regretted it and were now in correspondence with the French Government. The French reply must be examined. As the Armenians knew, he had always taken an interest in the Armenians and had done his best for them. The French reply, especially in so far as it concerned the protection of the Christian population, would be very closely scrutinised. He agreed that the Treaty of Sèvres could not be replaced otherwise than by common consent of the Allies. There would soon be another Supreme Council for remodelling the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Armenian case would then be heard. They would recollect that stipulations had been made in Armenia's favour at the time of the abortive negotia-

tions with Bekir Sami Bey earlier in the year. As to the despatch of a commission, he could not pronounce definitely. The French were retiring hurriedly and the proposal presented obvious difficulties. He would examine the French reply as soon as possible, and the Armenian delegation must trust him to do his best for them. He warned them, however, that the matter was much more difficult now than last year. Nevertheless, he would consider the suggestion submitted.

[E 12847/800/44]

No. 28.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 3239.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 22, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the reply which I have to-day received from the French Government to the enquiry which I addressed to them on the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 675 of the 17th November in regard to the protection of the Christian population in Cilicia after the withdrawal of the French troops.

M. Bonnefoy states that British subjects in Cilicia will be in the same position as French citizens, and that the French Government are no more responsible for their safety than they are for the safety of such persons in other parts of Turkey. As for the Christian minorities, his Excellency repeats the familiar contention that the guarantees afforded them by the Angora Agreement are entirely adequate for their protection. He adds, however, an assurance that the French Government will do all in its power to ensure the maintenance of peace in Cilicia so long as its efforts are not counteracted by mischievous intervention from elsewhere.

The tone of the note is, as your Lordship will observe, of a somewhat acid character.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 28.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Lord Hardinge.

PAR une note du 18 de ce mois, l'Ambassade britannique a fait connaître au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté était interrogé sur le point de savoir si les sujets britanniques devaient quitter la Cilicie avant l'évacuation de cette région par les troupes françaises. On presserait de toutes parts le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour qu'il intervienne auprès du Gouvernement français en vue de l'aider à renoncer à cette évacuation ou à l'ajourner et pour qu'il pourvoie à l'évacuation des populations chrétiennes de Cilicie.

En ce qui concerne les sujets britanniques, résidant en Cilicie, le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères par intérim, a l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence Lord Hardinge que leur situation est identique à celle des ressortissants français, au profit desquels aucune garantie spéciale n'a été stipulée dans l'Arrangement d'Angora. Il ne semble y avoir du reste pour les ressortissants étrangers qui résident actuellement en Cilicie aucune raison de quitter le pays. Le Gouvernement français ne saurait pas plus être responsable de leur sort que les Gouvernements alliés ne le sont du sort des ressortissants étrangers établis dans les autres parties de l'Empire ottoman. Ces derniers peuvent y demeurer à leurs risques et périls ou en partir à leurs frais.

Quant aux minorités chrétiennes, elles bénéficieront, après l'évacuation, des garanties précises que le Gouvernement d'Angora s'est engagé à leur assurer et qui sont celles que les Alliés ont stipulées dans les traités de paix avec la Hongrie et la Bulgarie.

A la suite de l'effort militaire considérable qu'il a fait en maintenant en Orient une armée de plus de 80,000 hommes, effort qu'il ne pouvait continuer indéfiniment, le Gouvernement français, a en effet obtenu, au profit des minorités en Cilicie, des garanties dont aucune autre population chrétienne ne jouit à l'heure actuelle dans le reste de l'Empire ottoman. Les agents qu'il a envoyés en Cilicie pour l'exécution de l'Accord d'Angora veilleront avec un soin particulier à l'application de ces garanties.

Sans être tenu, en ce qui concerne la protection des minorités, à des obligations autres que celles qui sont communes à tous les Alliés, le Gouvernement français usera de tous les moyens en son pouvoir, notamment à l'égard des autorités turques, pour assurer le maintien de la paix en Cilicie et la conciliation entre les divers éléments de sa population.

Il compte, d'autre part, que ses efforts auront pour heureux résultat d'assurer la protection de ces minorités s'ils ne sont pas contrariés par les conseils pernicieux qui, de Constantinople ou de l'étranger, pourraient être adressés aux populations chrétiennes de Cilicie, par des compatriotes qui les pousseraient à une intransigeance dont ils n'auraient pas à subir eux-mêmes les effets.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 21 novembre 1921.

[E 12947/1/44]

No. 29.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 3266.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 24, 1921.

THE Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate yesterday held a meeting, presided over by M. Poincaré, at which the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement formed the subject of discussion. At a recent joint meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Financial Committees of the Senate no criticisms of this agreement appear to have been made, but at yesterday's meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee alone a very different attitude was adopted. The committee took as the basis of this discussion the following three questions:—

1. Exactly what powers were entrusted to M. Franklin-Bouillon?
2. What instructions did he receive?
3. To what extent did he confine himself to the functions assigned to him?

M. Ribot pointed out that the Angora Agreement had raised vigorous protests from Great Britain which ought to be discussed, not only with loyalty, but also with cordiality. He added that other and more useful methods might well have been employed from the point of view of France's Allies and of the parliamentary committees alike. There was no one in France who did not wish to alleviate the military expenditure resulting from France's action in the Near East, and everybody was agreed that Cilicia ought to be evacuated. It was, however, the opinion of the committee that the ways and means of this evacuation ought to be discussed. Before expressing an opinion on this subject, it would be indispensable for them to be made acquainted with the progress and nature of the negotiations, as well as with the engagements taken by France towards her Allies and towards the Christian minorities, such as the Armenians, Chaldeans and Kurds, who had fought with France during the war, but who now seemed to be abandoned by her to the Turkish yoke, if not to massacre. France's relations with her Allies were all-important, and her rights and interests must be defended without breaking, now that peace was established, the solidarity achieved during the war.

The "Éclair," which gives the fullest account of the proceedings of the committee, states that this change of attitude is due to statements made by M. Franklin-Bouillon since the joint meeting referred to above. It is said that M. Franklin-Bouillon produced new documents which he had not communicated at the first meeting.

The committee finally issued the following communiqué:—

"The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, having met under the presidency of M. Poincaré, has examined, as a result of a verbal report by M. Bompard, the different clauses and conventions of Angora and the questions in regard to their negotiation and execution. After a long discussion, in which MM. Doumergue, De Selves, Ribot, Victor Berard, Lucien Hubert, Cruppi and Poincaré took part, the committee decided to ask the President of the Council for explanations on this subject as soon as he returns."

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 12924/1/44]

No. 30.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. de Montille.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 25, 1921.

HIS Majesty's Government have considered with the utmost care and attention the note which you addressed to me on the 17th November regarding the agreement negotiated by M. Franklin-Bouillon at Angora. They have observed with satisfaction the detailed character of the reply which the French Government has returned to my note of the 5th November, and they desire to reciprocate the conciliatory tone in which that reply has been couched. If further observations are required it can only be with the object of removing still outstanding misconceptions, and of passing, if it may be, from the sphere of a common understanding to that of common action.

2. It gives pleasure to His Majesty's Government to take note of the emphatic assurances contained in the reply of the French Government with regard to the scope and consequences of the Angora Agreement as understood by its signatories. These assurances are so important, and it is so essential that no doubts as to their nature should exist between our two Governments, that it appears desirable to summarise them as they are deduced from your note as follows:—

- (1.) The agreement is not a treaty of peace, and implies no recognition *de jure* or *de facto* of the Government of Angora.
- (2.) The agreement is of purely local scope, and is "dominated" by that idea. The French Government, as hitherto, reserves the question of peace with Turkey and has never contemplated any engagement in that direction without a close agreement with the Allies and especially with Great Britain. In particular, the rights of Italy and Great Britain recognised in the Tripartite Agreement are not in any way touched by the Angora Agreement.
- (3.) No facilities will be given by France for hostile designs against a territory under the British mandate; and in particular, in the case of armed conflict, France, as a neutral, would not permit the transfer of Turkish troops across Syrian territory under article 10 of the agreement.
- (4.) No reply beyond a formal acknowledgment was returned by M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal's letter of the 10th October, and that letter—the official publication of which in these circumstances it seems somewhat difficult to understand—was not the counterpart of any secret understanding written or oral with M. Franklin-Bouillon on matters which must be settled in agreement between the Allies, and especially the question of Thrace and Smyrna. M. Franklin-Bouillon held—and would have consented to hold—no conversation on territorial questions other than those implied in the evacuation of Cilicia. As proof of this, mention is made of a *procès-verbal* of questions reserved by the Kemalist negotiator at Angora.
- (5.) The rumours as to the French monopoly for gendarmerie organisation, a French loan, the supply of French war material to the Kemalists, and in particular as to the encouragement of an anti-British agitation in Mesopotamia are baseless, and the views exchanged orally and in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangement.
- (6.) The French Government admits the principle of adjusting in the final treaty of peace the different agreements negotiated: "Treaty of Sevres, Tripartite Agreement, agreements for the liberation of prisoners, and the Angora Agreement."

3. Confidently believing that this summary accurately represents the views and intentions of the French Government, His Majesty's Government express their sincere gratification at the full and frank nature of these assurances, and they cordially recognise the spirit of amity and goodwill in which they have been offered. If I now draw attention to certain points on which His Majesty's Government have found and still find some difficulty in reconciling these assurances, and the detailed arguments by which they are supported, with the actual text of the agreement of the 20th October, this is due to a desire, not to prolong controversy, but to remove any

misgivings that may still survive, and which might become a source of conceivable misunderstanding in the future.

4. I will deal first with a question with which British public opinion, and, indeed, the sentiment of the civilised world, is profoundly concerned—namely, the protection of the non-Turkish minorities in Cilicia. Whatever view may be taken of the precise validity of the Tripartite Agreement and the underlying intention of article 6, the French Government will hardly dispute that that agreement represented not only a definite pledge on the part of France towards her other Allies to undertake in Cilicia the common Allied task of protecting the minorities of Turkey, but also the immediate assumption of a definite responsibility towards those minorities themselves, who had been admittedly encouraged by the continued Allied occupation of Cilicia and by the published terms of the Tripartite Agreement to return there.

5. The French Government will readily understand, therefore, the apprehensions felt by His Majesty's Government at finding in the agreement no guarantees for the safety of these people beyond the amnesty of article 5 and the general declaration of the Kemalist Government, as to the minority rights in article 5. I need hardly remind you that while Part IV of the Treaty of Sèvres provides a measure of restitution for the serious injuries inflicted upon the minorities since the 1st August, 1914, and for the renewal of those necessary privileges accorded to them by the Turkish Government throughout Turkey before the war, no counterpart to these provisions exists in the minority treaties concluded with the European countries. Yet it is only the guarantees afforded by the latter treaties which the Kemalist Government in article 6 of the present agreement have declared themselves ready to offer. In fact, the value of this article and of article 5 depends exclusively on that loyalty of the Kemalist Government "to keep and execute engagements" as to which sanguine views are expressed by the French Government in your note. His Majesty's Government in the light both of past history and of recent events find it difficult at present to share those views, and they would fain hope that in any final treaty of peace the Allies may insist upon obtaining Turkish assent to the fuller safeguards of the Treaty of Sèvres. In the meantime, however, the grave responsibility of withdrawing the protection of her troops has been taken by France, and the presence of a limited number of special French representatives in Cilicia during and after the evacuation is the sole additional guarantee that has been provided for the security of the jeopardised sections of the population. His Majesty's Government, while convinced that the French Government will lend its utmost efforts to the safeguarding of their interests, cannot conceal the fact that they regard the situation with no small anxiety.

6. There is another feature of the agreement, namely, the formal revision of the northern frontier of Syria provided for by article 8 of the Angora Agreement, as to which it is necessary to say something. I do not wish to dwell here upon the extent of the surrendered territory, although this is far from inconsiderable, nor upon the danger that the normal number of its inhabitants may have been swollen since the armistice by an influx of Christian refugees; but His Majesty's Government cannot remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in Irak of the return of the track of the Bagdad railway to Turkey, or of the transfer to that Power of the "localities" of Jeziret-Ibn-Omar and Nisibin. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware, the latter transfer has never been contemplated up to this date, and no attempt has been made to ascertain their views upon it. For the rest, while they readily accept the French Government's assurance of their determination that no movement of Turkish troops over the Syrian portion of the Bagdad line with hostile intention against Irak shall be permitted, they apprehend, nevertheless, that article 10 of the agreement as it now stands may be found to preclude the French Government from arresting such movements in time of peace, whatever their ultimate object might prove to be.

7. Thirdly, the misgivings expressed by His Majesty's Government at certain features of article 10 have not been altogether dispelled by your explanations. Apart from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France by this transfer of a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French company in advance—and therefore possibly to the prejudice—of the reciprocal Allied arrangements contemplated by article 294 of the Treaty of Sèvres and article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, it is necessary to point out that these stretches of the railway which were previously in Syria but are now surrendered to Turkey, although placed in the French zone of economic interest, ought naturally to fall to be divided among the Allies in accordance

with the above-mentioned article of the Tripartite Agreement and the Treaty of Sèvres, and accordingly it is not relevant to claim that, had they remained in Syria, they could, by article 293 of the treaty, have been liquidated by the French Government as mandatory for Syria. Nor does the transfer to a French company of that part of the railway which still remains in Syria in itself fulfil the provisions of article 293 of the Treaty of Sèvres, which stipulates for liquidation by the mandatory and the assignment of the proceeds to the Financial Commission as an Allied asset.

8. There remain a number of subsidiary questions concerning which I am most reluctant to pursue a controversy that can only divert our two Governments from larger and more important issues, and which are mentioned here solely with the object of correcting certain errors of fact. These questions relate, firstly, to the two missions of M. Franklin-Bouillon, concerning which the French Government is mistaken in thinking that His Majesty's Government were fully informed either by the French Government or by M. Franklin-Bouillon himself, and secondly, to the explanations alleged to have been given to the British Government concerning the abortive agreement concluded by M. Briand with Bekir Sami Bey. His Majesty's Government had no certain knowledge of the terms or even the general character of this agreement until they were presented with the text. As soon as this had been received I stated very fully and explicitly the objections entertained by His Majesty's Government in a conversation with the Count de Saint-Aulaire on the 19th April last; and these objections (which I gave no undertakings to record or repeat in a note) were only not pursued because it was a matter of public knowledge that the Angora Government had already declined to accept the agreement.

9. In the concluding paragraph of the note under reply the French Government admits that when peace is finally concluded the different agreements which have been negotiated up to date, including the Angora Agreement, will require to be adjusted with a view to taking their place in a general settlement. On this understanding it appears to be no longer necessary for me explicitly to reserve the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the Angora Agreement in general. These subjects will come up again for discussion later on, and more especially will this be the case with regard to those articles of the agreement, such as articles 6, 8 and 10, which appear to infringe the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Tripartite Agreement.

10. Of greater importance is it to turn to the question of that larger settlement which both Governments must continually hold in view and the prolonged postponement of which is a source of ever-growing injury to all the parties concerned.

11. I have already acquainted the French Government with the satisfactory results of the conversations which I have held with the Greek Ministers in London. The acceptance by the Greek Government without reservations of Allied mediation of which the French Government has already been informed, is the first and necessary step towards some general Allied intervention. The French Government will readily appreciate, however, that if such intervention is to be made at an early date with reasonable hopes of success, both combatants in the present struggle must be made clearly to understand that the three Allies are loyally united and firmly agreed upon the terms of their mediation and the manner in which it is to be put forward. It is this paramount consideration which renders particularly gratifying to me those passages in your note which indicate the importance which the French Government attaches to Franco-British co-operation in the Near East, and in which, acknowledging the spirit of "complete collaboration" which characterised my conversations with the Greek Ministers, it expresses its satisfaction at "the perfect identity of principles" existing between the two Governments. His Majesty's Government, for their part, are convinced that it is only on the basis of such a collaboration, bearing fruit in acts rather than in words, that a speedy, just and general settlement in Turkey—essential alike for the prosperity of Europe and Asia—can be secured.

12. In the firm hope that the identity of principles, which His Majesty's Government have always felt to underlie the Eastern policy of the Great Allied Powers, may at no distant date be translated into identic action, I reserve for another communication the proposals which, on behalf of the British Government, I am prepared to make.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1051.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 21, 1921.

THE French High Commissioner called on me two days ago to ask me to agree to keep out of the local press a Reuter telegram purporting to sum up the objections of His Majesty's Government to the recent Franco-Kemalist treaty. I had already seen this telegram, which, I understand, had as a matter of fact been drafted here from indications in the English press, and I had decided that it would be inadvisable to let it be published. It seemed to me preferable, whilst the Franco-Kemalist agreement continues to form a subject of controversy between His Majesty's Government and the French Government, to refrain from starting a controversy in the local press on this point and to try to maintain at Constantinople an appearance of solidarity amongst the Allies. I therefore informed General Pellé that I had already, on my own initiative, decided that the so-called Reuter telegram should not appear in the press.

2. This matter gave me an opportunity of discussing the Franco-Kemalist agreement with my French colleague. I enumerated all the objections to it, and I said that the view which I had seen in the local and in the French press, that the agreement in question only differed in some small details from the agreement concluded in London last March between M. Briand and Bekir Samy Bey, would not hold water for an instant. Nor was the statement correct that His Majesty's Government had not objected at the time to the Briand-Bekir Samy agreement. I told General Pellé that your Lordship had left the French Government in no doubt that separate agreements between the Allies and the Nationalist Turks must not be concluded. Nevertheless, in spite of this declaration, the French Government had recently concluded a separate agreement which was open to the gravest objections.

3. I went on to point out to General Pellé that the conclusion of the Franco-Kemalist agreement had seriously weakened the whole position of the Allies *vis-à-vis* the Nationalists at a moment when it was of the utmost importance to present a united front to the latter in the event of intervention in the Greco-Turkish conflict being decided upon. The present intractable attitude of the Nationalists and their exaggerated pretensions were largely due to the conclusion of their agreement with France. The Allies now had the appearance of being disunited. The whole proceeding was most unfortunate.

4. I informed General Pellé of the substance of Mr. Satow's telegrams Nos. 34 and 35 of the 16th instant from Beirut, as also of the reports which I had received from other sources, with regard to the alarm felt by the Christian minorities in Cilicia. I said that I could not understand how the French negotiator could have agreed in the question of the protection of minorities to assimilate the Nationalists to Poles and Roumanians, having regard to the deplorable record of the Turks in the matter of massacres of Christians. I informed him of two visits which I had received from the three heads of the Armenian community and of the language I had held to them, as reported in my telegrams No. 679 of the 15th ultimo and No. 719 of the 10th instant.

5. General Pellé stated that he had received three visits from the heads of the Armenian religious communities. His impression, however, was that the fears of the Armenians were greatly exaggerated, and he, indeed, attributed these fears largely to political motives. I said that I could not agree with this view.

6. My French colleague took the above remarks in perfectly good spirit, and it was obvious that he had nothing to say. In fact, I derived the impression that he is genuinely embarrassed by the action of M. Franklin-Bouillon and resents the fact that he was side-tracked during the course of the negotiations between that politician and the Government of Angora. He alluded contemptuously to Colonel Sarraut as a Levantine.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1055.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 22, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 549 of the 3rd June, I have the honour to state that during the summer months the question of the election of a new (Ecumenical) Patriarch hung fire owing to the adverse attitude of the Greek Government and certain bishops. Some weeks ago, however, the Patriarchate here made a fresh effort to bring the matter to a head by issuing an encyclical again fixing the preliminaries of the election for the 8th December. Various intermediate steps have since been taken.

2. This decision of the Patriarchate provoked opposition from the Greek Government, who appear to be anxious to adjourn the election until such time as they hope to influence it sufficiently to secure the election of a Patriarch favourable to the Constantinist cause. The ostensible reasons for the hostile attitude of the Greek Government were stated in a telegram from Athens which was published here in the last days of October. I enclose a copy of this telegram as reproduced in the "Journal d'Orient" of the 27th October. It is only one of many statements which have appeared in the press bearing on the controversy.

3. The Acting Greek Patriarch stated to a member of my staff on the 16th November that it had become very necessary to fill the vacant Patriarchate see, and seemed to think that this time the election would be proceeded with. He mentioned the union of the churches as one of the many important matters which could not be dealt with until a Patriarch was elected, and appeared to be bidding for the sympathy of the Church of England. It is difficult to see, however, how the Patriarchate can overcome the difficulties arising not only from the opposition of the Greek Government and the Constantinist party in the church, but also from the severance of Constantinople and the Anatolian dioceses. These difficulties may be met for immediate purposes by convening an electorate body composed of bishops now in Constantinople, who are well affected to the Patriarchate, and lay members with a semblance of representative capacity. If this is done the result will almost certainly be an outcry against the validity of the election, and the last state of the Patriarchate may be worse than the first.

4. Little has been heard since the date of my despatch under reference of the Kemalist project of setting up an opposition Patriarchate of sorts in the interior of Anatolia. The draft law for this purpose does not appear to have been proceeded with. The Kemalists, however, still advertise the theory that the Greeks of Anatolia are "Orthodox Turks," whose one desire is to live in brotherly love with their Moslem compatriots, and who are disgusted with the political intrigues of the Patriarchate in Constantinople.

5. The Turkish press of Constantinople manifests as much hostility to the Patriarchate as it can do under censorship. When the Acting Patriarch, despite his hostility to the Athens Government, interested himself on behalf of the army in Asia Minor, *e.g.*, by sending his blessing to General Papoulas and issuing an appeal for funds for comforts for the troops, bitter recriminations were exchanged between the Turkish and Greek papers. Within the last few days statements have appeared in the Turkish press to the effect that the Ministry of Justice (who is also the Ministry of Public Worship) has approached the Grand Vizierate on the subject of the irregular proceedings of the Patriarchate. The Government of Constantinople have naturally resented all along the conduct of the Patriarchate in breaking off all official relations, sending missions abroad, and generally assuming a quasi-sovereign position in regard to matters affecting the "unredeemed Greeks." The revival of the proposal to proceed with the election gives the Government an opportunity of making their voice heard, and weak as their position is, they probably hope that, with the backing of Angora and in presence of dissension among the Greeks, it may be possible to reassert to some extent its own authority.

6. In conversation with me yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed the above-mentioned statements in the Turkish press to the effect that the Minister of Justice had commenced to intervene in the matter of the election of a Patriarch.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of October 27, 1921.

EN présence des intentions manifestées par les cercles du Fanar de procéder aux élections patriarcales, le Gouvernement chargea, d'après les journaux, le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce de Constantinople de faire auprès du Patriarcat œcuménique les démarches nécessaires pour demander sur quelle base on s'appuie pour hâter l'élection qui selon les décisions du congrès épiscopal d'Andrinople devait être ajournée jusqu'au règlement des questions nationales. La lutte pour le règlement de ces questions ne pouvant être considérée comme terminée, et le statut ecclésiastique qui réglait les relations du Patriarcat avec la Porte ottomane ne pouvant plus rester en vigueur, puisque les droits des Souverains de la Porte demeurent encore douteux sur une bonne partie des territoires de la juridiction du Patriarcat, le Gouvernement hellénique ne voit pas de raison pour procéder à l'élection en ce moment.

Athènes, le 25 octobre 1921.

[E 13062/116/58]

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1061.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 22, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in case your Lordship should not have received it from other sources, a translation of the agreement concluded between the Angora Government and the three Caucasian Republics at Kars on the 13th October, as published in the Tiflis paper "Pravda Gruzii" of the 21st October.

2. The project of a conference to regulate the position as between the Caucasian States and Nationalist Turkey had been under discussion for a considerable time before it actually assembled at Kars towards the end of September. Once the establishment of Communist power in Georgia had completed the Sovietisation of the Caucasus, it was natural that steps should be taken to regulate various outstanding questions, such as the status of Batoum and Kars, and the precise position which Armenia was to occupy between hammer and anvil. An agreement with the "independent" Soviet republics of the Caucasus was regarded as a suitable complement to the Russo-Turkish Agreement of last March.

3. All the parties concerned are said to have staved off the actual meeting of the projected conference in order to see how the Kemalists would fare in their struggle with the Greeks. By the time it assembled, Moscow had put the final touch to the new system in the Caucasus by centralising all real authority in the hands of Kavbureau, an organisation which, directed by Russian Communists and their creatures, had been set up at Tiflis to exercise powers equivalent to those of the Viceroy of the Caucasus under the Tsarist régime. On the other hand, the Kemalists had had sufficient success in their campaign against the Greeks to take up a stronger attitude than might have been possible two or three months earlier.

4. The conference was composed of delegates of the three Caucasus Governments, which still technically rule Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, a representative of the Moscow Government, and a Turkish delegation, headed by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, the Commander-in-chief of the North-Eastern army, and including among its members Mukhtar Bey, who, it will be remembered, has more than once been Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora. The Turks appear to have played the dominant rôle and to have practically dictated the treaty. They made no new sacrifice, for they had already agreed in previous instruments to waive their claim to Batoum. They secured a reaffirmation of the conditions that the Batoum Province should be made autonomous, and that Turkey should have a very privileged position in the port. They obtained a categorical recognition of their right to Kars, from which place the Russians were most anxious at the end of last year to evict them, and they avoided making any concession to the Armenians even on subsidiary questions.

5. Nothing is more remarkable than the accommodating and even subservient attitude of the Russians in the whole business. It is a fresh proof of the value which they attach to the Kemalist alliance. There is no reason to suppose that Moscow and Angora regard each other with anything but profound mistrust, but there is equally no reason to think that a rupture between them can be counted on

before they have settled their respective scores with the Western Powers. The Turks have consolidated their immediate position, and this is doubtless one of the reasons which encourages them to hope more strongly than ever to impose the National Pact on Europe, and to realise ultimately their dream of an Islamic federation under Turkish hegemony. The Russians doubtless feel that it is worth a good deal of temporary sacrifice to see the Western Powers embarrassed by an intractable Angora, and that ultimately they will be able themselves to prick the Turkish bubble and take their own back again. In the meanwhile they have kept Batoum out of the clutches of Turkey, though it has been necessary to give the Turks special privileges and to provide for the administration of the provinces on lines which will enable the Moslem Adjars to make themselves felt.

6. Effect has already been given to the clauses regarding Batoum by the creation of an autonomous Soviet Republic of Adjara. It appears to be recognised that it forms part of Georgia. I indeed notice in a Samsoun paper of the 13th November a statement that the Angora Government have "made representations to the Government of Adjara" with a view to the expulsion of Enver and his associates, who were reported to be at Batoum, but the same paper prints the text of a document defining the Turkish privileges in respect of the port of Batoum as having been handed to the Angora Government by the Georgian mission. I will forward a translation of this latter document by the next King's messenger.

7. The Anatolian papers announce the appointment by the Grand National Assembly of Mukhtar Bey as their diplomatic representative at Tiflis. Independently of this it is also announced that the further conference at Tiflis, which is contemplated in article 18 of the Treaty of Kars will assemble in the very near future.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Agreement between the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia and the Great National Assembly of Turkey.

THE following is a translation of the text of the agreement drawn up at the recent conference at Kars between the Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia and the Grand National Assembly of Angora.

The text in question was published officially in the Tiflis Soviet newspaper "Pravda Gruzii," No. 192, dated the 21st October.

The Governments of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia and of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia on the one side, and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the other side, being alike imbued with the principles of fraternity of nations and the right of self-determination of all nationalities, wishing to establish between themselves permanent friendly relations and an indissoluble and sincere friendship, based on mutual interests, have resolved to open negotiations with the participation of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, with a view to concluding an agreement, and have for this purpose appointed the following representatives:—

Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan: Vehbut Shahtakhtinsky, People's Commissar for Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection.

Soviet Republic of Armenia: Askanasa Mravian, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and Pogos Makintsian, People's Commissar for the Interior.

Soviet Republic of Georgia: Shalva Eliava, People's Commissar for the Military and Naval Forces, and Alexander Svanidze, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Finance.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Deputy for Adrianople and commander of the Eastern front; Veli Bey, Deputy for Burdur; Mukhtar Bey, former assistant to the Minister for Public Works; and Mehmet Shevket Bey, the Turkish Nationalist representative in Azerbaijan.

Soviet Republic of Russia: Jacob Ganetsky, the representative of Soviet Russia in Latvia.

The above-mentioned parties, having verified each other's credentials and found them legally complete and in order, duly signified their agreement to the following:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia hereby declare null and void all agreements concluded by the previously existing Governments of the countries now concerned with regard to all territorial questions affecting the said countries, as well as all agreements affecting these countries entered into with any third Powers.

The above will not apply to the Russo-Turkish Agreement signed in Moscow on the 16th March, 1921 (1337).

ARTICLE 2.

The parties to the present agreement undertake not to recognise any peace treaty or other international pact to which any one of such parties may have been compelled by force to become a signatory.

Following on the above, the Governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia agree not to acknowledge any international Acts, regarding Turkey and which has not been acknowledged by the National Turkish Government, as represented by the Grand National Assembly.

In the purposes of the present agreement the term Turkey shall be held to comprise the territories included in the Turkish National Pact and Covenant of the 28th January, 1920 (1336), as drawn up and proclaimed in the Turkish Parliament in Constantinople, and subsequently communicated to the Governments of all the countries and to the press.

The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, on the other hand, undertakes not to acknowledge any international Acts regarding Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which have not been actually acknowledged by the respective Soviet Governments of these States.

ARTICLE 3.

The Governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia regard the system of Capitulations as being incompatible both with the free national development of every country, as also with the realisation of the sovereign rights of such country, and hereby declare null and void all measures and rights based in any way on this system.

ARTICLE 4.

The north eastern frontiers of Turkey (*vide* Russian General Staff map 1:210,000, 5 versts=1 inch) consists in a line which commences from the villages Sarp on the Black Sea, then traverses the mountain Khedis-Mta, follows the watershed of the mountains Shevshet and Kanni Dag, follows the former northern administrative frontier of the Ardagan and Kars provinces down the valley of the rivers Arpa-Chai and Arax to the mouth of the lower Kara-Su. (A more detailed explanation of the frontier and of the questions connected with it will be found in Appendices 1 and 2, as also on the accompanying map, which has been signed by all parties. Should any discrepancies occur between the map and the text of the agreement, preference is to be given to the text of the agreement.)

The detailed demarcation of the frontier on the spot will be carried out by a Mixed Boundary Commission, consisting of an equal number of members with the participation of a representative of the R.S.F.S.R. This commission will carry out the work of designating the State frontiers, and will also supervise the placing of boundary marks (Appendix 4, map).*

ARTICLE 5.

The Turkish Government and the Soviet Governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia agree that the Nakhchevan district within the frontiers indicated in Appendix 3 of the present agreement shall form an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan.

ARTICLE 6.

Turkey agrees to cede to Georgia the sovereign rights over the port and the town of Batoum, as also over the territory lying to the north of the frontier as laid

* Not reproduced.

down in article 4 of the present agreement and comprising the district of Batoum, subject to the following conditions:—

1. The population of the territory indicated in the present article will enjoy a wide local autonomy in administrative matters, securing the cultural and religious rights of every community, and enabling the population to carry out its own agrarian legislation.

2. Turkey to have the right to free transit of all goods to and from Turkey passing through the port of Batoum free of customs, duties or other taxation, or any form of obstruction, and to have the free use of the port Batoum without the payment of any special dues.

With a view to bringing this clause into practical force, a commission will be appointed immediately after the conclusion of the agreement, consisting of representatives of both the parties interested.

ARTICLE 7.

The Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertake to afford special facilities to the population of the frontier district for traffic across the frontier in the shape of reduced customs, police and sanitary taxes, details of which will be drawn up by a mixed commission.

ARTICLE 8.

The Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, having regard to the necessity for the population of the frontier districts of both countries to have access to the summer and winter pasture lands situated on the other side of the frontier, agree to grant permission for the said population to drive their cattle through the frontier line and to use the said pastures. The customs formalities, as also the police, sanitary and other regulations in force on the frontier, will be drawn up by a mixed commission.

ARTICLE 9.

With a view to ensuring the opening of the straits and the rights of free passage through them for the commerce of all nations, Turkey and Georgia agree to leave the final working out of an international statute for the Black Sea and the Straits to a special conference of delegates of these Powers which border on the Black Sea, providing always that the decisions arrived at by such conference shall in no ways be derogatory to the complete sovereign rights of Turkey, as also to the safety of Turkey and of her capital—Constantinople.

ARTICLE 10.

The parties concerned agree to prohibit the formation or the residence on their territories of organisations or groups, pretending to be the Government of the other country or of a portion of its territory, as also the residence of groups, which have as their aim the struggle with one of the parties concerned in this agreement.

For the purposes of the present article, the term Turkish territory is held to mean any territory under the immediate military and civil administration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

ARTICLE 11.

All citizens of the countries represented in the present agreement, residing on the territory of the other party, will enjoy all the rights and obligations according to the laws of the country, in which they reside, with the exception of obligations in connection with national defence, from which latter are declared immune.

Questions concerning the family law, the law of inheritance and the ability of the citizens of the parties concerned, make an exception of the resolution of the article. They will be decided by a special agreement.

ARTICLE 12.

The Governments participating in the present agreement undertake to apply the policy of the most favoured nation to each other's subjects when residing in the territory of one or other of the parties of the agreement.

The present article is not intended to include the citizens of other Soviet republics with whom the Soviet republics now parties to this agreement may have made some mutual arrangement, nor does it include the citizens of any Moslem State which may be an ally to Turkey.

ARTICLE 13.

Every resident of territory which prior to 1918 comprised a portion of Russia, and which has now been brought under Turkish sovereignty, will have the right, should he not wish to remain a Turkish subject, to leave Turkey without let or hindrance, and to take with him his goods and chattels, or their value in money.

Similarly, every resident of territory, the sovereignty over which has been handed over by Turkey to Georgia, will have the right, should he not wish to remain a Georgian subject, to leave Georgian territory without let and hinderance, and take with him his goods and chattels, or their value in money.

In the case of individuals wishing to avail themselves of the above facilities, exemption from compulsory military service in monthly periods will be granted them, commencing from the date on which such individuals make the necessary application to the regular manner.

ARTICLE 14.

The treating parties undertake within a period not exceeding six months from the date of the signing of the present agreement, to draw up another and special agreement regarding the refugees of the wars of 1918-1920.

ARTICLE 15.

Each of the treating parties immediately after the signing of the present agreement undertakes to proclaim an amnesty to the subjects of the other parties from all acts and offences committed as a result of the war on Caucasian front.

ARTICLE 16.

The parties concerned undertake within a period of two months from the date of the signature of the present agreement to carry out the repatriation of former military and civilian prisoners of war who have remained in the territory of one or other of the countries involved.

ARTICLE 17.

With a view to ensuring uninterrupted communications between their respective countries, the parties to the present agreement agree to take all necessary measures for the preservation and development with all possible speed of the railways, telegraphs and other means of communications, as also of the unobstructed movement of passengers and goods between the countries concerned, providing always that both the movements in and out of the countries of passengers, as also the transportation of goods, will always be regulated by the rules existing on the subjects in each country.

ARTICLE 18.

With a view to organising commercial intercourse and regulating all economic, financial and other questions essential to the strengthening of the friendly relations between the countries concerned, a special commission consisting of representatives of these countries will be formed at Tiflis immediately after the signing of the present agreement.

ARTICLE 19.

The parties concerned, within a period of three months from the date of the signing of the present agreement, undertake to conclude consular conventions.

ARTICLE 20.

The present agreement, drawn up and signed by the Governments of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is subject to final ratification.

The exchange of ratifications will take place in Erivan on the earliest possible date.

The present agreement will come into force from the moment of the exchange of the deeds of ratification, with the exception of articles 6, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19, which come into force immediately on the signature of the agreement.

The above agreement is certified by the aforementioned representatives, who herewith affix their signatures and seals.

This agreement is drawn up in five copies at Kars on the 13th October, 1921 (1337).

KIAZIM KARABEKIR.
VELI BEY.
MUKHTAR.
MEMDUH SHEVKET.
A. MORAVIAN.
P. MAKINTSIAN.
B. SHAHTAKHTINSKY.
S. ELIAVA.
A. SVANIDZE.
Y. GANETSKY.

Appendix 1.

The north-eastern frontier of Turkey has been laid down as follows (*vide* map of the Russian General Staff 1 : 210,000, 5 versts = 1 inch) :—

The village of Sarp on the Black Sea-Kara Shaltso Mount (5,014), thence along the watershed to a point north of the village Maradidi, cutting across the River Chorokh, north of village Sabaur, Khivis-Mta Mount (7,052)-Khakibo Mount-Kavtareti village-line of the watershed on Medzibna Mount-Berat Kosun Mount (6,468)-watershed of Mount Korda (7,910)-along the western portion of the Shevshet range up to the former administrative boundary of the Artvin district, thence across the Shevshet range as far as Mount Sary Chai (8,478)-Kviraksky Pass, and thence to the former administrative boundary of the Ardahan district which it touches at Kanni Dag, whence, turning north, it runs up to the mountain Tili (8,357). Thence following the former boundary of the Ardahan district it runs to the River Poskhov Chai at a point north-east of Badel village. It then follows this river as far as Chanchakh village where it leaves the river and follows the watershed, reaching the mountain Airlian Basha (8,512). It then passes along the Kelle Tapa range (8,663), Kharhan Tapa (9,709), Kasris Serf (9,681), and follows the River Karzamet Chai as far as the River Kura, whose valley it follows down to a point slightly to the east of Kartavakev village, whence it leaves the River Kura and follows the line of the watershed Kara Ogly (7,259). Thence it crosses Lake Khozapin, ascends the hill marked (7,580), touches Goeck Dag (9,152), follows the hills Uch Tapalar (9,783) at which point the frontiers of Georgia and Armenia meet. Thence Taya Kala (9,716)-summit (9,065) where it leaves the former Ardahan district boundary and crosses the Great Ak Baba range (9,963-9,973) 8,828-7,602 feet, and further in a straight line to point 7,518, passing to the east of Ibish village, Kizil Dash Mount (7,439) village Novy Kizil Dash, thence follows the stream of the north-west of Kara Mamed, thence along the watershed as far as the River Chambushu Chai (running east of the villages of Delavar, B. Kmly and Tikhnis), thence through the villages Vartanli and Bash Shuragel, following the abovementioned river as far as the River Arpa Chai to the north of the villages Kialaila or Kalali. From here the frontier follows the Arpa Chai, thence down the valley of the Arax as far as the village of Urnia, at which point the frontier of Armenia gives place to that of Azerbaijan. The line then follows the Arax Valley down to the confluence of River Arax with the lower Kara Sou, where the frontier of Azerbaijan ends.

NOTE.—Where only the summit of the mountain is mentioned, the frontier is taken as following the watershed.

(Signatures.)

Appendix 2.

In view of the fact that the frontier line as laid down in Appendix 1 runs along the valleys of the Arpa Chai and Arax, the Government of the Grand National Assembly undertakes to withdraw its line of block houses to a distance of 8 versts from

the Alexandropol-Erivan Railway in the area of the Arpa Chai, and to a distance of 4 versts from the above railway on the area of the Arax. The actual boundaries of the above two areas are defined below.

Paragraph 1. Zone of the Arpa Chai.

(A.) South-east of Vartanly, east of Uzun Kilissa, across Bozur Height (5,096) 5,082 feet, east of Karmir Bank-Uch Tapa, east of Araz Ogly, east of Ani, thence to the Arpa Chai and west of Yeni Keney.

(B.) Leaving the Arpa Chai runs east of Hill 5,019, straight to Hill 5,481, thence to a point $4\frac{1}{2}$ versts east of Kizil-Kula—a point 2 versts east of Bojali, thence to the River Digor Chai, which it follows as far as the village Duz Kechut, whence it runs straight north from the ruins of Kara Bagh to the Arpa Chai.

Paragraph 2. Zone of the Arax.

A straight line between Kharaba-Alijan and the village Suleiman Diza.

In the areas bounded on the one side by the railway line from Alexandropol to Erivan, and on the other side by lines running at distances of 8 and 4 versts respectively from the above railway line, the Government of the Grand National Assembly undertakes to refrain from constructing any fortifications (the lines of 4 and 8 versts are considered to be outside the areas) nor to maintain in them any regular troops, save that it retains the right to maintain in the above area such troops as may be necessary for purposes of maintaining order, or for administrative purposes.

(Signatures.)

Appendix 3.

The territory of Nakhchevan.

The frontiers of Nakhchevan are defined as follows:—

From Urmia village in a straight line to Arazdayan station. (The latter falls in Armenian territory), thence in a straight line to Dash Burun (4,108), thence across the River Janam Darassi, thence to the watershed of Bagarsykh (6,607), thence along the former administrative frontier of the Erivan, Sharur and Daragez districts across Hill 6,629 and Hill Kemurliu Dag (6,839), thence across Hill 3,080, Sayat Dag (7868), village Kurt Kulag, Hill Gameaur Dag (8,160), Hill 8,022, Kiuki Dag (10,282) and finally the administrative boundary of the former Nakhchevan district.

(Signatures.)

[E 13063/143/44]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 1062.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 22, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 740 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. His Highness stated that he had received, through an intermediary, a telegram from Angora in reply to enquiries which he had spontaneously caused to be conveyed to the Nationalist Government as a result of conversations which I had with him, as reported in my telegram No. 724 of the 12th instant. He was having this telegram translated into French and would hand it to me. A few minutes afterwards, Edhem Bey, a former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, came into the room with the telegram in question, which I suspect was in reality addressed to Izzet Pasha himself.

2. I have the honour to transmit copy of the telegram as handed to me by Izzet Pasha. We discussed it together. Izzet Pasha took the view that whilst it was evasive it was not unconciliatory, nor did it close the door to further discussions. He did not consider that the telegram meant that the evacuation of Anatolia and of Thrace was a preliminary condition to peace discussions.

3. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at once that the second paragraph of the telegram was entirely incorrect. Neither Mr. Ryan nor I had ever

made any statement to the effect that discussion with the Angora Government could take place on the basis of the National Pact. Izzet Pasha at once said that he had no doubt inadvertently conveyed an incorrect impression to the Government of Angora, and that the blame was his. He suggested that I should delete this paragraph from the telegram. I again went over the ground with him and said that all I had done in conversation with him was to point out that the conflict in Anatolia had reached a deadlock, the only escape from which was a settlement by negotiation. This naturally meant that both sides would have to show moderation. Such being the case, I had merely asked his views as to the prospects of the Angora Government placing themselves in the hands of the Allies. I had said that it would be useless for the Nationalist Government to put forward conditions impossible of acceptance. His Highness had then spontaneously said that he would get to work and sound the Angora Government.

4. Izzet Pasha then said that he had, in fact, sounded the Angora Government on the lines of our conversation. I observed that the reply was anything but encouraging. It was quite evident that the Nationalists meant to take their stand on the National Pact. I reminded Izzet Pasha that he had told me some time ago that the Nationalists would not expect a rigid application of the National Pact in the case of Thrace. He replied that he had meant that they would not claim Western Thrace, but they certainly meant to claim Eastern Thrace with Adrianople, and he thought that the Maritsa would be a suitable frontier on the west. He said that he supposed I would transmit to your Lordship the telegram from the Angora Government.

5. Izzet Pasha then said he had heard a report that an unofficial British mission was going to Angora to enter into discussions with the Nationalist Turks. I replied that there was no truth in this report. It probably owed its origin to the fact that a Major Henry, who as your Lordship may remember, was the intermediary employed in the summer to endeavour to arrange a meeting at a Black Sea port between General Harington and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, had just gone to Iueboli to meet Rafet Pasha. I said that I did not know whether Major Henry had gone on private business, but, in any event, he had no authority to discuss political question and only represented himself.

6. Reverting to the telegram, I said that the prospect of peace in Anatolia did not seem very hopeful. Izzet Pasha, who also seemed to be somewhat pessimistic, said that the hatred between the two races was so great that it was impossible for them to enter into direct negotiations. One thing which the Turks would never forgive was the way in which the Greeks had violated Turkish women. I pointed out that there were two sides to this question, and then, without indicating its source, I gave him the information contained in my telegram No. 738 of the 21st instant. I asked him what was likely to be the fate of the 400 young Greek women who were being driven up from Trebizond into the interior. Izzet Pasha seemed genuinely perturbed by this information. He said that he could not understand such things happening in the district over which Kiazim Pasha Karabekir had command, for the latter was a humane man. I said that it was likely that most of the Greeks serving in Turkish labour corps in the place of Armenian prisoners, the bulk of whom had died of neglect and starvation, would, in their turn, succumb from similar causes. These deplorable events would continue as long as the war went on.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Telegram communicated by Izzet Pasha.

(Traduction.)

L'INVITATION en mars dernier n'a donné aucun autre résultat que de faire gagner du temps à l'armée hellénique; si, cette fois encore, nous nous rendons à la conférence sans aucune condition, il est probable que cela donnera les mêmes résultats. Si donc l'Angleterre et la Grèce sont vraiment animées, comme nous, du sincère désir d'arriver à la paix, seul l'évacuation de l'Anatolie et de la Thrace peut en constituer la preuve évidente et convaincante pour la grande Assemblée nationale et pour l'opinion publique turque.

L'affirmation du Haut-Commissariat anglais, d'après laquelle les négociations se dérouleraient sur la base du Pacte national, démontre qu'on a l'intention d'y apporter des modifications.

[7866]

M 2

Nous sommes persuadés qu'il serait sans utilité pratique d'entamer des négociations avant que nous soyons assurés d'une manière quelconque sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique.

Si des propositions sérieuses et fermes vous sont faites dans cet ordre d'idée, veuillez nous les faire connaître.

[E 13252/143/44]

No. 35.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3189.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 1, 1921.

THE French Ambassador called upon me at his own desire this afternoon upon his return from France. He explained that he was returning in a few days in order to see M. Briand, and wanted to be familiar with the latest aspect of the situation before speaking to his own chief.

He began by a reference to the note which I had recently sent to the French Government in reply to their defence of the Angora Agreement. Speaking for himself, and in an unofficial capacity, he told me that he thought this note was irreproachable—"parfait" was the word he used; that its tone and manner were exemplary and, moreover, that the juridical position which I had taken up in it was sound. But he begged me not to regard this as an official expression of opinion or to make official use of it in my communications with Paris.

I thanked him for his compliments, which were evidently intended to smooth away the disagreeable impression which the attitude of his Government had produced, but said no more on that point.

He then asked me whether it was true that the later communications with M. Gounaris had involved any serious modification of or departure from the position which he had taken up in his earlier interviews with me, reports of which he had seen in Paris.

I told him that the Greek Ministers had given me categorical assurances on this point; that the memorandum which they had submitted, and which I believed that I had already passed on to Paris, contained an expression of the Greek point of view, which they were quite entitled to put forward, but they had assured me that it implied no qualification of their previous declaration that they were prepared, in the event of a conference, to place their case in the hands of the Powers.

The Ambassador then went on to ask me what was my view of the course of procedure that should now be followed.

I replied that he was aware of my official despatches; that in my view the sole condition of re-establishing peace in the Near and Middle East was the absolute and unquestioning and unqualified agreement of the three Great Powers, France, Italy and ourselves, and that, unless that were attained, I saw no chance of escaping from the tangle in which we had all become involved. I said he would have noticed that, in the concluding words of my last note to the French Government, I had contemplated addressing to them a further communication. In this communication I had proposed, on behalf of the British Government, to suggest the summoning of a conference—the locality of which would be determined hereafter—to which the Great Powers would again summon Turkey and Greece, with a view to putting before them the terms of the final settlement. But I realised the dangers of summoning such a conference unless certain prior conditions were fulfilled. A conference summoned without them might fail in one of several ways; either the Angora Turks might decline to come, or they might lay down impossible conditions before they came, or, having come, they might break up the conference by insisting upon such conditions in the early stages. Any one of these situations would result in an abortive conference and a rebuff to the Powers. It was, therefore, in my view, an essential preliminary condition that the Powers themselves—by which I meant France, Italy and Great Britain—should come to a firm and absolute agreement as to the course which they would pursue before such a conference were convened. No such agreement had hitherto been attained. When I was in Paris last June the Italian Government had only been represented by their Ambassador there, and, in the absence of his Foreign Minister, he could not pledge his Government. We had arrived at a certain amount of agreement about Smyrna, but when we came to Thrace we had not been able to attain a similar accord. The agreement that was now indispensable must cover the whole ground, and must not admit either of evasion or of doubt. It

would be fatal to summon a conference and then bring about its failure by our own want of unanimity. The kind of agreement which I had in view must, I thought, cover the following points:—

1. Smyrna.
2. Asia Minor in general.
3. Constantinople.
4. Straits.
5. Financial provisions.
6. Thrace.

The Ambassador asked me if I thought that an inter-Allied agreement on these points was possible.

I answered that, provided goodwill was shown, I did not see any reason to the contrary, and that I thought it quite possible to formulate proposals as a basis for discussions which might lead to an agreement on all these points.

His Excellency expressed his most cordial concurrence with my mode of procedure, which entirely coincided with his own views and, he believed, with those of his own Government, and he asked whether the discussion which I had suggested was meant by me to mean a meeting of the Supreme Council or a more private and friendly conference of the representatives of the three Great Powers.

I replied, unhesitatingly, the latter. I doubted if this matter would ever be settled at a meeting of the Supreme Council, with all the attendant disadvantages and publicity. I thought that the best way to settle the matter would be for the Foreign Ministers of the three Powers to meet together—much on the same lines as the meeting in Paris last June—to thrash out, point by point, the various subjects that I had raised, and not to separate until they had arrived at an agreement upon all of them. When this had been done, it would then be possible to summon the belligerent parties to a conference, but, I thought, upon this condition—that the terms which had been agreed upon would have to be laid down and enforced. I did not suggest that all discussion would be ruled out, but, broadly speaking, the Powers could not afford to place themselves again in the position which had arisen in London in March last; and they would have to state their terms not merely as those upon which they had agreed, but as terms which they were prepared to enforce, and the responsibility for rejecting which, with all its serious consequences, would lie upon the party or parties which might refuse them.

Count de Saint-Aulaire recognised the justice of these views, which he thought corresponded exactly to the requirements of the case.

He then passed on to say something about the speech which I had delivered a few days ago in the City of London, and which had excited a certain amount of attention in his country.

He told me he had personally or officially no complaint to make about this speech; but there were passages in it, as reported to Paris, which seemed to call for some elucidation.

I said that, although I was not in the habit of preparing the text of my speeches, there was nothing in my observations, as recorded in the "Daily Telegraph," which seemed to me the most accurate report, which did not faithfully represent my views, and, as I believed, those of my colleagues, or which I was prepared to withdraw.

His Excellency hastily assured me that he contemplated no such suggestion, and that he himself had realised when he had read the speech in full that it was far from bearing the interpretation which had been attached to it by the quotation of certain passages detached from their context, which had been sent on the wires to Paris. There was one point, however, in which he did not clearly follow my argument. What was the meaning of my observation about disarmament? And what was the correlation between naval disarmament and military disarmament? He did not himself see the connection between the two, and thought that his countrymen shared his view.

I replied that if he would look at the passage to which he referred he would find that I had made no specific reference to France at all, and that my remarks were of a general character; but that if France chose to fit the cap on her own head, the responsibility must lie on her own shoulders.

I further said that from the point of view of my country I considered that there was the closest connection between the two factors, to which I had referred, and I explained it in this way:—

In response to the invitation which had been issued by the American Secretary of State, the British Government had at once and unhesitatingly agreed to a very large

reduction in that which, in the particular circumstances of our Empire, was our main, and indeed almost our sole, weapon of defence. Meanwhile, it was a matter of common knowledge that our army had been reduced to a point where it could not be regarded as a menace by anyone, and was hardly sufficient for the defence in times of peace of the Empire. In these circumstances it was a matter of most vital consideration to us if we found that, while we had rendered ourselves relatively powerless in both these respects, we were nevertheless expected to contemplate a situation in which the continent of Europe would remain a great armed camp—and I was not alluding to the armies of France only, but to those of Italy, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and possibly, if the French argument were sound, of Germany also—and in which, further, no limitation was to be placed either upon the construction of submarines, on the nominal plea that they were wanted for purposes of coastal defence, or of air machines, which had developed into one of the most powerful instruments of offensive warfare. I said therefore that the question of all these instruments of war and their multiplication was a matter of profound concern to us, and their relation to the naval aspect of the case was one which no Englishman could afford to ignore.

His Excellency thanked me for my explanation on these points, which he did not officially dispute, and as to which he repeated that the apprehensions which had prevailed in his own country arose from imperfect or condensed reports.

Reverting again to the situation in the Near East, I said that without desiring to repeat what I had said in my two notes about the Angora Agreement, I could not conceal from him—and he must by now be well aware himself—that the agreement had caused the most profound surprise and disappointment in this country; and that, whilst it was not for me to make any suggestion to the French Government as to what they should do in the matter, I thought it would be very surprising if M. Briand, in his reply, did not make some gesture in regard to this unfortunate pact, and thus give some relief to the feelings to which I had referred. The desirability of doing this seemed to me to be very obvious in the interests of the larger union referred to. Moreover, the unfortunate consequences of the agreement had already manifested themselves, for the Kemalist party had displayed an attitude of intractability which seemed decidedly ominous for the future. Elated by their agreement with France, they had since manoeuvred to extract a similar agreement with Italy with the object, undoubtedly, of isolating Great Britain and compelling her to be the last suitor for their favours. These manoeuvres had failed, as the Italians had declined to conclude an agreement at all and had withdrawn their envoy.

Nevertheless, the Angora Agreement had undoubtedly aggravated the perils of the situation, and it was for the French Government to consider by what methods they could extricate the Allies from the difficult position in which they had found themselves placed.

The Count de Saint-Aulaire concluded by asking me for information about the visits of Herr Stinnes and Herr Rathenau to this country.

I told him that I knew nothing about either, as the proposals of Herr Rathenau—which, I imagined, would be closely analogous to the discussions which had taken place between that gentleman and M. Loucheur—had not been brought before the Cabinet. He said he hoped that before he returned to Paris on Monday I might be able to give him some information on the point, which had excited a good deal of apprehension in his own country.

Our conversation then terminated in as friendly a manner as it had begun.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 13323/132/44]

No. 36.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1080.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report by the military attaché respecting the handing over at Trebizond of British prisoners.

Constantinople, November 28, 1921.

Enclosure 1 in No. 36.

Report by Major-General Franks.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff, General Headquarters, Allied Forces of Occupation.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report upon my visit to certain Black Sea ports to effect the exchange of prisoners of war, directed in your memorandum No. C.R.A.F. 98/P.T. 2:—

H.M.S. "Centaur" sailed from Constantinople at 6 P.M., Saturday, the 29th October, with myself, Major Jones and Captain Armstrong on board. Colonel Baird with Ali Maajid Bey sailed for Trebizond the previous day in H.M.S. "Somme."

H.M.S. "Centaur" reached Zunguldak at 7 A.M., the 30th October. I sent Major Jones and Captain Armstrong on shore, where they were met by Saladin Bey, the Nationalist representative, and the Mutessarif; on return they reported the attitude of the Nationalist authorities as frigid almost to the point of hostility.

No obstacles were, however, placed in the way of removing the British prisoners, who were all civilians. They disclaimed all knowledge of any military prisoners, British or Indian.

Mr. Borg, with his wife and child, and Mr. Falanger were brought on board H.M.S. "Centaur"; the remainder wishing time to make preparations, it was decided to pick them up on the way back.

H.M.S. "Centaur" sailed from Zunguldak at 8 P.M., the 30th October, and reached Ineboli at 7:30 on the 31st October. The wind was from the west and a heavy swell was running, which increased considerably during the day, and made communication with the shore difficult.

The harbour-master came on board about 7 A.M., and stated that the only prisoners that were at Ineboli were Captain Campbell and two civilians. I sent Major Jones, Captain Armstrong and Subadar Major Tikka Khan on shore.

Major Jones reported the attitude of the Nationalist authorities to be similar to that of those at Zunguldak, and that they disclaimed all knowledge of any British prisoners except Captain Campbell and two civilians at Ineboli and those already mentioned at Zunguldak.

H.M.S. "Somme" meanwhile arrived from Trebizond with Colonel Rawlinson and three British and other rank prisoners of war. Colonel Rawlinson, Colonel Baird and Ali Maajid Bey were transhipped at my request to H.M.S. "Centaur" with some difficulty as the swell was hourly increasing.

I explained the situation to Maajid Bey, and pointed out that it was extremely grave. He was sent ashore in H.M.S. "Centaur's" motor-boat, and Captain Armstrong and subadar major were brought away, as communication with the shore might shortly become impossible. H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum" and steamship "Mentenol" meanwhile arrived with the Turkish prisoners and anchored.

At 4:30 P.M. Maajid Bey signalled from the shore and was brought off by H.M.S. "Centaur's" motor-boat. The wind was now blowing in squalls and a heavy swell was coming in from the west.

Maajid Bey reported the situation to be as stated. He had been in communication with Angora, and brought me a copy of a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I append a translation in English, stating that, in spite of all their efforts, they had been unable to trace the other prisoners named, and guaranteeing that if any such should subsequently be discovered they would instantly be released, and all facilities given for their repatriation. He begged me to accept this assurance of their good faith and to carry out the exchange. Maajid Bey further assured me that Captain Campbell had no knowledge of any of the missing prisoners on my list, a statement subsequently verified as being true. Colonel Rawlinson also had no knowledge of any of them, and had, in fact, already expressed doubt on the subject in the case of Private Hillyer, of the 85th M.C. Company.

Difficulties were considerably increased by the report of Captain Scott that H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum" had only 50 tons of coal on board.

Later in the evening her cable parted, and it appeared likely that we should all have to put out to sea till the weather moderated, in which case she would hardly have sufficient coal to get her to Constantinople. Seventeen of the most important Turkish prisoners were on board that ship, and it was quite impossible to transfer them to H.M.S. "Centaur" with the high sea then running.

Captain French, of H.M.S. "Centaur," wished to send H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum"

back to Constantinople escorted by H.M.S. "Somme" to coal. I felt sure that such action would be regarded as bad faith by the Nationalists, as three of our prisoners were on board H.M.S. "Somme," and I was pledged to return them if negotiations fell through. I therefore asked Captain French to keep H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum" at Ineboli till daylight if possible. Fortunately her second anchor held.

At 7 P.M. I sent a wireless message to Constantinople to ask for instructions, and suggested that I should accept the assurance of the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora and carry on. My reasons were that, after hearing Colonel Rawlinson's story of what he and his companions had endured, it was abhorrent to think of giving them back to the Turks and leaving Captain Campbell in similar circumstances. Colonel Rawlinson most loyally volunteered to go back without a murmur if necessary, which made me the more reluctant to let him endure the suffering of a second disappointment of this kind.

Further, I was far from convinced that adequate proof had been obtained of the existence or accessibility of all the prisoners named in the list given to me. It seemed to me preferable to make certain of releasing those whom it was in our power to release rather than to cause great bitterness and much suffering by breaking off negotiations, possibly to no ultimate advantage. In the state of the weather it was obviously impossible to carry on further, and possibly lengthy negotiations with Angora while we lay off Ineboli, and a decision was necessary on the spot.

During the night an answer was received from Constantinople authorising me to carry out the exchange upon receiving a categorical guarantee from the Nationalist authorities that any British prisoners subsequently discovered would be delivered forthwith.

At 8 A.M. the 1st November Colonel Baird, accompanied by Ali Maajid Bey, was despatched in a whaler to convey this decision. The boat was, however, unable to effect a landing and obliged to return to the ship. A little later a large Turkish caique succeeded in reaching H.M.S. "Centaur," conveying the deputy harbour-master, and by him I was able to send a message ashore that I was prepared to accept the Angora guarantee and carry on.

The weather moderated slightly, and about 10 A.M. a second Turkish caique was able to reach H.M.S. "Centaur" conveying Kemal Bey, the second senior member of the Commission of Exchange appointed by Angora. The attitude of the Turks was now completely altered, and they were now very polite. Husni Pasha sent his apologies for not being able to come personally, owing to his age and the weather conditions. They expressed themselves gratified that their assurance of good faith had been accepted. I replied that it remained for them to make it good, which they promised they would make every effort to do.

It was then arranged that they should send off Captain Campbell and the two civilians forthwith, and that as soon as they had reached H.M.S. "Centaur" the disembarkation of Turkish prisoners would commence in Turkish boats. The weather had moderated slightly and we were able to transfer the Turkish prisoners from H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum" to H.M.S. "Centaur," though with some difficulty. This was done in case we should have to put out to sea before the exchange could be carried out, and wait for better conditions.

Fortunately this did not prove necessary. Captain Campbell, Mr. Maltass, and another civilian were sent out in a Turkish boat, and the disembarkation of the Turkish prisoners was commenced. The necessary certificates were exchanged, and the whole exchange was completed before dark.

H.M.S. "Somme" had meanwhile started for Constantinople, and H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum," escorted by H.M.S. "Centaur" and steamship "Montenol," sailed for Zunguldak at 8 P.M. Eleven of the Turkish prisoners permitted to return to Constantinople were taken back on H.M.S. "Chrysanthemum" and steamship "Montenol," the necessary certificates having been signed.

Before his release, I had the opportunity of speaking to Hussein Raouf Bey, with whom I was very favourably impressed, and who gave me his personal assurance that no stone would be left unturned to make good their promise regarding the release of any British prisoners who might still be left in Anatolia.

H.M.S. "Centaur" reached Zunguldak about 8 A.M. on the 2nd November and the remaining civilian prisoners were embarked on steamship "Montenol" without incident. The total number brought back to Constantinople were:—

Officers	2
British, other ranks	3
Civilians	19

I cannot speak too highly of the work of the Royal Navy under these difficult conditions. From Captain French down, all ranks were out to help with a hearty good will and invariable cheerfulness which earned the gratitude and admiration of the sister service.

I should also like to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-chief the valuable work done by the Red Crescent representative, Ali Maajid Bey.

He was of great assistance to Colonel Baird at Trebizond and to myself at Ineboli, and his loyal co-operation and tact did much to smooth over difficulties which might have wrecked the entire negotiations.

FRANKS, Major-General.

Headquarters, the British Army in Constantinople,
November 4, 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 36.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Angora, to Ali Mejid, Red Crescent Delegation, Ineboli.

WE had notified through the intermediary of Hamid Bey the names of the English who were to be handed over from Sokia, Adalia, Zunguldak and Trebizond.

As a result of these enquiries, which we have made in all directions and by all possible means, we have had conducted to the coast all the English that we have been able to find and we are handing them over.

As the six officers and the six Indians now asked for from us, as well as the two dragomans, are not in our country we know nothing about them.

If, in spite of all our enquiries, any person of British nationality (British subject) has remained in our country we are ready to give him up. Let people have confidence in the good-will we have shown and in the fulfilment of the agreement arrived at by the intermediary of Hamid Bey. We should like the exchange to take place at the earliest possible moment.

Enclosure 3 in No. 36.

Colonel Baird to Major-General Franks.

Sir,

Constantinople, November 4, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that I reached Trebizond in H.M.S. "Somme" at 11 A.M. on the 30th October and immediately sent Ali Mejid Bey (Turkish Red Crescent representative ashore with a letter (copy attached) addressed to the Turkish military commandant.

After a delay of some two hours, Ali Mejid Bey returned to the ship and informed me that the Turkish commandant had refused to hand over the prisoners on the ground that his instructions were that we were to hand over four Turkish prisoners in exchange. Ali Mejid Bey further stated that he had personally addressed a telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora remonstrating against the attitude of the local commandant, and that he hoped that a reply would be received from Angora in a few hours, authorising the handing over of the British prisoners without further trouble.

I directed Ali Mejid Bey to return ashore immediately and inform the Turkish commandant that I protested most strongly against his action, and to explain to him once more that the official exchange of prisoners was to be made at Ineboli, and my mission to Trebizond had merely been undertaken to relieve the Nationalists of the duty of conveying our prisoners to the place at which it had been agreed that the official exchange was to take place.

I also instructed Ali Mejid Bey to tell the Turkish commandant that I was prepared to give a written guarantee that Colonel Rawlinson and the other prisoners should be returned in the event of any hitch occurring in the conditions agreed upon for the official exchange, and that, if necessary, I was personally prepared to remain at Trebizond pending the receipt of a report that the official exchange had been duly carried out, but that in any case it was essential that Colonel Rawlinson and his companions should be on board H.M.S. "Somme" by 5 P.M. at the latest.

Ali Mejid Bey duly proceeded ashore with the above messages and, after a further delay of about an hour, returned to H.M.S. "Somme" and reported that the Turkish commandant now stated that since he had left him he had received a belated telegraphic order from Angora authorising him to hand over the prisoners, but that he requested me to go ashore as he wished to inform me personally to this effect.

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I accordingly proceeded ashore, and was met at the landing stage by various subordinate officers, by whom I was conducted to the commandant's office, situated in a building some five minutes' distance away.

Here the commandant was waiting for me. In reply to my immediate enquiry on the subject, the commandant informed me that he was now prepared to hand over the prisoners, and asked me how soon they should be ready and when I wished to see them. I replied that they should be sent for at once, and that I should prefer to see them in his office and would take them back with me to the ship. No further objections were raised, and in about twenty minutes Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlinson, followed a few minutes later by one corporal and two other ranks, were duly handed over to me. We immediately proceeded to the quay, and by 6 P.M. were proceeding in H.M.S. "Somme" at 20 knots for Ineboli.

I am unable to say whether or not the Turkish commandant's story that he had received belated instructions to hand over the prisoners was true, but according to Ali Mejid Bey this was in fact the case.

A. W. F. BAIRD, Colonel,
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 4 in No. 36.

Colonel Baird to Turkish Military Commandant, Trebizond.

M. le Commandant, Le 30 octobre 1921.
J'AI l'honneur de vous faire savoir que j'ai été chargé de la mission d'assurer le transport des prisonniers de guerre britanniques de Trébizonde à Inéboli, où l'échange officiel de tous les prisonniers ottomans et britanniques doit avoir lieu le 31 octobre courant selon l'arrangement convenu entre les autorités militaires britanniques et le représentant à Constantinople de la grande Assemblée nationale.

Je vous prie donc de bien vouloir m'indiquer le plus tôt possible l'heure et le lieu qui vous conviendrait pour faire les arrangements nécessaires à cet effet. Afin de permettre au contre-torpilleur de rentrer à Inéboli à l'heure fixée pour l'échange officiel demain, il est important que ces prisonniers soient embarqués à bord aujourd'hui à 17 heures au plus tard.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
A. W. F. BAIRD, Colonel,
Armée britannique.

Enclosure 5 in No. 36.

Declaration.

(Form No. 2.)

WE, the undersigned, representing and holding plenipotentiary powers for, and on behalf of, the Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, siégeant à Angora, responsible for the retention to this date of various British prisoners, military and civilian, whether British or British-Indian subjects, do hereby declare that after these prisoners, to the number of , whose names are submitted herewith, have been handed over to the British military representative, Major-General G. McK. Franks, C.B., this day on board H.M.S. "Centaur," there remain in Anatolia no other British or British-Indian subjects who are willing to appear individually or collectively before representative British authority, and that should any such be discovered at any date after the signature of this declaration, we, the undersigned, on behalf of the Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, siégeant à Angora, do hereby affirm that, immediately their presence is known, they shall be restored to British authority by the quickest means and with due regard to their well-being, and that His Britannic Majesty's Government and the British General Officer Commanding-in-chief at Constantinople shall be immediately notified.

Signed this day of , 1921, on board H.M.S. ,
off

[E 13355/1/44]

No. 37.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 943.)

My Lord,

Rome, November 29, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your Lordship's instructions, I conveyed the substance of Lord Hardinge's telegram No. 865 of the 14th November, with reference to the mandate alleged to have been given to the French Government for the organisation of the gendarmerie in Turkey, by *note verbale* to the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The latter now inform me that the contents of my *note verbale* have been communicated confidentially to the Italian Ambassadors at Paris and Constantinople, to whom instructions have been sent to give their attention to this important question, and to keep the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed of the developments.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

[E 13327/143/44]

No. 38.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1084.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 29, 1921.

THE political situation here has not improved in any respect during the last fortnight. Indications are not wanting to show that the Ministers at Constantinople are increasingly subservient to the Angora Government. The following story, which is authentic, bears out this view:—

2. A member of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control asked the Finance Minister whether he would not do well to look ahead and endeavour to devise means for balancing the budget. The Minister replied that he was only the "kavass" of the Angora Government, which, when it eventually came to Constantinople, could get rid of him if it wished to do so.

3. The Grand Vizier alone of the members of the Constantinople Government declares that he will have no dealings with the Kemalists. In conversation with Sir Adam Block, he characterised the latter as rebels.

4. The difficulties of the Kemalists must, however, be considerable. Reliable reports state that they have given up any idea of suppressing the Kurdish rising by force, because they cannot spare the troops necessary for that purpose. They hope to effect a settlement by conciliatory methods. Then, again, there are persistent rumours that Enver Pasha is proving a thorn in the side of Mustapha Kemal. Had it not been for the direct encouragement afforded them by the conclusion of their agreement with France, the above-mentioned anxieties of the Nationalists would have led to a much more chastened frame of mind on the part of the latter.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 13330/800/44]

No. 39.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1087.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 29, 1921.

AS reported in my telegram to your Lordship No. 751 of the 25th November, 1921, the question of the security of the Armenian and other Christian populations of Cilicia was raised at the meeting of Allied High Commissioners on that day, when the following decisions were taken:—

2.—(1.) That the French High Commissioner be requested to obtain permission from General Gouraud for the most compromised among the Armenians to take refuge in Syria.

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(2.) That those refugees who had private means should be allowed to go wherever they wished, with the exception of Constantinople.

(3.) That the heads of the Armenian religious communities should be recommended to advise the Armenians of Cilicia to concentrate as far as possible at Mersina or other seaports where they might be under the protection of Allied warships.

3. On the 28th November I communicated these decisions verbally to the heads of the Armenian religious communities whom I had requested to attend at the British Embassy for that purpose. I added that I could make no engagement that a British warship would be stationed at Mersina, or elsewhere on the coast, for the protection of the refugees, and I stated very plainly that His Majesty's Government could not be responsible for the provision of transport for the very large number of refugees involved, nor for their maintenance, and that none of the Allied Governments was now in a position to bear such expenses.

4. The Armenian patriarch communicated the contents of a telegram, dated Alexandretta, the 27th November, which he had received from the Catholicos of Cilicia, saying that his efforts to prevent emigration were in vain, and that he had been obliged to leave Alexandretta on the 25th November, and asking that steps should be taken to obtain permission for the refugees to emigrate to Palestine and Cyprus. The telegram ended with the statement that shipping was awaited at Deurt Yol to avoid serious complications, and that the Catholicos was leaving for Aleppo to deal with the situation at Aintab and Killis.

5. The patriarch explained that there were some 14,000 Armenians at Deurt Yol, which is quite close to Alexandretta. About 4,000 of these were young men, fully armed and organised, who were determined to resist the entry of Kemalist troops, and a serious conflict would certainly ensue unless arrangements were made for their peaceable evacuation.

6. The patriarch also communicated a telegram, dated Larnaca, the 27th November, to the following effect:—

"9,000 émigrés, destination Chypre, 2,000 débarquèrent démarches infructueuses."

7. I said that the Armenians of Deurt Yol seemed to come within the category of Armenians so compromised by their antecedents that they would be entitled to protection with the French Syrian area, and I undertook to draw the French High Commissioner's attention to the matter as one of extreme urgency. I could, however, hold out no prospect of permission being granted for the reception of refugees in Palestine or Cyprus, where the authorities, as well as those in Egypt, were strongly opposed to such immigration. I also said that the French High Commissioner had just informed me that ships were embarking refugees at Mersina, and that these were perhaps the 9,000 referred to in the Larnaca telegram. The Greeks had also sent three boats to embark the Hellenic subjects at Mersina.

8. My visitors went on to say that the wholesale emigration of the 120,000 Armenians of Cilicia would mean the disappearance of the last considerable element of Armenian population in Asiatic Turkey. They asked what would become of the lands, houses and other property which the emigrants were leaving behind them. They could not reconcile themselves to the idea that these people must abandon their homes for good, and they held that the present movement of emigration should be regarded as a temporary measure, with the hope of return when a permanent settlement of the Turkish question was effected. All they asked for was that some not too distant places of refuge might be pointed out to them, where their people could live and work while awaiting happier days.

9. They also begged that the High Commissioners would reconsider their decision not to allow refugees from Cilicia to land in Constantinople. They urged that many of them had means to pay for their transport and maintain themselves here on arrival. Many more had friends or relations in Constantinople who would be responsible for their maintenance, and they asked that an exception might be made for a limited number—not exceeding 10,000—of persons who could thus be provided for. The Armenian community had already chartered two small steamers and were in negotiations for a third, which would be employed for this purpose if permission were granted.

10. I replied that it was not easy to go back on the decision already taken, and that in any case the matter depended on the military authorities, who were responsible for order and public health in Constantinople and were very averse to the further influx of refugees. But I took note of their request, and without making any engagement would submit it to my colleagues and to the military authorities.

11. On taking leave my visitors showed signs of the deepest dejection, which seems justified by the gravity of the situation in Cilicia, and it is evident that, if the French Government is unable to guarantee the security of the few British subjects in that province, not much comfort can be derived by the Armenians from the somewhat vague declaration regarding the protection of minorities contained in article 6 of the Franco-Kemalist Convention.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 13331/143/44]

No. 40.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 1089.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 29, 1921.

THERE have recently been indications of uneasiness in the internal political situation at Angora. Attention has been directed more particularly to the resignation of two Ministers, Omer Lufti Bey, Commissioner for Public Works, and Hamdullah Subhi Bey, Commissioner for Public Instruction. The former has been replaced by Reduf Bey, formerly Minister of Marine, who proceeded to Angora on his release from Malta; the latter by one Yenbi Bey, deputy for Karassi. These changes took place about the middle of the present month. About the same time it was announced that Nureddin Pasha, who was in charge of the operations against the Kurds, and Mihad Pasha, commanding the Mesopotamian front, had been relieved of their commands and had been replaced by Kutchuk Jemal and Jevad Pashas, who are also among the deportees recently returned from Malta.

2. The general tendency is to connect these changes with the struggle which has been proceeding for some time between the pure Nationalists, who stand by Mustapha Kemal, and the supporters of Enver Pasha. Too little is known here of the details of this contest and of the present opinions of the persons named above to enable me to form a confident opinion. All that can be affirmed is that Enver is making a strong effort to re-enter Turkish politics, and has supporters in Angora and doubtless in the army, especially among those who favour a more whole-hearted co-operation with the Bolsheviks. There would also appear to be a party, not necessarily identical with the Enverists, who view with misgiving and jealousy the dictatorship of Mustapha Kemal.

3. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Mustapha Kemal's position has been sensibly weakened, nor is there any ground for thinking that he and his supporters stand for a "moderate" tendency in regard to the questions at issue between Turkey and the Allies. All my information up to date tends to show that Mustapha Kemal is still in a strong position at Angora, and that he is as resolved as ever to secure the main objects of the national movement, i.e., the complete expulsion of the Greeks and the acceptance by Europe of the national pact. If assured of these objects, he would doubtless welcome a composition with the Western Powers generally, but it is only in this sense that he can be regarded as a "moderate." His attitude towards the Central Government is still one of defiance. He may possibly have in view a time when it will be necessary to recognise again the authority of the Sultan or at least of the Throne, but in the meantime he continues to treat that authority as being in abeyance, and maintains the claim of Angora to be the sole Government of Turkey. How completely impotent and how largely subservient the Constantinople Government is in face of these pretensions I have described in my despatch No. 1084 of to-day's date.

4. It was natural that on the return of the Malta deportees posts should be found for some of the more capable men among them. The three mentioned above all played leading parts in the national movement in its earlier stages. Reduf Bey played a part second only to that of Mustapha Kemal in organising it. He is usually considered an honest patriot, and may be an element for good in the long run if his experiences as a deportee have not embittered him. Kutchuk Jemal Pasha essayed to play at Konia a rôle similar to that of Mustapha Kemal in Northern Asia Minor, but was less successful. At a later stage, as Minister for War here he promoted the Nationalist movement to the utmost of his power, and Jevad Pasha, as Chief of Staff, also supported it from Constantinople with even greater energy and ability. It will be remembered that the activities of these two pashas in this direction led to their dismissal at the instance of

the Allied High Commissioners early in 1920. In these circumstances, Reduf Bey, Jemal Pasha and Jevad Pasha may be expected to be whole-hearted supporters of Mustapha Kemal as long as he continues to direct the national movement on the present lines. There is no reason to suppose that the changes which have brought them into prominence in Anatolia represent in any way a success for the Enverist faction.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 13428/1/44]

No. 41.

Signor Taliani to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

LE Marquis de la Torretta a pris acte des déclarations de Lord Curzon, selon lesquelles une conférence avec les Turcs et les Grecs n'aura lieu qu'à la suite d'une entente préalable entre les Alliés. Il remercie vivement Lord Curzon.

Pour ce qui concerne l'Accord tripartite, indépendamment de l'opportunité—envisagée déjà avec Lord Curzon—de trouver une formule qui puisse le rendre acceptable par les Turcs (tout en maintenant l'intégrité des engagements interalliés), la requête du Marquis de la Torretta concerne spécialement le maintien des clauses du Traité de Sèvres, qui sont la seule garantie pratique du Tripartite et qui, par conséquent, constituent pour l'Italie un intérêt capital sur lequel aucune transaction n'est possible.

Le Marquis de la Torretta désire faire connaître à Lord Curzon qu'il est disposé à examiner et à accueillir avec la meilleure volonté, d'accord avec lui, toute modification des conditions de paix qui puisse les rendre acceptables par les Turcs, mais que dans aucun cas il ne pourra consentir à diminuer la portée desdites clauses, et cela pour des raisons d'équilibre économique et politique avec les avantages réalisés par les Alliés en Orient.

Ainsi posée la question, il paraît au Marquis de la Torretta qu'il ne sera pas difficile à Lord Curzon de lui donner des assurances précises et amicales à ce sujet.

*Ambassade d'Italie, Londres,
le 4 décembre 1921.*

[E 13347/1/44]

No. 42.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 953.)

(Extracts.)

My Lord,

Rome, November 28, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that I was received by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening. The Marchese della Torretta greeted me with extreme cordiality, and I took the opportunity of assuring him of the desire of His Majesty's Government to work in close friendship and understanding with the Government of Italy. I also gave him the friendly personal message from your Lordship as authorised by you. His Excellency thanked me warmly for this communication, and declared that he entirely reciprocated your Lordship's sentiments. In view of the recent French behaviour it was more than ever essential that the British and Italian Governments should work in close co-operation and afford each other mutual support.

The conversation turned at once to the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement with the Angora Government, and the Marchese della Torretta renewed the assurances that he had already given to my predecessor of his complete agreement in the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject. He agreed that it would be preferable not to treat France as having left the concert, but to endeavour to bring her back into line. The task was no easy one. I took the occasion to impress upon his Excellency how necessary it was that when, as in this instance, the Italian Government were in full agreement with the views of His Majesty's Government, they should give them their open and wholehearted support. But he evidently did not consider, or would not admit, that there had been any Italian failure in this respect. His Excellency referred at length to the Tripartite Agreement as representing one of the only advantages that Italy had secured from the war. The Italian Government were bound to hold tightly to it. His Excellency was aware of the opinion of His Majesty's Government on the

subject, but could not alter his point of view. I have since received a memorandum from the Italian Government in this sense, a copy of which is enclosed herewith in translation.

I enquired of his Excellency what was the position as regards the Italian negotiations with the Kemal Government. He said that they had degenerated into a Turkish attempt to involve M. Tuozi in some agreement of the same nature as that concluded by the French. In the circumstances, as I have already telegraphed to your Lordship, M. Tuozi was to be recalled at once in order to report to the Italian Cabinet.

I finally took leave of his Excellency with renewed mutual expressions of cordiality and goodwill and of our desire for a close understanding and co-operation between our two Governments. Nothing could have been more friendly or satisfactory than his Excellency's personal attitude. I had expected some reference on his part to the Eastern Mediterranean Agreement mentioned in the last paragraph of your Lordship's despatch No. 951 of the 8th instant, but this expectation was not realised.

Enclosure in No. 42.

*Aide-mémoire from the Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated
November 29, 1921.*

(Translation.)

IN the last paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* handed to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marchese della Torretta, on the 16th November, relative to the Franklin-Kemalist Agreement, the following passage occurs: "During the discussions at Paris in June last, both M. Briand and Lord Curzon were of the opinion that in the face of Turkish opposition there was no hope of maintaining the Tripartite Agreement inviolate, but that the efforts of the Allies should be directed to preserving its substance in another form in which, without sacrificing the interests of Italy and France, it would be acceptable to the Turks."

The same *aide-mémoire* adds that His Britannic Majesty's Government still consider that the Italian and other Allied Governments should aim at such a solution when the time comes for the discussion of the terms of the general peace, rather than insist upon the textual maintenance of the Tripartite Agreement.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that it does not appear that, in the meetings of the Supreme Council in Paris in June last, M. Briand and Lord Curzon expressed any personal views on the Tripartite Agreement.

In any case, however, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers that they should intimate to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that the Italian Government, quite apart from any solution that may eventually be adopted to render the Tripartite Agreement effective as regards Turkey, considers that this agreement should remain intact as between the Allies, the agreement itself being closely connected with the question of mandates and consequently with that of the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

[E 13428/1/44]

No. 43.

Mr. Vansittart to Signor Taliani.

Dear Taliani,

Foreign Office, December 6, 1921.

IN reply to the communication which you made to Lord Curzon on the 4th December, he authorises me to reply as follows:—

As you are aware, we have always been reluctant to change the basis of the financial clauses on account of the complicated questions which were bound to be thus raised afresh and on which unanimity was only reached with so much difficulty at the time of the drafting of the Treaty of Sèvres. Since then various suggestions have been made, not by us, that the financial clauses should be drastically modified. At the March conference we still maintained our attitude that the basis should not be changed, and we only consented to modifications in detail. Since then the Turkish attitude, based on the National Pact, has been that they will accept nothing short of financial

independence, and this attitude has, of course, been strengthened by the Franklin-Bouillon agreement.

It is therefore likely that, in order to arrive at any permanent settlement, we may all have to go further in the revision of the financial clauses than we personally should have desired, and in this respect we have always been more conservative than either the French or even your own representatives at the various discussions which have taken place on this subject.

But we are happy to inform the Marquis della Torretta that in no case could we agree to any such modifications except in complete harmony and agreement with him, or to any modification of a nature to hinder Italian interests under the tripartite agreement, as to which we have already given the Italian Government the widest assurances.

R. G. VANSITTART.

[E 13453/1/44]

No. 44.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 7.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 6 décembre 1921.*

M. le Marquis,

J'AI transmis à mon Gouvernement la lettre que votre Seigneurie a bien voulu m'adresser le 25 novembre dernier, au sujet de l'accord négocié par M. Franklin-Bouillon à Angora.

Je suis chargé de marquer à votre Seigneurie combien le Gouvernement de la République a été heureux de constater que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique appréciait le sentiment dans lequel il suivait cette affaire et était résolu à la traiter dans le même esprit. Comme votre Seigneurie, M. le Président du Conseil est convaincu que la continuation d'échanges de vues entre les deux Cabinets sur ce sujet ne peut avoir d'autre fin que de prévenir la possibilité de tout malentendu et de rendre plus facile, par une entente commune, une action commune que le Gouvernement français souhaiterait voir étendre au règlement de tous les problèmes qui intéressent les deux pays alliés.

J'ai pour instructions de faire savoir à votre Seigneurie que le résumé, fait dans sa lettre, des assurances que j'avais été invité à formuler est l'exacte expression des vues et des intentions de la France.

Il me sera seulement permis, à propos du paragraphe 1 de ce résumé, de remarquer que si l'Accord d'Angora n'implique aucune reconnaissance *de jure* ou *de facto* du Gouvernement d'Angora, ce Gouvernement avait été traité comme un Gouvernement de fait par les Alliés, à côté du Gouvernement de droit de Constantinople, lorsqu'ils admirent aux Conférences de Londres ses représentants sur un pied d'égalité avec ceux du Gouvernement de Constantinople, qui d'ailleurs laissèrent constamment la parole aux représentants du Gouvernement d'Angora.

Après avoir bien voulu marquer sa sincère reconnaissance pour le caractère des assurances données et cordialement reconnu l'esprit d'amitié et de bonne volonté dont s'est inspiré mon Gouvernement en les exprimant, votre Seigneurie attire mon attention sur certains points qui lui paraissent comporter encore quelques éclaircissements destinés à dissiper ou à prévenir tout malentendu qui pourrait être dans l'avenir une source de mésintelligence.

En ce qui concerne la protection des minorités non turques en Cilicie, le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur le sens et la portée de l'article 8 de l'Accord tripartite. Mais il est évident que la charge d'une responsabilité définie envers ces minorités suivra immédiatement la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix générale par lequel les Alliés de la France seront appelés en même temps qu'elle à assumer cette charge qu'il n'y a aucune raison pour imposer d'avance à la France seule.

Le Gouvernement français partage les préoccupations du Gouvernement britannique en ce qui concerne les garanties à assurer aux minorités chrétiennes, et il n'est pas moins soucieux d'éviter que les groupements arméniens aient à regretter leur retour en Cilicie, retour évidemment encouragé par l'occupation prolongée de ce pays par les forces alliées.

M. Franklin-Bouillon n'a pas perdu de vue cette question au cours de ses conversations à Angora. S'il n'a pas obtenu du Gouvernement nationaliste les conditions figurant à la Partie IV du Traité de Sèvres, conditions que la force totale des Alliés n'a pas d'ailleurs réussi jusqu'ici à faire accepter, il a du moins, dans la mesure

du possible, assuré aux minorités chrétiennes, par l'article 6 de l'Accord d'Angora, dont l'application ne peut qu'être strictement limitée à la Cilicie évacuée, des garanties qui ne sont pas sans valeur, surtout si l'on songe à la situation dans laquelle se trouvent actuellement les minorités chrétiennes dans le reste de l'Empire ottoman. Comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en exprime l'espoir, il sera loisible aux Gouvernements alliés de demander que la question de la protection des minorités en Turquie soit traitée dans le Traité de Paix à intervenir avec la même extension que dans la Partie IV du Traité de Sèvres.

Sans doute, jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, la protection des minorités en Cilicie dépendra, dans une large mesure, de la loyauté du Gouvernement kémaliste à tenir ses engagements, encore que les garanties présentées par la présence actuelle en Cilicie de M. Franklin-Bouillon et l'installation dans le pays de représentants spéciaux de la France pendant et après l'évacuation, constituent des sûretés supplémentaires dont la valeur ne doit pas être sous-estimée.

On peut déjà constater avec satisfaction que les premières informations reçues de Cilicie par le Gouvernement français permettent d'espérer que les autorités nationalistes suivront avec loyauté une ligne de conduite conforme aux obligations contractées par le Gouvernement d'Angora. Une série de décisions favorables aux minorités chrétiennes de Cilicie viennent d'être prises : abrogation de la loi de réquisition appliquée jusqu'ici ; ajournement de la conscription militaire ; organisation d'une commission mixte franco-turque afin de garder les propriétés des émigrés et d'en empêcher le pillage pendant leur absence ; assurance de la liberté des personnes et du respect des biens ; amnistie totale et immédiate. On ne peut dire que ces mesures, qui seront appliquées sous les yeux d'agents français, ne constituent pas un supplément appréciable aux garanties inscrites dans l'Accord d'Angora.

Il est à espérer que les populations chrétiennes répondront à ces bonnes dispositions par une attitude appropriée et qu'elles y seront encouragées par la sagesse et la prudence des conseils de leurs compatriotes résidant au dehors, dont l'influence est fort grande sur tous les groupements de même race et religion demeurés à l'intérieur des frontières ottomanes.

En ce qui touche la revision de la frontière septentrionale de la Syrie, le Gouvernement français se réserve, lors de la discussion du Traité de Paix, de faire valoir les raisons qui la justifient, dans l'intérêt même du mandat syrien, qu'il est particulièrement qualifié pour apprécier. En tous cas, quelle que puisse être la différence d'opinion concernant la valeur, même au point de vue stratégique, de localités comme Nisibin et Djéziret-ibn-Omar, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique a déjà reçu l'assurance de la détermination du Gouvernement français d'interdire en tout temps, sur la portion syrienne du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, aucun mouvement de troupes susceptible d'être dirigé contre un pays de mandat britannique.

Au sujet de l'article 10 de l'accord, votre Seigneurie fait remarquer que, par le transfert d'une section importante de la ligne de Bagdad, il serait assuré à la France un avantage immédiat qui anticiperait sur les arrangements entre Alliés prévus par l'article 294 du Traité de Sèvres et l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite. Je me permets de rappeler que l'Accord d'Angora comporte uniquement "l'acceptation" préalable d'un transfert et réserve l'application des dispositions du Traité de Paix et des arrangements entre Alliés au sujet de l'autorité qui prononcera ce transfert, de la procédure qui sera suivie et des accords sur la répartition entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Italie de l'ensemble de la ligne de Bagdad.

Le Gouvernement français entend, en ce qui concerne la section Bozanti-Djaïhoun, ne faire valoir à l'égard des Alliés aucun droit autre que celui qui est inscrit à l'article 4 de l'Accord tripartite, comme d'ailleurs il considère que l'article 10 de l'Accord d'Angora ne lui retire, en ce qui concerne les sections Djaihoum-Ekbès et Chobanbeg-Nisibin, aucun des droits que lui reconnaissent ledit article 4 et les articles 293 à 296 du Traité de Sèvres. Il considère également comme devant recevoir toute son application le dernier paragraphe de l'article 293 concernant le versement à la Commission financière du produit de la liquidation des chemins de fer.

Quant aux quelques "questions subsidiaires" qui ne paraissent pas à votre Seigneurie avoir une importance suffisante pour justifier la poursuite de la discussion, je me contenterai, me conformant à son avis, de marquer que les objections présentées verbalement par votre Seigneurie au Comte de Saint-Aulaire, sans juger utile de les confirmer par une note, me paraissent avoir été levées complètement par les assurances que j'ai eu l'honneur de donner à votre Seigneurie, sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement, dans ma note du 17 novembre dernier.

J'aime à croire qu'après les explications que cette Ambassade a été chargée de

fournir en toute franchise sur l'Accord d'Angora, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est convaincu que le Gouvernement de la République, en réalisant un accord que réclamait à bon droit l'opinion publique française, n'a cessé d'avoir en vue la nécessité de conclure au plus tôt, en commun avec ses Alliés, un traité rétablissant la paix dans tout l'Orient.

En considération des préjudices que causerait à tous un nouveau retard dans la conclusion de cette paix si désirée, mon Gouvernement fera tous ses efforts pour collaborer à l'œuvre de médiation envisagée, qui sera rendue plus facile par l'accord de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, tant sur les termes de ladite médiation que sur les modalités de sa réalisation.

Aussi, le Gouvernement de la République attend-il avec confiance les propositions annoncées à la fin de la lettre de votre Excellence, estimant toutefois nécessaire que l'intervention des Alliés ait lieu dans des conditions qui permettent d'aboutir à un résultat pratique.

Agréer, &c.
B. DE MONTILLE.

No. 45.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 37.

Following from vice-consul now at Adana:—

"French authorities have promised to give all possible protection to British subjects desirous of leaving.

"Measures taken to enable them to leave before the 24th December and to give food to refugees.

"More cases of smallpox."

I presume that you consider it advisable that British subjects should leave, but that they are not to be directly advised to do so.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 46.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul-General Satow (Beirut).

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 38 of 7th December: Cilicia.

Foreign Office, December 10, 1921.

His Majesty's Government can offer no advice to British subjects as to whether they should leave, and they must decide for themselves. Any who decide to leave and can pay their expenses should be warned that such expenses will be recovered from them if they are evacuated by one of His Majesty's ships.

Please telegraph whether, in your opinion, it is desirable that a British ship should return to and remain at Mersina for the present in the interests not only of remaining British subjects, but of Armenians and others.

[E 13616/143/44]

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 1102.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 5, 1921.

AT the weekly meeting of the High Commissioners on the 2nd instant, two notes from the Greek High Commissioner and from the Turkish Government respectively, regarding atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated by the Greek army in Thrace, were considered.

2. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of these notes.

The previous note of the 8th October, to which reference is made both by the Greek High Commissioner and by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well as the communication from the Grand National Assembly, to which M. Votsis also refers, were enclosed in my despatch No. 964 of the 18th October last.

3. Your Lordship will perceive that M. Votsis expresses surprise at the accusations made by Youssouf Kemal Bey against the Greeks. The Greek High Commissioner states at the end of his note that a strict enquiry has been ordered into the accusations brought by the Turkish Government against the Hellenic authorities in Thrace.

4. Izzet Pasha, in his note of the 28th ultimo, supplies further details of alleged atrocities committed by the Greeks in Thrace, and asks the High Commissioners to get their Governments to intervene to save the Mussulmans of Thrace from the extermination by which they are threatened, and to authorise the despatch of an inter-Allied commission of enquiry to the region in question, similar to the commission which was sent to the coast of the Sea of Marmora.

5. I pointed out that, to hold the balance even, it would be necessary that the Nationalist Government should agree to the despatch of an inter-Allied commission of enquiry to the Pontine region to investigate the atrocities alleged to have been committed in that region by the Turks. It was certain that the Nationalists would never agree to allow such a commission to proceed for the purpose indicated, and I did not, therefore, think it expedient that my Allied colleagues and I should back the present request from the Porte. My colleagues agreed with my point of view, and we decided to inform the Turkish Government that the Greek authorities had ordered an enquiry into the alleged atrocities in Thrace. In view of M. Votsis' declaration that such an enquiry had been ordered, we decided to forward to him the note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 28th ultimo with its further details.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

M. Votsis to Sir H. Rumbold.

*Haut-Commissariat de Grèce, Constantinople,
le 24 novembre 1921.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

PAR une note collective du 21 octobre dernier, votre Excellence, conjointement avec leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires de France et d'Italie, a bien voulu me transmettre une communication du Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale, ainsi qu'une lettre de la Sublime Porte, ayant trait aux prétendus méfaits qui auraient été commis par l'armée hellénique contre les populations musulmanes de l'Asie Mineure et de la Thrace.

Je n'ai pas manqué de m'en référer à mon Gouvernement, qui m'a autorisé d'exprimer à votre Excellence sa plus grande surprise pour les accusations relatées dans la communication du Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale.

Il est indéniable que dans toutes les guerres des excès se sont toujours commis par des soldats poussés par l'esprit de vengeance, mais il est inadmissible de penser même que dans la guerre actuelle des méfaits auraient été commis avec le consentement, même tacite, des autorités supérieures helléniques.

J'ai sous les yeux des copies des ordres des différents chefs de corps d'armée, par lesquels ils attirent l'attention la plus sérieuse de leurs officiers sur la conduite des soldats qu'ils commandent et les invitent à frapper de la manière la plus sévère ceux qui se permettraient de commettre n'importe quel méfait contre la population musulmane de la région occupée. Plus spécialement, je dois vous citer l'ordre du jour du 6 septembre du Général Polyménakos, dans lequel il n'a pas hésité de qualifier de traître celui qui se vengerait sur la population paisible.

J'ai également sous les yeux des rapports desquels il résulte que tous ceux qui, malgré les ordres formels de leurs chefs, avaient montré une négligence dans l'accomplissement de leur devoir et qui n'avaient pas pris toute mesure propre à protéger les populations, ont été très sévèrement punis.

Aussi, je me fais un devoir de protester de la manière la plus énergique contre ces accusations du Gouvernement d'Angora, que je ne peux que qualifier comme des pures calomnies.

[7866]

Il est vrai que la communication du Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale ne devait surprendre personne; elle fait une preuve palpable de la manière de voir des autorités turques, qui non seulement ne se sont jamais bornées à donner leur consentement tacite à tous les méfaits et les crimes commis par l'armée turque, mais elles les ont toujours suggérés, et ma pensée se porte aux déportations en masse des populations chrétiennes ordonnées par le Gouvernement turc et au triste sort de tous les chrétiens qui se trouvent sous le joug des Nationalistes.

En ce qui concerne les accusations relatées dans la lettre plus haut mentionnée de la Sublime Porte contre les autorités helléniques de la Thrace, je tiens à informer votre Excellence qu'une enquête très sévère a été ordonnée, dont le résultat je ne manquerai pas de communiquer à votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
VOTSIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Izzet Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.

Me le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 28 novembre 1921.

J'AI déjà eu l'honneur de signaler à l'attention de votre Excellence, à plusieurs reprises, les atrocités et vexations dont la population musulmane n'a cessé d'être victime en Thrace orientale depuis l'occupation de cette région par les troupes helléniques.

Les renseignements récents parvenus à la Sublime Porte démontrent que, loin de s'améliorer, cette situation devient de plus en plus intenable. Le régime de terreur appliqué à ces malheureuses populations est poursuivi implacablement tant par les autorités helléniques que par la population grecque, dont le but évident est de forcer les musulmans à abandonner leurs foyers afin d'installer dans les villages ainsi évacués les émigrants grecs de la Russie et du Caucase.

Cette politique d'anéantissement a été constatée aussi par M. de Wanderlip, dont l'impartialité ne saurait être mise en doute, lors de son dernier voyage d'étude en Thrace. Il ressort en effet des déclarations faites par lui aux journaux que, ne pouvant supporter les moyens de pression exercés contre eux par les Hellènes, plus de 20,000 musulmans étaient sur le point d'émigrer et que les autorités helléniques ne négligeaient rien de tout ce qui peut provoquer et hâter cette émigration.

Déjà des populations de villages entiers, afin de se soustraire à une extermination certaine, se sont réfugiées en Bulgarie; d'autres se sont retirées dans les montagnes et se trouvent—vu l'impossibilité de réintégrer leurs foyers—menacées de périr de faim et de froid.

Au surplus, je ne crois pouvoir mieux faire que de placer sous les yeux de votre Excellence l'extrait ci-joint, en traduction, des rapports parvenus à la Sublime Porte et qui ne retrace qu'une minime partie des méfaits commis jusqu'ici.

Si des mesures promptes et efficaces n'étaient pas adoptées, la suppression complète de la population musulmane de la Thrace deviendrait inévitable.

Le moyen le plus efficace pour mettre fin à cette situation tragique serait, à l'avis du Gouvernement impérial, l'envoi dans ladite région d'une enquête interalliée à l'instar de celle qui a été envoyée sur le littoral de la Marmara à l'effet de constater sur les lieux les atrocités et iniquités commises contre les musulmans et d'y adopter, le cas échéant, des mesures appropriées à la situation.

Persuadé que les grandes Puissances, dans leurs sentiments éminemment humanitaires, ne voudront pas permettre une telle iniquité, je viens faire un pressant appel à la bienveillance de votre Excellence en la priant de vouloir bien amener son Gouvernement à intervenir en vue de sauvegarder les musulmans de Thrace de l'extermination dont ils sont menacés et autoriser l'envoi dans cette région de la commission susvisée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
IZZET.

Enclosure 3 in No. 47.

Extract of Report on Atrocities, communicated by Izzet Pasha.

(Traduction.)

LES atrocités commises par les Hellènes ont atteint, notamment dans le secteur de Kirk-Kilissé, un degré de violence extrême. Les villages situés dans cette région ont été systématiquement détruits.

Les villages détruits jusqu'à présent sont les suivants: Djagal-Nigos, Kafdjagaz, Birgosdjik, Bey-Mahallé, Tchaglaik, Kara-Bagli, Sazara et Tchiknehor.

Une partie des habitants de ces villages se sont enfuis dans les montagnes et le reste en Bulgarie. Ceux qui n'ont pu fuir ont été conduits par les Hellènes dans les forêts, où ils furent exterminés.

La population mâle du village Kodja-Tarla, dépendant de Kirk-Kilissé, a été massacrée. Les cris des victimes s'entendaient même de la frontière bulgare et tout particulièrement du côté de Tirnovadjik. Les chemins sont couverts de cadavres.

Chériflerin Chérif Effendi, du village Déré-Djedid, a été tué avec deux de ses compagnons à Kouri-Keuy par l'ordre du commandant de la gendarmerie hellène de Kirk-Kilissé.

Le nommé Kis-oghlu-Husseïn, du village de Bey-Pinar, a été assassiné.

Les personnes dont les noms figurent ci-après ont été tuées dans le village de Sazara:

Osman Agha (avec les membres de sa famille), Suleyman, Topal Moustafa, Pala-Biyik-oghlu-Ahmed, Kiazim, Hassan, Tchavouch, Mehmed-oghlu-Hassan, Kourt-oghlu-Moustafa, Hassan Agha, Kara Hassan-oghlu, Chakir, Mojnla Moustafa, Redjeb, Riza, Bekir Agha, Ali Osman-oghlu-Moustafa et Hadji-oghlu-Ahmed.

De nombreux meurtres ont été commis en plus de ceux-ci; mais les victimes n'ont pu être encore identifiées.

Les biens des musulmans tant dans les villages détruits que dans ceux épargnés ont été saisis. L'état lamentable des malheureux qui se sont réfugiés en Bulgarie en est témoin. Le bétail de tous les villages avait été antérieurement enlevé.

Les populations dans le pays sont constamment maltraitées et terrorisées. Les femmes et les jeunes filles ne sont pas épargnées. Les habitants des villages sont à la merci des patrouilles hellènes qui y ont été installées et qui se livrent impunément à toutes sortes d'excès.

Les montagnes sont pleines de fugitifs qui sont condamnés à périr de faim et de froid, si les Hellènes ne viennent les achever avant.

Distriet d'Ouzoun-Keupru.

Osman Effendi, du village Kadi, a été arrêté, battu et torturé. Son argent et ses troupeaux ont été saisis.

Les nommés Derviche Agha et Hussein Tchavouch, du village de Sazli Malcotch, ont été arrêtés, sans aucune raison plausible, avec dix autres villageois. Les maisons des susnommés ont été pillées et leurs biens saisis.

A Loulé-Bourgas.

Saïd Agha, du village Tchenghali, a été arrêté, battu et torturé.

A Mandira.

Les nommés Youssouf, Mehmed et Pehlivan ont été jetés en prison avec quatre autres musulmans. Leurs biens ont été saisis.

A Torbadjik.

Le nommé Zeinel Agha a été battu et torturé de telle sorte qu'il garde le lit.

A Sultan-Cache.

Le nommé Bey-oghlu-Hadji a été jeté en prison après avoir été violemment battu et torturé.

A Kaba-Euyuk.

Le nommé Hadji Hussein a été blessé.

Les villages d'Akar-Déré et de Kara-Bair ont été attaqués par des soldats hellènes. Les femmes de ces villages, qui portent toutes des blessures de baïonnette et de bastonnade, se sont réfugiées à Andrinople. Elles ont pour la plupart subi les derniers outrages. Quant aux hommes restés dans lesdits villages, ils ont été conduits dans les montagnes et exterminés.

A Katrandja.

Les habitants de village subissent continuellement des tortures.

A Mandira.

Le nommé Djemal Effendi, ainsi que ses quatre compagnons, ont été tués par les Hellènes à coups de bâton.

A Tcherkess-Muslim.

Cinq hommes et six femmes ont subi le même sort que les précédents.

A Kara-Bouroun.

Ces Hellènes y ont tué cinq hommes. Ils ont en outre mis à mort six femmes en allumant du feu sur leur poitrine.

A Kouléli (dépendant de Baba-Eski).

Les Hellènes ont enlevé la femme d'un certain Emin Agha. La malheureuse après avoir été promenée durant plusieurs jours a été mise en prison à Kirk-Kilissé.

Un grand nombre d'habitants des villages de ces régions ont été conduits en petits groupes dans les forêts, où ils furent tous exterminés. Toutes les femmes et les jeunes filles ont été violées.

MM. les consuls de France et d'Italie à Andrinople ont connaissance de la plupart de ces faits.

Les mêmes atrocités se commettent systématiquement aussi dans les régions de Loulé-Bourgas, Séraï, Malkara, Kechan, Haïrébolou, Djissri-Erghéné et Vizé.

Les biens des musulmans de ces régions qui se sont réfugiés à Constantinople et en Bulgarie ont été saisis.

Il y a peu de jours cinq musulmans ont été exécutés à coups de mitrailleuse à Séraï-Itchi à Andrinople. Les cadavres de ces malheureux furent jetés dans une fosse et ne furent livrés sur la demande qui en a été faite par la communauté musulmane que plus tard et pendant la nuit, de sorte que leur identité ne put être établie.

Depuis quelques temps les Hellènes chassent de leurs foyers tous les habitants des villages musulmans situés sur les bords de la voie ferrée. Ces villageois ne sont installés nulle part et lorsqu'ils s'adressent aux autorités helléniques pour demander un refuge ils reçoivent pour toute réponse :

"Vous ne pouvez plus rester ici; allez n'importe où vous voulez," et souvent "Allez-vous-en en Anatolie; vous y trouverez assez de terre."

De plus, tous les biens de ces populations sont saisis et des émigrés venus du Caucase sont installés dans ces villages. Les villages ainsi occupés sont les suivants: Emirli, Iné-oghlu, Abour-Keny, Kavakli, Indjé.

Abour-Keny est un ancien village musulman bien peuplé et très prospère.

Les habitants de ces villages se sont réfugiés en grande partie en Bulgarie. La plupart ont été tués en cours de route. A peine vingt-huit familles ont pu atteindre, non sans difficultés, le territoire bulgare au cours du mois de novembre.

Les Hellènes attaquent les villages sous prétexte de chercher des armes et s'y livrent au pillage.

Les prisons d'Andrinople, de Kirk-Kilissé et de Rodosto sont remplies de musulmans arrêtés. Une partie de ces détenus ont été tués. Entre autres, Mehmed Effendi, de Rodosto, agent de navigation.

[E 13642/116/58]

No. 48.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 1110.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 6, 1921.

DURING the last few days the local press has been full of rumours concerning new developments in the Caucasus. It is impossible for the moment to check the accuracy of any of the reports current here, but they are in themselves of sufficient importance to be brought to your Lordship's notice.

2. The rumours in question may be summarised as follows:—

- (a.) It is affirmed that the Moscow Government have recently issued a decree formally abolishing the independence of the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.
- (b.) It is stated that there has been a *coup d'Etat* at Batoum, and that Enver Pasha has, under Bolshevik auspices, taken charge of the State of Adjara, which was brought into existence in pursuance of the Treaty of Kars.
- (c.) It is further stated that the Angora Government, who have long been suspicious of their Bolshevik allies and whose hold on the Nationalist

movement in Turkey has been threatened by the activities of Enver and his partisans, are seriously perturbed at the turn of events in the Caucasus, and especially in Adjara, and that Kiazim Kara Bekir has addressed an ultimatum to the Soviet Government demanding that the lawful Government of Adjara be reinstated within six days, failing which the Nationalist army would advance.

- (d.) According to other rumours, even less substantial than the foregoing, hostilities have already begun on the frontier between troops of Enver Pasha and the Turkish Nationalist army. Some go so far as to say that Enver has had initial success, and that the Angora Government had dismissed Kiazim Kara Bekir from his command. The latter statement, at any rate, is almost certainly false.

3. Pending further information it is useless to do more than comment very briefly on the several rumours.

4. As regards (a), the independence of the Caucasus republics has been merely nominal for some time past, as supreme control has been vested in the Moscow-controlled organisation at Tiflis known as Kav-Bureau. There is no obvious reason why Moscow should choose the present moment to do away with the forms of independence. I am therefore disposed to treat this rumour with some reserve for the moment, though I am told that a decree abolishing the separate Governments has actually been published in Tiflis.

5. Rumour (b) seems intrinsically probable. The partisans of Enver have for some time past made considerable efforts in Anatolia to secure control of the Nationalist movement. The present leaders of Angora have refused to have anything to do with Enver, and have done their best to repress the activities of his partisans. Though I have been slow to believe in the oft-recurring report of an approaching rupture between Angora and Moscow, there is no doubt that their relations are charged with mutual suspicion. It is therefore not impossible that the Bolsheviks may have decided to back Enver in an attempt to achieve his object, not by internal activity in Anatolia, but by action from outside, based on Moslem districts in the Caucasus where his name still has a glamour which it has largely lost in Turkey.

6. As regards (c) and (d), all rumours of ultimatums and military action must be received with the utmost reserve. I cannot even now, without further evidence, regard anything in the nature of a rupture between Angora and Moscow as a *fait accompli*. Taken collectively, these rumours point to an existence of a disturbed political situation in the Caucasus and to the possibility of a struggle between Russians and Turks for the effective control of Batoum. Incidentally, if it be true that the Bolsheviks have decided to affirm publicly their hold on the Caucasus and to risk a conflict with Angora, it would go far to explain their subservience at the Kars Conference, which may prove to have been only a device to gain time while they matured plans for rearranging matters in the Caucasus and putting Nationalist Turkey in her place by methods of a drastic nature.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 13622/143/44]

No. 49.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 1112.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a condensed translation of an account given in the "Wakt" of the 3rd December of a speech by Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the Grand National Assembly on the 30th November.

2. The speech was delivered in the course of a debate on a Bill relative to the powers and responsibilities of the Cabinet. Authentic information is lacking as to the nature of the Bill in question. So far as I can gather it aimed at doing away with the system by which the executive power is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which merely deposes its powers to individual Ministers or commissioners elected by it. This system is obviously calculated to embarrass the executive at the present time, when an active, if not numerous, party in Angora, drawing their inspiration from

Enver Pasha and the Bolsheviks, are seeking to undermine Mustapha Kemal Pasha's position. On the face of it the Bill suggests an attempt on the part of the latter to consolidate his position without taking the extreme measures of dissolving the Assembly. The latest information in the press here is that the Bill has been thrown out by the Grand National Assembly.

3. The portion of Mustapha Kemal's speech which has been telegraphed here does not, however, dwell on internal issues. Its significance lies in the fact that he went out of his way to disclaim any intention on the part of his Government to follow an extreme pan-Islamic policy. His pronouncement would appear to have a double aspect. In the first instance, it is probably a move in the contest between Mustapha Kemal and the Enverists. In the second place, it is doubtless designed to disarm the misgivings of European Governments, and especially Great Britain, as to the ultimate trend of Turkish Nationalist policy. As a statement of ultimate intention it must be received with scepticism. As a tactical move it is of great significance at the present time.

4. From various utterances of Mustapha Kemal and other leaders, it is evident that they are particularly anxious to emphasise their concern for the proletariat. The object of this would appear to be to discredit partisans of Enver working on Communist lines.

5. I conceive Mustapha Kemal's position at present to be somewhat as follows: He is, in my opinion, as determined as ever to secure the acceptance of the national pact in all its essentials. He has arrived at a point at which he can regard this as being well in sight. The French have practically subscribed to the pact. The Italians, though unwilling at the moment to separate themselves from His Majesty's Government, and though anxious to secure their own economic position, have no objection to the pact as a basis for the general political settlement. Mustapha Kemal must know that there is a strong movement in Great Britain itself in favour of giving him a measure of satisfaction which would be tantamount to acceptance of the pact. He may well feel therefore that he has all but achieved his ambition of wearing down the Allies to complete acquiescence in his point of view. On the other hand, his position at home is difficult. He is menaced by the Enverist movement, by discontent in Anatolia and by continuous, though incoherent, insurrection in Kurdistan. He sees the increasing difficulty of maintaining the Bolshevik alliance without coming under the ascendancy of Moscow. In these circumstances, he is not improbably seeking a way out for Angora and for himself personally on the lines of securing the national pact, but relegating to the future any idea of extending Turkish sovereignty or even influence to regions outside the territories definitely claimed under the pact, namely, Anatolia, Thrace, Kurdistan, Turkish Armenia and a portion of the three Caucasian sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum. If he can carry on long enough to secure this it will enable him to emerge from the whole adventure with undiminished credit as the saviour of his country and to play a further rôle in a reunited Turkey. He would incur the open hostility of the Bolsheviks, but he would be compensated for this by the moral and perhaps material support which he might hope to expect from the Allies if the Bolsheviks felt strong enough to join issue with him.

6. I do not offer this as more than an attempt to rationalise the very obscure situation at present existing in Anatolia. It may, however, serve as a working theory on which to base further consideration of the best means of bringing about peace. I would suggest that the present despatch be read in connection with my despatch No. 1110 of to-day regarding rumoured new developments in the Caucasus.

7. Returning to the public utterances of Angora statesmen, I would direct your Lordship's attention to a speech by Fevzi Pasha on the 28th November, reproduced in the Turkish press here from the "Réveil." Fevzi Pasha acclaims the partial realisation of the national pact and the conclusion of peace "with our old friend" France, expresses complete confidence in the ability of the Nationalist army to obtain a favourable settlement by arms should the enemy prefer a renewal of hostilities to a peace based on the national pact, and emphasises the determination of the Angora leaders not to lay down the sword until both Smyrna and Adrianople have been retrieved.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 49.

Summary of Speech by Mustapha Kemal Pasha before the Grand National Assembly on November 30.

(Translation.)

PROCEEDINGS began with the discussion of the Bill respecting the parliamentary responsibility of the executive commissaries. After explaining that the Bill in question would tend to a full development of the national sovereignty, Mustapha Kemal Pasha stated that they were a people's Government, opposed to imperialism and capitalism, and that their one aim was to secure their national independence. They resembled neither Democrats nor Socialists, but themselves alone. They were following a fixed programme, and would continue to do so. They were not dreaming adventurers, but had in view objects which were capable of accomplishment. In general, they wished for the prosperity of Mussulmans and the independence of Moslem Governments. They considered the happiness of Islam as their own happiness. At the same time they were convinced that to desire the material union of all Moslem Governments in one Empire was fantastic, for it would excite the enmity of the world against their country. They were simply a nation which desired to live independently, and that was why they were fighting.

[E 13738/800/44]

No. 50.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 14.)

(No. 173.)

My Lord,

Beirut, undated, 1921.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 37 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a despatch from Mr. Mackereth, who left for Mersina on Tuesday, the 29th November, by H.M.S. "Sikh."

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure 1 in No. 50.

Mr. Mackereth to Consul-General Satow.

Sir,

Mersina, December 2, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to state that I landed from H.M.S. "Sikh" on the morning of the 30th November and proceeded to the Spanish consulate to interview M. André C. Mavrommati, the Spanish consul. I later called upon the French Governor, Commandant Coulet, and Messrs. Rickards and Thirsk (two British subjects).

I have the honour to report the situation at the town of Mersina is calm, there are between 3,000 and 4,000 refugees, mainly Armenians, who have been held up by the refusal of the French authorities to grant permission for them to enter Syria, and other Powers declining to accept more immigrants. So far the Spanish consul, in charge of British interests, has granted 2,740 visas for Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus (each visa being for a family). I am informed that 45,000 persons have left since the signing of the accord. The reasons for this exodus appear to be four. I will enter into these reasons later in this despatch. French soldiers, mostly Algerians, who had been captured by the Turks during the Cilician campaign have come in and are recounting with much feeling the ill-treatment they have suffered at the hands of their captors. Two Frenchmen I saw certainly seemed in a deplorable condition.

On the 26th November M. Franklin-Bouillon and Mukhadine Pasha (the chief Kemalist member of the Franco-Nationalist Commission), made speeches appealing to the inhabitants to keep calm, and to trust the new administration which would, they stated, work for the common good without fear or favour. M. Franklin-Bouillon added that France did not intend to allow their friends (presumably referring to the lately-armed Christians) to suffer by the present agreement. He moreover stated that it was untrue that the Nationalists would levy a 40 per cent. on merchandise.

To-day the Nationalist Mutassarif, a certain Fahrudin Bey, arrived, escorted by twenty armed ruffians—a Kemalist bodyguard—and was installed in the Serai amidst

demonstration and hoisting of Nationalist flags. He took up his duties on the 1st December.

I conveyed His Majesty's Government's intimation that British subjects would stay at their own risk.

On the 1st December I visited Tarsus and Adana where the situation is calm. Practically the whole of the Christian population, some 20,000, has left, and the business of these places is at a complete standstill. After visiting the leading British subjects, I called on M. Franklin-Bouillon, and I attach herewith an account of my conversation with him.

Now is a suitable moment to offer a brief preliminary appreciation of the general situation.

Up to the 30th November between 30,000 and 40,000 persons have fled the country. They comprise Greeks, whose desire to leave is attributable to the state of war; Armenians, urged by their priests and in fear of Turkish reprisals. In this connection it must be recalled that the French, during their campaign in Cilicia, armed the Armenians and employed them to fight the Turks. The Armenians, finding themselves for the moment top-dogs, obliged the Turks to flee and pillaged their properties. Other Christians and Moslems of the towns feared excesses on the part of the local Nationalist levies, and also the threat, now denied, of military conscription. The movement had undoubtedly received impetus from certain lightly-veiled advice of General Dufieux, and more open advice from subordinate French officers to the effect that Christians would be in danger if they remained after the French evacuation. All these unfortunate people have managed to leave the country, with the exception of about 3,000 who are hung up in Mersina, hoping that some refuge will be found. These refugees are at the moment quiet, but there is an ever-present fear that idleness or shortage of food may lead to trouble, the end of which it is difficult to see.

The general feeling among the older British residents is that, provided Britain does not open hostilities against Kemal, they will be perfectly safe. As I have been careful to convey only the bare statement that British subjects remain at their own risk, I should be grateful if I may be informed confidentially whether His Majesty's Government's opinion is that it is advisable for British subjects to leave Cilicia. It is a particularly serious position for those persons who have real estate or other immovable property as the sole means of livelihood. Those who are at Adana, having no material reason for staying, consider it would be wiser and are preparing to leave. Representations had been made by M. Franklin-Bouillon to Dr. Chambers requesting him to remain to restore confidence. Dr. Chambers, however, has now decided to leave. There are about 1,500 Kemalists troops in Adana; they are well clothed in every respect, and appear smart and well disciplined; they bear Turkish and German rifles. I am told that there are German and Austrian and Italian volunteers among their officer ranks. The Nationalists have taken over the gendarmerie and French instructors have been allotted to them. The French troops are dismantling their defences and destroying old ammunition dumps. I have been able to glean no information that war material is being handed over to the incoming army. The French are loading guns and ammunition daily on to their transports at Mersina. The last of the French infantry are to be embarked by the 26th December.

I venture to suggest that Spanish vice-consul be instructed not to grant visas to British territory without ascertaining whether the people concerned will be allowed to land. His methods have been a subject of complaint to me by British residents. I have requested him to issue no further visas except to British subjects and genuine travellers. I am told confidentially by the captain of the American destroyer that he has thought fit to report to the American High Commissioner that M. Mavrommati is not a suitable person to act in American interests. Moreover, being Greek, he is very anxious to leave and may do so at any moment. In this eventuality, may I be instructed whether to approach the newly-appointed French consul, M. Guize, or make other arrangements to temporarily watch over British interests when I leave.

I have, &c.

G. MACKERETH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 50.

Résumé of Mr. Mackereth's Conversation with M. Franklin-Bouillon, December 1, 1921.

M. FRANKLIN-BOUILLON said he had received a telegram from Paris to the effect that His Majesty's Government was sending a vice-consul from Beirut to Cilicia

to arrange the evacuation of British subjects, and that a warship would be sent to further facilitate this operation. M. Bouillon, referring to the above, expressed the greatest surprise that the British Government should consider such a proceeding to be necessary. He said there was not the slightest danger to British subjects or, indeed, to any Christian, as he had the most definite and sincere promises and guarantees from the new Turkish authorities. The men around Kemal he described as really sincere patriots, and he had the most absolute confidence that they would make another and finer Turkey. He claimed that Kemal's great hope is to once more unite the Turks to meet the future Russian menace. The two Ministers from the Government of Angora would be well known to the British authorities as reliable and honest men. Mukhadine Pasha was the Turkish officer charged with the evacuation of Italians from Constantinople during the 1912 war, and he carried on his work with great humanity. Hamid Bey fought for the Christians at Trebizond. The latter has given very definite orders to all Turks to respect in every way the conditions of the agreement, failure to do so will be met by the most drastic measures. M. Bouillon requested me to inform the British Government of his proclamation of the 30th November, and I attach a copy thereof, wherein the inhabitants are assured of the good faith of the present Turkish administration, and calls upon those who have left to return and take up their occupations, security will be guaranteed to them. M. Bouillon states he signed this proclamation himself as a full guarantee from France to all Christians. He stated further that should the Turks fail in the slightest way in their obligations, France would not fail to take energetic measures; moreover, the Nationalist Party would be particularly anxious to prove their capability by justly ruling the people now placed under them. Continuing, he said he could not understand the British attitude, as he was firmly convinced that what France was doing was to find a solution for the near Eastern deadlock, and that if England would only make a similar agreement, all the Near Eastern questions would be simplified. He deplored the violent anti-French press campaign now taking place in England, which he described as being "inspired." He expressed his very deep sorrow at the personal nature of the attacks directed against himself. M. Bouillon gave me very definite assurance that the new administration would not interfere in any way with capitulatory rights. They would, however, place the whole question before the Powers with a view to their revision. Greek subjects would be obliged to leave; the Nationalists, he stated, would not rest until every Greek soldier had evacuated Smyrna (I gathered M. Bouillon was in sympathy with this feeling). He appealed for a fuller understanding by Britain, and again begged that the promises of the Nationalist Assembly be accepted. M. Bouillon further stated that he was proceeding to Angora on the 2nd December to complete certain minor alterations in regard to the limitation of the Franco-Turkish boundary.

The conversation was the whole time of a most cordial nature.

Enclosure 3 in No. 50.

Extract from the "Courrier d'Adana" of December 1, 1921.

PROCLAMATION OF NOVEMBER 30, 1921.

Habitants de Cilicie,

LA France et le Gouvernement d'Angora, désirant rétablir la paix en Orient, viennent de conclure un accord.

La France, respectant le droit des majorités, a spontanément rendu la Cilicie à la Turquie.

La France et le Gouvernement d'Angora, également désireux de faire respecter les droits des minorités, ont arrêté toute une série de garanties inscrites dans l'Accord d'Angora.

Avant même que ces garanties soient publiées, une campagne méthodique a été organisée par les ennemis de la paix pour jeter l'alarme dans les populations chrétiennes et les forcer à quitter la Cilicie. Des milliers de familles ont été ainsi arrachées de leurs maisons et jetées sur les routes de l'exil et de la misère.

Les deux Gouvernements, profondément émus de ce spectacle, ont résolu de faire un nouvel effort pour rassurer les populations et pour détruire l'effet de cette détestable campagne d'agitation.

Chrétiens de Cilicie,

On vous a dit que l'amnistie restera sans effet ; c'est faux.

L'amnistie est totale et immédiate. Le passé est mort et oublié !

Personne, absolument personne, ne peut être inquiété.

On vous a dit que vous ne pourriez plus vous déplacer librement ; c'est faux.

L'accord vous assure la liberté complète de vos personnes, comme le respect de vos biens. Vous avez d'ailleurs tous reçu des passeports des autorités françaises : le Gouvernement d'Angora les respectera absolument.

On vous a dit que la loi vous prendra immédiatement par réquisition 40 pour cent de vos biens ; c'est faux.

Cette loi de réquisition, appliquée pendant la campagne de la Sakharis, est maintenant abrogée, elle n'existe plus.

On vous a dit que vous allez être immédiatement enrôlés ; c'est faux.

Les autorités turques ont pris les dispositions nécessaires pour que la conscription ne soit pas appliquée pendant trois mois au moins après la fin de l'occupation française, qui cessera le 4 janvier 1922. Et nous voulons espérer que la paix générale sera rétablie avant la fin de la période prévue.

En outre, l'accord stipule pour vous toutes les garanties générales assurées aux minorités dans les pays d'Europe, en vertu des traités conclus par les Puissances alliées après la grande guerre.

Les deux Gouvernements se sont engagés d'honneur à faire respecter ces garanties. Leur parole ne vaut-elle pas mieux que celle des agitateurs qui vous poussent à fuir aujourd'hui et vous abandonneront demain après vous avoir ruinés, vous et vos familles ?

Dès maintenant, une commission franco-turque, où sont représentées toutes vos communautés, a été nommée pour garder les propriétés abandonnées. Tout acte de pillage sera impitoyablement réprimé. Musulmans et chrétiens doivent également respecter la loi.

Et maintenant, réfléchissez, revenez au calme, rentrez dans vos maisons qui vous attendent. La liberté et la justice sont assurées à tous.

MOUHEDDINE PACHA.
HAMID BEY.
H. FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

Adana, le 30 novembre 1921.

[E 13722/1/44]

No. 51.

M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 14.)

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 10 décembre 1921.*

M. le Marquis,

PRENANT acte des assurances données par mon Gouvernement, votre Seigneurie voulait bien noter au paragraphe 5 de sa lettre du 25 novembre que "the views exchanged orally or in writing between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Kemalist representatives add nothing to the substance of the agreement, which includes no secret arrangements." Le Gouvernement français, tenant à ce que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté reçoive tout apaisement à cet égard, me charge de communiquer à votre Seigneurie les lettres et notes annexes échangées entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et les représentants kémalistes, lettres et notes dont M. Briand a, d'ailleurs, déjà donné lecture à Lord Hardinge.

Ces documents, qui se trouvent ci-joints, sont au nombre de onze. Comme votre Seigneurie pourra s'en assurer, il n'ont pas le caractère d'avantages secrets modifiant l'Accord d'Angora.

Le Gouvernement français serait obligé au Gouvernement britannique de ne pas rendre ces textes publics sans s'être au préalable mis d'accord avec lui.

Veillez agréer, &c.

G. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

Letters and Notes exchanged between M. Franklin-Bouillon and Youssouf Kemal Bey.

(1.)

Il a été convenu entre M. Franklin-Bouillon et Youssouf Kémal Bey que l'accord signé aujourd'hui n'entrera en vigueur qu'après l'approbation des deux Gouvernements, approbation qui devra être donnée dans un délai de quinze jours au plus. Youssouf Kémal Bey déclare en sa qualité de Ministre des Affaires étrangères que l'approbation du Gouvernement français entraîne de plano celle de son Gouvernement.

Fait à Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.
YOUSSEUF KÉMAL.

(2.)

Au moment de procéder à la signature de l'accord intervenu aujourd'hui entre le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et le Gouvernement de la République française, Youssouf Kémal Bey, le plénipotentiaire turc, a émis les considérations suivantes, dont M. Franklin-Bouillon, plénipotentiaire français, a bien voulu prendre note :

Le plénipotentiaire turc tient à faire des réserves expresses en ce qui concerne le règlement des questions relatives à la participation de la Syrie à la Dette ottomane, aux biens de l'État, de la couronne et de l'Evkaf, et à tous autres points résultant du changement de la situation juridique de ce pays, règlement qui devra avoir lieu lors de la conclusion du Traité général de Paix.

Pour les régions d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche, Youssouf Kémal Bey déclare nécessaire d'accorder aux habitants la faculté d'adopter un pavillon spécial contenant le drapeau turc. Le plénipotentiaire français, ayant convenu de l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à reconnaître une telle faculté aux habitants de ces régions, a bien voulu promettre d'entreprendre les démarches nécessaires à cet effet auprès de son Gouvernement.

Pour ce qui est de l'article 4, concernant l'amnistie plénière à accorder par les deux parties contractantes, le plénipotentiaire français déclare qu'il recommandera à son Gouvernement de prendre les mesures nécessaires en vue de faire profiter de cette amnistie les habitants des régions d'Alexandrette et d'Antioche.

Le plénipotentiaire turc déclare par rapport à l'article 10 ce qui suit :

1. La garantie kilométrique était, en vertu des actes de concession du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, établie jusqu'ici sur la base des recettes globales de toute la ligne : il est indispensable de fixer la garantie kilométrique afférente à la section turque de Bozanti-Nousseibine, comme par le passé, sur la base des recettes globales de la totalité de la ligne de Bagdad. Le plénipotentiaire français s'engage à appeler l'attention de son Gouvernement sur le bien-fondé de cette réclamation.

2. Les plénipotentiaires des deux parties sont d'accord que la fixation du tarif des transports militaires turcs à effectuer par chemin de fer en territoire syrien et la fixation du tarif des transports syriens à effectuer par chemin de fer en territoire turc seront réservées à un examen ultérieur. Ils ont également reconnu la nécessité de donner, de part et d'autre, un préavis suffisant toutes les fois que l'un des deux pays se trouvera dans le cas de faire usage de la faculté mentionnée à l'article 10, alinéa 2, de l'accord turco-français.

Le plénipotentiaire turc formule la demande suivante que le plénipotentiaire français accepte de défendre auprès de son Gouvernement :

Dans le port d'Alexandrette, les ressortissants, les biens et le pavillon turcs devraient jouir de l'entière liberté de l'utilisation du port. Ils seraient, sous ce rapport et à tous égards, traités sur un pied de parfaite égalité avec les habitants, les biens et les navires du pays.

Dans ce port, il serait donné à bail à la Turquie un espace qui serait affecté au transit direct des marchandises en provenance ou à destination de la Turquie. Pour la jonction de cet espace avec le chemin de fer reliant Alexandrette aux territoires turcs,

son aménagement, sa location et son mode d'exploitation, toutes les facilités seraient accordées à la Turquie.

Aucun droit ou taxe autres que ceux de tonnage, de quai, de pilotage, de phare, de quarantaine perçus également sur les habitants, les biens et le pavillon du pays ne seraient imposés aux ressortissants, aux biens et au pavillon turcs à l'occasion du transit des marchandises en provenance ou à destination de la Turquie.

Fait à Angora, en double original, le 20 octobre 1921 (1337).

FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.
YOUSSEUF KÉMAL BEY.

(3.)

Yousseuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Comme complément à l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, je suis heureux de déclarer à votre Excellence que les œuvres scolaires et hospitalières françaises et les institutions d'assistance continueront à exister en Turquie, étant bien entendu que ces œuvres et institutions ne pourront sous aucun prétexte ou dans aucun cas se livrer à une propagande ou une action quelconque contraires aux intérêts de la Turquie et aux lois turques.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

YOUSSEUF KÉMAL.

(4.)

Yousseuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement désire profiter de la collaboration des professeurs spécialistes français dans les écoles turques de gendarmerie.

J'espère que le Gouvernement de la République française voudra bien prendre en considération ce désir; je serais heureux de faire connaître plus tard à votre Excellence le nombre des instructeurs français dont nous aurons besoin.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

YOUSSEUF KÉMAL.

(5.)

Yousseuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin-Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Par rapport à l'article 12 de l'accord signé aujourd'hui entre nos deux Gouvernements, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à votre Excellence que le mode de répartition des eaux de Kouveik pourra être déterminé par les représentants de la population des régions turques restées au nord de la ligne désignée à l'article 8 et ceux de la population de la ville d'Alep.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

YOUSSEUF KÉMAL.

(6.)

Yousseuf Kemal Bey to M. Franklin Bouillon.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

EN réponse à la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 20 octobre 1921, relativement à la demande d'un groupe français au sujet de la mine

d'Argana et d'une concession agricole qui aurait été accordée avant la guerre dans le vilayet d'Adana, je suis heureux d'informer votre Excellence que je vais faire reprendre sans retard l'étude de ces deux questions.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

YOUSSEUF KÉMAL BEY.

(7.)

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yousseuf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Je désire vous accuser immédiatement réception de la lettre accompagnant l'accord dont nous avons arrêté ensemble les termes.

Je me plais à espérer comme vous que l'accord conclu entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée de Turquie en vue de réaliser une paix définitive et durable aura pour conséquence de rétablir et de consolider les relations étroites qui ont existé dans le passé entre les deux nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'efforçant de résoudre dans un esprit de cordiale entente toutes les questions ayant trait à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté de la Turquie.

Je saisis, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

(8.)

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yousseuf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Je suis heureux de vous accuser réception de vos lettres annexes en date du 20 octobre 1921, concernant :

1. Le maintien des écoles et institutions françaises en Turquie.
2. Le choix d'officiers français comme instructeurs de gendarmerie.
3. La répartition des eaux du Kouveik.
4. La concession de la mine d'Argana et de terres à coton en Cilicie.

Je prie, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

(9.)

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Yousseuf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Comme complément de l'article 7 de l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, il me paraît utile de préciser qu'en ce qui concerne le régime administratif spécial de la région d'Alexandrette, les régions à majorité turque seront administrées en général par des fonctionnaires de race turque. Il sera institué des écoles qui profiteront de toutes les facilités pour le développement de la culture turque.

Ce régime s'appliquera également à la région d'Antioche et aux parties de l'ancien vilayet d'Adana restées au sud de la ligne désignée à l'article 8.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

(10.)

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

Comme complément à l'accord signé ce jour entre nos deux Gouvernements, j'ai l'honneur de confirmer à votre Excellence que la reconnaissance du transfert prévu à l'article 10 de cet accord est subordonnée aux deux conditions suivantes :

1. Que les droits du Gouvernement turc seront maintenus ;
2. Que le Gouvernement sera couvert contre toutes réclamations de la part de l'ancienne société résultant de ce transfert.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

(11.)

M. Franklin-Bouillon to Youssouf Kemal Bey.

Excellence,

Angora, le 20 octobre 1921.

J'ai eu l'occasion de vous signaler qu'au cours des négociations qui ont eu lieu à Londres en mars 1921, vos plénipotentiaires avaient promis aux représentants du Gouvernement de la République française la concession des mines d'Argana, sur lesquelles un groupe français avait fait des études préliminaires très complètes. Votre Excellence m'a déclaré que cette concession avait déjà été accordée à un groupe turc ; je lui ai alors demandé de bien vouloir faire tous ses efforts auprès de ce groupe pour que les intéressés français soient associés à cette affaire dans une juste proportion.

J'ai signalé de même à votre Excellence qu'une société française, la Société Vandœuvre de Lesseps, avait obtenu en Cilicie la concession de terres à coton et que les plus grandes difficultés avaient été faites à cette société, pour la remise des terres concédées. Votre Excellence a bien voulu me donner l'assurance qu'elle ferait tout son possible pour hâter l'étude de ces deux affaires.

Je tiens à prendre acte de votre déclaration et je renouvelle, &c.

HENRY FRANKLIN-BOUILLON.

[E 13937/1/44]

No. 52.

Bagdad Railway: Inter-Departmental Meeting held at the Foreign Office on December 15, 1921.

A MEETING was held in the Foreign Office on the 15th December, which was attended by Mr. Oliphant, Mr. Weakley and Mr. Forbes Adam (of the Foreign Office), Mr. Paine, Mr. Fountain (of the Board of Trade), and Mr. Bullard (of the Colonial Office), to consider the following points which the Board desired to raise in connection with the Bagdad Railway :—

1. Attitude to be adopted towards the disposal of the sections of the Bagdad line which fell in Syria under the Treaty of Sèvres, and have been surrendered to Turkey by France, by the Angora Agreement (see map* attached to this minute).
2. Possibility of transferring to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the provisions in the Tripartite Agreement regarding the Bagdad line.

1. The Board of Trade representatives feared that France may have consented to this transfer of the line merely in order to avoid the expense and trouble of liquidating it, as they would have had to do if it fell in Syria, whereas the line in Turkey has to be liquidated by the Turkish Government. It was suggested that the real motive may have been simply the knowledge of the French Government that they probably would not be able to garrison the line against the Turks—at any rate, for a long time. The surrender avoided the continuance of a slight to their prestige.

After some discussion, the meeting agreed on the recommendation that the

* Not reproduced.

change of frontier should be held not to effect the provisions of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, which should be integrally applied as they stand. This could be done without any change in the wording of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, which does not specifically refer either to the Treaty of Sèvres or to the northern frontier of Syria, as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres. The result would be that the right reserved to the French Government under paragraph 2 of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement to take over and work the whole or part of the line which lies in its zone of special interests, in exchange for the whole or part of French interests in the Bagdad line, as a whole, on the 1st August, 1914, would now have to be exercised in regard to the stretch of line from Bozanti to Nisibin, except for the small stretch between Midan-Ekbes and Choban-Beg (falling in Syria). Since the value of the French interests on the 1st August, 1914, in the whole line would probably be less than the value of this stretch of line, the French would not be able to claim the right to have conceded to them and to work the whole stretch by virtue of paragraph 2 of article 4, and a larger stretch of railway, than under the Sèvres settlement, would probably be left to be conceded to the Anglo-Franco-Italian joint company. The French would, however, probably wish to work the whole of this line, and this could be arranged with their partners in the joint company in accordance with the arrangement that was always contemplated, that each of the three partners should work separately a section of the system definitely allotted to it. If this course were adopted, the British, French and Italian groups would continue to have equal shares in the joint company, the whole of the additional capital allotted to France under paragraph 1 of article 4 having been exchanged against a definite cession of railway line.

The Board of Trade would be gratified by such a result, as they are anxious in the interests of British trade that as much as possible of the western part of the system up to the port of Haidar Pasha should be worked by the British group.

If the French insisted on the whole stretch of line within their zone being not only worked by but actually conceded to a French group, this would involve an alteration in article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, as it would involve France giving up a corresponding portion of capital in the joint company in which, therefore, France would hold less than a third share, a contingency not contemplated in the article.

It was realised that if His Majesty's Government urged the integral application of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement in the manner above indicated, the French Government might, nevertheless, claim that they expected to receive and control, quite independently of the arrangements provided for by article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement, those parts of the Bagdad line which fell in Syria under the Treaty of Sèvres and which they have now handed back to Turkey, since the Treaty of Sèvres gave them the independent right to liquidate and control those sections. In the notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and the French Government on the Angora Agreement the French attitude is not explicitly defined on this point.

It was pointed out, however, that His Majesty's Government might counter this argument by pointing to the prejudice to British interests, especially in Irak, caused by the change of frontier and by the actual conclusion of the separate agreement with Angora, and by claiming that in return the French Government must accept the inevitable results of their transfer of this section of the railway to Turkey, *i.e.*, its treatment as falling within the French zone of interests under article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. Whether, and to what extent, this argument could be pressed on the French was felt by the meeting to be a matter of foreign policy on which the Foreign Office were alone competent to decide in the course of forthcoming negotiations with the French in Paris.

2. The transfer of the substance of article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and a consequent modification of article 294 of the Sèvres Treaty, would mean that the latter would have to be redrafted in such a way as to lay down the precise manner in which the Financial Commission (or a reconstituted Debt Council, or the Allied Governments, if these eventually replace the Financial Commission), would actually apportion the Anatolian and Bagdad Railway concessions in Turkey, after liquidation by the Turkish Government—namely, in the manner now specified in article 4 of the Tripartite Agreement. If this were possible politically, the Board of Trade felt that the whole arrangement would be more binding on Turkey and would be more precisely defined than is now the case, when part of the arrangement figures in the Sèvres Treaty and part in the Tripartite Agreement.

After examination, the sense of the meeting was against any such change, on the following grounds:—

- (a.) The possibility of exception being taken by third parties, *e.g.*, the United States, to the division of the spoils between the three Allies in this way in the treaty itself.
- (b.) Similar opposition from Turkey.
- (c.) The desirability of minimising the changes to be made in the Treaty of Sèvres and of not reopening particular clauses in the Tripartite Agreement, which represented the result of long inter-Allied negotiations.

Foreign Office, December 15, 1921.

[E 13917/1492/44]

No. 53.

Mr. Bentinck to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 561.)

My Lord,

Athens, December 5, 1921.

IN view of the continual reports in the press that the Greek Government was exercising pressure on the Holy Synod at Constantinople with the object either of postponing the election of a Patriarch or, if an election took place, of refusing recognition, I have made enquiries to ascertain how far the Greek Government would be justified in this action, and I have the honour to report to your Lordship the following information, for which I am indebted to Mr. A. J. B. Wace, head of the British School of Archaeology at Athens.

Strictly speaking, as the Church in the Kingdom of Greece is autocephalous, the Greek Government and the Holy Synod of Greece have no right whatsoever under either canon or civil law to interfere in the election of a Patriarch. However, the Greek Government think that they have a right to exercise some pressure for the two following reasons:—

(a.) The Greek Government pay yearly a fairly large subvention to the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as the Patriarch is looked upon as the national leader of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire still in subjection (so much has the Patriarch declined from his true position as Ecumenical Patriarch or Patriarch of all Orthodox Christians, whatever their race may be).

(b.) Many of the metropolitans, who are electors to the Patriarchal throne, now have their dioceses within the new territories of the Kingdom of Greece, although ecclesiastically they are still under the Patriarchate and not under the Holy Synod of the autocephalous Church of Greece.

These two reasons, however, are not sufficient to justify interference by the Greek Government in a purely ecclesiastical affair. The most the Greek Government could do would be to advise the electors as to what course they should take in this national crisis and not utter threats or use various means of pressure, such as cutting off the subvention, which are at their disposal.

In my opinion the Greek Government are acting unwisely in allowing the press to talk so freely about their threat to refuse recognition to the Patriarch if elected, and to prevent the metropolitans going to Constantinople for the election. In doing so they are deliberately bringing internal Greek politics into what is after all an external affair. But the Greek Government are afraid that the new Patriarch will be Veniselist, for the general atmosphere at Constantinople is Veniselist, and Veniselist influence was, until recently, paramount at Phanar. On the other hand, the Greek Government are very anxious (as in 1916 when the Royalists promoted the anathema of Veniselos) to buttress the throne by the Church, and, consequently, want a Royalist Patriarch to be elected who will bless King Constantine. Consequently, the Greek Government's threats of non-recognition, &c., show how nervous they are and how much they fear that a non-Royalist Patriarch will be elected.

If a Patriarch who is not *persona grata* to the Greek Government be elected, what is likely to be the attitude of the Greek Government? Will they recognise him? If they do not recognise him it will mean that relations between the Patriarchate and the autocephalous Church of Greece will be broken off. Then either one, or both, of the churches will declare the other schismatic. Anathemata and other ecclesiastical artillery may also be brought into use, but without raising the prestige of "the Great Church of Christ," the official title of the Orthodox Eastern Church as represented by the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Matters will then reach a deadlock as regards the relations of the different branches of the Orthodox Eastern Church to one another. Though independent administratively, the various Churches are united dogmatically, and all recognise the Patriarchate of Constantinople as *primus inter pares*; but the Patriarchate has no spiritual or dogmatic authority over the sister Churches, for such matters can only be dealt with at an Ecumenical Council. Usually when a Patriarch is elected he sends letters to the other Patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria, and to the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus, Serbia, Greece and Roumania, announcing his election. These then should reply acknowledging his letters and offering congratulations and brotherly greetings. Should anyone not reply it would be equivalent to non-recognition, though they could go further and state that they do not recognise the new Patriarch, inasmuch as he has been elected uncanonically, which would, *ipso facto*, produce schism.

That the Greek Government will be impelled by political hatred to proceed to such lengths is just conceivable, but it would be extremely unwise. The Patriarchate, if it accepted the Greek Government's intervention, would be merely exchanging the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Eastern Orthodox Church for that of King Constantine and his supporters and become a political instrument subordinate to the State. It is to be hoped most sincerely that the Greek Government will not do so, because this will prevent for a long time to come any possibility of the Orthodox Church recovering its freedom and self-respect as a Church and of reforming itself from within. Such a state of affairs would be a great calamity for oriental Christianity.

I have, &c.

C. H. BENTINCK.

P.S.—December 9, 1921. Since the above was written I have received Sir Horace Rumbold's telegram No. 145 of to-day stating that the well-known Veniselist, Mgr. Meletios, has been elected to the Patriarchate, and thus the fears of the present Greek Government have been realised.

C. H. B.

[E 13900/1492/44]

No. 54.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 1118.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 10, 1921.

IN my telegrams Nos. 774 and 775 of the 9th December I had the honour to report the election of Mgr. Meletios Metaxakis, who was Archbishop of Athens throughout the Veniselist régime, and whose dismissal was one of the first acts of the Constantinists on their return to power, to the vacant Patriarchal See of Constantinople. As this event may have considerable political consequences, I have been at pains to collect more information than was in my possession when I wrote my despatch No. 1055 of the 22nd November. It is so difficult to obtain dispassionate statements that I cannot vouch for my information in every particular, but I believe the following account of the matter to be in the main accurate:—

2. The so-called Synod, held at Adrianople in June under the auspices of the Greek Government (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 349 of the 3rd June and Lord Granville's despatch No. 239 of the 4th June to your Lordship), produced two results. On the one hand, the election then contemplated by the Patriarchal authorities here was adjourned. On the other hand, a *modus vivendi* was arrived at between the dissident prelates and the Patriarchal authorities. This *modus vivendi* defined the manner in which the election should be conducted, and comprised an understanding, as to the terms of which I am not clear, that the election should be held in due course, but not until the political or military situation, or both, should be clearer.

3. The old mode of election is described briefly in my despatch No. 450 of the 4th May. The *modus vivendi* provided that for the purpose of the new election all metropolitans subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate should be entitled not merely to nominate candidates, but to vote, and that all dioceses should be entitled to lay representation in the electoral body. This constituted a very great departure from the old rule, under which only metropolitans belonging to the Holy Synod and any others actually present in Constantinople when the throne fell vacant should have votes; while (for reasons intended at the time to ensure the preponderance of electors of Greek

race) only twenty-eight provincial dioceses were entitled to lay representation. It was not apparently contemplated by the drafters of the *modus vivendi* that the electoral assembly should comprise representatives of dioceses now belonging to Yugoslavia, as the transfer of those dioceses to the Serbian Church has been the subject of a definite agreement with the Serbian Government, which has only not been ratified because it is necessary that the Patriarchal throne should first be filled. The *modus vivendi* did, however, contemplate the participation of episcopal and lay representatives of all dioceses in new Greece, Thrace and Smyrna.

4. The next important development was the decision taken by the Patriarchal authorities here in October to hold the election on the 8th December. An encyclical was issued convoking an electoral assembly on the lines laid down in the *modus vivendi*. The Greek Government protested, as described in my despatch No. 1055 of the 22nd November. The Patriarchal authorities persisted. They were beset with many difficulties. Seven members of the Holy Synod, reduced to eleven in all by the death of the late Archbishop of Broussa, were metropolitans of dioceses in Greek occupation, and were consequently subject to Constantinist influence. The laity in Constantinople were still in the main Veniselist, but even among the Veniselists there was not unanimity as to the desirability of open war with the Athens Government. Three of the eight lay members of the Mixed Council favoured negotiations with Athens. This led to an acute controversy, to resignations and counter-resignations, but eventually the question of sending a mission to Athens lapsed, and the eight lay members of the Mixed Council remained in their posts. Lastly, and this was the greatest difficulty, the Greek Government would allow no bishops in the territory under their control to proceed to Constantinople, nor would they allow lay representatives to be elected in the dioceses. The Greek Government seem to have been anxious to use pleasant means as well as repressive to effect their object. I was myself struck by the remarkable deference shown by the Greek High Commissioner to the acting Patriarch on a public occasion on the 24th November; and a few days later the Greek Minister of Marine, who came to Constantinople, exchanged visits with the acting Patriarch. It was even rumoured a few days before the election that a composition had been effected, but in the event this proved to be untrue.

5. If the Patriarchal authorities put this election through in spite of all obstacles, it was due to the determination of the local Veniselist organisation known as the "National Defence." Two days before the election the Holy Synod met, and, thanks to the presence of the seven prelates mentioned above, a majority decision was recorded in favour of an adjournment of the election. Even this was not allowed to stand in the way. The electoral assembly met at the Patriarchate on the morning of the 8th December. It was composed of about 100 members. Had the representation been complete in accordance with the *modus vivendi* there would have been between 200 and 300. As it was, there were comparatively few metropolitans, and there was, I understand, only one lay representative of a diocese under the control of the Greek Government. The remainder of the laymen were representatives of Constantinople, and representatives of dioceses under Kemalist control, chosen here by persons in Constantinople belonging by origin to such dioceses.

6. The seven dissenting members of the Holy Synod and some four other metropolitans who shared their views absented themselves from the electoral assembly. The incompleteness of the Holy Synod had to be overcome. It was decided *séance tenante* that the dissidents should be treated as having resigned, and that their colleagues and the Mixed Council should elect seven other bishops to fill their places. This was done at once, and the election proceeded. Speeches were delivered. The action of the Greek Government was held up to odium. A letter was read from a bishop in Greek occupied territory describing how he was prevented from attending the election. The atmosphere was heated and charged with Venisellism. Some excuse was found for the objection of three lay representatives of Constantinist leanings. When the nominations were read out it looked as though Mgr. Germanos, Metropolitan of Amassia, were the favourite of the ecclesiastics. The laity favoured Mgr. Meletios. It is said in explanation of this that a telegram was received by the National Defence on the eve of the election from the secretary of M. Veniselos to the effect that Mgr. Meletios must be elected at all costs. The third favourite was the present Acting Patriarch, Mgr. Nicolas, Archbishop of Caesarea, but he appears to have had little real support, and to have been given a nomination more by way of compliment than anything else. In the course of the day both he and Mgr. Germanos intimated that they were prepared to stand aside in favour of Mgr. Meletios. As, however, the business of the electoral assembly was to choose three prelates, it was still possible to vote for them, and the result of the poll was 83 votes each for Mgrs. Meletios and

Nicolas and 78 for Mgr. Germanos. It remained for the prelates present, with whom the final choice lay, to proceed to the Patriarchal Church, and, after invoking the Holy Spirit, to choose the worthiest of the three. Some of these prelates held proxies for metropolitans in the provinces, and 18 votes in all were cast. Sixteen were given to Mgr. Meletios, who was thereupon declared duly elected.

7. The new Patriarch is a Cretan. He studied and passed the earlier part of his ecclesiastical career in Jerusalem. In 1907 he left Jerusalem, and in 1910 he became Bishop of Kytion, in Cyprus. In February 1918 (not 1917 as stated in my telegram) he was made Metropolitan of Athens. He was dispossessed of that post in November 1920, after the collapse of M. Veniselos, but his dismissal has never been regarded as valid by the Patriarchate here. He is at present in the United States.

8. It is difficult to understand what the Greek cause generally has gained by this election. It is only necessary to read the above account to see on how many grounds its validity can be called in question. The failure of the Athens Government to impose its views may be a further source of weakness of M. Gounaris on his return, but so long as King Constantine remains on the Throne the Greek Government, whatever it may be, can hardly fail to contest the position of the new Patriarch. He will presumably have the majority of the Hellenic Church, as distinct from the Government, also against him. He is unlikely to be recognised by the Patriarch of Alexandria, Mgr. Photios, one of the most ardent of King Constantine's ecclesiastical supporters. Recognition may also be refused by the Patriarch of Jerusalem, not so much for political reasons as on grounds connected with the antecedents of Mgr. Meletios in Jerusalem. As for his own attitude, if what I hear of him is true, he is a man of no small determination and not at all incapable of putting into execution the threat which has sometimes been murmured in patriarchal circles here of excommunicating King Constantine.

9. The one and only thing in which all the parties to the quarrel have been united is their determination to ignore the Turkish Government. It will be interesting to see whether that Government feels strong enough to seek to assert its rights in any way.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 13903/1/44]

No. 55.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 1122.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 10, 1921.

IZZET PASHA, Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me yesterday evening to speak about the prospects of peace.

2. He stated that he knew that the Nationalists are anxious to come to some preliminary understanding with Great Britain. As a proof of this, he quoted the enthusiastic manner in which ex-Major Henry and his party had recently been received at Samsoun. I reported in my despatch No. 1062 the departure of four Englishmen for Ineboli, ostensibly in connection with commercial affairs. The party in question were unable to land at Ineboli, and had therefore to proceed to Samsoun, where Rafet Pasha was awaiting them. They were received with a guard of honour because it was supposed that the party constituted a semi-official mission from His Majesty's Government to the Nationalist Government. Major Henry's party has now returned to Constantinople, and, although I have not seen any of its members, I have just learnt that Major Henry has brought back a document containing a record of his conversation with Rafet Pasha. It was stipulated that this document should not be shown to the British High Commissioner.

3. I pointed out again to Izzet Pasha that there was no truth whatever in the story that Major Henry and his party had been sent on a mission to the Nationalists, and I think that his Highness is now persuaded of the truth of my assurance.

4. Izzet Pasha was evidently very anxious to know whether any reply could be expected to the telegram which I had the honour to transmit in my telegram No. 740. He said that it seemed to him desirable to ascertain the basis on which peace negotiations might be embarked upon. I replied that the telegram in question did not seem to me to be a very hopeful sign of the state of mind of the Angora Government, and, in any event, we were not going to make a separate agreement with that Government. There was no reason why we should do so. We wished to bring about peace in co-operation with our Allies.

5. Izzet Pasha replied that the Nationalists did not expect to make a separate agreement with us. He did not think that the telegram in question was unhelpful, and he compared the preliminaries to peace negotiations to a transaction which might take place in the bazaars. The purchaser would not at the outset of a bargain get the last price from the merchant. The original price asked by that merchant would be lowered in the course of bargaining. I enquired whether this meant that the Nationalists would be prepared to modify the National Pact. He said that the whole of Anatolia was necessary to the existence of Turkey. I told Izzet Pasha that I had long thought that the question of the European frontier of Turkey would prove the most difficult to solve. In June last it was certain that English public opinion would not have acquiesced in a considerable extension of Turkish territory in Thrace.

6. Izzet Pasha said he had read allusions to the Enos-Midia line as a possible frontier for Turkey in Europe. This frontier was a purely artificial one. What the Turkish Government feared most in the future was the incursion of Greek bands. For that reason it was necessary for them to have a frontier, such as that of the Maritza, which they could defend against those bands. The Allied Powers should be under no illusions in this matter of the formation of bands. It was absurd to imagine that if the Turkish frontier were continuous with that of Bulgaria the rest of the Balkan States would be in danger. Turkey could not go to war in conjunction with Bulgaria. Her alliance with Bulgaria during the war had anyhow been an unnatural one.

7. I then asked Izzet Pasha what he thought would be the attitude of the Nationalists towards the Sultan. He replied that he had no cause for devotion to the Sultan, who, he knew, detested him personally and had behaved very badly. Nevertheless, he, Izzet Pasha, was a monarchist, and would, with the rest of the Constantinople Government, rally to the support of the dynasty should the Nationalists attempt to interfere with it.

8. Finally, I enquired whether the existence of the large body of Turkish officers who found employment whilst hostilities lasted would not prove an obstacle to the re-establishment of peace. He said he did not believe this, and maintained that there were many Turkish generals who ardently wished for the end of the war. This led him on to say that the military capacity of Mustapha Kemal Pasha was overrated. The man who had done most for the Nationalist army was Ismet Pasha. It was owing to his dispositions that the Turks had forced the Greeks to retire from the Sakaria River. Just before the Greek retreat Mustapha Kemal Pasha had been appointed to the supreme command of the Nationalist forces, and had consequently been given all the credit for what was really due to Ismet Pasha.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 13914/12582/44]

No. 56.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 1139.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 13, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Sir Harry Lamb relative to the situation of the Circassians in Turkey, and more especially those who live in the country round Ismidt, and many of whom are now refugees in Smyrna.

2. In normal times the position of the numerous Circassians settled in Asia Minor gave rise to no special question, and I do not think there would be any ground of treating them as a racial minority requiring to be protected by special safeguards in the treaty settlement. The suggestion that they should be placed permanently under Greek protection is, of course, absurd if it means that they should be protected by the Greek Government in districts not finally placed under Greek administration.

3. The position of the Circassians in the Ismidt area presents, however, peculiar features. I have no very strong sympathy with them, as they have throughout looked to their own interests. It is nevertheless difficult for His Majesty's Government to disclaim all responsibility for their present plight. Large numbers of Circassians identified themselves with the efforts made by the Central Government and the British military authorities to hold the Nationalists in check at a time when it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to promote efforts to reduce the Nationalists by force. When the British withdrew from Ismidt and were replaced by the Greeks, those Circassians who had taken sides against the Nationalists were so compromised in the eyes of the latter that no course was open to them but to collaborate with the Greeks.

4. The only suggestion which I can make for discharging ourselves of our responsibility towards these Circassians, such as it is, is that provision should be made for an amnesty which would include them. Once things settle down again in Asia Minor there is no reason why they should not revert more or less completely to their former position of an integral portion of the Moslem population, with minor distinguishing characteristics. The dangerous time for them will be the transition period, when many of them may be marked out for vengeance owing to their opposition to the Nationalists.

5. In illustration of this danger I may mention the case of a Circassian leader, Mustapha Bey, who was Kaimakam of Ada Bazar while the Greeks were still at Ismidt. On the Greek evacuation, this man, who had certainly worked with the Greeks, took refuge in Constantinople. He was promptly arrested here and put on trial before the court-martial. A few days ago the court-martial, after acquitting him of all such charges as murder, arson and pillage, condemned him to death for treason. I had already endeavoured to secure this man's release, and on hearing of his condemnation I took strong exception to it, especially in view of the fact that he had been acquitted of the charges of common crime which have frequently been laid at the door of the Circassians, and had yet been condemned in the neutral zone for a treason which apparently consisted in action against the Kemalists. The Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me personally that there was no question of executing the sentence, but the incident, occurring as it does while Constantinople is in Allied occupation and is the centre of a "neutral zone" for the purposes of war between the Kemalists and the Greeks, shows what Circassian leaders generally might have to expect if they fell into Kemalist hands.

6. There are of course many Circassians who are identified with the Constantinople and Angora Governments both in the army and in civil functions. After the Congress at Smyrna, reported by Sir Harry Lamb, a number of Circassians held a meeting here to denounce their countrymen at Smyrna as traitors, and to protest their loyalty to the Turkish fatherland.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. 256.)

Sir,

Smyrna, November 24, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that I recently received a visit from a number of representatives of an organisation calling itself the "Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Circassians in the Near East," who presented to me a long memorandum purporting to record the decisions arrived at by a congress of Circassians assembled in Smyrna towards the beginning of this month.

2. In handing me this document the spokesman, whom I understand to have been the secretary of the association, named Ismail Hakki Bey, one of the delegates of the Circassians of Ada Bazar and formerly Civil Governor of Ismidt, endeavoured to impress upon me that his people, both by tradition and by natural inclination, desired the guidance and protection of England. During the British occupation of Ismidt the Circassians of the Ismidt and Isnik regions had done their best to co-operate with our officers, and, if they were now working in agreement with the Greeks, it was of course in great measure because circumstances compelled them to snatch at anything which offered them a chance of protection from the denationalising pressure of the Union and Progress fanatics or the Kemalists; but they did it with all the more conviction and alacrity in that they understood it to be in accordance with the policy of Great Britain. Their object throughout had been to preserve their existence as a separate nationality.

3. The ideal solution, they considered, would be for the Circassian colonies scattered all over North-Western Anatolia, whose numbers they estimate at over 2 million, to be collected together in some district on the sea-coast and placed under the protection of England. Failing this, which they recognise as being difficult of attainment, they desired that their nation should not be overlooked in whatever arrangements were eventually made for the protection of minorities in such portions of Anatolia as might eventually be left under Turkish rule. This they thought could best be attained by placing them under the protection either of "Europe" in general, as represented by the League of Nations, or of Greece as the Power most closely and

directly interested in them as a result of recent events. Gratitude to the Greek Government, which had afforded them so much assistance, and which was at the present moment providing for the maintenance, at Mitylene and elsewhere, of more than 4,000 of their unfortunate fellow-countrymen from Ismidt, Isnik and elsewhere, whose villages had been destroyed by the Turks, had compelled them to put forward this latter proposal in the memorial which they were submitting, through the Hellenic diplomatic representatives abroad, to the Allied and Associated Powers.

4. In this memorial they are requesting :—

- (1.) That the Circassians should be included in the protection of minorities clauses of the final Treaty of Peace ;
- (2.) That they should be placed under the protection of the Greek Government, which, they were confident, would assist their national development and progress ;
- (3.) That they should receive compensation for all the destruction and damage to their property of which the Turks had been guilty during the past fighting ; and
- (4.) That delegates of their nation should be admitted to the Peace Conference to expose their views and defend their interests.

5. I hardly think it necessary to offer any comments on the foregoing, as your Excellency is of course fully acquainted with the position which the Circassians have found themselves forced into as a result of the Greek invasion of Anatolia. That the Greeks are utilising them for their own ends, and would be as little likely, in the long run, as the Kemalists themselves to "promote their national development" when they come permanently under Hellenic rule, the Circassian leaders are of course sufficiently intelligent to realise ; but the fact remains that circumstances have forced them together, and the Greeks at present are the only protectors they possess.

6. They themselves are subsidised, and the refugees from the Ismidt, Broussa and Yalova districts are maintained in Mitylene at the expense of the Greek Treasury. These refugees are indeed living in the most pitiable and unsanitary conditions in the old Turkish quarters, but they are in receipt of 2½ drachmas per head per day, which constitutes an appreciable charge upon the limited resources of Greece.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB,
Representative of British High Commissioner,
Smyrna.

[E 14249/22/44]

No. 57.

Memorandum communicated by Italian Ambassador.—(Received December 19.)

(Translation.)

WITH reference to Foreign Office note of the 3rd October, 1921, the following are the views of the Italian Government regarding the question of the distribution between the Allies of posts under the Financial and Military Commissions in Turkey :—

1. *Military Commission.*—The Italian Government must insist on the principle of rotation of the posts in the Military Sub-Commissions. Whilst France would have the control of the gendarmerie and England would reorganise the Turkish army, Italy would have allotted to her only the Disarmament Sub-Commission. The great inferiority of the task assigned to Italy is evident—a task which is politically disagreeable, and temporary in character ; and to attain also in this sphere perfect equality of privileges as between the Allied Powers, it is necessary to establish rotation of the posts. Nor can any valid objection be raised on the ground that rotation is already applied to the post of president of the Military Commission, which will control the activities of the three sub-commissions ; in fact, the latter will always exercise within the scope of their functions a wide measure of freedom of action. The argument, therefore, can easily be refuted in that it is not perceived why the principle of rotation, already accepted by the Allied Powers for the presidency of the commission, cannot likewise be applied also to the presidency of the three sub-commissions dependent on it.

2. *Financial Commissions.*—The Italian Government take note of the concurrence of the British Government in the creation of a special post—to be assigned to an Italian—of liaison officer between the Turkish Ministries of Finance, Commerce and Public Works, on the one hand, and the Financial Commission, on the other, with the special object in view of a reciprocal agreement regarding concessions.

The British Government's agreement is, however, obtained to the principle that the Financial Commission in the execution of its instructions may create subsidiary posts to be divided equally between the nationals of the three interested Allied Powers.

There might be created therefore three secondary posts, viz., the secretary-general of the commission, the director-general of customs, and the representative of the commission attached to the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works to inspect concession documents and to supervise their application.

The officers appointed to these three posts should be elected by the Financial Commission, and should receive their respective instructions from, and be solely responsible to that body. On these conditions the powers of the Financial Commission would remain unchanged and would not be weakened at all, as the Foreign Office note under reference would seem to imply.

In order to adopt the plan outlined above, it would only remain to overcome the reluctance of the Ottoman Government.

There is indeed no particular reason why the Ottoman Government should accept the imposition by the Financial Commission of a director of customs, already laid down in article 246 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and not accept the similar appointments which would arise from the application of the same treaty.

It is clear, however, that unless the treaty stipulates the appointment of the representative of the Financial Commission to be attached to the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, this appointment will never be accepted by the Ottoman Government. It is thus necessary that such a post should be expressly provided for in the new text of the Peace Treaty with Turkey.

The opposition to be expected from the Turkish Government would not, on the other hand, be an adequate reason for abandoning so much it is indispensable to obtain in order to strengthen the influence of the Financial Commission and to safeguard the interests of the Allies.

The secretary-general of the Financial Commission, being a post within the commission itself, can be created and maintained without provision being made in the treaty, as such a post can exist even though not officially recognised by the Ottoman Government. But a delegate of the Financial Commission attached to the Ministries referred to could not be appointed if the treaty did not make express provision to that effect.

Moreover, the absence of a special delegate of the Financial Commission attached to the Ministries which draw up the rules for concessions, examine the relative agreements and control their application, would render article 239 of the treaty ineffective, and at the same time deprive the Financial Commission of a most important weapon for its measures in defence of the economic interests of the Ottoman Government.

The object in view would not be attained by the British Government's proposal for a mere liaison agent, as such an agent would be limited to reporting to the Financial Commission accomplished facts which were communicated to him directly or came indirectly to his knowledge. This would mean placing the Financial Commission in an unpleasant position such as would seriously prejudice its authority.

The Italian Government could not be satisfied with a purely ornamental post and there is clearly a wide difference between a director of the Customs, provided with all the necessary recognised powers and a delegate attached to the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, not recognised by the Ottoman Government and therefore ineffective.

The importance of Ottoman interests bound up with the regular working of undertakings in Turkey, on which depends very largely the economic progress of the country, cannot be denied, nor can the fact that up to the present these interests, which are of a public nature, have been the instrument of private individuals and only to a subordinate degree the instrument of the general public.

It is necessary, therefore, that the Financial Commission should have the right to intervene in regulating the question of concessions, and in order to attain this object it should have a duly accredited representative attached to the interested Ministries who could really supervise the regular development of the State working of the concessions.

The object aimed at by the Italian Government's proposal would be completely attained by the addition to the actual text of article 239 of the Treaty of Sèvres, the following paragraph:—

"La Commission financière aura la faculté de nommer un délégué *ad hoc* pour traiter des questions avec le Gouvernement ottoman et en référer à la Commission financière. Le Gouvernement ottoman fournira à ce délégué toutes les facilités requises pour l'accomplissement de sa mission."

London, December 18, 1921.

[E 14198/1/44]

No. 58.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)
(No. 1160.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan on an interview with the Turkish heir apparent.

Constantinople, December 21, 1921.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

(Confidential.)

I PAID a private visit to the Turkish heir apparent on the 17th December. The visit arose out of a meeting at Mgr. Dolci's concert. The Prince kept me for nearly an hour and a half and was very affable. The conversation contained nothing of outstanding interest, and I propose to record only the main lines of it.

The Prince, after we got on to politics, said that Great Britain had made a mistake in estranging Turkey before the war. Turkey was of little account, but her friendship had its value for even so great a Power as England, which, despite her greatness, had innumerable difficulties. We had sacrificed Turkey to Russia, and the difficulties with which we were now confronted proved that we had made a mistake. When war broke out the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" had come to fill a vacuum, and people like Enver, Talaat and Jemal had done the rest. The Prince spoke throughout in the most scathing terms of those men, especially Enver and Jemal. He also reiterated frequently his conviction that the friendship and support of Great Britain were essential to the well-being of Turkey, though she should also stand well with France.

I reminded his Highness that in 1913 His Majesty's Government had changed their policy towards Turkey and had manifested great eagerness to settle all questions then outstanding between the two countries. I referred to Sir Louis Mallet's Embassy here, and to Hakkı Pasha's mission in London. I agreed with him that Turkey was not a negligible quantity from our point of view. I said that, in spite of all the changes which had happened in between, a comparison might be drawn between 1921 and 1913, in the sense that early in the present year His Majesty's Government had greatly modified the rigorous attitude they had observed during the first two years of the armistice. I urged that Turkey should take the opportunity so offered. I said that, whatever else we were, we were not hypocritical. When our attitude had been rigorous we had made no secret of it. When early this year we showed a more benevolent spirit, we were sincere, and people in Angora who made out that the action of His Majesty's Government was only a device to gain time for the Greeks were entirely wrong.

The Prince blamed Mr. Lloyd George. He rather surprised me by reproaching the Prime Minister, not with regard for the Greeks, but with having, as he said, communicated to Krassin all that had passed with Bekir Sami Bey. He seemed to be obsessed with the idea that His Majesty's Government were still playing up to the Russians to the detriment of Turkey's interest and their own. Turkey, he maintained, could never menace British interests. Russia would always be a potential menace to them.

The Prince declared that the late Sultan was an imbecile, and blamed the present Sultan greatly for having lost all hold of the reins since the armistice. He regretted that Turkey had not of late years ever had a Sultan like his father, Abdul Aziz, who

had not been perfect, but who would never have done the harm done by his successors. Otherwise his Highness spoke more respectfully than I expected of the present Sultan. Arising out of a remark of mine that we should like to see before us a united Turkey under its proper authority instead of an impotent Central Government and a revolutionary Angora, he affirmed his confidence that that would all come right. Angora would last only as long as it was necessary to discharge its appointed task, which was to clear Smyrna and Thrace of the enemy.

Referring to observations of mine to the effect that Great Britain must guard against political pan-Islamism, a potential though perhaps not a great immediate danger, and must be sure of the Straits, the Prince said, in effect, that pan-Islamism was moonshine except in so far as the Caliphate was a moral force. If we compared our differences with Turkey she would help us with our Moslem subjects. As for the Straits, we might have a present of them. He would be delighted to see us in charge of the Straits, because if guns went off they would be Russian guns, and then we should be there to stand the racket.

As I had not conversed with the Prince since over two years ago, when I had to make rather a disagreeable communication to him, and as he probably credits me with personal antagonism to the Kemalists and with a bias in favour of the Sultan and his great enemy Damad Ferid Pasha, I was careful not to enlarge on anything which might sound unfriendly. He was no doubt similarly guarded. This and his natural politeness may account for the temperateness of his language, but I was once more struck by his appearance of sincerity and of readiness to take broad views. I fear he is too impulsive and too impressionable to be reliable from our point of view if he came to the throne, but as he may very likely do so any time in the next ten years, it is worth while to maintain friendly relations with him so far as this can be done consistently with a correct attitude towards the present Sultan.

Constantinople, December 19, 1921.

[E 14076/1/44]

No. 59.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 3419. Secret.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 30, 1921.

I TRANSMIT the accompanying copies of a memorandum containing an outline of the proposals which, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, might form the basis of discussion at my forthcoming meeting with the French and Italian Foreign Ministers on the subject of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. For convenience of reference, I have attached as an annex to the memorandum comparative tables giving summaries of the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and of the conferences held in London and Paris in March and June last respectively.

2. You should explain accordingly to M. Briand, and communicate to him for his confidential information two copies of the memorandum and annex, together with the four maps enclosed herein, which serve to illustrate the main territorial proposals referred to in the memorandum.

3. In handing the memorandum to M. Briand, you should impress upon him with the utmost earnestness the necessity of treating the suggestions which it contains, and which are in some cases necessarily of a provisional character, with extreme secrecy. Nothing could be more unfortunate or more likely to bring about the failure of the discussion upon which the Foreign Ministers are about to enter than any premature divulgence of their character either to the press or to the partisans of the interested parties, whether these be Greeks or Turks. From the moment that any such disclosure is made, every form of pressure will be applied to those who are engaged in the discussion, direct and indirect, open and clandestine. If the success of the ultimate negotiations with the Greeks and Turks depends, as it will do, upon the unbroken and unbreakable unity of the Allies, so will the success of these earlier conversations depend upon a reticence which is proof against all temptation or assault.

I am addressing a similar despatch to Sir R. Graham.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* Also to Sir R. Graham (Rome), No. 105, *mutatis mutandis*.

Memorandum of Proposals for Discussion at the Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers on the Revision of the Treaty of Sèvres.

1. THERE have been three main phases of the hitherto unsuccessful effort made by the Allies to conclude peace with Turkey: (1) The Treaty of Sèvres signed in August 1920 but never ratified; (2) the proposals made at the London Conference of March 1921, but not accepted either by the Greeks or Turks (or if accepted by one party in any particular, then declined by the other); (3) the discussion suggested by His Majesty's Government in Paris in June 1921, but rendered abortive by the refusal of the Greeks to accept Allied intervention. A fourth attempt is now to be made. It is essential that this attempt should prove successful, and it will be readily admitted that such success depends not only on prior agreement among the three Allies as to the precise terms of their intervention, but on a united Allied front throughout the period of intervention. It is with a view to facilitate and expedite the attainment of these essential objects that His Majesty's Government have thought it well to indicate as follows their ideas on the main questions, territorial and other, which must be considered in deciding how the Treaty of Sèvres is now to be revised. A summary of the results of the above-mentioned phases of negotiation is given as an annex to this memorandum for comparison with the present proposals.

(A.)—*Smyrna.*

2. It will doubtless not be disputed that it is essential in the interests of a general settlement that Turkish wishes on this question should as far as possible be met. The existence of a Greek administration, and perhaps even more the presence of Greek forces in the Smyrna zone, have provided the principal spur to Turkish nationalism, and in practice have proved an insurmountable barrier to a peaceful solution. At the same time it is impossible to insist on the evacuation of this area without devising safeguards for the large Greek population, calculated both to overcome the natural reluctance of the Greek Government entirely to withdraw the protection of their troops, and also to provide against the likelihood of oppression or massacre by the Turks. A reference to the annex shows that the Allies are now, generally speaking, agreed that the future sovereignty and administration shall not be Greek. At the same time the questions of the area to be administered under some special autonomous régime, the form of government, and conditions of defence still remain to be decided.

3. Arising out of the previous discussions two possible boundaries (see map I*) of the area which will require special treatment suggest themselves:—

- (a.) The first is the Smyrna zone as drawn for reasons, partly of population (the American pre-war figures gave Greeks about 500,000, Moslems 470,000, Armenians 23,000), partly economic and partly strategic, in the Treaty of Sèvres.
- (b.) The second is the Sanjak of Smyrna and Kaza of Aivali, with a pre-war population, according to the pre-war American figures, of Greeks 410,000, Moslems 330,000, Armenians 18,000.

4. The choice between these two areas will depend to some extent on the character of the administration. At the Paris Conference, autonomy under Turkish sovereignty and a Christian governor were provisionally agreed upon. It has since occurred to His Majesty's Government, however, that if only the help of the League of Nations could in some manner be enlisted in the settlement of this question, the strong objections which Turkey is known to hold to Allied or Greek executive interference in the administration might be removed, while safeguards acceptable to both the Greeks and Turks might be secured. The Allies, in treating the special problems of Turkey, would indeed be wise to remember the successes of the League of Nations since 1919 and the experience gained by that body in the conduct of difficult administrative problems in Europe.

5. For instance, the administration specially designed in the Treaty of Versailles for the Saar Basin is well worthy of consideration as a precedent. In that case, there is a governing commission of five, appointed by the League of Nations (one Frenchman, one German from Saar, and three others, neither French nor German), with a chairman appointed by the League: the appointments run for

* Not reproduced.

one year, but are renewable, and the powers of the commission are, except for a consultative assembly and the general supervision of the League, practically unfettered. After fifteen years of government by the commission, the population is to decide the question of future sovereignty.

6. This scheme might, if it were thought desirable, be adapted without much difficulty to the Smyrna area. The commission might consist of an American chairman (it may be remarked in passing that the advantages of American co-operation are not inconsiderable), with two local Greeks and two local Turks appointed by the League of Nations and ultimately responsible to the latter, while the Turkish flag could still be retained and the inhabitants would remain Turkish subjects. The arguments in favour of such a scheme are manifest. The solution of the problem would be made international. The presence of an American on the Governing Body, if it could be secured, would ensure a detached and impartial outlook, freed from the controversies of the European or the local situation. The commission would be specially designed to consider primarily the special interests of the administered area, whether Greek or Turkish.

7. While this plan could be applied to either of the two above-mentioned areas, His Majesty's Government would be inclined to favour the retention of the larger of the two as likely to form a more compact and self-sufficing administrative entity, as providing for the economic connection of the coastal ports with the hinterland, and as involving a less drastic revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. Under this scheme of administration, His Majesty's Government would suggest that the gendarmerie (or police in the towns) should be drawn representatively from the local population and placed under allied or at least foreign (*i.e.*, neither Turkish nor Greek) officers, who would be responsible solely to the local commission and paid from the revenues of the area or, in case of a deficiency, by the Turkish Government. If the Smyrna area were attacked by an enemy, its defence would devolve upon Turkish troops, since the sovereignty will remain Turkish.

8. As to the Greek army now in Asia Minor, His Majesty's Government consider that it might be invited to withdraw on the signature of the treaty to the Sèvres area, and should in any case evacuate Asia Minor altogether on ratification by Turkey. Foreign or Allied officers should, however, begin to organise the local gendarmerie on the signature of the treaty, and, pending their effective establishment, a small force of Allied soldiers to act as a police might be furnished from Constantinople.

(B.)—*Western Thrace.*

9. This territory, ceded to the principal Allies by the Treaty of Neuilly, and by them to Greece by a separate treaty signed in August 1920, but not yet ratified, has been occupied since 1920 by Greek troops. As the question of Western Thrace was settled, as between Bulgaria and the Allies, by the Treaty of Neuilly, it does not now concern Turkey, who lost the area to Bulgaria as a result of the Balkan war. The question could not now be reopened without the risk of jeopardising the whole Balkan settlement embodied in the treaties of Saint-Germain, Neuilly and Trianon; and to this His Majesty's Government could not consent.

(C.)—*Eastern Thrace.*

10. While the National Pact to which Turkey still professes strictly to adhere stipulates for the return of Eastern Thrace including Adrianople to Turkey, His Majesty's Government are firmly opposed to any such reopening of the question of Eastern Thrace in its entirety for the following reasons. Since the Treaty of Sèvres gave Eastern Thrace to Greece in full sovereignty, and since it has been occupied from 1920 by Greek troops with full Allied consent, it would neither be fair nor practicable to make Greece now the victim both in Smyrna and in Thrace. Moreover, the paramount importance of securing the freedom of the Straits renders it essential not to give back to Turkey the sovereignty on both shores of the Dardanelles (the same difficulty stands in the way of extending the area restored to Turkey as far westwards as the Enos-Midia line). There is, lastly, the strong objection, already referred to, to reopening in any way the general Balkan settlement. Roumania's interests, for instance, might be touched.

11. It would not, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be politic to revert now to the proposals formerly put forward for a commission of enquiry or a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. Apart from the local uncertainty and unrest which the experience of the past three years show to be

practically inseparable from all plebiscitary arrangements, it is almost impossible at this date to take into fair account the effect of the deportations of the Balkan wars and of 1914-18. The Turkish ethnological claim to Eastern Thrace is in any case extremely doubtful. Although Turkish 1914 figures were 235,000 Greeks, 365,000 Turks and 48,000 others, the 1912 population of this area was, according to Greek figures, 325,000 Greeks, 253,000 Turks and 98,000 others. While providing in the manner already proposed for the preponderance of Turkish claims in the population and history of Adrianople, it seems desirable, therefore, not to attempt any general reopening of the Thracian settlement already accepted both by the Allied Powers and by Turkey, save in the following respects.

12. To a large extent the Turkish contentions regarding Eastern Thrace are based upon the strategic security of Constantinople, and great stress has been laid in every presentation of the Turkish case upon the undesirability of allowing a possibly unfriendly Power or its forces to be planted within 30 miles of the Turkish capital. There is some force in this contention, which it should not be impossible to find the means of meeting without a drastic reversion of the treaty. The Sèvres Greco-Turkish frontier might, for instance, be pushed back in a north-westerly direction to a line starting from the Black Sea at a point just south of Midia, and running to the Marmora just east of Rodosto (both of which towns are predominantly Greek) (see map II*). Such a change would put back into Turkey about an equal number of Greeks and Turks (30,000 in each case). Its special merit would be the removal of the frontier to a distance of about 80 miles from the walls of Constantinople.

13. A second guarantee for the military security of Turkey in Europe might be provided by limiting the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, other than gendarmerie, in numbers, and by confining them to certain areas at a distance from the Turko-Greek frontier. Turkish forces might also be allowed in fixed numbers in European Turkey, say, at Chatalja, outside the demilitarised zone (reduced as suggested by the London Conference last March to 25 kilom. from the Bosphorus) (see maps II and III*).

14. For the rest, the protection of the Turkish minority in Eastern Thrace under the supervision of the League of Nations is already provided for by the Minorities Treaty between Greece and the Allies, signed at Sèvres in August 1920. As regards Adrianople, however, His Majesty's Government are willing, as has already been indicated, to strengthen the treaty by stipulating for a predominance of the Moslem element on the executive council of the town (Turkish 1914 figures, 54,000 Moslems and 41,000 Greeks and Armenians) and by more detailed provisions as to the immunities of Moslem places of worship.

(D.)—*Constantinople, the Straits, and Demilitarised Zone.*

15. His Majesty's Government are generally in favour of meeting, as far as possible, the Turkish contention that Constantinople should be freed from Allied forces and Allied interference. They support, therefore, the final withdrawal from the Treaty of Sèvres of the threat to the retention of Constantinople by the Turks in certain emergencies (see columns I and II of the annex), and, as suggested above, under the heading of Thrace, they would be prepared to permit a fixed number of Turkish troops to be stationed in European Thrace outside the reduced demilitarised zone (under the Sèvres Treaty the whole of European Turkey is demilitarised and the Sultan's bodyguard of 700 men is the only force allowed in Constantinople). The complete evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied troops (now about 14,000 bayonets), which was hinted at in London in March 1921, might now be offered as a condition of the final settlement. But the evacuation should not begin until Turkey has ratified the new treaty, the occupation being the most important pledge possessed by the Allies.

16. As regards the Straits Commission, His Majesty's Government feel that the Turks would be more likely to acquiesce in the provisions of the treaty if the Sèvres régime were to be given a more definitely international complexion. They would therefore propose that in addition to the modifications proposed by the London Conference (see column II of the annex) the direct intervention and control of the Allies might be replaced by putting the commission's administration under the supervision of the League of Nations and by giving to the League the appointment of its members (these would remain as specified in the Sèvres Treaty) on the recommendation of each Government concerned. In addition to being a concession

* Not reproduced.

to Turkey, such a change seems intrinsically desirable in that it would hand over definitely to an international body one of the greatest international waterways of the world. At the same time, it is to be remembered that the change might possibly be misinterpreted by the United States; this is a point which should be discussed before the Allies come to a final decision upon the proposed change as a whole.

17. As a further concession to Turkey, His Majesty's Government would propose to maintain the reduction of the demilitarised zone proposed in March last at the London Conference (see column II of the annex).

18. With regard to the Allied garrison, it may be possible to ensure the essential object of guaranteeing the defence of the Straits, and at the same time to mitigate Turkey's objection to the continued presence of Allied troops in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, (a) by withdrawing the troops of guarantee as soon as possible after ratification of the treaty to Chanak and Gallipoli (as proposed by the London Conference) (see column II of the annex): (a minimum garrison for the whole Sèvres zone of three battalions, and two batteries of garrison artillery, &c., was proposed by Marshal Foch's Committee in London in February 1920); (b) by reducing the Allied garrison as a corollary of the reduction of the demilitarised zone; (c) by including small Turkish and Greek contingents in the Allied forces on the Turkish and Greek shores respectively—a proposal that is recommended by considerations both of policy and economy; (d) by providing in the treaty that, after a specified interval, the duty of ensuring effective demilitarisation of the zone shall be transferred from the Allied garrison either to an international garrison chosen by, and responsible to, the League of Nations, or by a commission of experts sent yearly by the League to inspect the zone and report upon it. His Majesty's Government would suggest that the Allied military experts might in the first instance be asked to report on these four proposals.

(E.)—*Armenia.*

19. Before considering how the Armenian clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres may be revised, it will be well briefly to review both the numbers and distribution of the Armenian population, and the recent history of the Armenian provinces of Russia and Turkey. The Armenian people before the war was estimated at about 2,000,000 in Turkey and about 1,000,000 in Russia; the latest estimate (American, of February 1921) is 1,000,000 in Russian Armenia (including 400,000 Turkish refugees) and 500,000 in Turkey (including 150,000 at Constantinople and 120,000 in Cilicia), i.e., a reduction by massacres, famine, &c., of about a million and a half.

20. After the Turkish invasion of the Caucasus in 1915, Russia had by July 1916 occupied Trebizond, Erzingan, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van (Turkish Armenia). After the Russian revolution in March 1918, Russia retired, and Turkey overran Russian Armenia, reaching Baku in September 1918. Turkish occupation ceased with the armistice of Mudros, November 1918, and the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained a precarious existence up to the end of 1920. *De facto* recognition in January 1920, and *de jure* recognition by her signature of the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920, were given by the Allies to Russian Armenia as an independent State.

21. In November 1920, after a Kemalist attack, which reached Erivan, Armenia ceded the provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Kemalist Turkey. Simultaneously, Russian Soviet troops overran Russian Armenia, which has since, like Georgia and Azerbaijan, remained, except for a short interval, a part of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic. In October 1921, by the Treaty of Kars, Russia, Georgia and Armenia ceded half the province of Batoum and confirmed the cession of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey.

22. This summary of events is sufficient to show the impracticability of attempting now to pursue the plan, contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres (see column I of the annex), of adding to Russian Armenia a portion of Turkish Armenia in order to form one independent State. The Armenian frontier in Turkey actually delimited by President Wilson, and corresponding roughly to Russia's occupation of Turkish territory in 1916 (described above) is strongly held by Kemalist Turkey. Russia has lost territory in the Caucasus to Turkey. Neither the Allies nor other Powers have the men or the money to create an Armenian State or even a national home for Armenians (see the London Conference proposals, column II of the annex) in the inhospitable and inaccessible eastern vilayets of Turkey, even were the latter not known to be opposed to any such plan. In the main, Armenians in Turkey must trust to the minority provisions of the Treaty if the Allies can secure their proper execution.

23. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government desire to submit a suggestion for the possible discharge of the obligations to which all the Allies are equally committed, and for the partial, even if inadequate, satisfaction of Armenia's claims. It is that Turkey should be urged to accept some special régime on the lines of the Lebanon statute of 1861, with either a Turk (chosen by agreement between the Allies or the League of Nations and Turkey) or a foreigner (preferably a French citizen, chosen by the League of Nations) as Governor, for a coastal district in Cilicia, either the whole vilayet of Adana with the Sanjak of Marash (to include Aintab) or the vilayet only, or a smaller area round Adana and Mersina (see map IV*).

24. Before the war, according to American statistics the population of these areas was as follows:—

	Moslems.	Armenians.	Greeks.
Adana and Mersina sanjaks	165,000	35,000	20,000
Adana vilayet	220,000	75,000	20,000
Marash sanjak	146,000	55,000	1,000
Total	601,000	165,000	41,000

25. Since the armistice, the Armenian population has increased by the influx of refugees.

26. The advantages of the above scheme are easily discernible. It would practically meet the proposal made by the Armenian delegation during the London Conference (see column II of the annex); it would give security to the Christian refugees already in Cilicia and likely to come from other parts of Turkey; the district in question is fertile, and being easily accessible from the sea, and in close proximity to the mandated territory of Syria, it is therefore peculiarly open to Allied pressure exercised by sea or land.

27. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate that France, by reason of her position in relation to Cilicia, and the obligations as regards the protection of minorities which she has acknowledged there, is perhaps in the best position to advise on such a solution. But the obligation to Armenia is an international one; and its binding character is felt with peculiar intensity in the British Parliament and by large sections of the British people.

(F.)—Minorities.

28. The "National Pact" admits in principle the conclusion of Minority treaties with Turkey on the lines of the European Minority treaties. The peculiar conditions of a Moslem country would, however, render totally inadequate the provisions of these treaties as applied to Turkey—witness the main differences between the Minority provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres and the Minority provisions of the treaties concluded in 1919 at Paris with European States as shown in column I of the annex. Further, with the revision of the Smyrna and Armenian clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres, nearly 2,000,000 Greeks and Armenians will be left under Turkish sovereignty in Asia Minor. His Majesty's Government, therefore, feel sure that the Allies will share their view that the guarantees provided for racial minorities in the Treaty of Sèvres, so far from being weakened, should be enhanced, and they propose accordingly:—

- The maintenance of the substance of the Sèvres clauses, with only such drafting changes as would render their form more palatable to Turkey.
- The insertion in the treaty of clauses analogous to the concluding clauses of the European Minority Treaties, confiding the direct supervision of the Minority provisions to the League of Nations.
- The insertion in the treaty of a special clause appointing the League of Nations' High Commissioner at Constantinople to watch the execution of the Minority provisions, with power to send delegates to different parts of Turkey to examine and report on alleged infractions.

N.B.—It will be recalled that the League of Nations, on a motion of the last Assembly, have already decided to appoint a Minorities' High Commissioner at Constantinople.

* Not reproduced.

(G.)—Tripartite Agreement.

29. It is a matter of common knowledge that the conclusion of this agreement, and in particular the proposed communication to Turkey of a document which is regarded by the Turks as openly partitioning Asia Minor, has been one of the main Turkish objections to the Sèvres settlement. In these circumstances there will be general agreement that, if possible, some method of securing the substance of this inter-Allied pact without a provocation of direct Turkish hostility should be found. His Majesty's Government readily appreciate, however, that France and, in particular, Italy are primarily interested in the maintenance in some form or other of the advantages which this agreement secured to them. His Majesty's Government therefore think it proper to await the views which the French and Italian delegations may desire to offer. They will content themselves here with repeating the assurances which they have already given, that they, for their part, remain prepared to carry out the obligations which they have assumed towards France and Italy in the original agreement as signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920.

(H.)—Financial Clauses.

30. The financial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres (see column I of the annex) represented not only an agreement arrived at by the Allies after protracted negotiation, but in all probability the only scheme which would really provide both for the payment of Turkey's pre-war debt and war claims, as well as for the effective rehabilitation of Turkey's finances, and, as a consequence, of her administration and economic welfare. On the other hand, there seems no doubt that the foreign executive control of Turkey's administration which the financial commission, as constituted by the Treaty of Sèvres, implied, is regarded by Turkey as an excessive interference with her independence, even with the modifications of form proposed at the London Conference in March last. This situation was fully recognised by M. Briand at the Allied discussions at Paris in June. On that occasion, while pointing to France's paramount interest in Turkish finance, he expressed his willingness to seek a means of control which would secure Allied interests without offending Turkish susceptibilities.

31. His Majesty's Government, for their part, whilst obliged to point out that British private and official claims against the Turkish Government arising from the war exceed those of either of her Allies, readily acknowledges France's preponderant interest in Turkish pre-war finance owing both to her major holding in the Turkish public debt, and to the larger amounts of capital sunk before the war in Turkish public works and industrial and commercial enterprises. His Majesty's Government therefore prefer to await an expression of the French Government's views as to the best method of reconciling the due payment of Turkey's just obligations with the offer of acceptable financial terms to Turkey.

(I.)—Military Clauses.

32. At the London Conference, considerable concessions affecting the numbers, distribution and officering of the Turkish forces were offered to Turkey upon the military provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres. Whether these concessions will prove sufficient, whether, in particular, the organisation and powers of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation, as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres, can be retained, must be a matter for discussion between the Allies. It seems possible, however, that in order to secure the essential objects of the abolition of conscription, the appointment of foreign officers for the Turkish gendarmerie, &c., and the desired limitation of the Turkish forces in numbers and armament some further modification of the military provisions may prove necessary.

(K.)—Other Provisions.

33. Under this head His Majesty's Government would propose that, where possible, the other concessions proposed to Turkey at the London Conference might be maintained, and the possibility of suppressing or modifying the penalty clauses (part VII of the Treaty of Sèvres) be discussed. For the rest, it will doubtless be necessary to make some changes of detail in the economic clauses and in the drafting of some other stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres, not touched upon in the present memorandum.

December 30, 1921.

Annex.

Negotiations for Peace with Turkey.

I.—Treaty of Sevres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>1. SMYRNA.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>Sanjak of Smyrna plus Kazas of Kassaba, Manissa, Ak-Hissar (half only), Aivali (almost all).</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>(i.) <i>Sovereignty</i> remains Turkish. Turkish flag.</p> <p>(ii.) <i>Exercise of rights of sovereignty</i> is transferred to Greece. Greek administration.</p> <p>(iii.) Local parliament.</p> <p>(iv.) (<i>Incorporation in Greece</i> after five years on demand of local parliament.)</p>	<p>1. SMYRNA.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>1st Proposal.</p> <p>The conference proposed an Allied commission of enquiry into population upon condition—</p> <p>(a.) That Greece and Turkey should accept the result.</p> <p>(b.) That Greece and Turkey should accept the rest of the treaty (subject to possible modifications of certain clauses, notably those about Kurdistan and Armenia).</p> <p>Turkey accepted subject to reservations. Greece refused.</p> <p>2nd Proposal.</p> <p>The conference then made a general proposal which included—</p> <p>Possible modification of Smyrna boundary (in favour of Turkey).</p> <p>No discussion. No reply.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>The second proposal of the conference comprised the following:—</p> <p>(i.) Turkish sovereignty.</p> <p>(ii.) District to be called a <i>vilayet</i>.</p> <p>(iii.) A <i>Christian governor</i> of the district to be appointed by the Allies or League of Nations.</p> <p>An elective assembly.</p> <p>An elective council.</p> <p>(iv.) An <i>annuity</i> to be paid to Turkey corresponding with the district's prosperity.</p> <p>(v.) The <i>administrative personnel</i> to be recruited according to the racial distribution of the population as reported by an Allied commission.</p> <p>(vi.) (<i>Revision</i> after five years by League of Nations on demand of either Greece or Turkey.)</p> <p>The Greek delegation accepted subject to the following reservations as to (iii), (iv) and (v):—</p> <p>(iii.) The <i>Christian governor</i> should be appointed by Greece with the consent of the League of Nations or <i>vice versa</i>.</p> <p>(iv.) Before the payment of an <i>annuity</i> to Turkey Greece should first of all take a quota herself and deduct administrative expenses.</p> <p>(v.) The <i>administrative personnel</i> should be determined according to the result of a ballot; a minority should supply at least one-third of the personnel.</p> <p>No reply from Turkey.</p>	<p>1. SMYRNA.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>No discussion.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Lord Curzon proposed and M. Briand accepted the following:—</p> <p>The Italian Ambassador also accepted subject to his Government's final approval.</p> <p>(i.) <i>Autonomy</i> under Turkish sovereignty.</p> <p>(ii.) A <i>Christian governor</i>.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sevres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>1. SMYRNA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Greek garrison.</p>	<p>1. SMYRNA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>The second proposal of the conference comprised:—</p> <p>(i.) A Greek <i>garrison</i> in Smyrna town.</p> <p>(ii.) Outside the town, the <i>gendarmerie</i> to be officered by the Allies and recruited according to the racial distribution of the population, as reported by an Allied commission.</p> <p>The Greek delegation accepted subject to the following reservations:—</p> <p>(i.) Greece should fix the size of the <i>garrison</i>, and, in case of need, be able to move it to the frontier of the district to repel invasion.</p> <p>(ii.) The <i>gendarmerie</i> should be organised by Greek "cadres," and the racial proportions of the population should be determined by ballot rather than by a commission.</p> <p>No reply from Turkey.</p>	<p>1. SMYRNA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Lord Curzon proposed, M. Briand accepted, and the Italian Ambassador accepted subject to the Italian Government's approval:—</p> <p>(i.) A mixed <i>gendarmerie</i> under Allied officers.</p> <p>(ii.) <i>Withdrawal</i> of Greek troops as soon as the <i>gendarmerie</i> should be in working order.</p>
<p>2. WESTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>Western Thrace lies on the Aegean, between the River Maritsa and the mouth of the River Mesta (Kara Su), and extends inland some 30 miles.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Before the war, Bulgarian. Ceded by Bulgaria to the Allies by Treaty of Neuilly 1919.</p> <p>Transferred August 1920, under a separate treaty (not yet ratified), by the Allies to Greece in full sovereignty, with the proviso that <i>Dedeagatch</i> should be a port "of international concern," and should contain a Bulgarian zone to facilitate the transit trade with Bulgaria.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Greek forces.</p>	<p>2. WESTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>	<p>2. WESTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>
<p>3. EASTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>From River Maritsa to within about 15 miles of Chatalja lines, <i>plus</i> an area, south-west of Adrianople and west of the Maritsa, of about 30 by 20 miles.</p>	<p>3. EASTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>1st Proposal.</p> <p>The conference made the same proposal as for Smyrna, viz., an Allied commission of enquiry into the population on stated conditions.</p> <p>Turkey accepted with reservations. Greece refused.</p> <p>The 2nd proposal regarding Smyrna, &c., contained no reference to Thrace.</p>	<p>3. EASTERN THRACE.</p> <p>AREA.</p> <p>No discussion.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sévres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>3. EASTERN THRACE (<i>contd.</i>). GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Ceded, under Treaty of Sévres, by Turkey to Greece in full sovereignty, subject to:—</p> <p>(i.) General guarantees for <i>minorities</i>, especially Jews and Vlachs.</p> <p>(ii.) Guarantees for the protection of <i>Moslem</i> mosques and other institutions, and for the observance of Moslem practice in respect of questions of family law and personal status.</p> <p>(iii.) Representation of all the racial elements of the town of <i>Adrianople</i> upon the Municipal Council.</p> <p>Adrianople executive to be open to Moslems.</p> <p>Inalienability of mosques in Adrianople.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Greek forces, except in the demilitarised zone of the Straits.</p>	<p>3. EASTERN THRACE (<i>contd.</i>). GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>	<p>3. EASTERN THRACE (<i>contd.</i>). GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Lord Curzon proposed the enforcement of the provisions in favour of the <i>Moslem</i> population and institutions, and especially those concerning <i>Adrianople</i>.</p> <p>M. Briand suggested an <i>autonomous zone</i>. Lord Curzon was unable to accept this.</p> <p>M. Briand then revived the suggestion for a <i>commission of enquiry</i>. The Italian Ambassador agreed personally. Lord Curzon pointed out that it would mean a refusal by Greece.</p> <p>The whole question of Thrace was reserved.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Lord Curzon proposed the <i>demilitarisation</i> of an area north-west of the Chatalja lines.</p> <p>M. Briand suggested an <i>international gendarmerie</i>. Lord Curzon could not accept the suggestion.</p> <p>Reserved.</p>
<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, THE STRAITS AND DEMILITARISED ZONE. CONSTANTINOPLE.</p> <p><i>Constantinople</i> to be the capital of Turkey and the residence of the Sultan. The Allies, however, to have the right to modify this arrangement in the event of Turkey failing to carry out the treaty in general and the minorities clauses in particular.</p> <p>STRAITS.</p> <p>(i.) The <i>Straits Commission</i> to consist of the following representatives with two votes each and a rotatory right to the chairmanship:—</p> <p>American (if and when America willing to participate), British, French, Italian, Japanese, Russian (when Russia joins League of Nations),</p> <p>and of the following representatives with only one vote each:—</p> <p>Greek, Roumanian, Bulgarian (when Bulgaria enters League of Nations), Turkish (when Turkey enters League of Nations).</p> <p>(ii.) The <i>Straits Commission</i> to control the waters of the Straits and maintain freedom of passage to all ships and</p>	<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, THE STRAITS AND DEMILITARISED ZONE. CONSTANTINOPLE.</p> <p>The conference suggested—</p> <p>(i.) The withdrawal of the threat to the independence of Constantinople</p> <p>(ii.) The possibility of rapid <i>evacuation</i>.</p> <p>Greece refused this among other suggestions.</p> <p>No Turkish answer was received.</p> <p>STRAITS.</p> <p>The conference suggested that the permanent <i>chairman</i> of the Straits Commission should be a Turk with two votes.</p> <p>Refused by Greeks among other suggestions.</p> <p>No answer from the Turks.</p>	<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, THE STRAITS AND DEMILITARISED ZONE. CONSTANTINOPLE.</p> <p>M. Briand mentioned that he favoured early <i>evacuation</i>. Not otherwise discussed.</p> <p>STRAITS.</p> <p>No discussion.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sévres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, STRAITS, &c. (<i>contd.</i>). STRAITS (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>aircraft calling on the Allied garrison for help when necessary.</p> <p>(iii.) The <i>Straits Commission</i>—</p> <p>(a.) to be responsible for the usual harbour works and services;</p> <p>(b.) to have its own budget and to levy dues;</p> <p>(c.) to have its own police force recruited locally and officered by the Allies.</p> <p>DEMILITARISED ZONE.</p> <p>(i.) The <i>demilitarised zone</i> to consist of:—</p> <p>The Gallipoli Peninsula.</p> <p>The Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles to an approximate depth of 60 miles inland.</p> <p>A strip about 15 miles deep along the European shore of the Sea of Marmora.</p> <p>The European side of the Bosphorus to a depth of about 50 miles north of Constantinople.</p> <p>On the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, the whole <i>Ismid Peninsula</i>.</p> <p>A strip about 25 miles deep along the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora (leaving <i>Brussa</i> outside the zone).</p> <p>The <i>Marmora Islands</i>.</p> <p>The islands of <i>Lemnos</i>, <i>Imbros</i>, <i>Samothrace</i>, <i>Tenedos</i>, <i>Mitylene</i>.</p> <p>(ii.) In the demilitarised zone all military works to be destroyed and none constructed. The zone not to be used for military purposes except by the three Allies acting jointly.</p> <p>(iii.) Local Greek and Turkish <i>gendarmerie</i> to be under the Allied command.</p>	<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, STRAITS, &c. (<i>contd.</i>). STRAITS (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>DEMILITARISED ZONE.</p> <p>The conference's final proposals included:</p> <p>(i.) <i>Demilitarised zone</i> to be reduced to—</p> <p>(a.) 25 kilom. either side of Bosphorus.</p> <p>(b.) At Dardanelles: Gallipoli up to Rodosto; and from Tenedos to Karabigha.</p> <p>(c.) Islands in <i>Egean</i> which command Dardanelles.</p> <p>(ii.) Possibility of allowing Turkey free passage across Bosphorus end of demilitarised zone.</p> <p>Greece rejected these and all the other proposals.</p> <p>No answer was received from Turkey.</p>	<p>4. CONSTANTINOPLE, STRAITS, &c. (<i>contd.</i>). STRAITS (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>DEMILITARISED ZONE.</p> <p>Lord Curzon made the above-mentioned suggestion for the demilitarisation of an additional zone north-west of the Chatalja lines.</p> <p>Reserved.</p>
<p>5. ARMENIA. AREA.</p> <p>The President of the United States is to ascribe to the Armenian Republic of <i>Erivan</i> such parts as he thinks fit of the following Turkish <i>vilayets</i>:—</p>	<p>5. ARMENIA. AREA.</p> <p>The conference proposed the adaptation of the treaty clauses, provided that Turkey should recognise the right of Turkish Armenians to a national home on</p>	<p>5. ARMENIA. AREA.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>5. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>AREA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>Erzerum. Trebizond. Van. Bitlis.</p> <p>He may provide for Armenian access to the sea.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>The territory delimited by President Wilson to be ceded by Turkey to Armenia in full sovereignty and to form part of the then independent Armenian Republic, a signatory of the treaty.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Armenian forces.</p> <p>The President of the United States may also provide for the demilitarisation of the adjacent Turkish territory.</p> <p>N.B.—In December 1920 President Wilson recommended a frontier line between Turkey and Armenia which included in the latter nearly the whole of the vilayets of Van, Bitlis and Erzerum, and a large part of the vilayet of Trebizond, including the port of that name. He also recommended that the superior officers of the Turkish gendarmerie in the neighbouring Turkish territory should be foreign and should specially report to the Allied Military Commission at Constantinople of any signs of Turkish military preparations against Armenia.</p>	<p>5. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>AREA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>the Eastern Turkish frontier and should accept the decision of a commission appointed by the League of Nations as to territory to be transferred from Turkey to Armenia.</p> <p>This proposal was in accord with the demands of the Armenian delegates.</p> <p>Turkish reply not received.</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>N.B.—The Armenian delegation also asked for administrative autonomy for Cilicia with a gendarmerie of local Christians. The French representatives doubted the practicability of this, but stated that France was determined to do everything possible for the minorities in Cilicia.</p>	<p>5. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>AREA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>DEFENCE AND ORDER.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>
<p>6. MINORITIES.</p> <p>(1.) Provisions corresponding to those in the Hungarian, Bulgarian, &c., treaties, viz. :—</p> <p>(i.) Protection of life and liberty.</p> <p>(ii.) Religious freedom.</p> <p>(iii.) Freedom for use of any language.</p> <p>(iv.) Scholastic freedom.</p> <p>(v.) Political and civil equality.</p> <p>(vi.) General superintendence by the League of Nations.</p> <p>(2.) Provisions appropriate to the special circumstances in Turkey, viz. :—</p> <p>(i.) Mixed commissions under the League of Nations :—</p> <p>(a.) To recover Christians forcibly converted to Islam.</p> <p>(b.) To recover other survivors of deportations and massacres.</p> <p>(c.) To recover their stolen or confiscated property.</p> <p>(d.) To take administrative measures to re-establish these people in their homes.</p> <p>(ii.) Turkey reaffirms the ecclesiastic</p>	<p>6. MINORITIES.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>	<p>6. MINORITIES.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>6. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>and scholastic privileges of the non-Moslem communities and cancels all legislation contrary thereto.</p> <p>(iii.) The Allies, in consultation with the League of Nations, to decide on measures for the execution of these clauses.</p> <p>(3.) See guarantees for Moslems in Eastern Thrace (above).</p> <p>(4.) See Tripartite Agreement (below).</p> <p>7. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.</p> <p>This is an agreement between Great Britain, France and Italy which is to take effect with the Treaty of Sèvres and is to be communicated to Turkey :—</p> <p>(1.) The three Allies to be equal on all commissions for reorganising Turkish administration and for protecting minorities.</p> <p>(2.) A zone of special French interests to be recognised in south-east Anatolia, viz., a triangular zone lying north of Syria, comprising Cilicia, and running north to Sivas.</p> <p>A zone of special Italian interests to be recognised between the French zone and the Smyrna zone, i.e., in south and south-west Anatolia.</p> <p>The three Governments undertake to recognise the prior right of France and Italy to seek economic concessions in their respective zones.</p> <p>(3.) An Anglo-Franco-Italian financial group to take over the <i>Bagdad Railway</i> (in territory remaining Turkish); the French share to comprise the section in the French zone.</p> <p>(4.) Great Britain and France recognise that concessions in the <i>Heraclea coal basin</i> (on Black Sea) are reserved for Italy.</p> <p>(5.) Great Britain and France to recognise one another's prior right to economic concessions in their respective mandated territories.</p> <p>(6.) France and Italy undertake to supervise the execution of the minorities clauses in their respective zones.</p>	<p>6. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>7. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.</p> <p>No discussion.</p>	<p>6. ARMENIA (<i>contd.</i>).</p> <p>See Eastern Thrace (above).</p> <p>See Tripartite Agreement (below).</p> <p>7. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT.</p> <p>Since the zones of influence appeared to be regarded by Turkey as severe encroachment on her sovereignty, the desirability of modifying or abolishing the agreement was discussed. It was thought that French and Italian rights might be secured by a formula more acceptable to Turkey, and that a self-denying "undertaking between gentlemen" might satisfy Italy.</p> <p>The Italian Ambassador made the fullest reservations as to the abrogation or modification of the Tripartite Agreement.</p> <p>No decision.</p>
<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES.</p> <p>(1.) A Financial Commission to consist of representatives of—</p> <p>Great Britain. France. Italy. Turkey (consultative only).</p> <p>(2.) The Financial Commission to</p>	<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES.</p> <p>The conference proposed—</p> <p>(i.) That the <i>honorary president</i> should be Turkish.</p> <p>(ii.) That the <i>Turkish delegate</i> should have a vote on all internal questions but only a consultative voice in questions specially affecting the Allies.</p>	<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES.</p> <p>M. Briand agreed with Lord Curzon that a means of control might be found which, while securing Allied interests, would not offend Turkish susceptibilities.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES (<i>contd.</i>)</p> <p><i>control both revenue and expenditure:</i> Parliamentary modifications of the budget to be subject to the approval of the Commission.</p> <p>(3.) The Financial Commission to <i>control</i>—</p> <p>A Financial Inspectorate. Currency. Government loans. Grant of concessions. Customs tariff. Taxation of Allied nationals. Administration of the Public Debt.</p> <p>(4.) The Financial Commission to allot <i>Turkish revenue</i> in the following order of priority:—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Salaries and expenses of Financial Commission. 2. Current expenses of Allied garrison after entry into force of treaty. 3. Service of pre-war Public Debt. 4. Repayment of expenses of Allied armies of occupation, during armistice, in Turkey and Syria (British army). 5. Expenses of Turkish administration. 6. War claims of Allied nationals. 	<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES (<i>contd.</i>)</p> <p>(iii.) That <i>parliament</i> should have the right to modify the budget; but if such modifications should disturb the financial equilibrium, the budget should be submitted to the Financial Commission again.</p> <p>(iv.) That the Turkish Government should be free to grant <i>concessions</i>, but that the Minister of Finance should first consult with the Financial Commission as to the desirability of such concessions.</p>	<p>8. FINANCIAL CLAUSES (<i>contd.</i>)</p>
<p>9. MILITARY CLAUSES.</p> <p>(1.) The Turkish <i>army</i> is reduced to:—</p> <p>(a.) Gendarmerie, 35,000. (b.) Special elements to reinforce the gendarmerie and to defend the frontiers, 15,000; a low proportion of officers and n.c.os.</p> <p>(2.) These forces are <i>distributed</i> over Turkey by the Allies and tied to their particular districts.</p> <p>(3.) Not more than 15 per cent. of the officers to be Allied or neutral instructors. In any one district the <i>foreign officers</i> to be of the same nationality.</p> <p>(4.) <i>Voluntary enlistment</i>. No conscription.</p> <p>(5.) Turkish <i>munition stocks</i> are specifically limited. Further manufacture only by Allied consent.</p> <p>(6.) The <i>Military Commission of Control and Organisation</i> will consist of representatives of—</p> <p>Great Britain France. Italy. Japan.</p> <p>The commission is to—</p> <p>(a.) Control <i>demobilisation and disarmament</i>. (b.) <i>Organise</i>, in collaboration with Turkey, the new forces authorised (<i>see</i> 1)</p>	<p>9. MILITARY CLAUSES.</p> <p>The conference proposed:—</p> <p>(i.) <i>Gendarmerie</i> to be increased to 45,000; <i>special elements</i> to be increased to 30,000. (ii.) Turkey to <i>distribute</i> her own forces in agreement with the Allies. (iii.) Fewer <i>foreign officers</i> and more Turkish officers and n.c.os. (iv.) Extension of period for <i>demobilisation and disarmament</i>.</p> <p>This was included in general proposals to which no Turkish answer was received.</p>	<p>9. MILITARY CLAUSES.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p>

I.—Treaty of Sèvres, signed August 10, 1920.	II.—London Conference Proposals, March 1921.	III.—Paris Conference Proposals June 1921.
<p>10. OTHER CLAUSES,</p> <p>upon which proposals were made at the London Conference, March 1921—<i>see</i> column II.</p> <p>KURDISTAN.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Area lying between Armenia, Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and the Euphrates. 2. A <i>commission</i> of representatives of— Great Britain, France, Italy <p>to devise a scheme of <i>local autonomy</i>, with safeguards for Assyro-Chaldeans and other minorities.</p> <p>3. Turkey to grant <i>independence</i> on demand addressed by the majority of the population to the League of Nations.</p> <p>JUDICIAL COMMISSION.</p> <p>Judicial reform to be elaborated by a <i>commission</i> representing— Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan.</p> <p>NAVAL CLAUSES</p> <p>Turkish <i>fleet</i> reduced to— 7 sloops. 6 torpedo boats.</p> <p>FOREIGN POST OFFICES.</p> <p>To be re-established in Turkey.</p>	<p>10. OTHER PROPOSALS.</p> <p>The conference made the following additional proposals:—</p> <p><i>Admission of Turkey to League of Nations</i> to be facilitated on proof that Turkey is willing to carry out treaty.</p> <p>KURDISTAN.</p> <p>Modification of clauses in accordance with prevailing circumstances, provided that Turkey should give facilities for <i>autonomy</i> and for protection of <i>Kurds and Assyrians</i>.</p> <p>JUDICIAL COMMISSION.</p> <p>The conference proposed that Turkey should be represented.</p> <p>NAVAL CLAUSES.</p> <p>The conference suggested a possible increase.</p> <p>FOREIGN POST OFFICES.</p> <p>The conference suggested the possibility of suppression.</p>	<p>10. OTHER PROPOSALS</p> <p>KURDISTAN.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>JUDICIAL COMMISSION.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>NAVAL CLAUSES.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>FOREIGN POST OFFICES.</p> <p>Not discussed.</p> <p>NOTE—Greece refused the Allied offer of mediation after the June conference in Paris. The above proposals were therefore not made either to her or Turkey.</p>

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA.

[E 10911/4/91]

No. 60.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 30, 1921.

IN the event of King signing treaty can I promise him five months' subsidy immediately? He is in financial difficulties, and Ali thinks that he may yet sign.

Will reply to your telegram No. 87 to-night.

[E 10912/4/91]

No. 61.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, September 30, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 87 of 28th September.

Consider visit of Prince of Wales not advisable unless King signs treaty. Lawrence agrees to this.

King Hussein sent for me to-day and is obviously weakening.

His family are constantly putting pressure on him, and Emir Abdulla sent very strong telegram. Public opinion in Jeddah against him. If he signs, visit of Prince of Wales could be arranged for return journey.

Small-pox not spreading rapidly. Total cases here seven, and no fresh case past two days.

[E 10908/4/91]

No. 62.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 567.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, October 1, 1921.

FOLLOWING from Lawrence:—

“Following is paraphrase of extract from Jeddah telegram No. 253 of 25th September:—

“Position mainly unaltered. I think King Hussein's signature could be bought, as he is very short of money; but I have informed Ali and Zeid that until King sends me signed treaty I will not take any action. He mentions abdication, and has telegraphed to Feisal that until his successor is appointed Wakfs money should be retained in Mesopotamia. In Jeddah feeling against King is very strong.”

I suggest you approve Marshall's proposed course of action.

[E 11201/5148/89]

No. 62A.

Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 845.)

My Lord,

Ramlah, September 29, 1921.

IN accordance with the suggestion contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 962 of the 31st August last, on the subject of the future status of Syrians in Egypt, I have the honour to state that I authorised the Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government to ascertain the views of the Minister of Justice on the French proposal that Syrians established in Egypt should be treated as French protected subjects. Abdel Fatah Yehia Pasha unhesitatingly described the proposal as unacceptable. In view of this strong expression of opinion by the Minister of Justice, I have not thought it worth while to

submit the case to the Acting Prime Minister, and I consider your Lordship will be justified in pointing out to the French Government that it would not be possible to secure the agreement of Egyptian Ministers to their suggestions in present circumstances.

The practical difficulties in enforcing such an arrangement, before the promulgation of a nationality law, both in respect of determining to whom French protection should be extended and in what manner it should be exercised, are additional arguments for rejecting the arrangement favoured by the French Government.

I may add that Mr. Amos took the opportunity of urging the Minister of Justice again to take up the question of the promulgation of a nationality law, and Abdel Fatah Yehia Pasha promised to do so.

I have, &c.

ERNEST SCOTT.

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 11526/117/89]

No. 63.

Consul Morgan to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Aleppo, September 27, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that since my despatch No. 45 of the 23rd July the situation has been in general calm. This state of affairs is due to the military efforts of the French, as well as to a diminution, in Aleppo and Alexandretta districts, of Turkish intrigues and activities, which coincided with the withdrawal of practically all able-bodied Turks from the Syrian frontiers to the Greek front. Greek operations have taken the strain off Syria, and the French are hopeful of the early conclusion of an agreement with the Turks which will put an end to hostile Turkish action against them.

Brigandage and Organised Bands.—Apart from an isolated attack on a small caravan on the Alexandretta-Aleppo road, brigands and bands have been quiet during the past two months. The main roads to Alexandretta, Aintab and Deir-ez-Zor are now reasonably safe, but off them the country is unsafe for individuals or small parties.

Turkish News.—According to an Indian soldier, who escaped from Diarbekr in July last, there are two British officers and some 500 Indian prisoners in that town.

In Marash region the Moslems are persecuting and deporting Armenians. Many of the latter are killed on their forced journey.

A large number of the Armenians of Zeitun have been exiled. The fate of the rest is unknown. About 100 who had escaped from the town succeeded in reaching Killis, in the French zone, three months later—at the end of August—after almost continual fighting. A few were killed just outside Killis by a Moslem brigand band which encountered them.

Pacification of North Syria.—This is being successfully carried on. Ibrahim Hananou, who kept Idlib-Antioch region in a state of unrest by local and Turkish help, has been driven from the country, and his subsequent arrest by the British authorities was somewhat of a surprise to local elements and to many of the French, who have accordingly readjusted their views on British and French relations.

The frontier town of Aintab has been strongly fortified and garrisoned, and a number of inhabitants who had fled to Aleppo through fear of possible Turkish attacks have now returned to the town and district.

The Mewali and Hadidi tribes, living in the Aboudohourhama region, have sunk their feud and signed an agreement, in the presence of the Governor-General of Aleppo, to co-operate with the authorities in keeping the country quiet.

An incident has recently occurred at Deir-ez-Zor, where French troops were attacked by Arab tribes from east of the Euphrates. Popular opinion here attributes the attack to British influence. The French make Emir Feisal the instigator of the attack. A French column is being sent to Deir-ez-Zor to settle the matter.

Franco-British Relations.—French suspicion of British designs on, or intrigues in, Syria is still prevalent. It is recognised that former troubles in Aintab and Idlib districts formerly attributed to British influence were in reality due to Turkish intrigue. The British are, however, blamed for not having disarmed the local population before their withdrawal. The local population are quite convinced that Great Britain is patiently waiting until the time comes for getting control of Syria. Meanwhile the French are

strengthening their hold. The military state they will not leave a country where they have lost so many men. The civil authorities are working hard to diminish all non-French influences privileges.

The Imperial Ottoman Bank in this governorate has become the Banque de Syrie, and all employees, save French and Syrians, are to be transferred elsewhere. As some of the employees thus transferred are Italian the Italian consul is much perturbed. He argues that a mandatory Power has no right to accord more favourable or privileged treatment to its own nationals than to other foreigners.

Italo-French Relations.—Since the arrival of the French the Italian language and Italian propaganda have suffered a serious setback, but the Italian consul neglects no opportunity of setting up opposition to, or protesting against, any modification of the pre-war states of the vilayet. The United States consul shares his views.

Friday Closing for Moslems.—The Moslems of Aleppo, who until lately used to trade on Friday, now close all their shops on that day. This simultaneous action is due to an awakening of religious fervour and to higher orders, and to me indicates a drawing away from the Aleppo Christians, with whom they had always been on a footing of intimacy owing to identity of language, customs and race.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

[E 11656/4/91]

No. 64.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, October 21, 1921.

AFTER all arrangements made, King Hussein again refused to sign treaty.

He produced his own copy with article 2 and article 5 omitted and with an addition of his own to another article. I said that I could not at this stage make any alterations, and negotiations again broke down.

It appears useless to continue negotiations, and I recommend strongly that visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales be cancelled and no invitation given to King Hussein to visit England.

Our future policy can be discussed on the return of Lawrence to England.

[E 11721/4/91]

No. 65.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 2933.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 24, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 2234 of the 5th August and No. 2386 of the 23rd August, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the reply which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to my note of the 4th August relative to Colonel Lawrence's mission to negotiate a treaty with the King of the Hedjaz.

Your Lordship will observe that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs would be glad to learn the results of Colonel Lawrence's mission, and I should accordingly be grateful to your Lordship if you would inform me what reply I should make to the French Government on this point.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR ses lettres en date des 4 et 10 août dernier, l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu porter à la connaissance du Ministère des Affaires étrangères que le Colonel Lawrence avait été chargé de se rendre auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi Hussein pour négocier avec lui les termes d'un arrangement.

D'après les communications précitées, le Colonel Lawrence devait préalablement obtenir du Roi du Hedjaz une déclaration publique par laquelle ce souverain reconnaîtrait le principe et le statut des mandats anglais sur la Mésopotamie et la Palestine, ainsi que du mandat français sur la Syrie.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères serait reconnaissant à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre de lui faire savoir si la question des mandats a pu être effectivement posée par le Colonel Lawrence et, dans l'affirmative, à quelles conclusions ont abouti sur ce point les conversations entre cet officier supérieur et le Roi Hussein.

Il remercie à l'avance l'Ambassade d'Angleterre de tous les renseignements qu'elle voudra bien lui faire parvenir à ce sujet.

Paris, le 22 octobre 1921.

[E 11714/9382/88]

No. 66.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 25.)

Sir,

Downing Street, October 24, 1921.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of correspondence with the High Commissioner for Palestine and a memorandum on the subject of Mr. R. Storrs's visit to Rome.

I am, &c.

J. E. MASTERTON SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Jerusalem, September 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum containing an account by the Governor of Jerusalem district of his interviews and impressions during his recent visit to Rome.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Memorandum by Mr. Storrs respecting a Visit to Rome.

DURING my stay in Rome I endeavoured to get into touch with as many prelates and representative personages as are to be found there in the heat of summer. The weather was somewhat oppressive and compares unfavourably with that of Jerusalem.

I have already reported my interview with the Pope. Later on I visited Father Pascal Robinson, now happily recovering from an attack of pleurisy which has laid him prostrate for several months. He seemed chiefly preoccupied with the delay in forming, or even announcing officially the formation of, the Holy Places Commission. According to him, a very bad interpretation is being placed upon this delay and His Majesty's Government's silence. He went so far as to say that it would be preferable to announce its formation, even though it never sat.

The question of the conaculum was, in his opinion, of no interest whatever from the Vatican point of view, and was put forward, if ever, by Vatican representatives because it was known to be the strong desire of the Italian Government (subsequent interviews and audiences proved the correctness of Father Robinson's views). I was aware that Father Robinson had reported favourably on the Palestine Administration. In his report he laid stress on the strength and pertinacity of Protestant propaganda, but was careful to explain that it had no connection with the Government.

He was strongly against the building or rebuilding of the Gethsemane Basilica, and had, indeed, prepared a decree for the Papal signature when he was struck down by his illness. This decree will forbid building of any kind in the Latin Gethsemane

area, and will be presented for signature at the next Consistory, which will be held on the 7th November. Father Robinson is confident that it will be duly signed. At a subsequent interview Father Robinson showed me a letter from the Cardinal Secretary of State informing him that the French authorities had protested, on behalf of the Latin Patriarch, against the continuation of the rampart walk round the Patriarchate garden. The Secretary of State begged Father Robinson to use his influence with the British authorities to see that no infringements of privacy were permitted. I asked the Father whether it was not a sign of friendliness on the part of Cardinal Gasparri to settle the matter in this unofficial manner and without recourse to the French authorities, and he agreed that it was a friendly act and, in general, characteristic of the Cardinal's attitude.

He informed me that the question of the auxiliary Bishop to the Patriarchate had lately received something in the nature of a setback, as the French were pressing hard for a Frenchman. He strongly advised direct official action with the Vatican, which, according to him, never yields in any direction unless very powerfully urged.

I gather from another source that Cardinal Bourne is a great deal less friendly to the Palestine Administration than he was two years ago, and that he may before long openly attack it.

I had the opportunity of meeting the Cardinal Under-Secretary of State, as well as Monsignori Pucci and Biasiotti, all of whom showed great interest and considerable, though perverted, knowledge of current Palestinian politics, and I called upon the heads of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders at San Vitale and Sant'Antonio. Like the Pope, however, they appeared genuinely desirous of arriving at the truth, and open to conviction on matters not only of fact but of policy.

I visited the Foreign Minister, Marchese della Torretta, who had intimated through the Embassy that he would like to see me. After a little general conversation he urged a speedy settlement for the question of the cenaculum, as it was a matter of great personal interest to the King for dynastic reasons, and as he had already had three interpellations on the subject and would like to be in a position to reply favourably in November. I explained that I was only in Rome on leave and had no official position whatever, but promised to report the conversation to the High Commissioner. The Minister was throughout cordial and sympathetic with regard to the difficulties that were being encountered in Palestine.

As the Pope had specially requested me to see Cardinal Gasparri, I stayed on (after obtaining the approval of the High Commissioner) a week longer than I had originally intended in the hope of his Eminence's return to Rome, which was announced every few days by the Vatican. Two days, however, before my boat was due to leave I found that he had again postponed his journey, and so, on the advice of Mgr. Biasiotti, who was good enough to telephone from the Vatican, I took train to Terni and proceeded with Mr. Dormer, of the Legation, by car to Ussita, the home and birthplace of Cardinal Gasparri. The Cardinal received us very kindly and entertained us to breakfast. He asked a number of questions, which I answered to the best of my ability, and finally stated his views on the French protectorate of Christians in the Near East. This, he said, had been formally renounced by the French Government at San Remo, and the only question remaining for solution was that of the traditional honours paid to the French representative. The French Government had informed the Vatican that the protectorate was at an end. I asked the Cardinal if he had this in writing, and he affirmed that he had. I thought this a suitable occasion to remind him that the Latin Patriarch in Jerusalem continued to address letters to the Government of Palestine, as well as to the Governorate, through the French consul-general. The Cardinal seemed surprised at this, and said it was doubtless because he personally desired to do so.

Cardinal Gasparri further remarked that it was not the mass immigration elements in Zionism which alarmed him so much as the preponderating influence in Palestine which might be acquired by a comparatively small number of Jews occupying high positions. He said that in Hungary the proportion of Jews was only 5 per cent. of the population, but as high as 40 or 50 per cent. in the learned professions. This inclined him and others to be sceptical when they saw high official positions given so soon to Zionist Jews. He did not deny, therefore, that certain apprehensions with regard to Zionism had existed and continued to exist at the Vatican, but said that he personally was convinced of the good-will and good intentions of the British Government. As he is by far the most powerful personage, both officially and unofficially, in the Catholic Church, and a man of frank and open nature, I consider his Eminence's statement most reassuring.

I was impressed with the close relations between the Vatican and the Italian Government, as also the deference paid to the Cardinal Secretary of State by Government officials. The day I visited the Cardinal he was being met by the Minister of Fine Arts, who was thus travelling over 100 miles to see him, and I also found that the telephone authorities had instructions to give priority to calls from the Vatican to the Cardinal in his remote mountain village.

I venture to suggest that very much closer and quicker contact be established between the Government of Palestine and the Legation in Rome. Mr. Dormer stated that, with the exception of one or two private letters addressed by myself (with the High Commissioner's knowledge) to Count de Salis, he had practically no information whatever as to what was going on in Palestine, and was thus unable to reply to the many criticisms and questions that were addressed to him. The Legation had not received the High Commissioner's speech of the 3rd June until well on into August. That speech had created a most favourable impression at the Vatican, and it would have been well if that impression could have been created two months earlier. I would therefore recommend that all relevant telegrams and despatches from Palestine to the Colonial Office and from the Legation to the Foreign Office be repeated to the Legation and Palestine respectively.

I found the Italian press abounding in allusions to Palestine, and would therefore suggest that it should be arranged that newspaper cuttings, if and when no longer required by the Legation and Embassy, should be forwarded on direct to the Palestine Government. The Embassy has the additional advantage of a well-organised press bureau, and this Government would greatly profit if copies of relevant press reports or despatches could be forwarded directly here.

The method of transmission of secret matter would require study, as I am informed that letters are not infrequently opened in Italy, but the difficulty should not prove insuperable. I derived a general impression that the Vatican is by no means committed to unfriendliness towards the Palestine Government, but that it is scrutinising most narrowly the trend of events here. Little confidence is placed in the discretion or diplomatic abilities of the Patriarch Barlassina, though he is recognised as a devout and honest man, and there is no question whatever of his removal.

Finally, I would venture to suggest that relationships of confidence with the Vatican and preparedness to reply to criticisms or questions would be highly desirable for a Power occupying Palestine under any sort of mandate, that for the successful prosecution of the Zionist mandate they are essential and imperative, and that they can be effectively guaranteed only by close and constant co-operation with His Britannic Majesty's Legation.

In this connection I would like to record my gratitude to Mr. Dormer, Chargé d'Affaires at the Legation, who spared no pains in placing me in contact with persons in authority, and also to Mr. Kennard and the other Embassy officials.

R. STORRS, Governor.

Jerusalem, September 23, 1921.

Enclosure 3 in No. 66.

Mr. Churchill to Sir H. Samuel.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Downing Street, October 22, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your secret despatch of the 30th September, with which was enclosed a copy of a memorandum containing an account of Mr. Storrs's recent visit to Rome.

2. With regard to the suggestion in paragraph 12 of the memorandum that steps should be taken to establish a closer relationship between the Palestine Government and His Majesty's Legation at the Vatican, I would suggest that the object desired might be achieved were a copy of the monthly administrative report to be sent as a matter of course to His Britannic Majesty's representative at the Vatican, together with copies of any other despatches addressed to me, of a non-confidential and narrative description, on subjects which would be of interest to the Vatican.

3. I realise that a suggestion of this nature may cast some extra burden on your secretariat, but I am of opinion that, provided the despatches of which copies are sent to Rome are confined to the above categories, the extra labour involved should not be excessive.

4. I should be glad to learn in due course whether you agree to this proposal, and whether you have any other suggestions to make arising out of Mr. Storrs's memorandum.

I have, &c.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

[E 11656/4/91]

No. 67.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 97.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 28, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 91 of 21st October: Negotiations with King Hussein, and Cairo telegram No. 598 of 26th October.

I assume that in acting on my telegram No. 95 of 20th October you made it absolutely clear that both visit of Prince of Wales and invitation to King Hussein to visit England depend entirely upon Hussein signing treaty in time for arrangements for visit to be made. If not, you should do so at once. I agree that you should not continue negotiations. There seems no reason, however, to alter present arrangement whereby, if Hussein signs treaty in final form communicated to him by Colonel Lawrence in time for me to receive your telegram announcing signature by 3rd November, visit will take place and invitation be given. It seems still possible that Hussein may change his mind.

The 3rd November is now latest date to enable Admiralty to arrange for transfer from Malta of sloop necessary for landing party.

Please telegraph briefly substance of articles which Hussein has omitted from draft treaty, since I am not clear as to the numbering of articles in present draft.

With reference to Cairo telegram No. 598, you should again make it clear to Hussein that his communications to His Majesty's Government should be addressed to me and not to the Prime Minister.

(Repeated to Cairo.)

[E 11721/4/91]

No. 68.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 2791.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 28, 1921.

IN reply to your despatch No. 2933 of the 24th October regarding Colonel Lawrence's negotiations with King Hussein, I shall be glad if you will make a communication confidentially to the French Government in the following sense:—

2. Colonel Lawrence left Jeddah without persuading King Hussein to sign the treaty with His Majesty's Government. Negotiations are for the time being, at any rate, suspended, though the possibility cannot be entirely excluded that King Hussein may give way and sign the treaty in the form drafted before Colonel Lawrence's departure. The treaty, as drafted, follows generally the lines sketched in my despatch No. 2039 of the 25th July, except that His Majesty's Government have agreed to renounce their jurisdictional rights under the Capitulations in return for specific safeguards as regards the arrest and trial of British subjects and protected persons. The question of the customs tariff has not been raised. As anticipated in my note of the 20th September to Count de Saint-Aulaire see my despatch No. 2498 of the 21st September), Colonel Lawrence failed to induce King Hussein to issue any declaration regarding the French mandate in Syria, owing to the alleged attitude of the Syrian press towards himself and his sons, although King Hussein at one stage consented to include in the draft treaty a recognition of His Britannic Majesty's special position in Palestine and Mesopotamia. Colonel Lawrence, however, succeeded after much difficulty in persuading Hussein to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which would have constituted a recognition, even if an indirect one, of the mandatory status of the French and British Governments in Syria and Mesopotamia and Palestine respectively. Unfortunately it was afterwards discovered that, without the knowledge of Colonel Lawrence, King Hussein had accompanied his ratification by some proviso regarding the continued independence of the Arabs.

3. Should King Hussein eventually sign the treaty with His Majesty's Government I will not fail to inform the French Government, and communicate the text to them as soon as it is received from His Majesty's representative at Jeddah.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 11890/4/91]

No. 69.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 30.)

(No. 92.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, October 30, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 97.

After final interview King Hussein asked result of his not signing our treaty. I made it quite clear, firstly that the Prince of Wales would not visit him, secondly that he would not receive invitation to England, and thirdly that he would not receive the subsidy. I said that otherwise no change of policy would occur until Colonel Lawrence reported everything to you.

As he left for Mecca the following day, I do not consider that he will change his mind before 3rd November, and you may safely finally cancel His Royal Highness's visit. Article 2 says that we will undertake to use our good offices in the settlement of any dispute on boundaries between King Hussein and his neighbours, and he may invoke our arbitration in such dispute.

Article 5 says King Hussein will, to the best of his ability, maintain peace and friendship for neighbours who are in treaty with us, and will refrain from aggression, intrigue or conspiracy against such neighbours.

I do not know accurately additions of King Hussein to his treaty, but I think that he added somewhere "boundaries as in time of Turkey," and also altered the sense of, and weakened, article 12 of our first article [*sic*] in place of capitulation.

[E 11943/4/91]

No. 70.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 77.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, October 10, 1921.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 91 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the draft treaty as it now stands.

This is the draft treaty as it was handed to me by Colonel Lawrence, with the exception of article 19, dealing with the customs for goods in transit through Palestine to the Hedjaz, which the King did not want, and which Colonel Lawrence agreed might be deleted.

I telegraphed to you to-day asking whether I should substitute my name for that of Colonel Lawrence in the preamble of the treaty, or whether I should sign it on his behalf.

I will submit it to the King in a few days, when the Arabic translations are finished.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Draft Treaty.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty King Hussein, leader of his people the Arabs, founder of the Arab Hashimite State and its King, warden of the inviolate precinct of God's sanctuary, the city of his

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forefathers, lord of his messengers, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, being inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their respective interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples.

And His Britannic Majesty having named and appointed Mr. T. E. Lawrence as his plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Majesty King Hussein.

And His Hashimite Majesty having named and appointed His Royal Highness Emir Ali, his President of the Council of Ministers, and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, as his plenipotentiaries to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Britannic Majesty.

The said Mr. T. E. Lawrence, His Royal Highness Emir Ali, and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib have agreed upon and concluded the articles following:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the high contracting parties agrees and promises to use all the means which his laws provide to prevent his territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

ARTICLE 2.

The high British Government undertake that they will use their good offices in promoting and assisting the settlement of any dispute upon frontiers and boundaries which may arise between His Majesty King Hussein and any of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

His Majesty King Hussein shall be free at all times to invoke the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty in the event of such dispute arising.

ARTICLE 3.

The high British Government undertake to restrain by all peaceful means in their power, and in particular by the suspension of all manner of subsidy, any aggression upon the territories of His Hashimite Majesty by neighbouring States who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 4.

The treaties now in force between the high British Government and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali-el-Idrisi, and between the high British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Feisal-as-Saud are herewith communicated to His Majesty King Hussein.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the aforesaid treaties now existing between the high British Government and Seyyid Mohammed Ibn Ali-el-Idrisi, and between the high British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur Rahman-bin-Feisal-as-Saud, and undertakes to refrain from any act that would or might impede the due execution of those treaties by the high contracting parties.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to cultivate, to the best of his opportunity and power, the maintenance of peace and friendly relations with those of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty; to refrain from unprovoked aggression in act or form against such neighbouring States; and to discountenance, and as far as possible prevent, within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, any conspiracy or intrigue directed against these States or the interests of their rulers.

In issues of importance between His Hashimite Majesty's Government and neighbouring States His Majesty King Hussein may invoke the arbitration of His Britannic Majesty as provided in article 2.

ARTICLE 6.

Each high contracting party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the agent of the other. His Majesty King Hussein may appoint a Hashimite agent in London. His Britannic Majesty may appoint a British agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of His Hashimite Majesty. Out of respect for the special character of Mecca and Medina, His Britannic Majesty will not appoint a British agent there.

His Majesty King Hussein shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint a consular agent in England, Egypt and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be entitled to appoint a consular agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of His Hashimite Majesty as the high British Government may from time to time deem expedient.

These agents and consular agents shall enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

ARTICLE 7.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by the high British Government in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon the said Government.

On their part the high British Government agree to recognise such complementary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the territories of His Hashimite Majesty in accordance with regulations to be published by His Majesty King Hussein.

ARTICLE 8.

Subject to the provisions of article 10, the high British Government undertake not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Majesty King Hussein within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to assist any efforts made by Moslem British subjects or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty to contribute towards the welfare, health and food supply of pilgrims in the Hedjaz, as His Hashimite Majesty is doing in the case of Ain Zobeida.

ARTICLE 9.

The high contracting parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues, and to publish the amount thereof by the first day of the 1st Jamada in each year for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

His Majesty King Hussein shall retain dues charged for measures at ports of His Hashimite Majesty, and the high British Government shall similarly retain dues charged for measures at Kamaran.

ARTICLE 10.

The high British Government agree to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Majesty King Hussein who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British-protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Majesty King Hussein showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who may at any time be within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, provided such British subjects or British-protected persons are registered at a British consulate in the Hashimite territories. The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's Government who are habitually resident in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 11.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that the property of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who may die in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty shall be handed over to the British representative in the said territories, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British representative in the said territories will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under Hashimite laws are duly paid.

ARTICLE 12.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that in all cases which arise in Hashimite territories, and in which a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty is plaintiff or defendant, a British consular representative shall attend the Hashimite courts during the hearing of the case, and where the British agent wishes to make diplomatic representations to His Hashimite Majesty concerning any such case sentence shall not be promulgated or executed pending these representations.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that he will cause to be delivered over to the British consular authority British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who have been arrested by the Hashimite authorities, if the British consular authority gives security for their appearance when required by the Hashimite authorities.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 14.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that cases between British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in which the interests of Hashimite subjects are not involved shall be tried by the British consular authority.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply when both parties to the case desire that it should be tried by the Hashimite court, as provided in article 12.

The provisions of this article are not, however, to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 15.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees to notify the British agent in all cases where he requires the deportation from the territories of His Hashimite Majesty of a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty; and the British agent shall be responsible for the deportation of the person indicated within a reasonable time.

ARTICLE 16.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to surrender within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty all privileges and immunities, otherwise than as provided for in this treaty, hitherto enjoyed by British subjects and persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in virtue of the Capitulations between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

ARTICLE 17.

His Majesty King Hussein recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and undertakes that in such matters as come within the influence of His Hashimite Majesty concerning these countries he will do his best to assist His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 18.

The high British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the flag of His Hashimite Majesty. Provided that when such flag is flown by vessels other than public ships of the Hashimite Government, the vessel flying it shall be registered at Jeddah or Yenbo, or at one or other clearly-specified seaports lying within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and shall be possessed of papers, issued by His Majesty King Hussein, in general conformity with the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein hereby confirms his recognition of the flags as flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of His Britannic Majesty's dominions, or to British-protected territory, or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flags shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

ARTICLE 19.

Each of the high contracting parties hereby declares that it will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreements or understanding with a third party directed against the interests of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 20.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 21.

This treaty shall come into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for seven years after such date. In case neither high contracting party shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years, of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have given such notice.

[E 11944/455/91]

No. 71.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 78. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, October 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period from the 11th September to the 10th October, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Alexandria, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

Jeddah Report from September 11 to October 10, 1921.

(Secret.)

Smallpox Epidemic.

EMIR ALI and Emir Zeid came to see me on the 22nd September, and in the course of conversation they said that two of their servants, recently arrived from Mecca, had been admitted to hospital suffering from smallpox. Emir Zeid said that there were many cases in Mecca. I asked Emir Ali's permission to see these cases. This was

immediately granted, so I visited the hospital next day with Captain Pinder, M.C., R.A.M.C., and saw there was no doubt about the cases. On the 24th September I saw an Indian pilgrim with the disease, and was informed of Javanese pilgrims also suffering from the same malady. I informed the Dutch consul, who sent his Javanese doctor, and he found one case on the 24th and two cases on the 25th. A case occurred in a native of Jeddah on the 26th September and another on the 2nd October.

Conditions here are favourable for the disease to spread. The men are admitted into a ward in the local hospital. There is no isolation of contacts, and the women are isolated and treated in their own houses. The only other measure taken is vaccination. The disease is mild and the mortality low, and, owing to the dislike of being admitted to the Arab hospital, some cases may be concealed.

I proposed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that we should take all the cases and contacts to the Indian hospital, as the conditions there are favourable. It is outside the town, has open desert around, plenty of tents, and female nurses for the nursing of the women. This offer was refused.

There seems no doubt that the Hashimite Government concealed the outbreak in Mecca. No notification was sent to any foreign representative.

I sent Inspector Hassan, Indian police officer, to Mecca to give me a report on the severity of the outbreak there, and he has just returned with a letter from Dr. Khalil Husseini, the Egyptian doctor in Mecca, who reports the epidemic very widespread in Mecca, but with a very low mortality. The disease is said to have been brought in by the Bedouin. I have noticed that the quarantine authorities make no mention of the disease in the bills of health for steamers leaving Jeddah.

Pilgrimage.

The Medina pilgrims are now returning. All the Indian pilgrims have left Medina, but the Persians were not expected to leave until the 8th October. There are rumours of fighting in and around Medina, but it is difficult to get at the truth of the matter. Some Indian pilgrims say they were fired on just outside the gate of Medina, but that otherwise, except for one or two stoppages when they had to pay a small tax, they were unmolested.

The cause of the trouble seems to be the question of the transport of the Persian pilgrims. Formerly these were always carried by the Dawahir (Beni Salem) tribe, who charged these pilgrims more than the others. This year the King gave the pilgrims to the Auf tribe for transport and gave nothing to the Beni Salem, whom he challenged to do whatever they liked. The object of the Beni Salem seems to be to keep the Persian pilgrims in Medina, as their departure has been delayed at least fourteen days, while the Indian and Egyptian pilgrims were allowed to go.

There were rumours in Jeddah that the fighting in Medina was between Shereef Shahat (who had revolted against the King) and Shereef Ibn Mansour, whom the King had sent to arrest him; but I have it on the authority of Emir Ali that these rumours are entirely false and that the Government of Medina is unchanged.

The steamship "Koweit" sailed on the 1st October after a stay of two months in Jeddah. All the Singapore and Javanese pilgrims have left with the exception of a few hundreds. There are two boats in harbour waiting for the Persian pilgrims and also sufficient boats for the remaining Indian pilgrims.

There are about 400 Indian destitutes now in Jeddah. The vast majority were single-ticket holders. We are feeding them with rations from the Indian Hospital, and have wired to the Indian Government for authority to repatriate them.

Aviation.

The Italian pilot, flying a Coudron, reached Taif at his third attempt, and landed there. He used all his petrol, and, on the arrival of a new supply, while starting to take off for his return journey, he crashed his machine owing to the uneven nature of the ground. This machine is practically a total wreck.

Captain Brooke, on a D.H. 9, reached Taif at his first attempt in an hour and ten minutes. When commencing the return journey he carried away his undercarriage on a small hillock and was unable to proceed. He left the machine at Taif and returned by mule. He said the aerodrome at Taif was quite impossible, and that he could not find a suitable place without necessitating a good deal of manual labour to make it satisfactory.

Military Preparations at Taif.

Captain Brooke, on his return, informed me that he calculated the garrison at Taif at about 2,300, and said that preparations were completed for an expedition of more than 1,000 troops under Sabri Pasha, the commander. This force was expected to leave for Kleikh on the 4th October. They had a few machine guns but no artillery. Captain Brooke was much impressed by the smartness and good discipline at Taif, and by Sabri Pasha. The reason given for the expedition was that Khalid had collected his forces and was meditating an attack on Kleikh. (This was reported to you in my telegram No. 86 of the 8th October.)

Emir Ali left suddenly for Mecca on the 7th October, and I understand that he is going to Taif. I did not see him before he left.

It would appear that Khalid is probably acting on his own initiative, as Farhan-ibn-Samil, of Rania, has lately been to Riyadh and has been appointed by Ibn Saud to the Emirate of Rania, and independent of Khalid. Rania is near Khalid's territory, and he was anxious to rule over it.

General.

1. Sir Abdul Qaiyum, K.C.I.E., arrived here on the 5th October. King Hussein insisted that he should be a royal guest, and he left in a royal motor car for Mecca on the 6th. He will proceed to Yambo on the 11th, en route for Medina.

2. It is reported that the Wahabis have recently attacked Barza (on the eastern road between Mecca and Medina) where the Atiebah were camped. The old Sheikh of Ateibah was killed and ten of the tribe came to report to the King. They brought three flags they had captured from the attacking party.

3. *Water Supply.*—Colonel Lawrence and I, at the express invitation of the King, visited the new water supply at Wazirieh. It is a well, about 4 metres deep, situated about 8 miles from Jeddah on the Mecca road, and the water is pumped into pipes which carry it into an old aqueduct which carries it to Jeddah. The water is distinctly brackish and the supply uncertain, and we both concluded that it was not a satisfactory supply for the town of Jeddah.

4. Colonel Lawrence left Jeddah on the 22nd September. Haddad Pasha went with him. A guard of honour was drawn up on the quay.

Press.

Nos. 514 to 522 of "Al Qibla" are forwarded herewith.*

There is very little of importance in these numbers. In No. 517 there is an article on aviation and of the aspirations of the Hashimite Government, which includes schemes for the establishment of an aviation school where Arab pupils will be taught the art of flight and the manufacture and repair of aeroplanes.

No. 521 contains a political article on the policy of Europe towards the East, and the famous letter of the 21st El Keda, 1336, is given in full.

King Hussein sent me a copy of a paper called "Lewa-el-Islam," which is published in Berlin in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and German, and which is very anti-British in its sentiments. The King has asked for the return of the copy he sent me, as he wishes to write about it in the "Qibla."

The King also sent me copy of a Beirut paper called "El Marad," containing a portrait of Ibrahim Hanano. He is very annoyed with the Palestine Government for detaining Hanano at the request of the French, as he says he is an honest man with a good reputation.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

* Not printed.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Shipping Intelligence to September 30, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and 30th September, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Rotti ..	Dutch	Batavia	Sept. 13	1,790	..
Peleus ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore ..	Sept. 11	.. 12	1,002	..
Mansourah	Port Soudan ..	Suez 11	.. 12	..	5,683
Vincenzo ..	Italian	Akaba and Beyrout 11	.. 20	188	..
Dardanes ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia 12	.. 12	250	..
Deli	Rotterdam 13	.. 15	1,820	..
Telemachus ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore 14	.. 15	1,352	..
Ambou ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia 14	.. 15	613	..
Paulo ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Port Soudan 14	.. 22	460	..
Tantah ..	British ..	Suez 15	.. 15	..	457
Ajax	Liverpool ..	Batavia 16	.. 17	863	..
Mascotte ..	Italian ..	Port Said 16
Roeapat ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia 17	Sept. 19	1,625	..
Hyson ..	British ..	Liverpool ..	Singapore 17	.. 17	977	..
Stentor	New York ..	Penang 17	.. 19	596	..
Tvdeus	Liverpool ..	Singapore 18	.. 18	97	..
Dara	Bombay 18	45,816
Tantah	Port Soudan ..	Suez 21	Sept. 22	..	3,072
Menado ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia 21	.. 22	1,712	..
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massowa ..	Suez 24	.. 24	..	812
Yamagata ..	Japanese ..	New York ..	Aden 24	.. 27	..	10,000 cases petroleum
Massowa ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massowa 25	.. 25	..	172
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan 25	.. 25	..	628
Firooz	Bombay ..	Aden 28	.. 30	..	6,998
Kangean ..	Dutch ..	Amsterdam ..	Batavia 30

[E 11976/117/89]

No. 72.

Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 174.)

My Lord,

Damascus, October 11, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to bring to your notice a few entirely unsolicited remarks on the general situation in Syria volunteered by a junior French officer, who has, however, visited most of the chief military centres of the entire zone in his capacity as a flying officer. He has visited, flown over and bombed all the places mentioned below, and as he has a forceful personality I do not doubt for a moment that he has actually thoroughly discussed the points raised later with his superior officers at different towns of Syria. At the time of discussion he was furious because he had narrowly escaped a court-martial for an escapade which would have been treated summarily and benevolently by any English commanding officer. As I did not in any way solicit or prompt the remarks below, I have every reason to believe they were both genuine and spontaneous. I have attempted to arrange them in paragraphs, and to add my own comments where such might appear to be called for. As far as possible I have quoted his own words:—

"The state of warfare in Cilicia and 'les confins militaires' was an ulcer in the side of France, comparable to the effect finally produced by the Peninsular War upon Napoleon. The casualty lists were either concealed or distorted, but the losses were extremely high, and everyone from the generals downwards was thoroughly disgusted with the situation."

There is no doubt the French army is disgusted with this guerrilla warfare.

"The Ansariyah territory presented a serious problem, owing largely to the inaccessible nature of the district. But even near Aleppo there was no security, and French officers or soldiers who fell into the hands of the Arabs were sure of a lingering and gruesome death."

"He had recently taken part in a bombing raid on the Deir-ez-Zor. Fifty-three machines took part in this. Twelve machines and a guard of 100 Syrians and one French officer had perforce been left at an advanced post. This post was attacked by Bedouin, whereupon the Syrians fled, and the Frenchman defended himself to the last."

"When his corpse was discovered later it was horribly mutilated. Similar mutilations had been practised upon some Christian women near Aleppo."

"The rumour that two British officers had proceeded along the eastern bank of the Euphrates and urged the tribes to attack the French, which incitements had ended in the Deir-ez-Zor raid, was an absolute fabrication by persons desirous of creating bad relations between the French and ourselves."

Captain MacCallum has referred to this incident, and to General Lamothe's assurance that it was a mere Bedouin raid and his disbelief in our remotest connivance with it. This reference occurred in his memorandum of the 30th September, of which I presume a copy was forwarded to your Lordship by Mr. Satow—and he and G.H.Q.E.E.F. will therefore be interested in the above further details.

"It was very regrettable that a number of French officers and officials had adopted a policy of pin-pricks and even more directed against us. This policy was fatal and only encouraged all the malcontents to try and increase the misunderstandings that were responsible for this policy, and even to make raids with a certainty of impunity later in the particular zone to which the raiders finally retired for sanctuary."

I can only agree heartily with this, while noticing the admission that such a feeling exists and that such results are brought about owing to it.

"Several quite senior officers at Damascus and many junior members of the French delegation were convinced that the British officers in Transjordan were not merely cognisant of, but actually encouraged the recent attack on General Gouraud. He himself flouted the idea, but had been told by some of the persons referred to that he was rabidly pro-English."

I regret to say that I consider he is correct in his statement that certain Frenchmen do believe the above; and the obvious corollary is that if French senior officers and officials do believe this, it is only human nature that they should try to "get their own back." I have not the remotest doubt, at all events, that they are thus "trying to get their own back, or, as the British liaison officer, Beirut, describes it, "adopting a tit-for-tat policy."

"The French policy in Syria seemed to him illogical. On the one hand, there were sudden bursts of military activity, often too exaggerated for the locality, as, for instance, the recent expedition to the Jebel Druze, which he regarded as a serious political blunder; on the other hand, it had become the custom to flirt with the different Bedouin chiefs, which only resulted in the latter acquiring an exaggerated sense of their own importance."

I can only add that, while I agree with the above, I heard to-day that most of the infantry now at Damascus was to move down to the Jebel Druze again shortly, as water would soon be plentiful there.

"General Gouraud was not satisfactory. He was a fine soldier, but not the man for guerrilla warfare. He was also no politician, and was a complete failure when speaking in the Chamber at Paris and called upon to deal at a moment's notice with the hostile interpellations of the Socialists. He did better in England in quiet undisturbed discussion with our Premier, but most of the credit for this better showing was due to Commandant Canonge, who was with him and who did the real talking which counted."

"The only man for Syria was Marshal Lyautey. He, however, would not leave Morocco till he had received the final submission of two chieftains on the southern boundaries. This should soon be forthcoming, and he might then be available."

In summing up, I can only say that this officer seems to have judged the situation here very accurately indeed.

I consider that the divergencies between the French and us have not been settled, at least as far as Syria is concerned. It is not too late to remedy this, if the French

subordinate officials can be induced to abandon their actively anti-British machinations. I regret to say I consider there is a fair amount of evidence of the existence of such an attitude on their part.

There is also no doubt that a certain section of the local population does everything possible to widen this breach by means of incorrect information and alarmist rumours retailed to the French and/or ourselves as the case may be. It is clearly to the Syrian interest to foment such discord, if Syria is ever to be entirely free of all foreign control. Should the French and ourselves ever join hands and undertake a thorough pacification of the Bedouin districts, as this officer would like to see us both do, it is obvious that there would be no hope left for Syria that she would ever be able to assert her independence of all European tutelage.

The Silesian question was also alluded to, and this officer said that the French press had adopted a very alarmist and provocative attitude concerning it, and that this was not helping to improve our relations.

During the above diatribe I did not find any necessity for contributing any remarks except to say that I did not feel so pessimistic myself, because after slight initial divergences we had settled down to a policy of good-neighbourship in North and West Africa, and had long done so in Guiana. I therefore was convinced that we were merely passing through a temporary phase, and that all would end satisfactorily. I alluded as an example to the extradition treaty recently concluded between Syria and Palestine, and called attention to our loyal execution of this—at no matter what local inconveniences to ourselves—as already clearly proven by our arrest and surrender of Ibrahim Hannano.

He also alluded to the unsatisfactory type of officer sent here, who was neither a fit representative of France nor often above enriching himself in a dishonest way.

(Copies sent to Jerusalem, Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 11985/117/89]

No. 73.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 1.)

(No 139.)

My Lord,

Beirut, October 15, 1921.

I HAVE read with interest Mr. Palmer's despatch No. 174 of the 11th October, which is now going forward, although the remarks of the junior French officer quoted therein contain nothing which is especially novel.

It is, of course, a fact that the French military, both officers and men, are dissatisfied at the continued fighting which has been their lot since the occupation, and naturally so. But if there is any truth in the report that M. Franklin-Bouillon has at last concluded an agreement with the Angora Government, their main cause of pre-occupation should, at any rate for the time being, disappear. Minor and internal disorders there may be for some years to come, as a semi-savage population demoralised by a long war cannot be expected to settle down quickly. However, the French seem to have dealt pretty thoroughly with one centre of trouble, the Alaoui territory, which the Turks thought better to leave alone, and the Ansarieh have been impressed by the French success in penetrating their mountain fastnesses. A small force may therefore in future possibly suffice to maintain order in this district.

Much of Mr. Palmer's despatch deals with the relations between the British and the French in Syria. Undoubtedly a good many Frenchmen harbour suspicions both of our actions and our motives, and probably the worst offenders are those in Aleppo. In Beirut, thanks to the clearly-marked line taken by General Gouraud, it is plain sailing, and in Damascus Mr. Palmer seems to have succeeded in establishing cordial relations. But in Aleppo Mr. Morgan, genial though he is, has not been able to overcome the prevailing distrust. The British liaison officer here, when recently in Aleppo, noticed the difference of atmosphere. On the other hand, it is only fair to say that such few Britishers as there are in Aleppo seem to be decidedly anti-French.

Nevertheless, there is a certain underlying *malaise*, and even in Beirut the local newspapers seem to feel that if they can get in a sly dig at the British it will be counted unto them for righteousness. But it can hardly be considered as surprising that such a *malaise* exists if, as far as can be judged at this distance, the British and French Governments are following two antagonistic policies. It is understood that His

Majesty's Government are backing the Arabs, and that the French Government are supporting and trying to gain the friendship of the Turks, or at any rate of the Turkish Nationalists. In following these aims, each Government is believed to be regardless of the inconvenience, or worse, which may be caused to the other, and also to be regardless of the fact that both Arabs and Turks are, after all, or perhaps before all, Moslems, and capable one day of sinking their differences to the detriment of their respective backers. At any rate in Syria there are signs of a Moslem revival, and this both irritates and alarms the Christians, all the more as they see the French rather inclined to humour the Moslems. The Lebanese are more than ever disinclined to enter a Syrian confederation, and among the Lebanese the Maronites especially, when they hear rumours that the head of the confederation is to be a Moslem, and someone like the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi or Omar Tossoun Pasha may be selected for the office. It is a bitter pill for the Maronites to feel that they even risk in the slightest losing the predominant position with the French which they feel they ought to hold.

But however things may turn out, there will be always anti-British Frenchmen, and they must be accepted as part of the normal order of things. M. de Caix has been reputed to be the most rabid of Anglophobes, but as far as local affairs go he has certainly been reasonable. Apart from wider causes of dissension, the local reasons for anti-British feeling are dislike of Zionism and suspicion of Transjordan. The former is distasteful to good Catholics, and they seem to be fairly numerous here, while the apparently admitted lack of proper security in Transjordan, which under a member of the Sherifian family has served as a place of refuge for malcontents from Syria, is a sufficient ground for its unpopularity with those in charge of Syrian territory. But the arrest of Ibrahim Hannano has had a good effect, and if the rumour is true that Emir Abdullah is on the point of removal, that should produce an even better effect.

The French are, of course, themselves also coquetting with the Arabs, and they seem at present to be taking considerable interest in Central Arabia. But it would almost seem as if the main result would be the loss of the money spent in bribes and subsidies.

As regards the French High Commissioner, it is, of course, known that he is an honest man and a distinguished soldier, who is sincerely in favour of a close Anglo-French co-operation. As a civil administrator he is naturally without much experience. It is believed that in civil matters he is largely guided by M. de Caix, the Secretary-General, while in military matters he relies much upon Colonel Pettelat, his chief of staff, a young, ambitious and able officer. The departure of General Gouraud is periodically discussed and his successor named. When it is not the Mayor of Lyons, it is usually General Mangin who is to succeed him. French civilian officials especially seem ready to discuss the general's departure, being not unnaturally of the opinion that a civilian High Commissioner would be preferable. The Syrians apparently would be glad to see him go, though why it is hard to imagine, as he is quite nice to them, and must inevitably be succeeded by another Frenchman. It is believed that General Gouraud does not approve the pro-Kemalist policy of his Government, and that he would have been ready to attack the Turks if allowed, while the Greeks were still successful. It is possible that he is not stiff enough with the Syrians, but it is difficult for the representative of a mandatory Power, whose mandate is not yet confirmed, to take always the strong line which the Syrians, being Orientals, would probably in their heart of hearts appreciate. Certainly the people of Beirut seem to nourish little enmity against the Turks, and under Jemal Pasha and Azmi Bey they were treated hardly enough.

The root of the trouble between British and French lying deeper than is suggested in Mr. Palmer's despatch, nothing which General Gouraud can do would entirely remove it, but so long as he is here I am sure that he will do his best to maintain loyal co-operation with us, and that he will set his face against any anti-British "pin-prick" policy. But he cannot always control all his subordinates, and among the French officers and officials there are men, as has already more than once been noted, of a bad type, who are no credit either to their professions or to their country.

As far as an outsider can judge, relations with Palestine are satisfactory, as witnessed by the extradition and customs agreements recently concluded, but I gather that there has been some hitch in the frontier agreement which has caused disappointment to the French, who do not get what they had hoped for. The arrest of Hannano has eased the situation, and the departure of the Emir Abdullah, if really impending, should ease it still more, but what is yet needed is the arrest of those of General Gouraud's assailants who are understood to be sheltering in Transjordan. The peculiar difficulties of our position in that region are known to the general, even if not

understood by him, but he appears to be piqued, and it looks as if he intends not to go to Jerusalem to return Sir H. Samuel's visit until some satisfaction is given.
(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

[E 11890/4/91]

No. 74.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 98.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 4, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 92 of 30th October.

Admiralty have been asked to inform H.M.S. "Renown" that King Hussein has not signed treaty and that visit of Prince of Wales to Jeddah will not take place.

[E 12267/4/91]

No. 75.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 99.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, November 9, 1921.

JERUSALEM telegram No. 451 of 4th November to Colonial Office: Negotiations with King Hussein.

Fuad-el-Khatib telegraphed direct on 5th November to the Foreign Office that King Hussein apologises for message sent in Cairo telegram No. 598 of 26th October, and wishes to reopen negotiations through Abdullah. Please make suitable acknowledgment.

Please telegraph if King Hussein really desires to open negotiations, and, if so, make sure that Abdullah is actually given full powers to sign treaty. Text of draft treaty in your despatch No. 77 of 10th October shows that such full powers were given by King Hussein to Ali and Fuad-el-Khatib. Presumably they were subsequently withdrawn by Hussein, otherwise it is not clear why Hussein's signature to the treaty should have been required at all.

In any case it is now too late to arrange for visit of Prince of Wales.

Please repeat your reply to Jerusalem for Colonel Lawrence.

Please repeat to Jerusalem.

[E 12548/455/91]

No. 76.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 84. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, October 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th to the 30th October, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 76.

Jeddah Report for the Period October 11 to 30, 1921.

(Secret.)

Pilgrimage.

The Medina pilgrims have at last returned to Jeddah, and the great majority of them complain bitterly of unwarranted attacks and pillage. There is no doubt that a certain number were killed by Bedouin firing at the caravan, and I have seen Takrouri pilgrims who had been wounded by bullets, by knives and by sticks. The authorities

at Medina were apparently incapable of dealing with the situation, and some of the pilgrims were kept in Medina for thirty-three days.

The Shias undoubtedly suffered most, and the Persian consul was so angry that he sent a memorandum to all the foreign consulates informing them that the Persian pilgrims had all been plundered.

The first caravans which left, Indians and Egyptians, were practically unmolested, but Indians who travelled with Persians and Mesopotamians were treated in the same manner as the remainder of the caravan.

I have received numerous petitions and complaints, which I am forwarding to Mecca.

Ali El Haji Hassan Shalut, the Rais of the Belediyah of Kut-el-Amara, who came to see me, says that he was detained thirty-three days in Medina, and that, in his opinion, sixty persons were killed between Mecca and Medina and three between Medina and Yembo. He said that he would advise all Shias in Mesopotamia not to make the pilgrimage while conditions remain as they are at present.

Hassan-ibn-Abdel Khalik, of Bagdad, said that his mother was killed by a bullet just before they reached Medina.

Practically all the pilgrims complained about the mutawwifs and the mekauims (heads of camel men), to whom they attribute the cause of all their troubles, and there seems no doubt that these men misappropriated money and, with few exceptions, treated the pilgrims with scant consideration.

About 406 destitute Indians collected here after the return of the Medina caravans; 300 of these were repatriated on the steamship "Jeddah," and the remainder will be sent on the steamship "Nairung." The Government of India, who again very generously came to our assistance, are defraying the cost of their repatriation.

As I have emphasised in my previous pilgrimage reports, so long as single tickets are allowed we shall have, each year, a large number of destitute Indian pilgrims. This year we were able to feed these destitute pilgrims with surplus rations from the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, and when these rations were finished they were fed by the Hashimite Government by order of King Hussein.

It seems a pity that a pilgrimage, which began so well, should have such a disastrous ending, and the effect in Mesopotamia and Persia will be very unfavourable to King Hussein's Government. It shows also that King Hussein has no real control over the tribes around Medina, and, so long as this is so, the Medina pilgrimage will never be safe.

Situation at Kleikh.

According to the official telegrams, of which King Hussein sent me copies, the fighting at Kleikh resulted in a victory for the Hashimite troops and the defeat and withdrawal of Khalid's forces. Khalid tried to surround and cut off Kleikh, where the outpost of Arab soldiers was stationed and which lies 60 kilom. east of Taif. He was frustrated in this and retired suffering heavy casualties. The casualties on the Arab side were heavy, three officers and seventeen men being killed. One Sherif, fighting with the irregular forces, was also killed.

Emir Ali remained at Taif and did not proceed to Kleikh.

Small-pox Epidemic.

The small-pox epidemic is now apparently over, for I have not heard of any case since the 2nd October.

Aeroplanes.

I understand that King Hussein has ordered, from the firm in Egypt who supplied the other British machines, twenty additional aeroplanes. A representative of the firm, an Italian, who recently came to Jeddah, told me the King had given him the order. I have not ascertained the price, but what the Arab Government are going to do with twenty more aeroplanes, when perhaps only one of his present machines is fit to fly, I cannot think. Captain Brooke has returned to Cairo, but M. Maximof, the Russian who accompanied him, has signed a contract with the Arab Government for six months and has gone to Taif to repair the broken machines.

Press.

"Al Qibla" No. 527 contains the copy of a telegram sent by Es Sayed Bidairi, chief of the Arab Club in Jerusalem, and Es Sayed Arif, head of the Christian and

Moslem community there, protesting against the declaration of Haddad Pasha, said to have been published in the "Mokattam" and asking for the King's assistance. The King, in his reply, told them not to heed such fabrications and that he had nothing to do with them.

No. 528 contains an official proclamation denying the rumour that steps are being taken to arrange a conference at Mecca to discuss the question of the Khaliphate, and stating that the only policy of the Government is the independence of the Arab territories in accordance with the principles of the revolt.

No. 529 contains a Royal proclamation on the subject of the revolt, and sets forth the aims and aspirations of the Arabs as represented by King Hussein.

W. E. MARSHALL,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 76.

Shipping Intelligence to October 30, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between October 1 and 30, 1921 :—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1921	1921		Packages.
Kangean	Dutch	..	Batavia	..	Oct. 1	965	
Mansourah	British	..	Suez	Oct. 1	" 2	..	890
Koweit	Bombay	..	" 2	1,061	
Asmara	Italian	..	Massaua	Oct. 3	" 3	..	44
Dakablieh	British	..	Port Soudan	" 5	" 5	..	532
Mascotte	Italian	..	Port Soudan	" 7	" 13	161	60 tons coal.
Akbar	British	..	Bombay	" 8	" 30	1,166	11,553
Asmara	Italian	..	Massaua	" 8	" 8	..	552
Jeddah	British	..	Bombay	" 9	" 27	1,483	
Orestes	Liverpool	" 10	" 10	412	
Homayun	Bombay	" 10	" 12	940	
Dara	Yambo	" 11	" 11	..	
Dakablieh	Port Soudan	Oct. 11	" 12	..	2,023
Vergemere	Aden	" 12	" 17	..	
Paulo	Italian	..	Port Soudan	Oct. 12	" 21	354	
Mansourah	British	..	Suez	" 15	" 15	..	638
Mascotte	Italian	..	Port Soudan	" 20	" 20	..	390
Vergemere	British	..	Aden	" 20	Oct. 28	..	
Mansourah	Suez	" 21	" 22	..	2,612
Massaua	Italian	..	Massaua	" 22	" 22	..	2,278
Asmara	Suez	" 23	" 23	..	127
Dakablieh	British	..	Port Soudan	" 25	" 25	..	1,096
Dara	Yambo	" 25	" 29	1,427	

[E 12555/4/91]

No. 77.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 95.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 99 of 9th November.

King Hussein sent to Emir Abdullah his own copy of treaty. He has sent me copy of letter sent with this treaty, and in that letter he authorises Abdullah to rewrite and sign treaty provided that he sticks to the rights mentioned in King Hussein's decision, copy of which is being sent to Abdullah by one of his representatives.

This is presumably Abdul Malik. King Hussein has not sent me copy of this decision. Personally I am opposed to accepting treaty not signed or ratified by King Hussein himself.

From previous experience I am of opinion that any other signature is worthless, and on two previous occasions he has repudiated Abdullah's signature. In this case, if it suits him, he will simply say that Abdullah did not carry out his decisions.

I acknowledged Fuad's telegram in suitable terms.

(Sent to Jerusalem for Colonel Lawrence.)

Jeddah, November 14, 1921.

[E 13038/4/91]

No. 78.

High Commissioner for Palestine to Viscount Milner.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, November 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 24, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Foreign Office from Lawrence :—

"The following article, which Abdullah accepts, is suggested in replacement of Nos. [? group omitted] and 5. Please do not communicate to Hussein till treaty is ready for his ratification :—

"His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to do all in his power to encourage the continuance of peace and friendly relations between himself and those of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty; and will forbid in his own territories, and in all parts over which he has authority, anything harmful to material or moral interests of these States or to the interests of their rulers. The High British Government undertake that they will use their good offices, when it is desired, in promoting and assisting settlement of any dispute which may arise on any question between His Majesty King Hussein and any of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty."

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 13193/4/91]

No. 79.

Colonel Lawrence to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received by Colonial Office, November 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 28, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Foreign Office :—

"I propose to stop article 4 at end of first paragraph and make next five lines new article 5, and proceed 'and undertakes to conduct his relations with those rulers in friendly manner which prevailed before revolt in Arabia, and to respect all former pacts and limits agreed upon between himself and them, provided there is nothing in these pacts and limits contrary to sense of treaties referred to in article 4.'

"The object of this alteration is to clear away all agreements, reference to which is constantly being made by King Hussein, but of which he is unable to produce copies, by making them subject to ours. Intention of last phrases of old article 4 is covered by new draft which was sent to you in my telegram No. 81."

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 13193/4/91]

No. 80.

Colonel Lawrence to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received by Colonial Office, November 28.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

November 28, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Foreign Office :—

"Article 12 is modified as follows: After 'diplomatic representations' read 'on grounds of equity to His Hashimite Majesty concerning any such case, judgment shall be adjourned and shall not be executed while such communications are being made; and execution of judgment shall not proceed except after permission of His Hashimite Majesty.'"

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 13193/4/91]

No. 81.

Colonel Lawrence to Secretary of State for the Colonies.—(Received by Colonial Office, November 29.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Jerusalem, November 28, 1921.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 352 of 18th November.

Abdulla being only plenipotentiary, his signature without royal ratification is as valueless as my own. Abdulla accepts treaty as modified by my telegrams Nos. 81, 82 and 83. He swears that Hussein will ratify subvention [group omitted], but I, like Marshall, have my doubts. It may, however, seem to you worth letting [? group omitted] try. If I receive your concurrence by telegraph we can sign it next few days before I start home. Philby has arrived and I am handing over. Report from Aden says Imam not yet ripe, so I can start back at end of week.

[E 13193/4/91]

No. 82.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 103.)

Foreign Office, December 3, 1921.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING sent by Colonial Office to Jerusalem yesterday for Colonel Lawrence:—

"Your telegrams Nos. 81 to 84.

"Proposed changes are accepted, but last sentence of suggested modification of article 12 should be altered to read 'and in no case shall execution of judgment proceed, &c.' Words 'ratification by His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty' should be substituted for word 'signature' in article 21, and, if possible, you should secure omission of words 'the Arabs' after words 'his people' at the beginning of the preamble.

"You are authorised to sign treaty with these changes and additions."

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 13288/117/89]

No. 83.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 3383.)

Paris, December 3, 1921.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 3078 of the 23rd November, I have the honour to inform you that at an interview this morning with the President of the Council I asked him whether there was any truth in the rumour that the French Government were contemplating the appointment of either the ex-Khedive Abbas Hilmi or of Prince Omer Tossun as ruler of Syria.

M. Briand at once replied that it was the first he had heard of such an idea. As for Abbas Hilmi, he had acted throughout the war in a spirit of the greatest hostility to France, for which he would never forgive him, and he knew nothing of the other, not having even heard of Prince Omer Tossun. He added that the suggestion had been made to him of the appointment of a Turkish prince as ruler of Syria, but he had at once turned it down, and he had no idea of doing anything of the kind at present.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 930/248/91]

No. 84.

Anglo-Hashimite Treaty.—Signed at Amman, December 8, 1921.

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate!

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty King Hussein, Leader of the Arab Revolt, Founder of the Arab Hashimite State

and its King, Warden of the Inviolable Precinct of the Sanctuary of God, and of the City of His Ancestor, Lord of the Divine Messengers, on behalf of themselves, their heirs and successors, being inspired with the sincere desire of confirming and strengthening the good faith and friendly relations established between their respective countries during the war together waged against the Germanic Powers and Turkey, and with the further desire of consolidating their respective interests and ensuring permanent peace and harmony among the Arab peoples.

And His Britannic Majesty having named and appointed Mr. T. E. Lawrence as his plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Majesty King Hussein,

And His Hashimite Majesty having named and appointed His Royal Highness Emir Abdallah as his plenipotentiary to conclude a treaty for these purposes with His Britannic Majesty,

The said Mr. T. E. Lawrence and His Royal Highness Emir Abdallah have agreed upon and concluded the articles following:—

ARTICLE 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Hussein, their heirs and successors. Each of the high contracting parties agrees and promises to use all the means which his laws provide to prevent his territory being used as a base for activities directed against the present or future interests of the other.

ARTICLE 2.

The High British Government undertake to restrain by all peaceful and practicable means in their power, and in particular by the suspension of all manner of subsidy, any aggression upon the territories of His Hashimite Majesty by neighbouring States who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 3.

His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to do all in his power to encourage the continuance of peace and friendly relations between himself and those of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty; and will forbid in his own territories, and in all parts over which he has authority, anything harmful to the material or moral interests of those States, or to the interests of their rulers.

The High British Government undertake that they will use their good offices, when it is desired, in promoting and assisting the settlement of any dispute which may arise on any question between His Majesty King Hussein and any of his neighbours who are in treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 4.

The treaties now in force between the High British Government and Seyyid Mohammed-ibn-Ali-el-Idrisi, and between the High British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur-Rahman-bin-Feisal-as-Saud are herewith communicated to His Majesty King Hussein.

ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the treaties, referred to in article 4, now existing between the High British Government and Seyyid Mohammed-ibn-Ali-el-Idrisi, and between the High British Government and Seyyid Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdur-Rahman-bin-Feisal-as-Saud, and undertakes to conduct his relations with those rulers in the friendly manner which prevailed before the Arab revolt, and to respect all former pacts and limits agreed upon between himself and them, provided that there is nothing in these pacts and limits contrary to the sense of the treaties referred to in article 4.

ARTICLE 6.

Each high contracting party agrees and promises to receive and recognise the agent of the other. His Majesty King Hussein may appoint a Hashimite agent in London. His Britannic Majesty may appoint a British agent to reside at Jeddah or other seaport town of His Hashimite Majesty. Out of respect for the special character of Mecca and Medina His Britannic Majesty will not appoint a British agent there.

His Majesty King Hussein shall also be entitled, if he so desires, to appoint a consular agent in England, Egypt and India, and His Britannic Majesty shall be

entitled to appoint a consular agent at Jeddah and such additional seaports of His Hashimite Majesty as the High British Government may from time to time deem expedient.

These agents and consular agents shall enjoy the usual diplomatic and consular privileges.

ARTICLE 7.

His Majesty King Hussein hereby recognises the provisional quarantine arrangements set up by the High British Government in Kamaran to fulfil the medical provisions of the International Sanitary Convention of 1912, or of any other sanitary convention which is binding upon the said Government.

On their part, the High British Government agree to recognise such complementary measures as, in conformity with the medical provisions of the said convention or conventions, are to be taken at Jeddah and other ports of the territories of His Hashimite Majesty in accordance with regulations to be published by His Majesty King Hussein.

ARTICLE 8.

Subject to the provisions of article 10, the High British Government undertake not to interfere in any way with the measures adopted by His Majesty King Hussein within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty for the care and comfort of pilgrims.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein undertakes to assist any efforts made by Moslem British subjects or persons or institutions enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty to contribute towards the welfare, health and food supply of pilgrims in the Hedjaz, as His Hashimite Majesty is doing in the case of Ain Zobeida.

ARTICLE 9.

The high contracting parties agree to fix a definite sum per pilgrim by way of dues, and to publish the amount thereof by the first day of the First-Jamada in each year, for sanitary services respectively performed by them. These dues shall cover the cost of the total sanitary services up to the time of the landing of the pilgrims, and shall be included in the price of the tickets issued by the various shipping companies.

His Majesty King Hussein shall retain dues charged for measures at ports of His Hashimite Majesty, and the High British Government shall similarly retain dues charged for measures at Kamaran.

ARTICLE 10.

The High British Government agree to recognise the Hashimite status of all subjects of His Majesty King Hussein who may at any time be within the territories of His Britannic Majesty, or within British-protected territory or territory under a British mandate, provided such Hashimite subjects are possessed of papers issued by His Majesty King Hussein showing the Hashimite status of the bearer.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein agrees to recognise the British status of all British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may be at any time within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, provided such British subjects or British-protected persons are registered at a British consulate in the Hashimite territories.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply to British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty's Government who are habitually resident in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 11.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that the property of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who may die in the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, shall be handed over to the British representative in the said territories, or to such authority as he may appoint for the purpose, to be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the case. The British representative in the said territories will see that any dues or taxes which are payable on such property under Hashimite laws are duly paid.

ARTICLE 12.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that in all cases which arise in Hashimite territories, and in which a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His

Britannic Majesty is plaintiff or defendant, a British consular representative shall attend the Hashimite courts during the hearing of the case, and where the British agent wishes to make diplomatic representations on grounds of equity to His Hashimite Majesty concerning any such case, judgment shall be adjourned and shall not be executed while such representations are being made; and in no case shall the execution of judgment proceed except after permission of His Hashimite Majesty.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that he will cause to be delivered over to the British consular authority British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty who have been arrested by the Hashimite authorities, if the British consular authority gives security for their appearance when required by the Hashimite authorities.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 14.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees that cases between British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty in which the interests of Hashimite subjects are not involved shall be tried by the British consular authority.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply when both parties to the case desire that it should be tried by the Hashimite court, as provided in article 12.

The provisions of this article are, however, not to apply in the case of British subjects or persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, who are habitually resident in Hashimite territories outside Jeddah and other seaports at which His Britannic Majesty may appoint consular agents.

ARTICLE 15.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to surrender within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty all privileges and immunities, otherwise than as provided for in this treaty, hitherto enjoyed by British subjects and persons enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty, in virtue of the Capitulations between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.

ARTICLE 16.

His Majesty King Hussein agrees to notify the British agent in all cases where he requires the deportation from the territories of His Hashimite Majesty of a British subject or person enjoying the protection of His Britannic Majesty; and the British agent shall be responsible for the deportation of the person indicated within a reasonable time.

ARTICLE 17.

His Majesty King Hussein recognises the special position of His Britannic Majesty in Mesopotamia and Palestine, and undertakes that in such matters as come within the influence of His Hashimite Majesty concerning these countries he will do his best to assist His Britannic Majesty.

ARTICLE 18.

The High British Government hereby confirm their recognition of the flag of His Hashimite Majesty; provided that when such flag is flown by vessels other than public ships of the Hashimite Government the vessel flying it shall be registered at Jeddah or Yembo, or at one or other clearly-specified seaports lying within the territories of His Hashimite Majesty, and shall be possessed of papers, issued by His Majesty King Hussein, in general conformity with the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

On his part, His Majesty King Hussein hereby confirms his recognition of the flags flown by merchant ships belonging to any parts of His Britannic Majesty's

dominions or to British-protected territory, or to territories under a British mandate, provided that vessels flying such flags shall be possessed of the certificates and documents customarily issued to their vessels by the principal maritime States.

ARTICLE 19.

Each of the high contracting parties hereby declares that it will not, during the continuance of this treaty, enter into any treaty, agreement or understanding with a third party, directed against the interests of the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE 20.

No clause contained in this treaty shall override any obligations which may have been incurred, or may in the future be incurred, by either of the high contracting parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations, or under any convention which may be adopted by the League of Nations and entered into by either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 21.

This treaty shall come into force on the date of its ratification by His Britannic Majesty and His Hashimite Majesty, and shall remain in force for seven years after such date. In case neither high contracting party shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of seven years, of its intention to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force until the expiration of six months from the day on which either of the high contracting parties shall have given such notice.

The present treaty has been drawn up in English and Arabic. One copy of each will remain deposited in the archives of the Hashimite Government, and one copy of each in those of the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

T. E. LAWRENCE.
ABDALLAH.

Signed at Amman by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries on the 8th day of December, 1921, corresponding to the 9th day of Rabia-el-Thani, 1340, of the Mahommedan era.

[E 13920/455/91]

No. 85.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 95. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, November 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 31st October to the 30th November, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Delhi.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

Jeddah Report: October 31 to November 30, 1921.

(Secret.)

Visit of Emir George Lotfallah.

EMIR GEORGE LOTFALLAH, accompanied by Selim Sirkis, editor of a journal in Cairo, and George Salem, an American Syrian, arrived on the 25th November. King Hussein, accompanied by Emir Zeid, came to Jeddah the same day. The object of their visit was to present to the King a table ordered for His Majesty by the late Prince Lotfallah. King Hussein is said to have expressed to them his sympathy with the aims and views of the Syrian Congress, but that he could not help them as two of the members of the congress, Sheikh Reshid Risa and Shakib El Arslan, were inimical to him and to the Hedjaz.

The King gave an enormous banquet in Emir Lotfallah's honour on the evening of the 28th and it was on a much more magnificent scale than I have ever seen in Jeddah. Emir Lotfallah sat on the King's right and Commander L. G. B. A. Campbell, D.S.O., of H.M.S. "Cornflower," on the left. No speeches were made.

Visit of H.M.S. "Cornflower."

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 26th November. The King sent an officer to welcome them, and also the usual present of sheep and fruit. The following morning Commander Campbell called on the King and invited His Majesty to visit the ship. The visit took place on the morning of the 28th, the King being accompanied by his guests and about twenty notables.

On the morning of the 29th, Emir Zeid took Commander Campbell, Emir Lotfallah and myself to visit the King's farm at Hadda, about 25 miles from Jeddah on the Mecca road. We returned after lunch, and the "Cornflower" sailed for Suakim at 5 P.M.

The visit of the "Cornflower" was most opportune, as the King has a great personal liking for Commander Campbell, and enjoys the opportunity, by exchange of courtesies, of showing to his adherents his friendship for Great Britain.

Political.

The news of the capture of Hail by Ibn Saud has caused a considerable sensation, and a message in Reuter's telegram that Ibn Saud might now turn his attention to Mecca did not tend to allay the apprehension of some of the inhabitants. King Hussein has not mentioned the matter to me, but Emir Zeid, in discussing the probabilities, said he thought it was more likely that Ibn Saud, should he wage war on the Hedjaz, would attack Medina by way of Khaibar.

Pilgrimage.

The steamship "Nairung" left for Bombay on the 21st with a full complement of pilgrims, including 200 destitute Indians who were repatriated at the expense of the Government of India. The personnel of the Indian Pilgrims' Hospital and Sir Abdul Quaiyum, K.C.I.E., also left by the same boat.

The remaining destitute pilgrims, 64 Bokharas, 21 Afghans, 43 Persians and 16 Indians, left on the 28th by the steamship "Hwah Yih," a Chinese boat chartered by Namazi and Co., Bombay. The company carried these pilgrims, totalling 144, free of charge. All the 1921 pilgrims, except those who intend staying in the Hedjaz, have now left the country.

General.

Captain Ibrahim Depui, the French representative, recently visited Mecca. Soon after his arrival he expressed a desire to see Emir Ali, who was at Taif. The King offered the necessary transport to take him to Taif, but said he could not bring Emir Ali to Mecca even for one day, unless the message was very important. Captain Depui replied that the message was purely personal, and he returned to Jeddah after a stay of two days at Mecca, as he was suffering from bronchitis.

Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 533 contains two official proclamations. The first is to the effect that Haddad Pasha is not, and has not been, the representative of the Hashimite Government in Europe, but only accompanied Feisal during his visit. He is, however, a notable man amongst the Arab people. The second is a strong denial of a rumour that the Hedjaz Railway had been sold to Great Britain. The Hashimite Government had, on the contrary, frequently protested against the usurpation of the northern part of the line, and were much too careful to give up any of the rights of this sacred railway.

Nos. 535 and 536 deal entirely with the life history of the prophet.

King Hussein sent me a copy of the "Lisan-el-Arab" (No. 81 of 13.2.40), drawing my attention to a leading article by a correspondent from Koweit. This article deals with the fighting between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid, and says that Great Britain is able to secure peace and friendship among the Arab Emirs, and proposes that a conference of these Emirs should be held under the auspices of Great Britain.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Shipping Intelligence to November 30, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between October 31 and November 30, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Yang-tsze ..	British	Liverpool ..	Singapore	Oct. 31	Oct. 31	40	..
Dakahlieh ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 31	Nov. 1	..	2,612
Massana ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 31	Oct. 31	..	308
Massana ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez ..	Nov. 6	Nov. 6	..	1,604
Mansourah ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 6	" 6	..	708
Mansourah ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 11	" 12	..	1,498
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 15	" 15	..	804
Nairung ..	British	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	" 15	" 21	795	14,803
Asmara ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 19	" 20	..	1,852
Dakahlieh ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	" 21	" 22	..	1,113
Massana ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 21	" 21	..	170
Mansourah ..	British	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 25	" 26	..	2,727
Hwah Yih ..	Chinese	Port Said ..	Bombay ..	" 27	" 29	148	..
Asmara ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 28	" 28	..	150

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 26th and left on the 29th November, 1921.

[E 14255/4/91]

No. 86.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).

(No. 108.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 23, 1921.

LAWRENCE'S telegrams Nos. 82 and 83 of 28th November to Foreign Office, repeated to you, and my telegram No. 103 of 3rd December: Negotiations with King Hussein.

Treaty was eventually signed by Major Lawrence and Abdullah at Amman on 9th December with above changes and with insertion of words "and practicable" after "peaceful" in article 3. One Arabic and one English text was sent by Abdullah to Mecca for ratification by King Hussein. Please telegraph if and when latter ratifies.

[E 14137/37/88]

No. 87.

Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Cox.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, December 24.)

(No. 536.)

Sir,

Downing Street, December 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in continuation of my despatch No. 414, dated the 16th November, copies of the following documents:—

1. Letter sent by the Prime Minister to the President of the League of Nations on the subject of the treaty with King Feisal.
2. Statement on the same subject as read to the League of Nations by Mr. Fisher.

I have, &c.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 87.

Prime Minister to President of League of Nations Council.

Your Excellency,

November 14, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd October, and to express my appreciation of the support which that letter gives to His Majesty's

Government in the execution of the task which devolves upon them as the result of their acceptance of the responsibility for certain mandated territories.

I have the honour to inform you, in the name of His Majesty's Government, that at the forthcoming special session of the council of the League of Nations the British representative on the League will make a communication regarding the mandated territory of Mesopotamia which it is hoped will convince the council that the council's confidence in His Majesty's Government as expressed in decision (c) contained in your letter under reply is not misplaced.

I have, &c.

(For the Prime Minister),

THOMAS JONES,

Acting Secretary, Cabinet.

Enclosure 2 in No. 87.

Report by Mr. Fisher on Mesopotamia presented to the League of Nations Council November 17, 1921.

HIS Majesty's Government wished to take advantage of this special session of the League to acquaint the council with the progress of the policy which, as the mandatory of the League, they are pursuing in respect of Iraq, and with that aim in view they gave due notice to the president of the council that their representative would make a statement on the subject at the present session. This statement I will now, with the permission of the council, proceed to read.

The council have been kept informed of the manner in which His Majesty's Government have hitherto discharged their obligations towards the League by means of the printed documents already communicated to the League, viz.:—

1. The draft mandate.
2. The Review of the Civil Administration in Mesopotamia (published in December 1920).

In addition, copies of a note on political developments in Mesopotamia since October 1920 are being communicated to the members of the council.

The last of these documents describes the events which culminated in the selection of the Emir Feisal as King of Iraq and his formal accession on the 23rd August. The attitude of the people of Iraq during the last two and a half months has but served to confirm the results of the plebiscite, which, as the printed report shows, resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of the Emir Feisal.

It is clear, then, that His Majesty's Government have not delayed to act upon article 94 of the Treaty of Sèvres, by which the high contracting parties agreed that Iraq should, in accordance with the 4th paragraph of article 22 (Part I) of the Covenant of the League of Nations, be provisionally recognised as an independent State, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the mandatory until it is able to stand alone. His Majesty's Government have obligations, however, not only towards Iraq, but also *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations, for, apart from the necessity to submit the draft mandate to the League (article 96 of the Treaty of Sèvres), article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations lays down that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the council.

His Majesty's Government accordingly think it desirable to inform the League that the political developments in Iraq have led them to the conclusion that their obligations *vis-à-vis* the League can be most effectively discharged if the principles on which they rest are embodied in a treaty to be concluded between His Majesty's Government and the King of Iraq. They found themselves unable to resist the overwhelming desire of the people of Iraq for the formation of a national Government under an Arab ruler. The march of events was so rapid that it did not admit of their consulting the council before taking steps of which they were confident that that body should approve, namely, the recognition of the sovereign, whose recent accession to the throne followed upon the universal demand of the people of the country. The recognition of a local sovereign modified to such extent the position of the mandatory Power; and it is to meet the needs of the situation, as thus modified, that His Majesty's Government

find it necessary to define their relations with the local authority in the manner proposed.

The spirit in which King Feisal envisages his responsibilities is shown clearly in the following passage, which is taken from his accession speech:—

"My first task will be to proceed with the elections and the convocation of the constituent assembly. The nations should understand that it is this congress that will, in consultation with me, draw up the constitution of its independence on the basis of democratic government, and define the fundamental principles of political social life. Finally it will confirm the treaty which I shall lay before it regarding the relations which are to exist between our Government and the Great British Government. Furthermore the congress will establish the freedom of religion and worship so that all men may follow their own law and religion, provided it does not conflict with security and public morals. It will also enact certain judicial laws which will safeguard the interest of foreigners and ensure them against any interference with their religion, race, or language, and will guarantee equity of commercial dealing with the foreign countries."

Another passage in this speech contains an undertaking that the organic law which the King proposes to frame, and which will be drafted in consultation with the High Commissioner, shall establish freedom of religion and worship, assure equity of commercial dealing with foreign countries, and also set up a judicial system which will safeguard the interests of foreigners and ensure them against any interference with their religion, race, or language.

These statements, made publicly by King Feisal from the throne at the moment of his accession, show clearly that he is ready and willing to include in his treaty with His Majesty's Government all proper provisions to ensure that the Government of Iraq shall be carried on in strict conformity with the spirit of the covenant of the League.

It is therefore the opinion of His Majesty's Government that, provided that the treaty secures, firstly, the control of His Majesty's Government over the foreign relations of Iraq; secondly, due fulfilment of the international obligations incurred by His Majesty's Government by treaty, mandate, or agreement; thirdly, such measure of financial control as may be necessary; and, fourthly, provided that it contravenes in no respect either the spirit or the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it would provide a more satisfactory definition of the relations between the mandatory Power and the mandated State than any other form of instrument.

It will be understood that the proposed treaty will serve merely to regulate the relations between His Majesty's Government, as mandatory Power, and the Arab Government of Iraq. It is not intended as a substitute for the mandate, which will remain the operative document defining the obligations undertaken by His Majesty's Government on behalf of the League of Nations.

Paris, November 16, 1921.

[E 14210/455/91]

No. 88.

Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 99. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 10, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st to 10th December, 1921.

(Copies have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Delhi.)

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

Jeddah Report, December 1 to 10, 1921.

(Secret.)

EMIR GEORGE LOTFALLAH and his staff left for Egypt on the morning of the 4th. The King and his retinue left in the afternoon for Mecca. King Hussein, Emir Zeid, Emir George Lotfallah, Fuad-el-Khatib, George Salim and Selim Shirkis came to lunch at this agency on the 2nd. It was after this lunch that the King first referred to Ibn Saud and gave me the written statement which I am forwarding under cover of a separate despatch.

Hedjaz Steam Navigation Company.

King Hussein sent for all the Jeddah merchants and, in the presence of Emir George Lotfallah, explained to them the scheme for forming a company to buy two steamers for the coastal traffic from Akaba to Kunfuda. It was proposed to commence with a capital of 100,000l., of which Emir George Lotfallah would produce 50,000l. and the other shareholders, Hedjaz merchants and notables, the remaining 50,000l.

This scheme was discussed in my presence by the King and Emir Lotfallah. I discouraged the scheme and pointed out that it could not pay, as the running expenses, especially repairs, would be very heavy, that they were competing against a subsidised mail line (the Khedivial) and the Italian line, and that they had the example of the Italian trawlers, which came here for coastal traffic, the owner of which is now said to be bankrupt, and which have ceased to run. The King, as I suspected, said he also wished them to prevent smuggling and to call at the smaller ports on the coast. I do not think that my advice will be taken, and I expect the scheme will go on. I pointed out that it would be better to spend the money on the development of the country and on providing better means of transit for the pilgrims, as everything possible should be done to encourage the pilgrimage, on which this country largely depended for its revenue.

Aeroplanes.

Two aeroplanes—one De Havilland and one Caudron—arrived from Taif on the 4th. Both were damaged. The former landed at the aerodrome, but the latter came down about 8 miles from Mecca and was brought in by camels. One broken Caudron has been left at Taif.

The Russian aviator, M. Naidenof, and the Russian mechanic, M. Maximof, were in the British machine, and the two Italian pilots in the Caudron.

It appears that the Russian aviator, M. Naidenof, was sent on two occasions to drop bombs on Taraba. On both occasions he was accompanied by an Arab officer, who acted as observer and who dropped the bombs. One of these was an aviator in the Turkish army and wears wings on his uniform, but M. Maximof informs me that he knows nothing of aeroplanes or of mechanics. M. Naidenof has refused to work any longer with the Arab Government on the grounds that his pay (25l. a month) is insufficient and that they have no right to use him for military work. He leaves for Egypt by the first boat.

I understand that the Italians, who are paid 40l. and 35l. per month respectively, have signed a new contract and are going to remain, and that the chief aviator is leaving shortly for Italy to get five more pilots, five or six mechanics, and some more aeroplanes, the latter suitable for bomb carrying. There is, I think, a good deal of intrigue going on to drive out the Russians, who alone understand the British machines, and to leave the Italians a clear field. Constantine, who is said to have been responsible for bringing the Italian planes here, is probably at the bottom of it. He is the quarantine secretary, and was responsible for sending the telegrams, supposed to be from Indian pilgrims, to the King during the quarantine trouble in May 1920. He is said to be trying to arrange a treaty between the Italian Government and the Hashimite Government, but I doubt the veracity of this. He talks to the Russians in a most lordly way of his power in regard to aviation in the Hedjaz, that the foreign representatives are powerless, and that the written contracts are of little value.

General.

Emir Ali has returned to Mecca from Taif. He brought with him all the troops who accompanied him from Medina. It was reported that he had brought away the whole of the Taif garrison, but this is not true, as I have recently interviewed a Turkish

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soldier who came direct from Taif, and he says that Sabri Pasha and the garrison are still there and that the outpost is still at Kleikh. Captain Ibrahim Depui, the French representative, is going to Mecca on the 11th for five days. He told me that he is going for a rest and change, but there is no doubt he is going to see Emir Ali, who has sent his car for him, and he is probably continuing the negotiations mentioned in Colonel Lawrence's telegram No. 23 of the 20th September last.

2. Ali Riza Pasha Rikabi, C.B.E., at one time Governor of Damascus, arrived on the 5th on a private visit to King Hussein. I called on him, as I knew him in Damascus, and he returned my visit shortly afterwards. He left for Mecca on the 6th.

3. Mohamed, son of the brother of Khodari and nephew of the late Emir Saud of Hail, has arrived here on his way to Mecca. He is a boy of 12, and fled to Medina from Hail some time ago.

Press ("Al Qibla").

Nos. 537 and 538 still deal exclusively with the biography of the Prophet.

No. 539 has a leading article on the communiqué in Reuter that Ibn Saud had conquered Ibn Rashid and might move towards Mecca. The editor, while sympathising with the deplorable state of things in the Arabian peninsula, quotes long passages of King Hussein's declarations, showing that his motives were for the peace and prosperity of all Arab countries, and says that His Majesty King Hussein had more than once declared his readiness to hand over the country to any prince who believes he could do better in his place. Reuter is asked to be content with such declarations and to entertain no more apprehensions on the subject.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

Shipping Intelligence to December 10, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 1st and 10th December, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
						Packages.
Mansourah	.. British	.. Port Soudan	.. Suez	.. Dec. 1..	Dec. 2..	3,628
Asmara	.. Italian	.. Massowa	.. Suez	.. " 3..	" 4..	1,884
Hedjaz	.. British	.. Bombay	.. Bombay	.. " 3..	" 8..	22,995
Dakahliah	.. British	.. Suez	.. Port Soudan	.. " 5..	" 5..	1,671

[E 14259/37/88]

No. 89.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Harvey.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, December 29, 1921.

IN my note of the 22nd December I explained the suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government to meet the American proposals, concerning the British mandates in Africa, contained in your Excellency's memorandum of the 24th August, 1921, and reserved for the subject of a later note a reply to the proposals in that memorandum relating to the territories under mandate in the Middle East, their position still being legally undefined.

2. The position with regard to these territories has not materially changed. A state of peace with Turkey does not yet exist, and the Council of the League has not yet formally approved the provisions of the draft mandates. The consequent delay and uncertainty causes His Majesty's Government considerable anxiety in Palestine. In these circumstances the peculiar religious and racial problems in that country and the particular conditions which attach to His Majesty's Government's acceptance of the mandate as set out in the draft provisions are daily rendering more onerous the task which His Majesty's Government have assumed. For these reasons His Majesty's Government intend to invite the Council of the League of Nations, at the forthcoming session on the 10th January, formally to express their approval of the terms of the

mandate for Palestine as drafted in spite of the dependence of the final legalisation of the status of the mandatory upon the entry into force of a treaty of peace with Turkey. It is with this object in view, and in the confident hope that your Government will find it possible forthwith to withdraw any objection that they may still entertain to the provisions of the mandate for Palestine, that I now have the honour to furnish you with the following observations upon paragraphs 4 and 5 of your note of the 24th August in so far as they concern those provisions:—

3.—Paragraph 4. His Majesty's Government have no desire to challenge the statement of the United States Government that the victory over Turkey was bound up with the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers over Germany to which the United States so generously contributed. In particular, His Majesty's Government emphatically disclaim any intention on their part to discriminate against United States nationals and companies or refuse them full equality of commercial opportunity. His Majesty's Government have already explained, in the case of the African mandates, why they find it difficult to provide in the articles of the mandates, which deal with these questions, for reference to any States, other than those of the League of Nations, whether by name or by collective definition, but they repeat the assurance given in my note of the 22nd December to embody an undertaking with regard to the equal treatment of United States citizens and companies in an exchange of notes between our two Governments.

Paragraph 5.—(a.) The difference in this respect between the mandate for Palestine on the one hand, and the mandate for Syria on the other, is due not to any difference of policy, but to the fact that whereas in Syria, which was taken over at the time of the armistice, the native administration was found to be exercising its functions, the complete collapse of the Turkish administration in Palestine had compelled His Majesty's Government to set up courts, which in themselves provided for the time being such safeguards as are referred to in article 9 of the Palestine mandate. No foreign tribunals exercise functions in Palestine at present, and there is therefore no question of their continuing to perform their duties. In that country adequate courts have already been established, and, under the constitutional proposals that are now under consideration for Palestine, His Majesty's Government have inserted a provision, in virtue of which foreign nationals, including of course citizens of the United States, shall have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases, where this provision would lead to administrative inconvenience. In these cases foreign nationals will have the special right to appeal to a court composed with a majority of British judges. For the rest, His Majesty's Government are prepared to recommend to the League of Nations the extension of the provisions of article 28 of the mandate for Palestine so as to ensure that, in the event of the termination of the mandatory régime, suitable arrangements are made to safeguard the rights secured by article 6 of the mandate.

(b.) I have already dealt above with the question of possible discrimination against United States nationals and the undertakings which His Majesty's Government are prepared to give. The wording of article 18 of the mandate for Palestine was very carefully considered, and I wish especially to point out that the explanation of the difference between the wording of the Syrian mandate and that of the Palestine mandate is to be found in the difference between French and British law; in the latter, the word "company" embraces all bodies which would properly be entitled to the protection of the article in question. His Majesty's Government feel sure that the United States Government, in the light of this explanation, will rest satisfied with the present wording of this article.

His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot see their way to adopt the suggested introduction into the Palestine mandate of the provision of article 7 of the "B" mandate for East Africa on the subject of concessions quoted in your memorandum of the 21st August. The suggestion appears to His Majesty's Government to overlook the peculiar conditions existing in Palestine, and especially the great difference in the natures of the tasks assumed in that country and undertaken by them in East Africa. So far as Palestine is concerned, article 2 of the mandate expressly provides that the Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency, mentioned in article 4, to develop any of the natural resources of the country in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. The reason for this is that, in order that the policy of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people should be successfully carried out, it is impracticable to guarantee that equal facilities for developing the natural resources of the country should be granted to persons or bodies who may

be actuated by other motives. The general spirit of the Palestine mandate, in the view of His Majesty's Government, seems to render unnecessary the insertion of an especial provision preventing the mandatory from developing the natural resources of the country for his own benefit.

(c.) His Majesty's Government are well aware of the great benefits which all the countries of the Near and Middle East have received from the unremitting and self-sacrificing efforts of American missionaries and educationalists. They have therefore carefully considered the proposal of the United States Government that safeguards for missionary enterprises in the Palestine mandate should be expanded to render them equivalent to those accorded by article 8 of the British "B" mandate for German East Africa. His Majesty's Government would, however, point out that the intention of article 9 of the Franco-British convention of the 23rd December, 1920, was, so far as His Majesty's Government was concerned, in no way to restrict the extension of missionary enterprise in Palestine. The particular article in question was designed by the French Government to satisfy religious opinion in France regarding the future of the large French ecclesiastical and educational interests already established in Palestine and Mesopotamia.

For the rest, His Majesty's Government feel convinced that the religious and educational activities of the nationals of the United States are adequately safeguarded by the provisions of article 16 of the mandate for Palestine. This article is, in fact, identical in substance with article 8 of the British mandate for German East Africa. Should, however, the United States Government still desire some further guarantee, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to make a declaration in suitable terms regarding the rights of United States missionaries, as suggested in paragraph 2 of my note of the 22nd December regarding the African mandates.

(d.) I have already dealt in paragraph 4 of my note of the 22nd December with the suggestion of your Government that the consent of the United States Government should be obtained as to any modification of a mandate once agreed upon, and I can only repeat in this note the same offer with regard to the modification of the "A" mandates.

4. I reserve to myself a still further memorandum to your Excellency regarding the mandate for Mesopotamia. The position of His Majesty's Government in that country is peculiar. The course of events since the grant of the mandate, and in particular the coronation of King Feisal and the appointment of the Arab Cabinet for that country, makes it necessary for His Majesty's Government carefully to consider the manner in which they can best fulfil the obligations undertaken by them in the draft mandate. They are therefore forced to examine very carefully what, if any, modification of, or addition to, those obligations they are in a position to assume. I hope, however, to be in a position at an early date to give you the fullest assurance on this matter.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 14259/37/88]

No. 90.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 3435.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 29, 1921.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 3530 of the 19th December, enclosing a copy of a note from the French Foreign Office regarding the answer to be returned to the United States Government on the subject of the "B" mandates, I transmit to your Excellency the accompanying copy of a further reply which His Majesty's Government have now addressed to the United States Ambassador here in answer to those portions of the note of the 24th August last from the United States Government which concerned the draft mandate for Palestine.*

2. In communicating a copy of this note to the French Government, I shall be glad if you will express to them the sincere regret of His Majesty's Government that they found themselves unable for the following reasons to consult the French Government in advance regarding the terms of this reply.

3. The delay and uncertainty with regard to the issue of the mandate for Palestine have been causing His Majesty's Government for some time considerable

* See No. 89.

anxiety in that country. This delay has been enhanced by the peculiar religious and racial problems in Palestine and the particular conditions which attach to His Majesty's Government's acceptance of the mandate as set out in the draft provisions. These developments have forced His Majesty's Government to take stock of the position, and, in the hope that their action may have a stabilising effect on the population of Palestine, His Majesty's Government have now decided to invite the Council of the League of Nations at their forthcoming session formally to express their approval of the terms of the mandate for Palestine as drafted, in spite of the dependence of the final legalisation of the status of the mandatory upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. In order that this invitation may be successful, it was essential to endeavour in the first instance to secure the withdrawal of the United States objections to the Palestine mandate.

4. The necessity for immediate representations to the United States Government, once the decision of His Majesty's Government on this point had been reached, made it in practice impossible for me to consult M. Briand before despatching my note to Mr. Harvey. At the same time His Majesty's Government are confident that their action will not be misunderstood by the French Government. In particular, that Government will readily appreciate that the case of the Palestine mandate is peculiar and raises no such controversial issues as between the mandatory and the United States Government as, for instance, the mandate for Iraq, where larger questions of economic interest affecting American nationals may arise. His Majesty's Government have, however, every intention of consulting the French Government with regard to the terms of their reply to the United States Government's note of the 24th August so far as the Iraq mandate is concerned, that mandate raising, as it does, somewhat similar problems to those with which the French Government will be treating in their reply to the similar American representations regarding the Syrian mandate.

5. In these circumstances, you should express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the French Government will see their way to instruct their representative on the Council of the League of Nations to support the proposal of the British representative, thus furthering the solution of the problem, which is essentially international in all its aspects, and lightening the task of His Majesty's Government pending the final entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

6. You should add that I have addressed similar representations to the Japanese and Italian Governments.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 14259/37/88]

No. 91.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Taliani.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 29, 1921.

WITH reference to my note of the 19th December, I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying copy of the further reply which His Majesty's Government have addressed to the United States Ambassador here in answer to those portions of the note of the 24th August last from the United States Government which concern the draft mandate for Palestine.*

2. The delay and uncertainty with regard to the mandate for Palestine have been causing His Majesty's Government considerable anxiety in that country. In the face of this situation the peculiar religious and racial problems in Palestine and the particular conditions which attach to His Majesty's Government's acceptance of the mandate, as set out in the draft provisions, are daily rendering more onerous the task which His Majesty's Government have assumed. It is for these reasons and in the hope that their action may have a stabilising effect on the population of Palestine that His Majesty's Government have decided to invite the Council of the League of Nations at their forthcoming session formally to express their approval of the terms of the mandate for Palestine as drafted, in spite of the dependence of the final legalisation of the status of the mandatory upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. In order that this invitation may be successful, it was essential to endeavour in the first instance to secure the withdrawal of the United States objection to the Palestine mandate.

* See No. 89.

3. His Majesty's Government, while regretting that circumstances have thus made it impossible to give your Government a longer warning of their intentions, confidently expect that the Italian Government will see their way to instruct their representative on the Council of the League of Nations to support the proposal of the British representative, thus furthering the solution of a problem which is essentially international in all its aspects and lightening the task of His Majesty's Government, pending the final entry into force of a Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

4. I am addressing similar representations to the French and Japanese Governments.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 14322/800/44]

No. 92.

Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 180. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 17, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 39 of the 13th December, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum by Mr. Acting Vice-Consul Mackereth describing the steps taken by him to assist British subjects in Cilicia and giving an account of the general situation as he found it.

I venture to call the attention of your Lordship to the able manner in which Mr. Mackereth carried out what was in the circumstances a somewhat difficult and delicate task. The dissatisfaction of His Majesty's Government with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement is fully realised locally, and the French authorities were clearly not altogether pleased at their decision to send British warships to Mersina. In these conditions some occasional unpleasantness might have been expected, but Mr. Mackereth, by his tact and good sense, seems to have been able to win the confidence and enlist the help of the French authorities with whom he came in contact.

As soon as possible after his return I went with him to call on the Acting French High Commissioner, and thanked the latter for the help which had been rendered. I wished to give him the opportunity of learning what Mr. Mackereth had done and, if he wished, of asking questions. M. de Caix was clearly glad to learn the impressions of an outsider, and he made special enquiries as to the condition of the Armenian refugees now collected at Mersina. I incline to the belief that endeavours are being made to devise some means of removing these people, and in this connection it is interesting to read in to-day's local paper a paragraph to the effect that the Maronite Patriarch is prepared to place several villages at the disposal of the refugees who will be admitted to the Lebanon and to assist in every way their settlement.

(Copy to Constantinople.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Report by Acting Vice-Consul Mackereth on the Situation in Mersina and Adana consequent upon the impending French Evacuation of Cilicia.

(Confidential.)

I ARRIVED at Mersina by H.M.S. "Sikh" on the 30th November and I left by the same vessel on the 12th December. For the sake of convenience I have thought best to divide my report under the various headings as follows:—

1. British Subjects.

I conveyed to all traceable British subjects the intimation of His Majesty's Government that, as the French Government was unable to guarantee the safety of British subjects after the 4th January, 1922, those subjects remaining after this date would do so at their own risk. I pointed out that this implied no advice either to go or to remain, and that each person must decide for himself. I found that the older British residents had received from M. Franklin-Bouillon, either directly or indirectly, a request to remain; the chief reason for this request was that by remaining they would help to reassure the Christians, who were fleeing in large numbers. Great efforts

were being made to induce them to return to their homes. M. Bouillon made a personal appeal in this sense to the Rev. Dr. Nesbitt Chambers, a Canadian, who is head of the American Mission in Cilicia. He is a man with a very intimate knowledge of the country, well known and respected, so that practically the whole of the Christian population of Adana turned to him for guidance.

Of the British-born members of the British colony, the following had, up to the date of my departure from Mersina, intimated their intention of remaining: Mr. Henry Rickards, his wife, son and daughter; Mr. John Thirsk, Miss Hotson, a Canadian nurse in the American hospital in Mersina, and Miss Ash, a helper in the Near East relief at Adana. Mr. Rickards is anxious to leave, but is in an unfortunate position, as all his means of livelihood are derived from real estate, which he cannot possibly sell, and on which he cannot at present even collect his rents. Mr. Thirsk, formerly manager of a Greek-owned cotton-seed oil factory at Mersina, has recently acquired considerable proprietary rights in the factory, which cannot be liquidated. He is, however, sending his wife and three daughters away. The Misses Hotson and Ash, working in American institutions, are influenced by the advice to remain given by the American High Commissioner in Constantinople.

There are no other British subjects remaining in Mersina. In Adana I found nine families of Indians, of long settlement in this district, who declared themselves anxious to leave, as those Indians possessing means had already left, and I therefore made the necessary arrangements for them to be conveyed to Mersina on the 9th December, where they could be placed on board the destroyer "Sikh" and taken to Cyprus. However, on the 9th December I was informed that local Moslems had persuaded seven of these families to remain, and I did not consider it to be in the public interest that a warship should be employed for the conveyance of the remainder (two families). I therefore arranged that the ten persons comprising them and the Mersina consular cavas Bedr, and his family, should be given passages to Cyprus in an Italian-Lloyd steamer sailing on or about the 16th December for Larnaca, at an approximate cost of 11. 2s. each.

I received a request from Mr. Rickards that His Majesty's Government would allow a vessel to call at Mersina from time to time, his idea being that the presence of a warship would exercise a restraining influence on the Turkish Administration.

2. British Goods.

As there appeared to be no merchants in Mersina having knowledge of any British goods I experienced considerable difficulty in discovering if any such goods existed. In the meantime I learned upon very good authority that the Kemalists were contemplating the requisition of commodities of military value, and would base their requisition upon the state of war between Angora and Greece. This possibility made it imperative that as far as could be arranged no unpaid-for British goods should remain in the customs. After a lengthy search through the customs-house, which were in a hopeless state of chaos, three lots of British goods belonging to British firms were found, and as there were no representatives available I made the following arrangements for their disposal:—

- (1.) Thirty cases of tinned jam and preserved meat from the Imperial Tinned Goods Company of Australia were to be handed over to the Banque française de Syrie, but before this was done the client, Mohamed Hilmi, who had hitherto refused to take delivery, intervened and took up the documents from the bank and obtained possession.
- (2.) Four cases of goods had been sent by a Mr. Walter W. Davies, of Birmingham, to his agent, who was either leaving or had already left. The documents for them were in the hands of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, who agreed to transfer the goods from the customs to their own warehouse, where they would be secure against requisition for six months at least. They have also notified Mr. Davies, and requested his instructions.
- (3.) The third case was that of goods belonging to a Cyprus firm, George Argyros and Co. The head of this firm was anxious to leave, and wished to take his goods with him. The customs authorities were very obstinate, but finally, after intervention of the late French Governor, permission was granted for the goods to be withdrawn without payment. These, to the best of my knowledge, were the only cases of British goods not already paid for, or of goods belonging to British subjects in the customs-house.

3. Postal Service.

On the 1st December the new civil administration stopped the distribution of all European and American mail, presumably upon the grounds that no reciprocal postal arrangements had been made. This action naturally caused much consternation. On behalf of the British subjects I made representations to General Bordeaux, commanding French troops in Cilicia, that pressure might be brought to bear to ensure the delivery of the mail thus held up, and further requested that British mail be received by the French military post. This procedure did not appear practicable to the general, but he promised to ensure the clearing of the mail then in the post office. The captain of the United States destroyer approached the new Mutessarif in the same sense, and after two days' delay the delivery was effected. In the meantime, as a temporary measure, I made arrangements whereby British subjects might leave letters at the Spanish consulates in Adana and Mersina, paying the postage as from Beirut, and the letters so accepted should be handed to an English master of any British vessel proceeding to Beirut to be delivered at the consulate-general and from there be posted in the usual course. I made it clear that letters would be handled at the senders' entire risk. So far this rough arrangement has sufficed.

On the 7th December the Turkish Administration let it be known that letters would be accepted for abroad—but a strict censorship has been imposed on both letters and telegrams. Parcels are not accepted.

4. Visas to British Territory.

The Spanish consul had issued 2,714 visas to passports for British territory. This roughly represents 10,000 persons (each passport being for one family). I requested him not to grant visas to British territory or to countries under the British mandate except to proven British subjects—I indicated to him the definition of a British subject. All genuine travellers would require to pass through either Constantinople or Beirut, at which places they could obtain the visa from a British passport control officer. Consequent upon a telegram received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, I informed M. Mavromati, the Spanish consul, that the Allied High Commissioners had decided not to accept Armenians in Turkish territory in Allied occupation.

5. Incoming Turkish Administration.

The representatives of the Nationalist Assembly of Angora took over the civil control in Cilicia on the 1st December. A certain Hilmi Bey had been appointed Vali at Adana and Fakhreddin Bey Mutessarif at Mersina. I was present at the installation of the latter. There was considerable excitement and display of Turkish flags in the town, but there was no disorder. A Moslem religious ceremony followed the formal transfer of office. The Turkish gendarmerie took over the policing. I was told by General Bordeaux that he was much displeased by the display of Turkish flags, as it had been agreed upon that no such flags should be flown before the 5th January. All flags were removed the next day with the exception of one flying over the Mutessarif's headquarters. Hilmi Bey, at Adana, took over his duties with no appearance of ceremony. He has, so I was told by a prominent French official, already taken too much upon himself, and protests have been made to Angora with requests for his removal. I have not been able to learn the result of these requests.

On the 1st December an Adana newspaper published a proclamation signed by the Turkish members of the Franco-Turkish Commission, Muhieddin Pasha and Hamid Bey, and also by M. Bouillon. The latter told me that he placed his name to this proclamation with the object of clearly showing that the French Government would insist upon its complete fulfilment. In passing, I might mention, in regard to the property abandoned by the owners, that pillaging had already been rife and that anything of value taken away by the inhabitants remaining.

6. Gendarmerie.

This is to consist of 50,000 men all armed with rifles and to be organised by a French officer—Colonel Sarrout. The gendarmes who relieved the French-raised force were well equipped and bristled with arms and cartridges. They are supplied with many different kinds of rifle, but Turkish and German Mausers predominate. They appear to be well disciplined.

7. French Representatives.

To co-operate with and as far as possible control the new Administration, a French consul-general, M. Osmin Laporte, recently French consul-general at Smyrna, has been appointed. He will reside in Adana and will remain from three to six months, and will then be replaced by a consul, who will, according to present intentions, remain permanently.

8. Military.

The military occupation by the Nationalists is scheduled to follow immediately on the French evacuation, which is timed as follows: Adana, 20th December; Tarsus, 28th December; Mersina, 4th January.

It is the Kemalist intention to garrison the Adana vilayet with 2,000 men, but I consider it to be doubtful that so many men can be maintained in this area in addition to the gendarmerie, as I have learned from a very reliable source that the Nationalists have practically no money whatever. It is quite out of the question for them to reopen hostilities against the Greeks. The possibility of an attack upon Mesopotamia on any scale seems to be very remote, as it will be many years before the projected railway in Turkish territory can be constructed between Islahie and Jerablus, while the present levies are feeling very discontented. I would like here to record a version of the main source of Kemalist funds, which I have put together from what I consider to be reliable information. The Nationalists oblige all farmers to hand over to the Government 40 per cent. of the whole of their produce. This is collected and sent in bulk to the Bolsheviks, who pay for what they receive in gold. I learn also that no Bolshevik is allowed to enter the Nationalist zone, and that all transactions are arranged by a Turco-Russian commission. The reason for the present financial crisis in Angora is said to be due to the fact that Mustapha Kemal had been obliged to mortgage his this year's crop in order to be able to carry on his operations against the Greeks, so that now he finds himself without funds or commodities to sell. It is believed by my informant that the Nationalists will be obliged to make a levy on all property wherewith to obtain the money to carry on their Government. A prominent member of the French commission told me that had the French Government known that the Kemalists were so near to financial collapse the present *accord* would never have been made, or at least the French terms would have been very much more severe.

After enquiring from various people who have travelled over the area to be evacuated by the French—my informants have been either British or American and French—I feel convinced that there is no truth in the rumour that the French will hand over war material to the Kemalists. Every scrap of French material is being shipped from Mersina, burned, or otherwise destroyed, and even telephone wires (many originally laid by the British forces) and entanglements are being removed. There were no dumps of servicable material, captured by the British army in 1918, remaining in the districts of Adana, Tarsus or Mersina.

9. Railways.

The railway between Yenidjie and Bozanti is now partially working. There is direct communication along the coast from Adana to Alexandretta, but the line between Adana and Aleppo is very badly destroyed, and will require a great deal of repair to put it again in working order. I am told that there is considerable difficulty in finding the necessary financial backing in France for the carrying out of the railway concessions, as the country is very mountainous and the cost of construction so high that the exploitation is scarcely likely to prove very profitable.

10. Exodus.

The Christian population of Cilicia after the war numbered, it is estimated, some 100,000 souls, the whole of whom, with the exception of old men and women and children, have fled the country. The majority have migrated south into Syria, but some 40,000 left by steamships and sailing vessels from Mersina. In Adana there are not more than 200 Christians of the country left in the town. In Tarsus less than 30. Mersina is flooded by thousands of refugees who have been held up by refusals to issue visas to any other country and also absolute destitution. The Greeks have, however, all been able to leave, so that those who remain consist of Armenians and Syrians. Arrangements have been completed by the French to repatriate the latter. This will make it that only Armenians remain. Of these there are probably between 10,000 and 15,000, but some estimates put the number as high as 25,000. The condition of these unfortunate people is pitiable, and it may be of interest to enquire into the reasons

which have prompted this tremendous flight of Armenians and other Christians. The most important cause is undoubtedly the very real fear, notwithstanding written promises of leading Kemalists, of immediate and bloody reprisals. In this connection it must be recalled that the French armed a considerable number of Armenians and employed others in labour corps during their operations against the Turks. The Armenians, thus placed in a position to tyrannise over the Turk, did not fail to take advantage of the opportunity to wipe out old scores, and many are the stories current of their cruelty towards the Turks. Much encouragement was, I fear, given by subordinate French officers. Again, merchants (many of them Turks) possessing capital feared its confiscation and had no faith in the incoming Government. The threat of immediate conscription has been another cause. Not that the Angora Government require more soldiers (they can scarcely feed their present army), but the threat of military service has always been a convenient way of getting money from those who wish to avoid this service. The Nationalists, foreseeing in the removal of all the leading merchants the inevitable commercial ruin of the rich Cilician plain, have been endeavouring to persuade the merchants to return, but no success has so far been recorded.

The condition of the refugees in Mersina is very bad; they are penniless, and are only being kept from death by starvation by the efforts of the Near East Relief. Small-pox is rife, and various members of the American hospital and Near East Relief sent me an urgent request, as I was leaving, to obtain vaccine from Beirut, but, so far, I have only been able to procure sufficient for about 1,000 persons. M. de Caix, whom I approached on behalf of the doctors in Mersina, promised to secure and despatch an adequate quantity.

The problem of dealing with so large a number of destitute people is a difficult one. Unfortunately those in authority at Adana seem to favour withholding food from the starving beings in Mersina, with the idea of obliging them to return to their homes inland. This is sheer cruelty, for not only have most of them already sold all their miserable possessions, but their houses have been thoroughly pillaged. The chance of them obtaining employment, otherwise than in the Nationalist army as labour corps, is slight. The majority had been employed by the more wealthy Christians who owned factories, flour-mills, orchards and farms; now the employers have already left and there is no one to replace them to provide work. In the meantime winter is here, and the stocks of food, &c., saved during the working months have disappeared in the panic of the flight. To oblige these unhappy people to leave the safety of numbers and again scatter themselves over the country in small colonies, where they would not be in a position to defend themselves, is no solution, but rather an aggravation. There is one possible course, that of forming a colony or colonies of workers to reclaim the Lebanon. There are very many villages completely deserted through emigration which could provide shelter at least, and the result of their labour would bring prosperity not only to themselves, but also to the new Lebanon State. There being a majority of Christians and the additional protection of a Christian Power, the personal safety thus ensured one could hope in this to find the beginning of the solution of the Armenian question. Perhaps naturally the Angora Turks and those Frenchmen concerned in the establishment of the new régime, seeing the loss of Armenian industry, will endeavour to force the return of all Armenians now in Mersina and be strongly against any measures for their wholesale evacuation.

11. *Kemalist Attitude.*

There was considerable disappointment in French official circles over the attitude adopted by the new Vali and Mutessarif at Adana and Mersina respectively. The entry of the latter into Mersina with encouraged demonstration and the arrival in Adana of the first train from Konia, decorated with Turkish flags was all contrary to the very definite understanding that there should be no display. Later, Hilmi Bey rather foolishly issued orders to the gendarmerie concerning public security, completely ignoring M. Laporte, and upon his own initiative discharged all the civil employees engaged by the French and replaced them by Turks from Angora or local gentlemen with well-known Nationalist leanings. The French, considering this action at least premature, requested Hilmi Bey's removal. In a hundred little ways the Turks are showing themselves to be very arrogant. Many French officers feel very bitterly about it as they and their men suffer daily from veiled jeers of the New Turk. French soldiers are confined to barracks, and it will only be strict discipline that can prevent an open breach between the outgoing troops and the Turkish. On my way back from Adana I travelled from Yenidjie to Tarsus with a Kemalist officer. He spoke a certain amount

of French, and taking me for a Frenchman gloated over the success of Kemalist arms. He attempted, however, to sweeten the gall by describing with much enthusiasm their next victory, over the British in Mesopotamia. He said Djemal Pasha was raising an army in the north of Mesopotamia. He was very bitter against us and his reasons were the slaughter of Turks during the war and the treatment of Turkish prisoners by British and Indians. I gathered that the discipline of the new levies left much to be desired. I quote this not as information but rather to confirm the statements of an American who had recently returned from Sivas and an American lady who had been in Angora, both of whom told me that there was bitterness against all foreigners, but the feeling was much more pronounced against England. They expressed great contempt for the new Turkish methods, and, far from agreeing with M. Bouillon that a better Turkey had risen from the ashes of the war, expressed the opinion that Kemalist administration was even worse and more corrupt and cruel than the administration in the days before the war. Bearing this in mind, I venture strongly to deprecate the action of M. Bouillon in urging British subjects to remain in view of the fact that the French Government had declared itself unable to guarantee the safety of such persons. He twice called upon Dr. Chambers at Adana, and saw Mr. Rickards in Mersina and almost begged them to stay in order to encourage the Christians to return. M. Bouillon's action is possibly explained by his anxiety to see his scheme carried through. Moreover, I gathered that the French Government is seriously perturbed by the flight of the Christians which has apparently come as a surprise to them. Whilst there is no immediate danger to British subjects their position when the French have left seems likely to be an unpleasant one, especially if any friction arises between His Majesty's Government and Angora. At present both the Turkish members of the Commission of Evacuation and the Vali have made all manner of promises as to the safety of everyone and as to the régime of justice which will prevail. No published statement has been made concerning the Capitulations. M. Bouillon was very guarded and merely said that the question of Capitulations had not arisen and could not arise, as it was one to be decided by all the Powers concerned. He said that "the new Government would naturally respect them as they were on their trial before the world."

I learn, however, on very good authority that the customs duty will be raised to 20 per cent. *ad valorem* on imports from the 1st January, 1922. M. Bouillon, talking to a representative of the Standard Oil Company, said that as the Turks were at war they would certainly requisition stocks of petrol. The Standard Oil agent obtained, however, a personal assurance from Muhieddin Pasha that no such requisition would be made.

I have referred to Mr. Rickard's request that a British warship be either maintained at Mersina or call there at intervals as a warning to the Turks to behave. I do not consider that any useful purpose could thus be served. It seems to me that the presence of a destroyer, probably the only type of vessel that could be spared, would, in the present spirit of the Turks, be more likely to irritate than to keep them in awe.

12. *Spanish Consul in Charge of British Interests.*

The Spanish consul charged with the protection of British interests is a Greek named André Mavrommati. He at present represents all the European Powers and America. His behaviour during the present crisis has been a matter of complaint to me by British subjects. The Greek Government has, I understand, instructed him to discontinue his protection of Greek interests, and the captain of the American destroyer has complained of his methods. There is no other person who is in relation with the Turks, and if he leaves, as is very probable, being a Greek, the function of helping British subjects during the difficult times ahead will devolve upon his chief clerk, an Italian. I venture to suggest that it might be best if the French Government could be requested to instruct their consul in Adana to take charge of British interests. M. Laporte, quite unofficially and personally to me, has promised to do all he can, but of course unofficially. If the French Government consents to this it would be a great relief to those who are obliged by necessity to remain, and this request could quite reasonably be made in view of M. Bouillon's personal urgings to British subjects to remain.

I should like, in conclusion, to express my thanks for the facilities granted to me by the French authorities in Cilicia. Everywhere I was most cordially received and every possible assistance was given to me.

G. MACKERETH, *Acting Vice-Consul.*

Beirut, December 16, 1921.

CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[C 19310/477/3]

No. 93.

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 838.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 6, 1921.

THE Italian Ambassador, who had asked to see me this afternoon, commenced his conversation by a long exposition of the attitude of his Government with regard to the dispute between Hungary and Austria, arising in the main out of the occupation of the Burgenland. He assured me of the absolute disinterestedness of the Italian Government in offering mediation, and said that the Marquis della Torretta was in a position to do so with greater advantage than anyone else, because of his recent experience as Minister at Vienna and the influence that he had been able to acquire over the Austrian Government. He earnestly pleaded for British support in this connection.

I told him that our one desire was to get the matter closed by whatever methods seemed most likely to secure that result. With this end in view we should have been quite willing, as at one stage seemed probable, for the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to settle it themselves. When that chance disappeared, we had been quite willing to accept the intervention of Dr. Benes; but, now that we understood that Dr. Benes had withdrawn from the stage, I was only too glad to support the mediation of Italy. All that I would urge would be that it should take place without delay, and that no decision of any kind affecting the frontier should be taken without reference to the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris.

This assurance the Ambassador was quite willing to give, and he left expressing his complete satisfaction on this account.

He then asked me for my views on the Græco-Turkish question, and said that his own information led him to think that the moment for successful intervention had not yet arrived. His chief in Italy was, however, most anxious to act in accord with us, and would be very glad of any indication of our opinion.

I reminded him that we had agreed earlier in the summer, with the knowledge of our Allies, to a visit from M. Gounaris to this country in the course of the present month. Whether M. Gounaris himself would come it was as yet too early to say, because our information was to the effect that there was a political crisis in Greece which might result in the fall of the present Ministry. In these circumstances, some other spokesman of Greece might appear upon the scene. There was some reason to think, whoever it might be, that his visit would not be confined to Great Britain, but that he would also wish to visit Paris and Rome. If that were so we should all be able to ascertain in a few weeks' time what was the attitude of the Greek Government, and the degree of pressure which it would be possible to exercise upon them. Simultaneous or subsequent attempts might be made to explore the position of Constantinople and Angora. At the latter place there appeared to be two parties: an extreme Nationalist Party, who were in favour of invoking Bolshevik assistance and throwing themselves into the arms of Russia; and a more moderate party, said to be led by Mustapha Kemal, who were in favour—although no doubt on their own terms—of coming to an arrangement with the Allies. When we had ascertained the attitude of both the Greeks and the Turks it would then be for the Allies to agree to a policy amongst themselves, which should be dictated at a conference to the two combatants. Such was the line of action which seemed to me to be pointed out by the necessities of the case. But it demanded for its success the closest communication and co-operation between the Allies, since it would be useless and humiliating to have a conference at which we disagreed, or to offer terms, either to the Greeks or to the Turks, upon which we were not united. I thought myself that the greatest argument on both sides in favour of a settlement was the approach of winter. The highlands of Angora would not be particularly agreeable either for Greeks or Turks in the months of December and January, and we might find both in a more reasonable frame of mind in a few weeks' time.

The Ambassador thought that my anticipations corresponded correctly with the needs of the situation, and felt sure of the hearty concurrence of his own Government.

I asked him the whereabouts and intentions of Signor Tuozi, the Italian representative, who was alleged to be on his way to Angora.

He replied that this gentleman had not got further than Constantinople, and that his visit was still uncertain. If, however, he went to Angora, he would do nothing and arrange nothing without communication to the Allies, for the Ambassador concurred with me in the view that our own disunion was at any rate a partial cause of our failure up to date, and that only by a different policy could we hope to be more successful in the future.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.